Survival of the fittest? - The military and political career of Duncan (IV) earl of Fife, 1289/90 – 1353 This paper is part of a wider analysis I am currently putting together on the lethality of combat in Anglo-Scottish warfare, from the perspective of the Scottish nobility. Contrary to a recent paper by Andy King which discussed the relative safety enjoyed by members of the Northumbrian nobility during the Anglo-Scottish conflict, the nobility of Scotland appear to have faired particularly badly in battlefield situations. The roll-call of Scottish noble dead at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Neville’s Cross, and much later at Flodden, suggests that the field of battle was not the safest environment for Scotland’s elite. It is my intention to try and address why this should be the case, in a period when, it has been suggested elsewhere, the elites should have been afforded protection under the law of arms, and have received good treatment under the system of ransom and through the belief in chivalry. The case I am putting to you today, of the earl of Fife, is interesting because he is one of the few Scottish nobles who actually managed to survive his experiences of combat. It is primarily a survey of his career during the second phase of Anglo-Scottish conflict, from 1332-1357, and will no doubt benefit from a more detailed search of the surviving source material. In 1350, Duncan, earl of Fife, returned to Scotland after almost four years in English captivity, following his capture in the Scottish military defeat at Neville’s Cross. In the aftermath of his return, the earl granted the parish church of Auchtermuchty to the monks of Lindores Abbey.1 The charter confirming this grant listed the earl’s reasons for his display of piety. In part it was a response to his survival at Neville’s Cross, ‘where cruel death, with its keen edge having sway, carried many of the combatants from this life.’ In his own survival on the battlefield the earl apparently perceived the hand of God protecting him. He also believed that God and the saints had interceded on his behalf when in captivity, where ‘we continually felt that the souls of our enemies were softened by mildness of clemency so much 1 The Chartularies of Balmerino and Lindores (Abbotsford Club, 1841), 43-5. 1 that now we enjoy the patronage of the said Saints with the desired freedom.’ This latter comment refers to his treatment during captivity, from which he was finally able to secure release in exchange for a ransom of 1000 marks, but more specifically to his survival in spite of having been sentenced to death by Edward III for treason.2 Fife possessed, perhaps, more reasons than most to believe that he had been particularly blessed by divine intervention. He had fought on the defeated side at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross, and actively participated in the renewed state of conflict in Scotland in the 1330s, through all of which he survived. His last minute escape from execution because of a familial relationship to Edward III through his English wife (who was a grand-daughter of the English king), was brought further into focus by the execution of his fellow prisoner, John Graham, earl of Menteith, who suffered the full extent of a traitor’s execution. This may well have encouraged Fife to give thanks for his deliverance. Earl Duncan’s survival through this period of conflict is particularly interesting considering his vacillating loyalty to both sides in the Bruce versus Balliol/English conflict. Especially in the early years of the war, Earl Duncan played the part both of Bruce partisan and Balliol supporter, altering his allegiance to suit the prevailing political situation. In a period when many of his contemporaries fell in battle or suffered loss of lands as a result of their political affiliation, the earl’s survival, both physically and with regards to his status, appears quite remarkable. Did, however, his survival have anything to do with astute manoeuvring and successful military ability? Or was it the turn of fate or, indeed, blind luck that ensured his survival and allowed him to die peacefully in his sixties? Duncan of Fife was born around 1289/90, and was raised at the court of Edward I. During his time in England he was married to Marie de Mothermer, daughter of the earl of Gloucester, a match that Edward II facilitated by seeking papal dispensation for the union.3 Duncan received safe conducts for himself and his retinue in December 1314, in order to For Fife being sentenced to death and then reprieved, see Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 68. For the earl’s ransom release, see TNA, E39/14/18. 3 CDS, iii, no. 8. 2 2 make pilgrimages in France.4 And he returned to Scotland around 1315, following the statutes of Cambuskenneth, which reordered Scottish landed society based on loyalty to the increasingly successful Bruce regime and removed the possibility of men retaining territorial interests in both Scotland and England.5 Duncan entered the Bruce peace in 1315 and in return received royal confirmation of his lands and title, with the condition that allowed for the reversion of the earldom to the crown if the earl died without legitimate heirs.6 Michael Penman suggests that Fife, along with the earls of Strathearn and March, were at the head of a group of nobles and families, ‘who…entered Bruce’s peace after Bannockburn but (later) found themselves excluded from royal favour, government office and regional influence.’7 It was to men such as these, Penman argues, that Edward III and Edward Balliol would in the future turn to, to support the arrival of an alternative regime that would reward individuals’ change in allegiance.8 Fife’s lack of support for the Bruce dynasty is perhaps best indicated by his absence, along with that of Earl Malise of Strathearn, from the coronation of David II in 1331. Both magnates were expected to perform traditional duties at the ceremony, and their absence is all the more damning considering their attendance at Edward Balliol’s coronation less than a year later following his invasion of Scotland.9 The earl of Fife’s early career does not appear to have involved participation in the military activities of Robert I and his commanders, in Scotland, Ireland or northern England. He is mentioned only once in John Barbour’s romantic chronicle of the First War of Independence, The Bruce, and not in a particularly positive light. An English expeditionary force sailed from Northumberland to raid Scotland, and landed in Fife. Having raised the 4 CDS, iii, nos. 408, 409. See Duncan, RRS, v, for complex discussion of the dates of his return. Earl Duncan was definitely back in Scotland and in the Scottish allegiance by August 1317, when the manor of Glapthorn (Northampton), was forfeited by his mother due to the return of her and her son to Scotland (CDS, iii, no. 566). 6 RRS, v, 354-60; G.W.S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1988), 278; A. McDonald, ‘Macduff family, earls of Fife (per. c.1095–1371)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/50328, accessed 28 June 2007] 7 M. Penman, David II (East Linton, 2004), 32. 8 Penman, David II, 43. Edward III’s letters of 1332 demanding the restitution of Henry Beaumont and David de Strathbogie to their lands were sent not only to the king and the guardian, but also to Donald of Mar, and the earls of Fife, Strathearn and March. 9 Penman, David II, 45, 49. 5 3 local levies, both Earl Duncan and the sheriff of Fife shamefully turned tail and fled at the site of the English force. During their retreat, they were met, however, by the bishop of Dunkeld, resplendent on a large horse and in full armour. He rebuked the two Fife leaders for their cowardice, and convinced the local levies to turn around and attack the English. It is the bishop of Dunkeld who is rather obviously the hero in this episode, rather than the less than militarily impressive Earl Duncan. As the discussion of his early political life already presented suggests, his potentially pro-Balliol sympathies may have led to a general avoidance of military action under Robert I. When the war began again in 1332, the earl of Fife was, however, thrown into the forefront of the conflict. The Disinherited landing at Kinghorn in Fife, likely forced the earl to make a decision on his political allegiance. Balliol and his supporters may have been counting on support or at least disinterest, on the part of men like Fife. Initial support for Balliol and his small invasion force appears, however, to have been minimal, and Duncan of Fife, on this occasion, led his local levies to oppose the Disinherited landing.10 The Scots were, however, defeated and chased from the field.11 The English Brut chronicle, which described Fife as ‘a fierce man and stern’, made a point of highlighting the earl’s defeat, commenting that he ‘was so wonder sorry, and full evil shamed that so little company had him discomfited, and shamefully put him and all his company that was alive for to flee.’12 Fife’s flight appears to have taken him north, where he joined up with the forces of the earl of Mar outside Perth, and he is recorded amongst the Bruce notables Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 269, which numbers Fife’s force at 4000; Scalacronica (King), 109; Chron. Le Baker, 49, who also included Robert Bruce, illegitimate son of Robert I, as a principal leader of the Scottish forces, along with Fife and Alexander Seton; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304, which also lists Bruce, described as earl of Carrick, among the leaders; Chron. Melsa, ii, 362-3; Brut, 275-6; Chron. Knighton, i, 462; Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, 193; Chron. Bridlington, 104; Capgrave, Liber Illustribus Henricis, 168; BL Cotton Caligula A XIII, f. 13; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 346; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Chron. Bower, vii, 73-5 (all three Scottish chronicles omit Fife from the action altogether, instead placing Seton in command of the Bruce forces); R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots (Oxford, 1965), 83; C. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Woodbridge, 2000), 36-7; Penman, David II, 47. 11 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 269; Scalacronica (King), 109; Chron. Murimuth, 66; Ann. Paulini, 357; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307-1334, 149; Chron. Le Baker, 49; Brut, 275-6; Chron. Melsa, ii, 362-3; Chron. Knighton, i, 462; Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, 193; Chron. Bridlington, 104; Capgrave, Liber Illustribus Henricis, 168; BL Cotton Faustina B V, f. 62; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 346; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Chron. Bower, vii, 73-5; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 83; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 36-7. 12 Brut, 275-6. 10 4 who fought at Dupplin Moor, five days after the defeat at Kinghorn.13 As the tide of battle at Dupplin turned against the Bruce Scots, following the uncoordinated charge of the earl of Mar and his division, the earl of Fife appears to have been able to extricate himself and his men. English sources claim his forces to have been at the rear, and so they were able to flee in order to save their lives.14 Henry Beaumont and some of the Disinherited were, however, able to mount the horses they had retained at their rear and chased down Fife’s contingent. It appears that it was at this point that Scottish chronicle descriptions of 360 men dying under the earl’s banner took place.15 The earl himself was captured and he appears to have submitted to Balliol at this time.16 Fife’s defection was confirmed by his attendance at the coronation of Edward Balliol at Scone, the earl apparently fulfilling his hereditary duty of crowning the new king.17 Whether this was done under duress is debatable, but the earl’s previously ambiguous support of the Bruce cause may point towards the adoption a pro-Balliol stance on the earl’s part at this time.18 Indeed, the possibility of coercion seems less likely if English chronicle reportage is correct in placing his confirmation as keeper of Perth for Edward Balliol before the coronation.19 This action, if correct, appears as either an enticement to a wavering Fife to join the Balliol cause, or a reward for already having done so. Fife’s attendance at Balliol’s coronation along with thirteen knights of his retinue further appears to represent his defection to the Balliol cause, the earl’s knights reflecting the acceptance of Balliol allegiance by both 13 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 391; Chron. Bower, vii, 77-9; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364-5; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 86. 14 Chron. Melsa, ii, 364-5; Chron. Bridlington, 106; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 89; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 45-6. 15 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 391; Chron. Bower, vii, 77-9; cf. C. Candy, ‘The Scottish Wars of Edward III, 1327-38’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2005), 55-6, who suggests that Fife led the general withdrawal of Scottish troops from the battlefield. 16 Penman, David II, 48. 17 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 392; Chron. Bower, vii, 81; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272; Chron. Melsa, ii, 365-6; Chron. Bridlington, 108; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 93-4; Penman, David II, 48-9; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 47. 18 For Fife’s potential pro-Balliol affiliation, see R. Tanner, ‘Cowing the Community? Coercion and Falsification in Robert Bruce’s Parliaments, 1309-1318’, in K.M. Brown and R.J. Tanner (eds), Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235-1560 (Edinburgh, 2004), 50-73, at 71; A.G. Beam, ‘The Political Ambitions and Influences of the Balliol Dynasty, c.1210-1364’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stirling, 2005), 313-4; M. Penman, ‘A fell coniuracioun again Robert the douchty king: the Soules conspiracy of 1318-1320’, Innes Review, 50 (1999), 25-57, at 44. 19 Chron. Bridlington, 108. 5 the earl himself and those closest to him.20 In light of the catastrophic defeat at Dupplin Moor, and Fife’s own experience of two defeats at the hands of the Disinherited, defection to Edward Balliol, even without latent support for the Balliol cause, was probably a logical move. Fife’s reward as keeper of Balliol’s new capital, recently strengthened with the erection of basic defences, acted as further encouragement.21 Balliol’s progress south to reinforce friendly elements in Galloway and expand his rule in southern Scotland left Fife in charge at Perth, but the situation in this part of Scotland was not as secure as Balliol appears to have believed. In his absence, a party of Bruce Scots led by James and Simon Fraser, and Robert Keith attacked Perth around 7 October and captured the earl of Fife, his family and some of his supporters, damaging the town and its defences before they left.22 Following Fife’s capture by the Scots, it appears that he was removed to Kildrummy Castle, but did not long endure captivity.23 Earl Duncan was amongst the witnesses to a charter of Edward Balliol dated 20 October at Roxburgh, granting the manor of Bonkle to Thomas Ughtred.24 Fife’s appearance in Roxburgh may have been related to a parliament held by Edward Balliol in the town around the beginning of the same month.25 The earl may also have sought assistance in raising any ransom demanded by the Bruce Scots for his release. Fife’s movements thereafter are unknown, although he may have remained with the Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 93; Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 313. The knights were named as David Graham, Michael Wemyss, David Wemyss, Michael Scott, Alexander Lamberton, John Dunmore, John Bonvile, William Fraser, William Cambo, Roger Morton, John Laundel, Walter Lundie and John of Inchmartin. Around 1330, witnesses to a charter of Duncan, earl of Fife, included David and Michael Wemyss and Michael Scott (NAS, RH1/2/103; NAS, GD1/349/1). Michael Wemyss was the recipient of a grant of £40 from Edward III on 24 March 1336 (Foedera, ii, p. ii, 935; Rot. Scot., i, 411, details that Wemyss received 40 marks worth of victuals from Edward III on the same date. Is this an error in the Foedera stuff?). John of Inchmartin remained in the Disinherited allegiance in June 1334, when John Stirling, prominent Disinherited member and then sheriff of Perth, witnessed Inchmartin’s grant to the Blackfriars of Perth (NAS, GD79/1/6). For more on Inchmartin, see Penman, David II, 69, n. 76. 21 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273. 22 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 94. The Lanercost chronicler’s version of events, where the Bruce Scots captured the town ‘by stratagem and wiles’ differs from that of Henry Knighton, who held the earl of Fife solely responsible for having ‘traitorously surrendered the town’ (Chron. Knighton, i, 465). 23 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 94; Penman, David II, 56, who suggests that Fife was warded in Kildrummy along with his daughter, by Andrew Murray. 24 CDS, iii, no. 1129; CPR 1330-34, 553; Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 327, 432; see also Rot. Scot., i, 2734. 25 Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 327. 20 6 Disinherited in the south until the break-up of the Balliol’s forces some time before Christmas, presumably then returning to his earldom. Earl Duncan’s retirement to Fife appears corroborated by a reference by the Lanercost chronicler. He wrote that, in the period after Edward Balliol was driven from Scotland in December, Fife was ‘treacherously captured…when he was travelling beyond the Scottish sea’ by Archibald Douglas, the Scottish guardian.26 According to the English writer, the earl was imprisoned for a time, but released and granted lands north of the Forth by the guardian, ‘so that he (Douglas) could have the earldom.’27 This slightly confused depiction of events suggests that following his second capture, the Bruce Scots considered forfeiting the earl for his behaviour.28 This course of action does not, however, appear to have been followed. The earl may have been deemed too important a figure to forfeit, and in any case the Scottish guardianship may have not possessed sufficient authority to carry out such an action. Despite his behaviour, Duncan of Fife appears to have been allowed back into the Bruce fold, and took his place among the Scottish nobility when they lined up to fight at Halidon Hill the following July. Fife’s experience of battle in July 1333 at Halidon Hill, to the north of Berwick, appears to have been rather like his experience at Dupplin. He was presumably involved in the raid on Northumberland that preceded the battle, the Scottish army marching as far south as Morpeth before being persuaded to return to Berwick to fight the English. 29 Perhaps because of his ambiguous allegiance to the Bruce cause, Earl Duncan was, as at Dupplin, placed in the rearward Scottish division at Halidon.30 This appears to have allowed him the possibility of egress from the battlefield, and the earl of Fife was one of only three major 26 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276. 28 Penman, David II, 56, referring to possible action in 1334. 29 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307-1334, 157; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Scalacronica (King), 115-7; Chron. Bridlington, 113-4; Historia Anglicana, 196; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 68; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 124-9. 30 Of the men brought to Balliol’s coronation by the earl of Fife, at least six are recorded in the same battle as the earl (David Wemyss, Michael Scott, William Fraser, William Cambo, John Laundel and Walter Lundie), with a possible seventh in the shape of Roger Morton (Mortimer?). Duncan, son of Roger Mortimer was a hostage for the earl’s ransom in 1350 (TNA, E39/14/18). For more on Mortimer, see Penman, David II, 205. 27 7 Scottish nobles to escape with his life.31 Fife’s location was, however, shared with men such as the guardian, Archibald Douglas, as well as the earls of Lennox, Atholl and Carrick, all men who were not able to escape the battlefield.32 Location was, therefore, apparently less important than sheer good fortune with regards to the survival of Scotland’s major nobles. Indeed, the other two major survivors of the battle escaped from positions more advanced than Fife’s, the earl of Strathearn from the third Scottish division, and Robert the Steward from the second. The escape of these three men is particularly interesting, considering the changes of allegiance of all three men during the following years of conflict. Following his escape, the Steward sought shelter in the islands of the Clyde estuary, likely on Rothesay, from where he eventually sailed to join the king at Dumbarton Castle around early 1334.33 Fife and Menteith may also have fled to their own territories, but the advancing Disinherited forces that spread throughout the kingdom after Halidon Hill likely soon overtook them.34 It appears that both men submitted to the Balliol/English forces around this time.35 The following years appear to have been difficult for Earl Duncan, as he sought to remain in the allegiance of the side most likely to guarantee his continued possession of his lands and status. Having already displayed a marked habit for switching allegiance when required, Fife’s political vacillations continued through 1334-6. It is not clear if he played any part in the Bruce uprisings against the Balliol/English regime that occurred during 1334, but it is probable that the resurgent support for David II and the second expulsion of Edward Balliol and his Disinherited supporters in that year, prompted a return to the Bruce cause. In the following year, the Scottish ‘parliament’ of April 1335 was held within Duncan’s 31 Of the nine major Scottish nobles at Halidon Hill, only Robert the Steward and the earls of Fife and Strathearn escaped. The guardian, Archibald Douglas, and the earls of Atholl, Carrick, Lennox, Ross and Sutherland all perished on the battlefield (Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 73-4). 32 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307-1334, 165-7, cf. 68-73; Brut, 283-6; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308-9; Chron. Knighton, i, 468-70. 33 S.I. Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and Robert III, 1371-1406, 4-5; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 148-9; Candy, ‘Scottish Wars’, 80; G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The Ferry of Inverennok’, Innes Review, 52 (2001), 100-4, at 100. 34 move north to his new capital at Perth also appears to have involved expansion into Fife. Cupar and St Andrews Castles were apparently garrisoned, and a parliament was held at Scone (Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 149). 35 Earl Malise of Strathearn’s submission appears to have included the resignation of his earldom into the hands of Edward Balliol, who proceeded to grant it to John Warenne, earl of Surrey (J. Maitland Thomson, ‘A Roll of the Scottish Parliament, 1344’, SHR, 235-40, at 237-6, 238-9). 8 earldom, at Dairsie, near Cupar.36 In August of the same year Fife is recorded at Cupar Castle, presumably holding it for the Bruce Scots. By 7 August 1335, Earl Duncan had, however, handed over the castle to Edward III in response to the English king’s arrival in Fife with a large army.37 It is unclear whether the English besieged Cupar, or if Duncan decided to cut his losses and hand it over to the approaching English king before he arrived. Fife may have been aware of Edward Balliol’s treatment of the garrison of Cumbernauld Castle, most of which was put to death for treason some ten days before Fife’s submission.38 If this was the treatment that he and his men could expect, it perhaps seemed safer to submit to the English king. Edward III in turn handed over Cupar Castle to Edward Balliol on 21 August.39 A more formal submission by Earl Duncan may have followed at Perth. The chronicler of Meaux Abbey wrote that while there, ‘the earls of Atholl, Fife and Menteith, and other principal people of Scotland, with many communities, came to peace…And [the two kings] permitted them into peace in return for securities and indentures entered into by the said parties, one part of which was kept by the kings, the other by the magnates.’40 Duncan of Fife may also have been forced to concede land to the Disinherited/English as part of the terms of his surrender. Edward III gave Fife licence in October 1335 to grant the manor of Calder (Edinburgh) to Thomas Ferrers, an Disinherited/English knight, perhaps as part of the price of re-entering the Balliol/English peace.41 36 Penman suggests that the Steward had commenced a military campaign in Fife around April 1335, and was besieging Cupar and perhaps also Falkland, when the ‘parliament’ met at Dairsie (Penman, David II, 57). The collection of individuals named as attending this meeting (including the Steward, John Randolph, Andrew Murray, David de Strathbogie, William Douglas and Alexander Mowbray) would suggest that a campaign might have taken place at this time (Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 350; Chron. Bower, vii, 109). This, then, may have prompted a Fife defection, assuming that the sieges were successful. 37 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 239. 38 Chron. Bridlington, 122-3; cf. Chron. Knighton, i, 473; Scalacronica (King), 121; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 206; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 99. 39 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 239. 40 Chron. Melsa, ii, 376. This chronicle is alone in naming Fife amongst those who submitted at this time. He was not included amongst those named individuals who submitted at Perth on 18 August, and appears to have made his own arrangement with the two kings. If so, then his appearance at Perth, assuming he was there at all, must have been purely symbolic, a public submission alongside those other Scots who had accepted Balliol/English peace (see Chron. Avesbury, 298-302, for the terms of submission; cf. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Scalacronica (King), 121). 41 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 924; Rot. Scot., i, 380. 9 Once again Fife’s change of allegiance did not last particularly long, as the situation in Scotland altered once more. Despite the apparent finality of the 1335 campaigns, the two Edwards had achieved little in the way of concrete results. The flimsiness of the settlement reached through the submissions of August 1335 was demonstrated by the Bruce recovery in the aftermath of the armies’ retreat. The defeat of David Strathbogie at Culblean in November 1335 left large parts of Scotland open to attack once more from resurgent Bruce forces. Cupar Castle was besieged in the aftermath of the battle, and the arrival of Bruce forces in Fife likely prompted a further change in allegiance by Earl Duncan, if he had not already changed sides by this point.42 Fife’s reintegration into the Bruce party again appears to have been relatively seamless, and he was involved in the resumption of the Cupar siege in May 1336 alongside the earls of March and Sutherland.43 This reintegration of Earl Duncan as a prominent Bruce military commander suggests, once more, that his loyalty to Balliol was never particularly strong. He does, however, appear to have been an opportunist, altering his allegiance to suit the pervading political climate, and doing so in a way that did not adversely affect his landed interests. The events of 1336 add, therefore, an interesting element to the discussion of Fife’s political outlook. For the first time since the war began anew in 1332, Fife did not change sides in the face of advancing English armies. His participation in the siege of Cupar appears to have been the turning point, and although the armies of Edward 42 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 930; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426; Chron. Bower, 117; Chron. Knighton, i, 477. The 1335-6 accounts of John Stirling, sheriff of Edinburgh, show that Earl Duncan had forfeited lands in Lennie (Edinburgh) during the period of the account, which ran from 13 October 1335 until 29 September 1336 (CDS, iii, p 333). The suggestion in the account is that Fife was either forfeited these lands by the beginning of the account, or at the latest by 11 November. It may be that the cost of submission to the Disinherited/English was too high, and Earl Duncan reverted back to the Bruce allegiance before Culblean and the campaigning in Fife that followed (CDS, iii, p 339). 43 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296-7; CDS, iii, p. 354; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 428; Chron. Bower, vii, 117-9. The earl of Fife forfeited further lands in Englishheld southern Scotland in May 1336, which possibly ties in with his involvement in the resumed Cupar siege. Earl Duncan forfeited financial returns from the freeholders of North Berwick, worth up to 106s 4d a year. The English accounts attest that the earl forfeited these profits on 2 May 1336. Two breweries of the earl’s in Castleton (Edinburgh) were also forfeited around 19 May 1336 (Pentecost) (CDS, iii, p 339). These forfeitures remained in the hands of the English administration throughout 1336-7, although the proceeds appear reduced due to several tenements in North Berwick and the two breweries in Castleton lying waste (CDS, iii, p 387). This second forfeiture of the earl suggests that there may have some sort of reconciliation between Fife and the Disinherited/English regime after c. November 1335 but before May 1336. This cannot have lasted very long, and the resumption of the Bruce siege in May 1336 appears to have convinced Earl Duncan to rejoin the Bruce cause once more. 10 Balliol and then Edward III spent several months camped at Perth, little further is recorded about Earl Duncan.44 This may be a result of lack of evidence. The actions of the Disinherited/English forces in Fife at this time do suggest, however, that the earl at least, and potentially his tenants also, had turned finally away from the Balliol cause. Attempts appear to have been made around this time to subjugate the earldom under Balliol/English rule. The garrison at Perth was likely the main focus of this operation, but it was reinforced by troops stationed at the newly fortified castles at St Andrews and Leuchars, as well as at Cupar and Falkland.45 This challenge to Bruce authority could not be ignored, and Andrew Murray led a large-scale offensive against the earldom in 1337, including forces led by the earl of March, William Douglas of Liddesdale, and Earl Duncan of Fife. During this attack large parts of Fife suffered devastation, and the castles of St Andrews, Leuchars and Falkland were dismantled following their capture.46 Fife’s involvement in attacking his own earldom would appear to signal his acceptance that allying himself with the Bruce party was the means to regain his earldom and that the Balliol/English alternative was now a decidedly lost cause. If 1336 may be seen as something of a turning point with regards to the earl of Fife’s political allegiance, it also appears to have brought an end to the active involvement of the earl in the continuation of the war. He does not appear, for example, to have taken part in the large-scale siege of Perth in 1339, or indeed the siege of Cupar before it. Indeed, his next martial experience did not occur until the great assemblage of Scottish military might for the invasion of northern England in 1346. Earl Duncan faced great difficulties throughout this John Stirling’s shrieval accounts for 29 September 1336 to 29 September 1337 show that Earl Duncan’s lands in Lennie (Edinburgh) remained forfeited for the entire period of the account, suggesting further that the change to the Bruce allegiance was final (CDS, iii, p 380). 45 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Melsa, ii, 378; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 249-249r; R. Allen Brown, H.M. Colvin and A.J. Taylor (eds), The History of the King’s Works, i (London, 1963), 421-2 (check references); Chron. Melsa, ii, 378. 46 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353-4; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 436; Chron. Bower, vii, 125-7; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313. Duncan of Fife was at Falkland on 20 January 1337 (RRS, vi, 98-9). The wavering of Fife in his allegiance, in order to best protect his own interests, is apparently reflected in the behaviour of others in Fife. Edward Balliol wrote to Edward III on 6 June 1337 that the abbot of Lindores had come into his peace on 29 September (Michaelmas) 1336, and remained so to the present time. Earl Duncan may not have adopted the Balliol allegiance in the aftermath of the 1336 campaigns, but others apparently did, the abbey coming under the protection of Edward Balliol. If the abbot of Lindores did indeed remain in the Balliol peace in June 1337, it calls into question the success of the Bruce campaign in Fife earlier that year (TNA, C47/22/4/46). 44 11 period. His own loyalties may not have been particularly strong to either Bruce or Balliol. What he attempted to do was walk through the minefield of political allegiance whilst still retaining his lands and status. This course of action was further complicated by the political manoeuvring of other magnates who sought the earldom of Fife for themselves once Earl Duncan was dead. He had no sons, and was unlikely to have any as his wife remained in England. He had only one daughter, Isabella, and she became the focus of political wrangling over the future of the earldom. Robert the Steward and David Strathbogie, for example, were among those who sought to advance their position by acquiring the earldom, and the king too would, upon his return to Scotland in 1341, attempt to control the future direction of the earldom by having Isabella married to one of his close allies.47 The Steward, Michael Penman argues, was able to gain control over elements of the Fife earldom following his promotion to guardian in 1338. Taking advantage of the ‘sad, lonely and aging Earl Duncan of Fife’, the Steward was appointed baillie of the earl’s lands of Strathtay, Strath Braan and Strathord by 1345-6.48 This appointment may have been an attempt to buy off the Steward, but it could also have been a conscious choice on the part of Earl Duncan to align himself politically with the future Robert II. This was not necessarily a wise move. If he had intended this political union to form an axis with the Steward through which to pressure the young David II into providing some financial and political advancement, rewards that had been lacking for both men up to this up to this point, it singularly failed. Indeed, Earl Duncan may simply have been further marginalised as David II sought to build his own power base, free of men, like the Steward and perhaps, whom he distrusted. By 1343, Penman argues, Fife may have been retained at court in order to force him into conceding lands to crown men.49 This is perhaps corroborated by the amount of time that David II spent within the earldom during 1342-3, possibly exerting physical pressure on the earl to submit to the royal Penman, David II, 58; see also A. Ross, ‘Men for all Seasons?’, part 2. Penman, David II, 68-9; Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 12; see RRS, v, no. 72. 49 Penman writes that for men like Fife, the Steward and the earls of Ross and March, ‘the royal court was an uncomfortable, intimidating arena, dominated by David and his favoured nobles, bureaucratic clerics and household knights, men for whom the king in contrast must have represented a figure of generosity and stable authority’ (Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 173). 47 48 12 will, as well as attracting Fife’s own knights to join the king’s personal military retinue.50 Caught amongst the political machinations and competing interests of king and nobility, Fife appears to have fared rather badly, and was unable to secure the kind of political support he likely desired to safeguard the future of his earldom in the hands of a candidate of his choice. And yet the aging earl did not remain at home when the military service of the kingdom was demanded for the invasion of England in October 1346. Earl Duncan appeared ready once more to fight on campaign, and the arrival of the Scottish army outside Durham led to his participation in yet another battlefield defeat, this time at Neville’s Cross. On this occasion, Fife was placed in the lead Scottish division. Penman implies that this location was intended to keep the earl close, on the basis that he could not be trusted sufficiently, and to ensure that he could not run away quite so easily.51 If there were, however, men who could not be trusted, history shows that these were the Steward and the earl of March. If Penman is correct in suggesting that these two men were demoted to the rear division as a sign of their disfavour, then Fife’s prominent positioning in the foremost Scottish battle surely suggests something different. It is probable that Earl Duncan’s place was related to his standing amongst the assembled troops, possessing as he probably did by this stage, the aura of an old soldier. As detailed above, Fife was an experienced warrior who had fought in the two previous major battles of the period, as well as on various campaigns within Scotland in the 1330s. Alongside the younger warriors of the lead divisions, it was likely sensible to retain an ‘old head.’ And even though Fife’s experience of war had involved a certain familiarity with defeat, it was the fact that he had been there at Dupplin, at Halidon and at other skirmishes and sieges that singled him out for prominence. Earl Duncan also took his position towards the front alongside much of Fife’s military elite. Although Penman suggests that many Fife knights had been enticed by the king to form part of the royal military cadre, the presence of the earl with men who were, or had recently been, his knights is perhaps 50 51 Penman, David II, 101. Penman, David II, 125. 13 telling.52 Fife’s position is certainly in contrast to that of the Steward and Earl Patrick of March, who were relegated to the rear while the majority of their knightly followers were distributed amongst the other divisions. As for the battle itself, little mention is made in contemporary chronicles of Earl Duncan apart from the detail that he was captured by the Northumbrian knight, Robert Ogle.53 This would seem to have occurred as the front two Scottish divisions collapsed after failing to break through the English defensive line. The chronicler Geoffrey le Baker leaves open the possibility that Fife was amongst those who remained on the field after the flight of the Steward and March, ‘staying faithfully with their king, together like a round tower, protecting the king in the middle, until there were barely forty left surviving, of whom not one could flee away.’54 The earl’s conduct in fighting on while others ran may have commended him, at last, to the king, while the likelihood of the Steward’s succession to the earldom of Fife while both the earl and the king languished in English captivity may also have prompted David II to finally favour Earl Duncan.55 Nonetheless, Fife’s relationship with the Steward may also have paid belated dividends. Earl Duncan’s release, for the albeit sizeable ransom of 1000 marks, may have been at the instigation of the Steward, who ensured the release of Earl Duncan before that of most other captive Scots, and notably, long before the king’s own release. It was upon his return to Scotland that Earl Duncan made his gift to the abbey at Lindores, before spending the rest of his life (he died around 1353) attempting to secure the succession of his daughter Isabella to his earldom. Earl Duncan (IV), as this paper has hopefully suggested, is a rather interesting figure who successfully beat the odds of the medieval battlefield and survived three major encounters, as well as various other skirmishes and sieges. His location towards the rear at the first two battles may have assisted in helping him escape, but as his capture in flight after Dupplin Moor demonstrates, extracting oneself from a medieval battlefield was no simple 52 Fife men named amongst the dead and captured include John Bonville, William Fraser, Gilbert Inchmartin (?), Michael Scott, Patrick Polwarth (?)and David Graham (Penman, David II, 136-7). 53 See ‘Thomas Sampson’s Letter to his Friends’, in Lettenhove, Oeuvres, v, 489-92. 54 See Chron. Le Baker for original; translation in Rollason and Prestwich (eds), Neville’s Cross, 150. 55 Penman, David II, 162. 14 task. This was especially so when it is borne in mind that Scottish nobles would have fought on foot – that anyone escaped at all is to be wondered at. Earl’s Duncan’s survival throughout the period of conflict is nothing short of unique, and it is little surprise that he himself saw the hand of God in his continued survival. Modern portrayals of him have suggested that he was a sad old figure, separated from his wife, who remained in England, and unable to produce a male heir to safeguard the continuation of the ancient Fife earldom in the hands of his descendants. But by examining his military career, as opposed to just his vacillating and largely unsuccessful political career, another image perhaps emerges. It is one of the experienced, veteran soldier. The knightly class considered the experience of war, of real combat, as paramount for the chivalric warrior. English cases before the medieval Court of Chivalry included long witness statements confirming an individual’s involvement in various campaigns, sieges and battles. Every man called to give testimony was eager to list the military experience he had earned, and it is no exaggeration to suggest that privilege and prominence was awarded to those who had ‘been there, done that and bought the chain mail.’ And even though Earl Duncan’s experience of war was largely based upon the experience of war, his participation in the major military endeavours fought to ensure continued Bruce and Scottish freedom from Balliol/English control, surely stood him in good stead amongst his fellows, and brought with it the intangible but no less important reward of knightly kudos. For in this age, chivalric reputations were earned on the field of battle. And although there is little in the way of positive contemporary commentary on the earl himself – unsurprising, considering his wavering political support for the Bruce cause and his various changes of allegiance – we should not ignore the military contribution of men like Duncan of Fife, or the reputation he likely retained on the back of his martial endeavour. 15