(PDF) Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

After seven years from the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in mid of March 2011, the Syrian scene was marked by major changes, with the fall of hundreds of thousands of Martyrs, double of them injuries, the displacement and the refuge of millions inside and outside the country, and the destruction of millions of buildings , every year in the Syrian revolution witnessed a group of exchanges on the ground such as the exchange of control, advance, retreat and the actors, with the continued fall of the deaths and wounded people, continued aerial bombardment by the regime, Russia and Iranian backed Shiite militias to opposition areas, and continued battles on other fronts. Other dominant forces, such as (ISIS), which lost large areas in 2016 and 2017, have control over a narrow area in Syria, mostly desert and with a small population.

Since the beginning of the Syrian Revolution, we clarified that this revolution was spontaneously started by best of our young men. They granted their lives for the way they started, namely the revolution of freedom and dignity, and political parties had not any role in it. The peaceful demonstrations spread in all Syrian cities and they were faced by fire, suppression and oppression of Assad forces who killed, violated and abused the innocent civilians with a green light of the Iranian Shiite leaders. As a result, Hezbollah intervened in Syria under sectarian agendas and slogans of revenge veiled with claims that they came to protect sacred Shiite shrines in Damascus. The goal of this slogans and claims is to arouse the sympathy of poor illiterate people and arming them to fight their brothers in the same region. The revolution of our people faced the conspiracies of near and far parties, but it continued its way until a crucial moment at which Assad regime was about to fall down on Aug 2015. To save Assad regime and sectarian militias that amounted to 80 thousand militants, Russia intervened in Syria in all its powers including marine and air forces with all kinds of weapons.

The debate over international responses to the Assad governments continued barrel-bombing and lethal use of chemical weapons centered on the dominance and agenda of ‘extremists’ in the Syrian opposition and their role in a post-Assad Syria. With 1,500 groups and significant inter-conflict, the future of the popular revolution that originated with non-violent, idealistic civilian demonstrators cannot be foreseen with any certainty. The Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was created in an effort to better coordinate its efforts. There were many tensions between the FSA and salafi-jihadist groups which were blocked from the FSA’s distribution system. These salafi-jihadist groups are stigmatized internationally due to their expansion, brutality and actions towards minorities and women in their areas of control. There were also secular or at least, anti-sectarian elements of the Syrian opposition. The Syrian population may well reject the harsh sectarianism and imposition of ‘Islamic rule’ by salafi-jihadists in a post-Assad era. Or conversely, Islamist elements might prevail.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN SYRIAN SOCIETY (II/II) PERCEPTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence August / 2017 All rights reserved for The Day After organization © The Day After (TDA) is a Syrian organization which supports the democratic transition in Syria. Its scope of work focuses on the following areas: rule of law, transitional justice, security sector reform, electoral systems design, elections of the constituent assembly, constitutional design, economic reform and social policies. The Day After - Istanbul - Turkey Address: Cihangir, Palaska Sk NO: 5 D:3/ 34250 Beyoğlu-İstanbul, Turkey Tel: +90 (212) 252 3812 Email: info@tda-sy.org www.tda-sy.org Table of Contents Excutive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Summary of Main Findings ........................................................................................................................ 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 10 Procedural Terms and Definitions ........................................................................................................... 11 Methodology and Sample ......................................................................................................................... 12 Chapter I: The Perception of Domestic Violence ................................................................................... 15 The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in the Social Environment.......................................................... 15 Minors Involved in Domestic Violence .................................................................................................. 17 The Reasons for Silence (not reporting the assault) ................................................................................ 17 Domestic Violence in the Home.............................................................................................................. 19 Domestic Violence between Men and Women ................................................................................... 19 Personal Exposure to Domestic Violence Among Women ................................................................. 20 Who is the Aggressor? ........................................................................................................................ 22 Reaction to the Assault ........................................................................................................................ 23 Chapter II: The Perception of Forms of Violence Against Women and Attitudes Towards Them .. 24 The Prevalence of Violence .................................................................................................................... 24 Views on Punishment for the Abusive Spouse........................................................................................ 28 In the Case of Physical Abuse ............................................................................................................. 30 In the Case of Verbal Abuse ................................................................................................................ 33 In the Case of Verbal Threats .............................................................................................................. 37 In the Case of Deprivation of Liberty.................................................................................................. 40 Chapter III: The Justifications of Spousal Violence Against Women .................................................. 45 Justifications which do not lay responsibility on the female victim........................................................ 46 Religious Justification: "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases." ........................... 46 The Justification of Comparison: "The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries." ..................................................................................... 50 Justifications which lay responsibility on the female victim ................................................................... 53 Assuming that Women Exposed to Spousal Violence are Uneducated .............................................. 53 Assuming that there are Logical Reasons for Violence Against Women ........................................... 56 Chapter IV: "Honor Killings" ................................................................................................................. 61 The Perception of the Prevalence of “Honor Killings” ........................................................................... 61 Views on Punishment for the Perpetrator ................................................................................................ 62 In the Event of the Discovery of an Illicit Relationship ...................................................................... 63 In the Event of the Victim Choosing to Marry Without the Consent of her family ............................ 69 In the Event of the Victim Choosing to Marry a Man from Another Religion ................................... 74 In the event of the Victim Choosing to Marry a Man from Another Sect ........................................... 78 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................... 84 Questionnaire ............................................................................................................................................. 85 Excutive Summary In order to identify the perception of domestic violence against women in Syrian society, The Day After has conducted a survey which included six Syrian provinces, in areas controlled by both the regime, Democratic self-governance and the opposition, in addition to the refugee camps in Turkey. The survey depended on a multistage stratified sample which adopted proportional allocation (men/women). The number of respondents totaled 2091; 1120 men and 971 women. Data was collected using a questionnaire and through personal interviews conducted by The Day After's trained researchers. This report presents the results of the data analysis. The research begins by trying to identify the respondents’ perception of the prevalence of domestic violence against women, and finds that women are more aware of abusive incidents of this kind, and that their concern for the children and "the feeling of shame and the desire not to share their problems with others", in addition to the absence of an institution that women trust can protect them, were the most prominent reasons why abused women remain silent. The percentage of women who said that they have experienced domestic violence is 21.2%, which is double the percentage of men who reported the same answer. In 61.5% of cases the abuser is the partner, but only a small percentage of victims (less than 7%) reported the abusive husband to one of the concerned institutions. In general, women do not report domestic violence practiced against them. The results also reveal that the majority of domestic violence incidents (69.2%) occur in the presence of minors (sons, relatives or others). In more than a third of these assaults these minors are also exposed to violence. In the second chapter, emphasis is placed on one of the most prevalent forms of domestic violence against women; spousal violence. The greater percentage of men (more than one-third) believe that the prevalence of this kind of violence is small or rare, while the largest percentage of women (43.3%) say it is prevalent to some extent, or that it is widely prevalent. The analysis of the results shows that there is a moderate and positive relationship between exposure to domestic violence and the belief in the prevalence of spousal violence, as those who were personally exposed to domestic violence tend to believe that spousal violence is widely prevalent. Despite the fact that there is almost a consensus that physical abuse and deprivation of liberty are cases of violence that require legal accountability, around a third of respondents do not believe that this applies to verbal threats and abuse. However, looking at the data based on gender shows a dramatic difference in attitudes, as half of the men do not wish to punish the perpetrator of physical abuse, and the majority of them reject such punishment for the perpetrator of the deprivation of liberty. The areas, along with the social and demographic groups, in which the percentage of those who do not agree with punishing the perpetrator is high are later defined. 1 To create a deeper understanding of the respondents’ perception of spousal violence against women, the study devotes the third chapter to the justifications for such violence and finds wide acceptance for religious justification (Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases) and for laying the responsibility on women for the violence committed against them, being the ones who push their husband to commit violence in some cases. In both cases, the proportion of those who refused these two justifications is up to one-third. Justification by comparison (the cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries) appears to be the most common (opposed by only 16.9%). The least popular justification was laying responsibility on the woman for being uneducated (women who have experienced or are experiencing violence from their spouses are usually uneducated) which was opposed by 45% of respondents. What is interesting is the big difference in the demographic and social characteristics of categories among which this latter justification prevails, in comparison to other justifications; among Secularists, not Islamists, among the minorities, and not the majority of Sunnis or Arabs, and in large cities (Damascus, Aleppo and Homs), and not in Idlib and the camps in Turkey. In the last chapter of this report a very sensitive issue is addressed; what is known as "Honor" killings. The city of Al-Hasakah has the highest percentage of respondents who stated that they had heard about violent incidents of this kind during the past year, yet these respondents are the most supportive of dealing with such acts like any other crime. The general attitude is biased towards addressing this type of crime in a way different from other murders. However, women are much stricter on this issue than men, with around a third of them stating, in almost all cases (except in the event of an illicit relationship), that it must be dealt with like any other murder, compared to around a quarter of the number of men. It seems that the collective (men and women) tend substantially towards the commutation of sentence in the event of the discovery that the victim.engaged in an illicit relationship. Hence, tremendous efforts to influence views in this regard will be required. This study does not only provide estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence and its perception in Syrian society, but also provides details, as it defines the demographic and social characteristics of the categories where the refusal to deal with honor killings as any other murder is increasing, as well as the refusal of legal accountability for the aggressor in the case of spousal violence. This study also defines the justifications that accompany such aggressions. This information will help organizations and authorities develop the plans and programs necessary to work on achieving what Syrian activists initiated earlier in 2005 under the title of "the national campaign against honor killings," and other activities intending to end all forms of discrimination against women in Syria. 2 Summary of Main Findings Chapter I: The Perception of Domestic Violence           The largest percentage of women (46%) said that they know a woman that has been exposed to violence by a family member, while the majority of men (59.6%) said that they are not aware of any woman who has been exposed to such an experience. Reporting cases of aggression against a woman by a family member in the total sample (men and women) is found more among the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people, housewives, Islamists, age category 36-45, individuals with low income, in Damascus, Idlib and in areas under the control of Selfgovernance, the opposition, and Sunnah. The two most important reasons, in the opinion of the respondents, which prevent women from speaking about or reporting their exposure to domestic violence to the competent authorities were "the concern for the children" and "the feeling of shame and the desire not to share their problems with others." The comparison between the results of men and women shows that women mentioned a third reason; namely, "the absence of a credible authority that can protect them". 42.5% of women mentioned this in comparison to 25.2% of men. Abused women are more likely to mention each of the following reasons than those who say they have not been abused in the home: “The absence of a credible authority that can protect them”, “fear of the consequences of the complaint” and because she “considers it a normal matter." More than a quarter of respondents said that they had been personally exposed to or had witnessed cases of domestic violence (27.2%), and 55.6% stated that they had neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation. 21.2% of women reported their exposure to domestic violence, while 16.9% refused to answer this question. Women report abuse more than men (almost double). Reporting personal exposure to domestic violence, in the sample of women, reaches its highest level among less educated, Islamists, Arabs, married and divorced women, the young, women with higher income, in Aleppo, Idlib, the camps in Turkey, and in the areas under the control of the opposition, including non-besieged opposition areas. In 40% of cases in which violence occurs inside the home, the aggressor is the partner. 61.5% of women said that the latest case of violence inside the home that they were personally exposed to or had witnessed, was undertaken by the partner, with brothers coming in second place (17.1%) and parents in third (8.8%). Women do not report violence occurring against them inside the home: the percentage of those who said that they reported the incident slightly increased to reach 13.9% when the aggressor was a relative of the victim or was someone from outside the family. In the case of the husband’s aggression, only 6.8% reported the incident to one of the competent authorities. 3  Around 18% of cases of domestic violence include a female minor. The majority of this kind of violence incidents (69.2%) occur in the presence of minors (sons, relatives or others). In more than a third of these assaults these minors are also exposed to violence. Chapter II: The Perception of Forms of Violence Against Women and Attitudes Towards Them            Women are more aware of spousal violence against women than men, as the largest percentage (43.3%) say that it is prevalent to some extent, or that it is widely prevalent; compared to 30.9% who say that it is not prevalent and only 18% who say it rarely happens. On the other hand, over a third of men say that it is somewhat or widely prevalent, while the largest percentage, which amounted to 36.3%, apparently believe that it is not common and around a quarter of them say that it rarely happens. Those who have already been exposed to assaults inside the home tend to believe that spousal violence against women is widely prevalent. Those who have witnessed an assault inside the home (but have not been personally exposed to it) tend to believe that such violence is prevalent to some extent. Those who have neither been exposed to an assault inside the home nor witnessed any such situation, tend to believe that the prevalence of this kind of violence is little or rare. Those who choose not to declare whether they have been exposed to violence inside the home tend not to express a clear attitude towards the prevalence of spousal violence. Reporting spousal violence against women in the sample of women reaches its highest level among young women (less than 25 years), those with a lower income, in Damascus, Al-Hasakah, Idlib, and in areas under the control of the regime and democratic selfegovernance, including non-besieged opposition areas. Reporting spousal violence against women in the sample of men reaches its highest level among the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamist, in Idlib, Damascus Rural Province, in areas under the control of the opposition and among Arabs, Sunnis, and married individuals. Both verbal threats and verbal abuse are not perceived as violence that requires legal punishment by around a third of respondents. This proportion differs largely in the case of physical violence and the deprivation of liberty inside the home where we find some consensus among respondents that these abusive acts require legal accountability. 72.4% of women say that in the case of physical abuse, the perpetrator must be punished, while the percentage declines to around half among men. More than half the women say that the deprivation of liberty requires punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage declines to 38.4% among men. Around a quarter of women say that verbal threats or insults require punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage declines to 17% among men. 4         In the case of physical abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those older than 56 years, those with the lowest income, those in the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the opposition, among Arabs, Sunni, married and widowed women. In the case of physical abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among the less educated, Islamists, those in Damascus, Aleppo, the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the opposition, and among Arab, married and Shi’a. In the case of verbal abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in Homs, Aleppo and the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition, non-besieged opposition areas and among Arabs and married women. In the case of verbal abuse, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, those who practice some work, those older than 36 years, those in Homs, Damascus, Aleppo, the camps in Turkey, in areas under regime and opposition control, and among Arabs and married men. In the case of verbal threats, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, the widowed or married, the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those with a low/moderate income, those in Homs, the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition. In the case of verbal threats, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, Islamists, those with a moderate/high income, those in Homs, the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition. In the case of deprivation of liberty, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, Sunnis, the married/widowed, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those with a low/moderate income, those in the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the opposition, including non-besieged areas. In the case of the deprivation of liberty, conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, the less educated, individuals responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the employed, 5  Islamists, those with moderate income, those in the camps in Turkey and in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition, including non-besieged opposition areas. The majority of women want to hold the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases (67.5%), although they want some leniency in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threats. The percentage of agreement for full accountability declines to just over half among men (54.3%). Chapter III: The Justifications of Spousal Violence Against Women         Only a third of respondents oppose the argument that "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases." Only 16.9% reject the hypothesis that the situation in Syria is not the worst, in comparison with other Arab countries. Only 35.8% oppose the argument that women should bear responsibility, being the ones who push their husbands to commit violence in some cases. Less than half of the respondents refuse to lay responsibility on women under the pretext that women are uneducated. In the case of religious justification (Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Arabs, Sunnis, the married/widowed, the less educated, those who are responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those older than 36 years, those with a moderate income, those in the camps in Turkey, in Aleppo, Idlib, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. In the case of religious justification (Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Arabs, the less educated, those who are responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamists, the young (younger than 25 years), those with a low income, those in the camps in Turkey, those in Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus Rural Province and in areas under the control of the opposition and non-besieged opposition areas. In the case of the justification of comparison (the cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Arabs, housewives, Islamists, females with a moderate/high income, those in the camps in Turkey, in Homs and in areas under the control of the opposition. In the case of the justification of comparison (the cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Sunni, Islamists, those with low and middle incomes, those in the camps in Turkey, Aleppo, Damascus, in Self-governance areas, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. 6     In the case of the justification of assuming that women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Christians, Secularists, single women, widows, the elderly, those in Homs, Damascus and in areas under the control of the regime. The percentage of rejection increases in besieged areas compared with non-besieged opposition areas, and among Arabs compared with Kurds. In the case of the justification of assuming that women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Shiites, Alawites, Secularists, married people, those with a high income, those in Homs, Aleppo and in areas under the control of the regime and in besieged areas. In the case of the justification of assuming the existence of logical reasons for violence against women (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of women among Arabs, Sunnis, the married/widowed, the less educated, those who are responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in the camps in Turkey, in Idlib, in Aleppo, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. In the case of the justification of assuming the existence of logical reasons for violence against women (which is a justification that holds women responsible for the violence occurring against them), the support for this reaches its highest level in the sample of men among Arabs, married people, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamists, young people, those with a low income, refugees in the camps in Turkey, those in Idlib, in Aleppo, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. Chapter IV: "Honor Killings"    Only 15.5% said they had heard of an honor crime occuring during the last year in their area. Around one-third of respondents in the province of Al-Hasakah say that they had heard of an honor crime that took place in their area over the past year. The percentage drops to a quarter in Damascus and Homs, to 11.1% in the camps in Turkey and to less than 8% in Damascus Rural Province, Aleppo, and Idlib. Respondents in Self-governance areas reported the most on the occurrence of an honor crime occuring in their area over the past year, followed by respondents in areas under the control of the regime (15.9%) and then respondents in areas under the control of the opposition (11.6%). The general attitude is biased towards addressing this type of crime in a way different from other murders. However, women are much stricter on this issue than men, with around a third stating that in almost all cases (except in the event of an illicit relationship), 7       it must be dealt with like any other murder, compared to around a quarter of the number of men. It seems that they (men and women) tend substantially towards the commutation of sentence in the event of the discovery of an illicit relationship between the murderer and the victim. The percentage of those who state that they had heard of the occurrence of an honor crime increases in besieged areas compared to non-besieged opposition areas. If the motive of the crime is an illicit relationship, the support for “dealing with the crime like any other murder” reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, the married/widowed, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those between 26 and 55 years, those with a moderate income, those in Idlib, in Homs, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. If the motive of the crime is an illicit relationship, the support for “dealing with the crime like any other murder” reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Shiites, Arabs, those who are married, non-university graduates, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six or more), the unemployed, Islamists, those older than 46 years, those with a moderate income, those in Homs, in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, those who are married, those who have not yet finished secondary school, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, females with a moderate income, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, those who are married, those who are not university graduates, educated people, widows, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the non-university educated, Islamists, those older than 46 years, those with a moderate income, those in Idlib, in Homs, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of women among Arabs, the married/widowed, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. 8    If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, the less educated, Islamists, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder drops in the sample of women among those educated without gaining a high school diploma, Arabs, the married/widowed, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, housewives, Islamists, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged areas. If the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect, the support to deal with the crime like any other murder reaches its lowest level in the sample of men among Arabs, Shiites, the married, the less educated, those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, the unemployed, Islamists, men younger than 56 years, those in Idlib, in the camps in Turkey, in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition and in non-besieged opposition areas. 9 Introduction This study demonstrates the second part of the report detailing Discrimination against Women issued by The Day After. To avoid prolongation and repetition, and to be better informed of the contexts of this research, we refer the reader to Part I, titled “Discrimination against Women in Syrian Society (I/II): Awareness of Women Rights and Freedoms”. Very briefly, the question asked throughout the research in Part I is “how do Syrians perceive women's rights and freedoms?”, whereas the question in Part II is “how do Syrians perceive domestic violence and, in particular, its most common form (spousal violence)? What is the nature of its prevalence? What are the perceptions and attitudes of Syrians towards the different forms of this type of violence? Which areas or social/demographic categories have the highest percentage of acceptance or occurrence of this sort of violence?” What concerns us in this research is the respondents’ perception of violence. Thus, this study does not approach what is known as symbolic violence, which includes forms of violence that are often unperceived by the victims. We must note that difficulties accompanied this work; we were obliged to exclude a question related to one of the primary forms of spousal violence, namely sexual assault. The question focused on "the punishment which the perpetrator of such an assault deserves", but during the stage testing phase of the questionnaire we noticed a strong refusal to answer the question and, in addition, we received many complaints from field researchers requesting that this question be deleted due to the sensitivity of the subject, especially in conservative areas. This research is divided into four chapters: The first chapter is dedicated to the perception of domestic violence against women. The second chapter deals with one of the most prevalent types of domestic violence, spousal violence against women. The third chapter delves into the justifications of spousal violence. The fourth and final chapter researches the issue of what is known as"honor killings" in detail. 10 Procedural Terms and Definitions Areas under Self-governance: Areas controlled by what is known as the Democratic Selfgovernance forces. The project of self-governance was first proposed by the Democratic Union Party, headed by Salih Muslim. The announcement of "Democratic Self-Governance", which is based on the principle of decentralization, was declared in 2014. After the support received by the Kurdish units and what is known as the Syrian Democratic Council from the international coalition, as well as the Federal Republic of Russia, the governance dramatically expanded and is currently composed of three territories, Al-Jazira (Al-Hasakah), Afrin and Kobani. Areas under the control of the Regime: Areas controlled by the regime or one of its allied troops from the foreign forces. Areas under the control of the opposition: Includes all areas controlled by one of the Syrian opposition forces. Besieged areas: In our sample, the areas under the control of the opposition and besieged by the regime forces or its allies. Our sample does not include any of the areas under the control of The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria "ISIS" in Syria. 11 Methodology and Sample The Day After conducted a field survey, during the period of September 17th to November 22nd 2016, which aimed to identify the perception of domestic violence in Syrian society. Trained field researchers conducted 2091 personal interviews, using a questionnaire, with 1120 men and 971 women in various Syrian provinces. Despite all of the difficulties faced during the data collection through fieldwork phase in conditions such as those currently experienced in Syria (a raging war and a continuous displacement of the population) The Day After was able to draw from a multistage stratified sample using proportional allocation (men/women). As for the analysis of data, statistical analysis was conducted: to reject or accept the null hypothesis H0 (there is no association or statistical significance between two or more variables), Chi-square test was applied, based on levels of significance less than or equal to 0.05. We also applied two types of Multivariate Analysis; Cluster Analysis and Correspondence Analysis. Sampling phases* Phase I: The total population of Syria: 18,215,868 Trust level: 95% Margin of error: 2.2% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q The required sample size: 1985 Phase II: Total number of men in Syria: 9,214,866 Trust level: 95% Margin of error: 3% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q The sample size required: 1067 Total number of women in Syria: 9,001,002 Trust level: 95% Margin of error: 3.2% Maximum heterogeneity: p = q The required sample size: 938 Phase III: A random cluster sample was used throughout the regions and provinces in this phase. We also took into consideration the religious and ethnic distribution; as shown in the following Table (A) and map. The sample does not include any areas under the control of The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria "ISIS." The difficulty and risks of working in the areas under the control of the regime affected the size and nature of samples based in those areas. . It is worth mentioning that in this stage we are dealing with indicative samples which help us to better understand the topic of our research by comparing various demographic and social categories. However, we can neither generalize the results for these areas nor for religious or ethnic categories. * These figures were estimated from the population in 2015. There are no current accurate statistics (see Http://countrymeters.info/en/Syria). 12 Table (A). The Distribution of Sample Governorate Hasakeh (Syrian Democratic Forcesheld area) Aleppo (Mashhad district in the city of Aleppo, Azaz) Idlib (al-Zawiya mountains, Kafruma, Mara al-Nu’man) Homs (al-Waer district in the city of Homs, al-Rastan, districts in regimeheld areas) Damascus (Districts in regime-held area) Damascus suburbs (Yalda, Babila, Beit Sahem, Douma, al-Tal, and towns in regime held areas) Camps in Turkey (Islahiya, Kalas) Total Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Areas under the control of Democratic Self-governance Total Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Total Nationality – Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Turkmen I prefer not to answer Other Total Religion - Sect* Sunnis Alawites Shiites Christians I prefer not to answer Other Total Men Women Total 222 141 363 84 88 172 236 231 467 255 68 323 77 43 120 172 74 1120 106 294 971 278 368 2091 225 84 309 676 739 1415 219 1120 148 971 367 2091 282 394 676 132 607 739 414 1001 1415 921 160 4 31 4 1120 828 109 8 25 1 971 1749 269 12 56 5 2091 868 28 31 5 180 8 1120 833 3 2 10 118 5 971 1701 31 33 15 298 13 2091 * We withhold mention of details in areas controlled by democratic self-government or the regime in order to protect our field researchers. **Lower numbers or complete absence of some sects does not mean they were not present. A large percentage were most likely present among those who preferred not to answer this question. Our previous study (Sectarianism in Syria. Survey study, TDA, February 2016) showed that the greatest percentage of those refusing to answer the question about sectarian affiliation came from areas in which there was supposed to be a significant presence of a given minority (e.g. Suweida) or areas having a religious or ethnic plurality (Hasakeh and Homs). Nonetheless, we preserved the small numbers because they are useful for comparison and in cases were the sample was less than 30, we mentioned the number rather than the percentage so as not to produce any misunderstanding resulting from these small samples. 13 A map showing the distribution of the sample inside Syrian territory and the Turkish refugee camps 14 Chapter I: The Perception of Domestic Violence The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in the Social Environment The largest percentage of women (46.0%) say that they know a Figure 1. Do you know a woman woman who has been exposed to violence by a family member, who has been assaulted by one of the members of her family? and the majority of men (59.6%) say that they are not aware of any woman who has been exposed to such a situation (Fig. 1). 59,6% However, we should pay attention to the fact that considering 46,0% an action as "violent" is related to the respondent’s concept of 44,5% violence. To gain a deeper understanding of the respondents’ 30,6% view of what violence is, we will later investigate their understanding of many forms of violence. What concerns us in 9,8%9,5% this research is whether the respondents themselves perceive violence, and we proceed to identify their opinions and attitudes based on that understanding. Yes No No Answer We will study the variation of the answers of respondents (men and women) based on demographic and social characteristics. Man Woman Variables that are related to reporting violence are summarized in Table (1) as follows: Education: Reporting incidents of an assault on a woman by a member of her family declines with the progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six and above) tend to report less than those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people. Profession: Reporting such violence increases among housewives (48.1%). This is followed by the unemployed (40.1%) and workers and students (around one third). Ideology: Reporting such violence increases among Islamists compared with Secularists. Age: Most of those reporting acts of domestic violence in their social environment were between 36-45 years old.. Income: Reporting incidents of domestic violence drops with the increase of income. Province: Around half of the women in Damascus say they know a woman who has been exposed to violence by a family member. The percentage declines to 43.7% in Idlib, to 39.9% in AlHasakah, to around a third in Aleppo, Damascus Rural Province, the camps in Turkey, and to a quarter in Homs. 15 Region: The reporting percentage in areas under the control of the regime amounts to 27.8%, while the percentages in areas under the control of the opposition and Self-governance areas are approximately the same (around 40%). Religion-Sect: Sunnis tend towards reporting incidents of this type (40%), the percentage drops among Alawites (16.1%), while a third of Shiites refused to show a clear attitude. Table (1). Knowing a woman who was assaulted by one of her family members, according to some sociodemographic variables Yes No Do not know / No answer Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University No. of individuals to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology * Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Homs Damascus Rural Province The camps in Turkey Aleppo Al-Hasakah Idlib Damascus 42.9% 41.9% 40.5% 35.0% 36.3% 42.9% 45.2% 48.5% 54.5% 57.2% 14.3% 12.9% 11.1% 10.4% 6.5% 39.7% 38.5% 33.3% 52.9% 53.4% 50.3% 7.3% 8.1% 16.4% 35.3% 31.6% 40.1% 48.1% 55.4% 59.2% 48.2% 41.9% 9.3% 9.2% 11.7% 10.0% 31.5% 26.5% 40.3% 43.0% 37.9% 62.6% 60.6% 53.1% 44.7% 53.4% 5.9% 12.8% 6.7% 12.2% 8.7% 36.8% 37.8% 41.0% 34.1% 36.6% 54.6% 54.3% 50.0% 49.8% 47.3% 8.6% 7.8% 9.0% 16.1% 16.1% 45.2% 36.0% 34.4% 47.9% 54.6% 59.8% 6.9% 9.4% 5.8% 25.1% 34.5% 37.2% 37.8% 39.9% 43.7% 51.7% 59.4% 54.7% 46.7% 59.9% 53.4% 49.0% 47.5% 15.5% 10.8% 16.0% 2.3% 6.6% 7.3% 0.8% 16 Region Areas under the control of the Regime 27.8% 56.0% 16.2% Areas under the control of the Opposition 39.4% 51.5% 9.1% Self-governance areas 40.1% 53.7% 6.3% Sect Sunnis 40.0% 50.9% 9.1% Shiites 12.1% 54.5% 33.3% Alawites 16.1% 80.6% 3.2% Christians (in figures) 2 10 3 * we relied on the respondent’s self-placement on a scale from 0-10 where zero is the secular extreme and 10 is the extreme of political Islam. We asked the respondents to determine the position closest to their perspective on this issue. We then recoded the data in the following way: 0 is extreme secularism; 1, 2, and 3 are secular; 4, 5, and 6, are moderate; 7, 8, and 9 are Islamist; and 10 is extreme political Islam. Minors Involved in Domestic Violence The data analysis shows that around 18% of cases of domestic violence against women occur against a female minor (Figure 2). The majority of this type of violence (69.2%) occurs in the presence of minors (sons, relatives or others) (Figure 3). In more than a third of these assaults, these minors are also exposed to violence (Figure 4). Figure 2. Do you know whether the age of the victim is more or less than 18 years? Figure 3. Do you know if there were any minors (younger than 18 years) with the victim? Sons, brothers or relatives? 3,7 Figure 4. Were they also exposed to violence in the incident(s)? 9,0 18,1 12,2 38,4 21,8 78,2 69,2 18 years or more 49,4 less than 18 years I do not know Yes No I don’t know Yes No I do not know The Reasons for Silence (not reporting the assault) According to the opinions of the respondents, what makes women submit to domestic violence? It seems the two main reasons, in their view, are the concern for the children, and the shame and desire not to let other people know about these problems (Fig 5). These answers were given by the 17 general collective, but when looking in detail and comparing the answers of women respondents an interesting difference arises. The percentage of those who stated, among the reasons, the absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect her increases to 42.5% in the sample of women compared to around a quarter of men. It is also noted that men mention the justification that “the husband is right” (Table 2) more than women do. Figure 5. What are the three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member? (Three options) ‫من أجل األبناء‬ For the children The shame and desire not‫اطالع‬ to let ‫عدم‬ other know ‫المشاكل‬ ‫على هذه‬ ‫اآلخرين‬ ‫في‬people ‫والرغبة‬ ‫الخجل‬ Fear of the consequences of the complaint ‫الشكوى‬ ‫الخوف من تبعات‬ The absence of a credible authority ‫حمايتها‬ ‫وقادرة على‬ ‫تثق بها‬that ‫جهة‬women ‫ال يوجد‬can ‫ألنه‬ trust to protect them ‫لعدم وجود دخل يمكنها من اعالة نفسها‬ The absence of income to support herself ‫معينة‬ ‫الن الشرع يسمح بذلك‬ Islamic law allows it in‫حاالت‬ some‫في‬ cases She considers it normal ‫ألنها تعتبر ان هذا أمر عادي‬ She believes her husband‫زوجها‬ is right‫ألنها تعتقد أن الحق مع‬ The high cost of litigation‫ألن اللجوء إلى المحاكم مكلف‬ Other ‫غير ذلك‬ I do not know ‫ال اعرف‬ No Answer ‫ال إجابة‬ 0,00% 25,20% 21,80% 12,20% 11,10% 8,80% 5,30% 5,30% 4,30% 2,80% 1,80% 0,80% 0,60% 5,00% 10,00% 15,00% 20,00% 25,00% 30,00% Table 2. The three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member (by gender) For the children The shame and the desire not to let others know about these problems The absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them Fear of the consequences of the complaint The absence of income to support herself She considers it normal. Islamic law allows it in some cases She believes her husband is right The high cost of litigation Men 76.5% 62.8% 25.2% 39.2% 26.7% 17.6% 19.4% 15.1% 8.1% Women 74.8% 68.8% 42.5% 34.0% 25.8% 14.1% 12.0% 10.3% 8.9% Now we will compare the answers of women who say they have been personally subjected to domestic violence and those who have not been exposed to such violence. In general, the responses do not differ greatly. Notable differences came in the fact that abused women mentioned the absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them, the fear of the consequences of the complaint, and because she considers it normal (Figure 6). 18 Figure 6. The three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member The shame and the desire not to let others know about these problems 67,30% 70,80% 65,40% For the children The absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them 44,90% 41,20% 39,50% 32,10% Fear of the consequences of the complaint 24,90% 25,60% The absence of income to support herself 21,50% 12,10% She considers it normal 11,70% 10,60% Islamic law allows it in some cases The of the high cost of Litigation 9,80% 9,00% She believes her husband is right 8,80% 10,80% Other 77,70% 3,90% 6,10% I do not know 2,00% 2,30% No Answer 0,50% 1,70% Personally exposed to violence Has not been exposed to violence personally Domestic Violence in the Home Domestic Violence between Men and Women More than a quarter of respondents said that they had been personally exposed to or had witnessed cases of domestic violence (27.2%), and 55.6% stated that they had neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation (Fig. 7). The proportion of those who preferred not to answer this question is observed to be relatively high. For women, the percentage of those who reported their exposure to domestic violence reached 21.2%, while 16.9% of them refused to answer this question. Women report abuse more than men (almost double) (Fig. 8). Figure 7. Have you ever been personally exposed to or witnessed cases of domestic violence? 55,6 10,9 Yes, personally 11,5 17,2 4,8 Yes, personally, and also I witnessed such violence to one of my witnessed such violence to one of my family family members members I've neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation I prefer not to answer 19 Figure 8. Personal exposure to violence inside the home (by gender) 71,50% 17,50% 62,00% Man Prefers not to answer 21,10% 16,90% 11,00% Woman Has never been exposed to domestic violence Has been personally exposed to domestic violence Personal Exposure to Domestic Violence Among Women Variables related to reporting personal exposure to domestic violence in the sample of women are summarized in Table (3) as follows: Education: Reporting personal exposure to such violence drops with the progress in education. Ideology: Islamist women report their exposure to domestic violence more than Secularist women. Age: In general, reporting this type of violence declines with age. Most noteworthy, when comparing the results in relation to age, is an important increase in the proportion of those who refuse to answer this question as the respondents get older. Income: Reporting such violence increases among those with a high income compared to those with a low income. Province: Around a quarter of women in Aleppo, Idlib and the camps in Turkey say that they have been personally exposed to domestic violence. 18.6% of women in Damascus and 13.2% in Damascus Rural Province state the same. The proportion declines dramatically in the cities of AlHasakah and Homs. Region: Women in areas under the control of the opposition are most likely to report such violence (around a quarter). The percentages from the areas under the control of the regime and Selfgovernance areas are almost the same (around 9%). Women in non-besieged opposition areas are more likely to report such violence in comparison to women in besieged areas. Nationality-ethnicity: Around a quarter of Arabic women say they have been exposed to domestic violence compared to 5.5% of Kurdish women. Civil Status: Reporting such violence increases among divorced women, followed by those who are married, then by widows, while single women are the least likely to report. 20 Table (3). Personal exposure to domestic violence among women (by socio-demographic variables) Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Homs Al-Hasakah Damascus Rural Province Damascus The camps in Turkey Idlib Aleppo Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Nationality - Ethnicity Arabic Women Kurdish Women Turkmen Women Religion-Sect Sunnis Has been personally exposed to domestic violence Has never been exposed to domestic violence Prefers not to answer 38.9% 31.6% 22.1% 20.3% 15.4% 52.8% 53.3% 59.3% 64.0% 66.3% 8.3% 15.1% 18.6% 15.8% 18.3% 12.1% 5.8% 22.7% 22.5% 40.2% 71.7% 74.2% 62.2% 57.6% 52.2% 16.2% 20.0% 15.1% 19.9% 7.6% 17.1% 15.1% 16.3% 14.9% 10.8% 70.4% 69.5% 63.6% 61.8% 61.3% 12.6% 15.4% 20.1% 23.3% 28.0% 19.3% 22.0% 26.0% 69.6% 62.7% 63.5% 11.1% 15.3% 10.4% 2.9% 9.2% 13.2% 18.6% 27.2% 27.3% 28.4% 66.2% 73.8% 67.0% 81.4% 61.9% 48.1% 61.4% 30.9% 17.0% 19.8% 0.0% 10.9% 24.7% 10.2% 9.5% 24.9% 8.8% 69.0% 58.9% 73.6% 21.4% 16.2% 17.6% 12.1% 27.7% 69.7% 56.6% 18.2% 15.7% 23.7% 5.5% 0 59.1% 80.7% 8 17.3% 13.8% 0 23.5% 60.6% 15.8% 21 Christians (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced 0 7 3 14.3% 23.1% 18.8% 39.1% 74.2% 58.4% 62.4% 47.8% 11.5% 18.6% 18.8% 13.0% Who is the Aggressor? In 40% of cases where domestic violence occurs, the aggressor is the partner, followed by parents and brothers (Figure 9). However, the answers vary by gender: 61.5% of women said that the latest case of violence inside the home that they were personally exposed to, or had witnessed, was committed by the partner, with brothers coming in second place (17.1%) and parents in third (8.8%). (Fig. 10). Only around a quarter of men mentioned the partner and parents. The two following chapters pay particular attention to spousal violence, as it is the most widespread of all types of domestic violence towards women. See figure (10). Figure 9. Who was the main aggressor in the most recent incident you were exposed to/witnessed? 40,0 16,9 Partner 16,4 A parent 13,9 Brothers Relatives 4,6 4,6 3,7 Friends I prefer not to answer Other Figure 10. Aggressor (by gender) 61,50% 26,00% 26,00% 17,10% 14,60% 10,60% 8,10% 6,50% 8,10% 8,80% 4,40% 1,50% 1,50% Man I prefer not to answer 5,40% Woman Other Friends A parent Relatives Brothers Partner 22 Reaction to the Assault In general, women do not report domestic violence which occurs against them, regardless of the identity of the aggressor. As Figure (11) shows, the percentage of those who said that they reported the incident slightly increased to reach 13.9% when the aggressor was a relative of the victim or was someone from outside the family (20.0%). In the case of the husband’s aggression, only 6.8% reported the incident to one of the competent authorities. Figure 11. Reporting the assault in the sample of women 93,60% 80,00% 92,30% 88,30% 77,80% 20,00% 13,90% 6,40% 3,80% 8,30% 6,80% 0,00%0,00% Yes No Other A parent Relatives 3,80%4,90% I prefer not to answer Brothers Partner 23 Chapter II: The Perception of Forms of Violence Against Women and Attitudes Towards Them The Prevalence of Violence Women are more aware of spousal violence against women than men, as the largest percentage of females (43.3%) say that it is prevalent to some extent or that it is widely prevalent, compared to 30.9% who say that it is sparse and 18% who say that it rarely happens. On the other hand, over a third of men say that it is common or prevalent to some extent, while the largest percentage of them (around 36.3%) believe that it is sparse and around a quarter of male respondents say that it rarely happens (Figure 12). Figure 12. To what extent, in your opinion, is spousal violence against women prevalent in your area? 30,30% 26,60% 36,30% 30,90% 22,30% 18,00% 13,00% 6,30%7,10% 6,60% 1,50%1,10% Widely Prevalent Prevalent to some extent Little Rarely occurs Woman I do not know No answer Man However, is there any relation between the perception of the prevalence of domestic violence and previous exposure to domestic violence? If any, what is the nature of this relation? To answer this question we conducted a Correspondence Analysis, and found a moderate relationship between exposure to violence and reporting the prevalence of spousal violence against women, as clearly shown in Figure (13):     Those who have already been exposed to assaults inside the home tend to believe that spousal violence against women is widely prevalent. Those who have witnessed an assault inside the home (but have not been personally exposed to it) tend to believe that such violence is prevalent to some extent. Those who have neither been exposed to an assault inside the home nor witnessed any such situation, tend to believe that the prevalence of this kind of violence is little or rare. Those who choose not to declare whether they were exposed to domestic violence tend not to express a clear attitude towards the prevalence of spousal violence. 24 In the following section we identify in detail the demographic and social characteristics of those who say that the prevalence of spousal violence is not common or does not exist at all. Figure 13. Exposure to domestic violence in relation to views on the prevalence of spousal violence To what extent, do you think, that spousal violence against women is prevalent in your area? Have you been personally exposed to or witnessed a domestic violence incident? The Sample of Women The analysis of the results shows a relationship between the perception of the prevalence of spousal violence against women and all other variables, which are summarized in detail in Table (4): Age: Young women (younger than 25 years) report more than other age groups on the prevalence of this type of violence. Income: The proportion of those reporting the prevalence of such violence drops among women with a high income compared to those with a low income. Province: The majority of women in Damascus say that this type of violence is prevalent, along with around half of the women in Idlib and Al-Hasakah, also 42.5% of those in Damascus Rural 25 Province. The majority of respondents in Aleppo, Homs and the camps in Turkey say this type of violence is “not common.” However, an important percentage of the latter regions do say that such violence is dramatically prevalent. Region: Around half of the women in areas under the control of the regime and self-governance areas say that this kind of violence is prevalent, while the percentage declines to 40.6% in opposition controlled areas. The proportion of women in non-besieged opposition areas who say that such violence is not common/rare reached around half, while in the besieged areas the percentage drops to 42.4%. Table 4. Views on the prevalence of spousal violence in relation to demographic and social variables in the sample of women Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Aleppo Homs The camps in Turkey Damascus Rural Province Idlib Al-Hasakah Damascus Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas controlled by the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Prevalent Not common/ rare No Clear Attitude 45.2% 43.3% 44.0% 33.3% 41.2% 44.2% 51.2% 50.9% 54.7% 35.3% 10.6% 5.5% 5.2% 12.0% 23.5% 47.1% 46.7% 42.7% 46.4% 45.5% 55.2% 6.4% 7.8% 2.1% 23.9% 36.8% 38.1% 42.5% 50.6% 51.8% 62.8% 71.6% 60.3% 56.1% 36.8% 39.8% 41.8% 37.2% 4.5% 2.9% 5.8% 20.8% 9.5% 6.4% 0.0% 48.8% 40.6% 53.4% 48.8% 50.6% 40.5% 2.4% 8.8% 6.1% 40.9% 40.6% 42.4% 52.3% 16.7% 7.1% The Sample of Men The study found a relationship between the perception of the prevalence of spousal violence against women and all of the following variables in the sample of men (Table 5): 26 Education: The less educated are most likely to report this type of violence, while the percentage drops to 40% among those who gained a primary/intermediate level education, and lowers to around 30% among those who gained a high school level education and above. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six and above) report the prevalence of such violence the most. Profession: The percentage of those who say spousal violence is prevalent increases among unemployed men in comparison to those who work/study. Ideology: There is a growing conviction that such violence is widely prevalent among Islamists as opposed to Secularists. Age: Although the percentages are close in the various age groups, the lowest percentage, which says that such violence is rare or does not exist, is among young people (younger than 25 years). Province: Men in Idlib (40.7%) and Damascus Rural Province (37.2%) are reported the prevalence of spousal violence most, while the men in Al-Hasakah, Damascus, and Aleppo are the least aware (around a quarter). Region: The proportion of those in areas under the control of the opposition who say that it is prevalent (more than one third) is increasing in comparison to those in areas under the control of the regime and Self-governance areas (up to a quarter). Nationality-Ethnicity: Arab men tend more towards considering such violence common (one-third) in comparison to Kurds (one-quarter). Religion-Sect: One third of Sunnis and one quarter of Shiites say that spousal violence is prevalent. Civil Status: Single men report the prevalence of spousal violence against women less than those who are married. Table 5. Views on the prevalence of spousal violence in relation to demographic and social variables in the sample of men Prevalent Not No Clear common/does Attitude not exist Education Illiterate (in figures) 5 9 6 Primary 40.2% 49.6% 10.2% Intermediate 40.7% 51.8% 7.5% High School 28.1% 63.9% 7.5% University and above 30.3% 62.7% 7.0% No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 29.7% 56.4% 13.9% 3-5 people 31.2% 61.6% 7.3% 6 people and above 39.6% 55.3% 5.0% Profession Working 33.0% 59.4% 7.6% Student 20.6% 60.3% 19.0% 27 Unemployed 42.7% 49.4% 7.9% 17.1% 22.9% 35.9% 43.1% 33.3% 69.9% 69.5% 55.4% 53.2% 50.0% 13.0% 7.6% 8.7% 3.7% 16.7% 32.7% 32.4% 33.3% 37.4% 28.9% 52.0% 61.4% 62.2% 55.2% 63.2% 15.4% 6.2% 4.5% 7.5% 7.9% 25.7% 27.3% 28.6% 32.9% 35.1% 37.2% 40.7% 63.1% 71.4% 57.1% 62.0% 64.9% 52.3% 49.6% 11.3% 1.3% 14.3% 5.1% 0.0% 10.5% 9.7% 25.3% 38.8% 24.2% 68.9% 53.3% 64.4% 5.8% 8.0% 11.4% 35.6% 21.9% 57.0% 65.0% 7.4% 13.1% 36.9% 25.8% 5 55.4% 64.5% 20 7.7% 9.7% 3 29.7% 34.8% 2 2 58.0% 58.2% 7 11 12.3% 7.1% 0 0 Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Province Al-Hasakah Damascus Aleppo Homs The camps in Turkey Damascus Rural Province Idlib Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Nationality - Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Religion - Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) Views on Punishment for the Abusive Spouse It is not easy to determine the meaning of spousal violence as different people’s perceptions of it may differ. How do respondents perceive all of the following cases: physical violence, verbal abuse, verbal threats and deprivation of liberty inside the home? Figure (14) shows how both verbal threats and verbal abuse are not perceived as violence that requires legal punishment by around a third of respondents. This proportion drops to a great extent in the case of physical abuse and the deprivation of liberty inside the home, as we find some 28 consensus among respondents that these cases require legal accountability. Yet, what is the punishment that the perpetrator deserves, for each case, according to the opinions of respondents? Figure 14. How should the law deal with a man who commits any of the following acts? 60,3 46,6 41,8 36,4 31,8 40,7 34,0 31,7 22,4 21,3 14,3 7,00 2,7 0,9 Physical abuse Detention of wife (inside the home) 4,1 4,00 Verbal abuse Verbal threats I do not know/ no answer The perpetrator must not be punished Case by case The perpetrator must be punished The women’s answers differ substantially from the men’s on the necessity to deal with such violence legally. 72.4% of women say that in the case of physical abuse the perpetrator must be punished, while the percentage decreases to around half among men (Table 6). More than half the women say that the deprivation of liberty requires punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage decreases to 38.4% among men (Table 6). Around a quarter of women say that verbal threats or insults require punishment for the perpetrator, while the percentage decreases to 17% among men (Table 6). We review, in what follows, each type of domestic violence and analyse the social and demographic backgrounds of those who are lenient towards the punishment of the perpetrator. Table 6. Opinions concerning punishment of the perpetrator, in relation to demographic and social variables The perpetrator Case by case The perpetrator I do not know/ No must be punished must not be answer punished The sample of women Physical Abuse 72,4% 22,1% 5,0% 0,4% Verbal Abuse 27,3% 46,0% 23,4% 3,3% Deprivation of Liberty 56,0% 32,4% 10,2% 1,3% Verbal Threats 26,6% 43,3% 26,9% 3,3% The sample of men Physical Abuse 49,8% 40,2% 8,8% 1,3% Verbal Abuse 18,1% 38,2% 38,8% 4,8% Deprivation of Liberty 38,4% 39,9% 17,9% 3,8% Verbal Threats 16,8% 38,6% 40,1% 4,6% 29 In the Case of Physical Abuse The Sample of Women The following variables, which have a relationship with attitudes towards physical abuse in the sample of women, are shown in Table (7): Education: The conviction for the necessity of punishing the perpetrator increases with the progress in education. Around a third of illiterate women have this conviction, compared to 82.5% of women who reached university level and above. Sustenance: Women who are responsible for the sustenance of a greater number of individuals are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator. Profession: Housewives are the least likely to support the punishment of the perpetrator of physical abuse, and working women are the most supportive of it. Ideology: There is consensus among Secularists concerning the necessity of punishing the perpetrator; the percentage exceeds 80% in this group, while it drops among Islamists. Age: Women younger than 35 years are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, while those least likely to support it are women older than 56 years. Income: The percentage of those who oppose the punishment of the perpetrator increases among women with a high income. Province: Women in the camps in Turkey are the least supportive of punishing the perpetrator, even though the majority of them do support it (61.2%). There is a consensus in Homs and AlHasakah on the need to punish the perpetrator (over 85%), which is shared by the majority of women in Idlib, Aleppo, Damascus and its rural region (between 67% -77 %). Region: Women in areas under the control of the opposition are the least supportive of punishing the perpetrator, although the majority of them do support it (67.8%). The percentage of support reaches a type of consensus in the the areas under the control of the Regime and self-governance, at 84.5% and 91% respectively. Nationality-Ethnicity: Arab women are less supportive than Kurdish women of punishing the perpetrator, although the majority of them support it. Religion-Sect: No Christian women, in our small sample, oppose the punishment of the perpetrator, while a quarter of Sunni women show opposition. Civil Status: Married women are less supportive than single women concerning the punishment of the perpetrator, although the majority of them do support it. 30 Table 7. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of physical abuse in the sample of women Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province The camps in Turkey Aleppo Damascus Rural Province Damascus Idlib Homs Al-Hasakah Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Nationality - Ethnicity Arab Women Kurdish Women Turkmen Women (in figures) Religion - Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) Civil Status The perpetrator must be punished Case by case The perpetrator must not be punished 37,1% 58,0% 66,3% 76,0% 82,5% 34,3% 30,0% 28,5% 22,2% 15,4% 28,6% 12,0% 5,2% 1,8% 2,1% 75,2% 74,2% 60,4% 18,7% 22,4% 33,1% 6,1% 3,4% 6,5% 79,8% 78,2% 72,9% 64,5% 15,8% 21,1% 23,4% 28,0% 4,4% 0,8% 3,7% 7,5% 93,9% 86,6% 69,3% 69,6% 55,4% 5,1% 11,8% 27,7% 27,3% 16,3% 1,0% 1,7% 3,0% 3,1% 28,3% 74,5% 76,7% 69,1% 66,7% 35,3% 20,9% 19,0% 26,1% 26,7% 41,2% 4,6% 4,4% 4,8% 6,7% 23,5% 71,5% 74,5% 75,0% 23,1% 20,8% 11,5% 5,4% 4,7% 13.5% 61,2% 67,0% 67,9% 69,8% 76,5% 86,8% 92,0% 27,2% 31,8% 30,2% 20,9% 21,3% 13,2% 5,8% 11,6% 1,1% 1,9% 9,3% 2,2% 0,0% 2,2% 84,5% 67,8% 91,0% 10,7% 26,7% 6,2% 4,8% 5,6% 2,8% 70,1% 88,8% 5 24,3% 10,3% 3 5,6% 0,9% ` 69,0% 10 25,4% 0 5,7% 0 31 Single Married Widowed Divorced (in figures) 84,7% 69,3% 64,3% 20 12,5% 24,8% 31,0% 2 2,8% 5,9% 4,8% 1 The Sample of Men Table (8) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards physical abuse in the sample of men: Education: Less educated men have minimum support for the punishment of the perpetrator. Sustenance: The percentage of those who say that the perpetrator must not be punished increases among those responsible for the sustenance of a small number of people compared with those responsible for the sustenance of more people. However, the main division is between the belief in the necessity of punishing the perpetrator and the possibility of tolerance in some cases. Ideology: Islamists are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than Secularists. Province: The majority of those in the cities of Al-Hasakah, Homs and Damascus Rural Province support the punishment of the perpetrator. The respondents are divided in Idlib and Damascus, while the majority in the camps in Turkey and Aleppo say that each case must be examined individually. It is noted, though, that the highest percentage of respondents who say the perpetrator must not be punished is found in Damascus (around a quarter), while the percentage drops in Aleppo and the camps in Turkey. Region: The majority of men in areas under the control of the Regime (71.1%) say that the perpetrator must be punished, along with the majority of respondents in Self-governance areas (62.4%). The percentage declines to 39.5% in areas under the control of the opposition. Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs support the punishment of the perpetrator less than Kurds: 46.6% compared to 65.6%. Religion-Sect: The majority of Shiites and Alawites say that the perpetrator must be punished, while Sunnis are divided. Table 8. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of physical abuse in the sample of men Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people The perpetrator must be punished Case by case The perpetrator must not be punished 52,6% 43,9% 40,6% 51,4% 60,1% 47,4% 43,9% 49,3% 38,1% 34,8% 0,0% 12,2% 10,1% 10,6% 5,2% 50,2% 48,7% 37,7% 41,7% 12,1% 9,6% 32 6 people and above 53,6% 41,3% 5,0% 64,2% 82,5% 45,7% 32,4% 40,0% 35,0% 14,8% 45,7% 53,8% 44,5% 0,8% 2,7% 8,6% 13,9% 15,5% 24,7% 27,0% 35,1% 45,3% 57,1% 59,2% 62,9% 62,3% 56,8% 37,7% 47,8% 39,4% 29,4% 35,3% 13,0% 16,2% 27,3% 6,9% 3,5% 11,4% 1,8% 71,1% 39,5% 62,4% 19,6% 49,5% 35,8% 9,3% 11,0% 1,8% 46,6% 65,6% 42,9% 33,1% 10,5% 1,3% 41,3% 77,4% 24 47,5% 19,4% 4 11,1% 3,2% 0 Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Province Aleppo The camps in Turkey Damascus Idlib Damascus Rural Province Homs Al-Hasakah Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Nationality – Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Religion - Denomination Sunnis Shiites Alawites (in figures) In the Case of Verbal Abuse The Sample of Women The following variables, summarized in Table (9), highlight attitudes towards verbal abuse in the sample of women: Education: Those who most oppose the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal abuse are the less educated. Sustenance: Those who are responsible for the sustenance of fewer individuals are most supportive of punishing the perpetrator. Profession: Housewives are most opposed to the punishment of the perpetrator, while students and working women are the least opposed to it. Ideology: Islamists oppose the punishment of the perpetrator more than Secularists. Province: Women in Al-Hasakah support the punishment of the perpetrator the most (more than half), while those who support it the least are women in Homs, Aleppo and the refugee camps in Turkey. 33 Region: More than half of the women in Self-governance areas agree with punishing the perpetrator, while the percentage drops to around a quarter in the areas under the control of the regime and the opposition. Women in besieged areas are more favorable towards supporting the punishment of the perpetrator in comparison to women in non-besieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than Kurds. Civil Status: Those who are married are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, while the most supportive of punishment are single and divorced women. Table 9. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal abuse in the sample of women Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Province Homs Aleppo The camps in Turkey Damascus Idlib Damascus Rural Province Al-Hasakah Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas The perpetrator must be punished Case by case The perpetrator must not be punished 11,8% 15,2% 24,9% 32,7% 33,7% 44,1% 41,4% 48,5% 48,6% 49,3% 44,1% 43,4% 26,6% 18,7% 17,0% 32,6% 26,4% 19,3% 43,9% 49,3% 54,8% 23,6% 24,3% 25,9% 37,7% 32,3% 24,3% 19,6% 43,8% 51,5% 53,4% 48,0% 18,5% 16,2% 22,3% 32,4% 60,2% 27,2% 24,4% 25,4% 20,0% 36,6% 58,8% 51,2% 47,9% 32,2% 3,2% 14,0% 24,4% 26,8% 47,8% 15,8% 16,1% 17,4% 30,2% 31,4% 33,7% 54,8% 54,4% 65,5% 47,8% 18,6% 43,8% 59,2% 40,0% 29,8% 18,4% 34,8% 51,2% 24,8% 7,1% 5,2% 23,3% 23,9% 53,2% 39,7% 49,5% 41,8% 37,0% 26,6% 5,0% 29,6% 22,5% 56,0% 48,2% 14,4% 29,2% 34 Nationality - Ethnicity Arab Women Kurdish Women Turkmen Women (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced 24,3% 48,1% 3 48,7% 47,2% 4 27,0% 4,7% 1 38,3% 23,2% 37,0% 43,5% 44,2% 50,4% 35,8% 43,5% 17,5% 26,4% 27,2% 13,0% The Sample of Men The analysis of the results shows a relationship between each of the following variables, which are summarized in Table (10), in relation to attitudes towards verbal abuse in the sample of men: Sustenance: The largest percentage (44.5%) of those responsible for the sustenance of up to two people say that the perpetrator must not be punished, while the rest of the categories are divided between those who oppose the punishment of the perpetrator and those who prefer leniency in some cases. Profession: The percentage of respondents who say that they are against the punishment of the perpetrator substantially drops among students compared to unemployed respondents. Students are the most supportive of punishment. Age: Young people (younger than 25 years) are more inclined to support the punishment of the perpetrator (25.2%), while support declines as the respondents get older. Province: Men in Damascus Rural Province are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator (more than one-third). The percentage drops to around a quarter in Idlib and AlHasakah, while it dramatically drops in other areas, and reaches a low of 7.1% in Homs. Region: In areas under the control of the regime the majority tend to oppose the punishment of the perpetrator, while respondents in Self-governance areas tend to be lenient in some cases. As for respondents in areas under the control of the opposition, they are divided between leniency and non-punishment. Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurdish men support a case by case study on the issue of verbal abuse, while Arabs are more divided, with a tendency towards opposing the punishment. Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents agree to the punishment of the perpetrator, while the percentage of those who agree with punishment does not exceed 20% among Sunnis. Civil Status: Those who are married are less supportive than single people with regards to the punishment of the perpetrator. 35 Table 10. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal abuse in the sample of men No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above The perpetrator must be punished Case by case The perpetrator must not be punished 24.3% 19.8% 13.6% 31.2% 40.6% 46.6% 44.5% 39.6% 39.8% 17.7% 28.8% 26.8% 41.3% 44.1% 24.4% 41.1% 27.1% 48.8% 25.9% 13.5% 13.4% 17.2% 43.2% 55.4% 50.7% 40.6% 31.7% 29.7% 18.8% 35.7% 46.0% 51.2% 27.0% 25.2% 21.5% 16.6% 10.2% 15.1% 35.7% 40.1% 40.4% 46.4% 39.7% 39.1% 38.4% 43.0% 43.4% 45.2% 7.1% 10.4% 12.0% 13.9% 21.1% 23.8% 36.6% 32.4% 9.1% 68.0% 27.8% 61.0% 34.4% 39.6% 60.5% 80.5% 20.0% 58.3% 17.8% 41.9% 23.8% 7.2% 22.4% 20.5% 31.3% 36.1% 61.4% 61.5% 41.5% 18.1% 17.9% 20.3% 35.8% 63.4% 46.3% 16.3% 19.9% 0.0% 2 37.1% 43.3% 10 43.1% 56.7% 13 Province Homs Damascus Aleppo The camps in Turkey Al-Hasakah Idlib Damascus Rural Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status 36 Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) 24.8% 17.2% 1 3 37.6% 41.5% 4 1 37.6% 41.3% 4 9 In the Case of Verbal Threats The Sample of Women There is a relationship between attitudes towards verbal threats and each of the following variables (Table 11): Education: The support for the punishment of a person who makes verbal threats against his wife increases with the progress in education, as it rises from 11.8% among the illiterate to reach 33.6% among university graduates. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people. Profession: Workers and students are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator (around one third) while housewives are the least supportive (17.4%). Ideology: Secularists are more favorable towards supporting the punishment of the perpetrator in comparison to Islamists. Income: The largest proportion of those who have a low/moderate income tend to be lenient in some cases (around 40%). Province: The majority of women in Al-Hasakah wish for the perpetrator to be punished, while the percentage substantially drops in other areas. The majority of those in Aleppo, Damascus Rural Province and Homs prefer leniency in some cases along with the largest percentage of respondents in the camps in Turkey, while women are divided in Idlib between leniency and opposition. Region: The majority of women in areas under Self-governance wish to punish the perpetrator, while the largest percentage of those in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition prefer leniency in some cases as they believe the issue must be studied on a case-by-case basis. The percentage of those who oppose the punishment of the perpetrator substantially increases to 34.7% in beseiged areas, in comparison to 15.3% in non-beseiged areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: The largest percentage of Arab women prefer leniency in some cases, while the majority of Kurdish women wish to punish the perpetrator in all cases. Civil Status: Married women are less supportive of punishing the perpetrator than single women (23.4% and 39.8%, respectively). 37 Table 11. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal threats in the sample of women The perpetrator must Case by case The perpetrator must be punished not be punished Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Homs The camps in Turkey Idlib Damascus Damascus Rural Province Aleppo Al-Hasakah Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Turkmen (in figures) 11.8% 12.6% 23.8% 31.6% 33.8% 44.1% 44.1% 48.2% 48.8% 41.2% 44.1% 43.4% 28.0% 19.5% 25.1% 33.1% 25.0% 16.3% 40.5% 47.0% 51.9% 26.4% 28.0% 31.9% 36.7% 35.1% 24.3% 17.4% 38.0% 46.6% 52.4% 48.0% 25.3% 18.3% 23.3% 34.6% 71.3% 32.7% 22.9% 20.6% 16.7% 26.6% 54.9% 50.0% 44.0% 36.7% 2.1% 12.4% 27.1% 35.4% 46.7% 30.0% 27.9% 36.2% 40.0% 39.4% 33.0% 30.0% 32.7% 30.9% 15.0% 16.7% 21.3% 23.3% 25.5% 34.5% 65.4% 58.3% 44.0% 37.3% 27.9% 67.3% 63.2% 29.3% 26.7% 39.2% 41.3% 48.8% 7.1% 2.3% 5.3% 19.7% 21.4% 63.3% 47.4% 47.2% 30.2% 32.9% 31.4% 6.5% 22.6% 21.0% 62.1% 44.2% 15.3% 34.7% 21.6% 59.6% 3 47.2% 34.6% 3 31.2% 5.8% 2 38 Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) 39.8% 23.4% 27.2% 6 42.7% 45.6% 42.0% 11 17.5% 31.0% 30.9% 5 The Sample of Men Table (12) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards verbal threats in the sample of men: Sustenance: The largest proportion of those responsible for the sustenance of up to two people oppose the punishment of the perpetrator. Those responsible for the sustenance of three to five people are divided. Being the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, the largest proportion of those responsible for the sustenance of six people and above say there must be tolerance in some cases. Ideology: Secularists tend to be lenient in some cases, while Islamists prefer not to punish the perpetrator. Income: The percentage of those who support the punishment of the perpetrator declines with the increase in income. It drops from around a quarter among people with a low income and reaches a low of 16.7% among people with a high income, i.e. more than 75 thousand per month. Province: Men in Damascus Rural Province and Al-Hasakah are the most supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator (more than a quarter), while the percentage drops and reaches its lowest level in the camps in Turkey (only 4.3%) as the vast majority of respondents in this region say that the perpetrator must not be punished. The majority of men in Damascus and Homs share the same opinion along with the largest percentage in Idlib (around half). Region: Men in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition tend to oppose the punishment of the perpetrator, while men in self-governance areas prefer leniency in some cases. Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Arabs (around half) prefer not to punish the perpetrator, while the majority of Kurds tend to be lenient in some cases. Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents agree to the punishment of the perpetrator, while the proportion of those who agree with punishment does not exceed 17.4% among Sunnis. Table 12. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of verbal threats in the sample of men The perpetrator Case by case must be punished No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center The perpetrator must not be punished 24.8% 17.6% 11.9% 33.7% 39.3% 47.6% 41.5% 43.2% 40.5% 30.6% 16.9% 16.6% 52.3% 51.7% 41.9% 17.1% 31.4% 41.5% 39 Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province The camps in Turkey Homs Damascus Aleppo Idlib Al-Hasaka Damascus Rural Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites ( in figures) 10.9% 28.6% 30.2% 34.8% 58.9% 36.6% 25.3% 15.3% 16.7% 33.8% 38.9% 47.1% 40.9% 45.8% 36.3% 4.3% 5.9% 11.7% 13.5% 17.6% 27.6% 31.9% 27.1% 32.8% 11.7% 74.3% 32.6% 58.4% 42.9% 68.6% 61.3% 76.6% 12.2% 49.8% 14.0% 25.2% 6.3% 18.0% 27,5% 35.6% 36.5% 57.3% 58.2% 45.5% 15.2% 14.8% 29.4% 37.1% 56.2% 48.1% 14.4% 17.4% 0.0% 2 37.4% 43.3% 11 45.2% 56.7% 12 In the Case of Deprivation of Liberty The Sample of Women Table (13) shows the relationship between attitudes towards the deprivation of liberty and each of the following variables in the sample of women: Education: Support for the punishment of the perpetrator increases with progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a greater number of people are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator. Profession: Housewives are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator, while students are the most supportive. Ideology: Secularists support the punishment of the perpetrator more than Islamists. Income: Individuals with a higher income are more inclined to punishment the perpetrator than those with a lower income (i.e. low/moderate). support the Province: There is almost a consensus among women in Al-Hasakah on the necessity of punishing the perpetrator (88.8%), along with the majority of respondents in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus Rural Province. More than half of the women in Idlib share the same attitude, while women in 40 Damascus are divided. The important difference occurs in the case of the refugee camps in Turkey, as the largest percentage (46.4%) of respondents tend to be lenient in some cases. Region: There is a consensus on the necessity of punishing the perpetrator among the women in Self-governance areas along with the majority of women in areas under the control of the regime, while the percentage drops to around half in areas under the control of the opposition. Women in besieged areas are more supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator in comparison to women in non-besieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: There is almost a consensus among Kurdish women on the necessity of punishing the perpetrator, while the proportion declines to around half among Arab women. Religion-Sect: Half of the Sunni respondents and all of the Christian respondents support punishment of the perpetrator. Civil Status: Single women are the most supportive of punishment (over 68.9%) while married women are the least supportive (53%). Table 13. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of deprivation of liberty in the sample of women Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province The camps in Turkey Damascus The perpetrator must be punished Case by case The perpetrator must not be punished 30.3% 41.9% 49.1% 62.7% 64.8% 39.4% 36.5% 40.4% 30.5% 29.0% 30.3% 21.6% 10.5% 6.8% 6.2% 62.6% 55.5% 41.6% 26.1% 36.1% 46.0% 11.3% 8.4% 12.4% 61.9% 64.6% 56.6% 49.6% 28.9% 30.8% 34.0% 36.8% 9.1% 4.6% 9.4% 13.6% 91.7% 75.4% 62.6% 40.3% 41.3% 7.3% 18.6% 31.0% 47.3% 28.3% 1.0% 5.9% 6.4% 12.4% 30.4% 57.9% 56.5% 62.5% 28.9% 32.9% 22.9% 13.2% 10.6% % 14,6 32.4% 44.2% 46.4% 44.2% 21.2% 11.6% 41 Idlib Damascus Rural Province Aleppo Homs Al-Hasakah Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Turkmen (in figures) Sect Sunnis Christians Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) 54.1% 68.0% 72.7% 77.9% 88.8% 34.9% 30.1% 26.1% 20.6% 9.0% 10.9% 1.9% 1.1% 1.5% 2.2% 67.9% 49.4% 88.7% 26.2% 38.2% 9.2% 6.0% 12.4% 2.1% 65.9% 45.9% 31.8% 39.5% 2.3% 14.6% 52.2% 86.7% 3 36.5% 10.5% 4 11.3% 2.9% 1 52.0% 10 36.2% 0 11.8% 0 68.9% 53.0% 55.3% 13 25.0% 35.4% 31.8% 9 6.1% 11,6% 12.9% 1 The Sample of Men The analysis of the results shows a relationship between each of the following variables, which are summarized in table (14), in relation to attitudes towards the deprivation of liberty in the sample of men: Education: Support for the punishment of the perpetrator increases with progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a greater number of people are the least supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator. Profession: Students and unemployed individuals are more supportive of punishment than those in work. Ideology: Secularists are more supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator compared to Islamists. Income: Those with a moderate income are less supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than those in other income groups. Province: The majority of men in Damascus Rural Province and Al-Hasakah say that the perpetrator must be punished, while the respondents are divided in Homs. The percentage of support drops to less than a third in Idlib and Aleppo, and to less than a quarter in Damascus. 42 However, unexpected results were found in the camps in Turkey, where less than 3% said that he must be punished. Region: The percentage of support for the punishment of the perpetrator reaches its peak in Self – governance areas (56.9%), and drops to around a third in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition. Men in besieged areas are more supportive of the punishment of the perpetrator than men in nonbesieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: 60% of Kurdish men support the punishment of the perpetrator, while only one third of Arabs wish for the perpetrator to be punished. Religion-Sect: Around one-third of Sunnis and Shiites wish to punish the perpetrator. None of the Alawite respondents, in the small sample, oppose the punishment of the perpetrator (0.0% said the perpetrator should not be punished, while this percentage reaches around a quarter among Sunnis and Shiites). Table 14. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator of deprivation of liberty in the sample of men The perpetrator must Case by case The perpetrator must be punished not be punished Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province The camps in Turkey Damascus 8 33.6% 34.8% 38.2% 48.1% 6 42.0% 46.4% 42.2% 37.0% 5 24.4% 18.7% 19.5% 14.8% 47.8% 40.0% 33.3% 30.3% 39.7% 53.7% 21.9% 20.3% 12.9% 38.7% 48.3% 46.3% 42.0% 48.3% 31.7% 19.3% 3.3% 22.0% 60.3% 51.4% 40.4% 26.7% 34.6% 34.5% 38.5% 40.4% 45.4% 46.2% 5.2% 10.1% 19.2% 27.9% 19.2% 43.2% 34.8% 41.3% 34.2% 47.7% 43.0% 22.5% 17.5% 15.7% 2.7% 23.4% 47.3% 41.6% 50.0% 35.1% 43 Idlib Aleppo Homs Al-Hasakah Damascus Rural Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites (in figures) 28.9% 30.3% 34.7% 57.5% 68.3% 59.6% 61.8% 34.7% 35.5% 24.0% 11.5% 7.9% 30.7% 7.0% 7.8% 36.2% 35.7% 56.9% 42.1% 42.9% 36.5% 21.7% 21.4% 6.6% 51.3% 23.6% 23.8% 57.6% 24.9% 18.8% 35.3% 60.0% 43.4% 34.2% 21.4% 5.8% 35.6% 33.3% 15 42.7% 43.3% 13 21.7% 23.3% 0 One of the most suitable methods to summarize these results is to conduct a type of Multivariate Statistical Analysis, which is known as Cluster Analysis. This analysis enables us to classify data into different groups, according to the distinctive characteristics of each cluster, so that we can create groups based on attitudes towards the issues mentioned above. The first group wishes to hold the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases. They say that he must be punished in cases of physical abuse and the deprivation of liberty, and they show leniency in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat. The second group wishes for leniency in the cases of physical abuse and the deprivation of liberty and opposes legal accountability in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat. Figure (15) shows that the majority of women wish to hold the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases (67.5%), although some show leniency in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat. The proportion of support for full accountability drops among men to just over half (54.3%). Figure 15. Holding the perpetrator legally accountable (among men and women) Women 67,50% Men 32,50% 54,30% 0% 10% 20% 30% 45,70% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Holding the perpetrator legally accountable in all cases opposes legal accountability in the cases of verbal abuse and verbal threat 44 Chapter III: The Justifications of Spousal Violence Against Women In the previous chapter, we learned about attitudes towards spousal violence against women. However, what are the excuses which justify such acts? What are the social and ideological characteristics of those who do not oppose domestic violence? To understand these points, we introduced two different types of common justifications:   The first does not hold women responsible for violence occurring against them, and involves two interpretations. One is based on religious interpretations, as Islamic Law is used to justify such violence, while the second uses comparisons with neighboring Arab countries to show that violence against wives in Syria is not the most extreme example. The second holds the victim responsible for violence occurring against her, as it assumes that these acts occur because women are uneducated, or because they are the ones who push men to resort to violence. Figure (16) shows the following:     Only a third of respondents oppose the argument that "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases." Only 16.9% reject the hypothesis that the situation in Syria is not the worst example, in comparison with other Arab countries. Only 35.8% oppose the argument that women bear responsibility, being the ones who push their husbands to commit violence in some cases. Less than half of the respondents refuse to lay responsibility on women under the pretext that women are uneducated. We will later understand the demographic and social characteristics of those who agree with these statements. However, in view of the differences between men and women, the attitudes of both genders are summarized in Table (15) which shows how men are more supportive of these statements in comparison to women. Figure 16. Which attitude do you have towards the following statements? 38,5 23,6 11,3 15,6 33,0 37,5 11,0 3,9 13,0 32,1 12,7 Islamic Law allows the beating The violence against wives in of wives in some cases Syria is few in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries Strongly disagree Disagree 13,6 20,5 38,5 29,3 24,2 4,4 Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated Not sure Agree 11,6 15,7 10,0 The existence of logical reasons for violence against women Strongly agree 45 Table 15. The attitude towards statements (by gender) Women Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated The existence of logical reasons for violence against women Men Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated The existence of logical reasons for violence against women Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly disagree 7,2% 35,1% 15,1% 27,1% 15,4% 11,7% 32,2% 36,5% 13,7% 5,9% 5,4% 24,2% 18,6% 32,6% 19,2% 6,6% 31,3% 13,9% 30,2% 18,0% 14,2% 41,5% 16,0% 20,6% 7,7% 13,5% 42,1% 29,9% 12,4% 2,1% 3,7% 33,8% 22,1% 31,6% 8,8% 12,9% 44,7% 17,3% 18,9% 6,1% Justifications which do not lay responsibility on the female victim Religious Justification: "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases." The Sample of Women There is a relationship between the attitudes towards religious justification and each of the variables summarized in detail in Table (16): Education: Agreement with this statement declines with progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are the ones who are most inclined to agree with the religious justification, compared to those who are responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people. Profession: Housewives are the most supportive of this justification, while students and working women are the most opposed to it. Ideology: The percentage of respondents who agree with religious justification dramatically increases among Islamists compared with Secularists. Age: The percentage of respondent agreement increases among those older than 36 years compared to younger women. Income: Those with a moderate income are the most supportive of this justification, while those with a lower income are most opposed (around half of the respondents). 46 Province: The majority of women refugees in the camps in Turkey (%65.3( agree with this religious justification (63.6%), as well as around half of the respondents in Aleppo and Idlib. The percentage substantially drops in Damascus and Damascus Rural Province to around a quarter, drops again to 14.7% in Homs, and reaches a low of 5% in Al-Hasakah. Region: The vast majority of respondents in areas under the control of the regime and Self – governance areas oppose the religious justification, while half of the women in areas under the control of the opposition support it. Women in non-besieged opposition areas are more supportive of this justification than women in besieged areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: There is almost a consensus among Kurdish women on opposing this justification, while half of Arab women support it. Religion-Sect: All Christian women, in our small sample, oppose this justification, while around half of Sunni women support it. Civil Status: Single women tend to oppose this justification, while less than half of the married women support it. Table 16. The attitude towards the statement "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases" in the sample of women Agree No clear attitude Disagree Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology 58,3% 60,5% 44,8% 38,3% 35,0% 19,4% 6,6% 15,1% 14,9% 18,3% 22,2% 32,9% 40,1% 46,8% 46,8% 36,8% 45,3% 51,8% 12,8% 15,3% 22,3% 50,4% 39,4% 25,9% 39,9% 32,3% 43,5% 47,6% 13,2% 18,8% 13,9% 15,9% 46,9% 48,9% 42,6% 36,5% Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 7,1% 14,2% 36,5% 59,6% 69,6% 7,1% 17,5% 17,1% 18,0% 3,3% 85,9% 68,3% 46,4% 22,5% 27,2% 41,3% 38,7% 43,1% 56,0% 14,2% 13,4% 20,7% 10,7% 44,6% 48,0% 36,2% 33,3% Education 47 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Al-Hasakah Homs Damascus Damascus Rural Province Idlib Aleppo The camps in Turkey Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Nationality – Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Turkmen (in figures) Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced (in figures) 64,7% 11,8% 23,5% 34,6% 43,9% 34,4% 10,7% 16,9% 18,8% 54,6% 39,2% 46,9% 5,0% 14,7% 25,6% 28,3% 48,5% 55,7% 65,3% 9,9% 11,8% 9,3% 18,9% 26,0% 19,3% 8,2% 85,1% 73,5% 65,1% 52,8% 25,5% 25,0% 26,5% 13,1% 11,9% 75,0% 52,8% 16,4% 30,9% 6,8% 10,8% 82,4% 31,1% 57,4% 16,7% 16,3% 52,3% 26,2% 48,2% 5,5% 5 16,2% 8,3% 1 35,6% 86,2% 2 48,7% 0 15,7% 0 35,5% 10 30,4% 45,7% 48,2% 9 12,9% 15,6% 15,3% 5 56,7% 38,7% 36,5% 9 The Sample of Men The variables associated with attitudes towards religious justification are summarized in Table (17) as follows: Education: Agreement with this statement declines with progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are more likely to agree with this justification. Profession: The unemployed are most likely to agree with religious justification (67.4%), while those least likely to support it are students (around half). Ideology: The percentage of those agreeing with this justification dramatically increases among Islamists compared with Secularists. Age: Young respondents (younger than 25 years) agree with religious justification the most. 48 Income: Those with a higher income show more opposition to religious justification than those with a lower income. Province: There is almost a consensus among respondents in the camps in Turkey and Idlib on supporting this justification along with the majority of respondents in Aleppo and Damascus Rural Province. The percentage drops to half in Damascus and reaches 40% in Homs. The percentage of respondents in agreement reaches its lowest in Al-Hasakah, where this justification is only supported by around a quarter of men. Region: The vast majority of respondents in areas under control of the opposition (around 77%) agree with this justification, along with around 25% in areas under control of the regime and Self – governance areas. The support of this justification increases in non-besieged opposition areas compared to besieged areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Arab men support this justification, while the majority of Kurdish men oppose it (over 60% in both cases). Religion - Sect: The majority of Shiites refuse to give a clear attitude (58.1%), while the majority of Sunnis support this justification (68.4%). Civil Status: Around a third of single men oppose this justification, which is higher than among married men (around a quarter). Table 17. The attitude towards the statement "Islamic Law allows the beating of wives in some cases" in the sample of men Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years Agree No clear attitude Disagree 7 62,2% 63,6% 56,5% 47,0% 6 14,2% 20,0% 16,8% 11,5% 7 23,6% 16,4% 26,7% 41,5% 51,9% 55,0% 60,1% 10,9% 16,0% 20,1% 37,2% 28,9% 19,8% 55,1% 49,2% 67,4% 17,1% 7,9% 10,1% 27,8% 42,9% 22,5% 20,3% 14,8% 60,3% 81,0% 84,2% 17,9% 30,0% 16,7% 8,6% 7,0% 61,8% 55,2% 23,1% 10,3% 8,8% 66,1% 55,1% 52,4% 11,0% 11,9% 18,3% 22,8% 33,0% 29,3% 49 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Al-Hasakah Homs Damascus Damascus Rural Province Aleppo The camps in Turkey Idlib Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) 45,4% 57,9% 25,9% 22,4% 28,7% 19,7% 70,7% 56,0% 44,9% 7,9% 18,8% 17,4% 21,4% 25,1% 37,7% 23,0% 40,8% 49,4% 64,0% 73,8% 82,4% 83,9% 17,6% 27,1% 6,5% 12,8% 16,7% 1,4% 12,3% 59,5% 32,2% 44,2% 23,3% 9,5% 16,2% 3,8% 23,6% 32,0% 44,4% 77,1% 10,2% 12,7% 22,8% 17,4% 59,8% 70,2% 82,7% 8,9% 10,2% 20,9% 7,1% 63,2% 18,8% 15,7% 19,4% 21,1% 61,9% 68,4% 19,4% 1 12,4% 58,1% 3 19,1% 22,6% 24 55,1% 56,2% 0 9 11,6% 17,3% 5 0 33,3% 26,5% 3 4 The Justification of Comparison: "The cases of violence against wives in Syria are fewer in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries." The Sample of Women Table (18) summarizes all variables that have a relationship with the justification of violence through comparison to neighboring countries and the assumption that such violence is less prevalent in Syria: Profession: Housewives accept this justification the most. Ideology: Islamists accept this justification more than Secularists. 50 Income: Those with a higher/moderate income accept this justification more than those with a lower income. Province: The majority of women in the camps in Turkey (around 57%) and around half in Homs, accept this justification. The percentage declines to 40% in Damascus, Idlib and Aleppo, reaches around a third in Damascus Rural Province and around a quarter in Al-Hasakah. Region: Around half of the respondents in areas under the control of the opposition accept this justification, along with 42.9% in areas under the control of the regime and around a quarter in self–governance areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs (45.9%) accept this justification more than Kurds (27.5%). Religion-Sect: Half of the Christian respondents in our small sample accept this justification along with 45.9% of Sunnis. Table 18. Attitudes towards the statement “The violence against wives in Syria is few in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries” in the sample of women Agree No clear attitude Disagree 42,8% 32,3% 42,6% 49,4% 34,3% 47,4% 35,2% 35,0% 22,9% 20,3% 22,2% 15,7% 30,3% 40,8% 41,8% 48,9% 51,1% 45,5% 35,0% 38,2% 36,8% 21,7% 24,2% 24,2% 20,1% 14,3% 27,2% 43,6% 47,5% 47,9% 30,7% 32,2% 30,2% 25,7% 20,4% 21,9% 24,1% 31,1% 43,2% 43,7% 44,2% 50,0% 57,1% 50,4% 47,2% 50,0% 34,2% 18,6% 26,5% 28,6% 25,5% 21,7% 6,8% 22,1% 37,2% 23,5% 14,3% 42,9% 21,4% 35,7% 47,8% 35,5% 16,8% 25,7% 50,0% 24,3% 45,9% 27,5% 6 34,5% 54,1% 1 19,6% 18,3% 1 45,9% 36,3% 17,9% Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Al-Hasakah Damascus Rural Province Aleppo Idlib Damascus Homs The camps in Turkey Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the Opposition Self-governance areas Nationality - Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Turkmen (in figures) Religion - Sect Sunnis 51 Christians (in figures) 5 3 2 The Sample of Men Table (19) shows variables associated with attitudes towards the justification of violence through comparison to neighboring countries and the assumption that such violence is less prevalent in Syria, in the sample of men: Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of three to five people hold the highest percentage of acceptance for this justification, while those responsible for the sustenance of six people and above oppose it the most. Ideology: Islamists accept this justification more than Secularists. Income: Agreement with this statement drops among those with a higher income in comparison to those with a lower income. Province: The vast majority of respondents in the camps in Turkey and Aleppo accept this justification, along with the majority in Damascus (62.3%) and half of the respondents in Idlib, Damascus Rural Province, Al-Hasakah and Homs. Region: This justification is accepted by the majority in areas under the control of the opposition (59.6%), by around half of the respondents in Self-governance areas, and by 45.8% of respondents in areas under the control of the Regime. Those in non-besieged opposition areas agree with this justification more than those in besieged areas. Religion-Sect: The proportion of opposition to this justification increases among Shiites compared to Sunnis. Table 19. Attitudes towards the statement “The violence against wives in Syria is few in comparison to neighbouring Arab countries” in the sample of men No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Agree No clear attitude Disagree 54,9% 61,4% 46,2% 26,3% 27,4% 37,1% 18,8% 11,2% 16,7% 61,8% 48,0% 54,8% 57,2% 60,5% 27,6% 32,7% 26,3% 32,2% 29,8% 10,6% 19,3% 18,9% 10,6% 9,6% 58,1% 60,4% 47,8% 26,6% 28,5% 31,6% 15,3% 11,1% 20,6% 52 Homs Al-Hasakah Damascus Rural Province Idlib Damascus The camps in Turkey Aleppo Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Religion-Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites (in figures) 46,7% 51,8% 53,5% 53,8% 62,3% 74,3% 78,6% 31,0% 35,1% 31,4% 36,0% 7,8% 24,3% 17,9% 22,4% 13,1% 15,1% 10,2% 29,9% 1,4% 3,6% 45,8% 28,4% 25,8% 59,6% 29,0% 11,4% 53,0% 34,2% 12,8% 55,0% 63,4% 27,7% 29,6% 17,4% 7,1% 57,1% 41,9% 17 29,7% 35,5% 7 13,1% 22,6% 4 Justifications which lay responsibility on the female victim Assuming that Women Exposed to Spousal Violence are Uneducated The Sample of Women Analysis of the results shows a relationship between each of the following variables, which are summarized in Table (20), in relation to attitudes towards violence against women being justified by assuming that the victims are uneducated: Ideology: Secularists are more supportive of this justification than Islamists. Age: Agreement with this justification increases as the respondents get older. Province: Homs and Damascus are the provinces which hold the most support for this justification (61.8% and 51.2%, respectively). This support declines to approximately a quarter in Damascus, the camps in Turkey, Idlib and Al-Hasakah, while only 13.6% of respondents in Aleppo support the statement. Region: The majority of women in areas under the control of the Regime agree with this justification (66.7%), while the proportion of agreement drops to around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition and in Self – governance areas. Respondents in besieged areas oppose this justification more than respondents in non-besieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: Arabs oppose this justification more than Kurds. 53 Religion-Sect: There is a consensus of agreement among Christians in relation to this justification, which is echoed by a quarter of Sunnis. Civil status: Married women oppose this statement the most, while single and widowed women are the most supportive of it. Table 20. Attitudes towards the statement "Women exposed to spousal violence are uneducated” in the sample of women Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Province Aleppo Damascus Rural Province The camps in Turkey Idlib Al-Hasakah Damascus Homs Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Turkmen (in figures) Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced (in figures) Agree No clear attitude Disagree 27,3% 49,2% 25,0% 27,5% 29,3% 26,3% 19,2% 15,1% 22,8% 5,4% 46,5% 31,7% 59,9% 49,7% 65,2% 24,4% 27,6% 32,8% 42,7% 58,8% 21,5% 16,9% 18,5% 16,0% 17,6% 54,1% 55,5% 48,7% 41,3% 23,5% 13,6% 24,5% 26,5% 28,6% 29,1% 51,2% 61,8% 21,6% 10,4% 16,3% 21,6% 31,9% 4,7% 8,8% 64,8% 65,1% 57,1% 49,8% 39,0% 44,2% 29,4% 66,7% 9,5% 23,8% 25,7% 17,1% 57,2% 27,7% 31,8% 40,5% 25,8% 25,7% 8,3% 18,8% 65,9% 55,4% 30,1% 33,0% 0 17,0% 32,1% 1 52,9% 34,9% 7 27,4% 9 17,8% 0 54,9% 1 34,1% 27,6% 37,6% 3 21,7% 18,0% 17,6% 3 44,2% 54,5% 44,7% 17 54 The Sample of Men There is a relationship between attitudes towards violence against women being justified by assuming that the victims are uneducated and each of the variables summarized in detail in Table (21): Ideology: Secularists agree with this justification more than Islamists. Income: Those with a higher income are more supportive of this statement than those with a lower income. Province: Homs and Aleppo are the provinces which hold most support for this justification, while the camps in Turkey and Idlib hold the least. Region: Around half of the men in areas under the control of the Regime agree with this justification, while the percentage drops to around a third in areas under the control of the opposition and in Self-governance areas. Respondents in besieged areas support this statement more than those in non-besieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: Kurds oppose this justification more than Arabs. Religion-Sect: Shiites are more likely to agree with this statement compared to Sunnis. Civil Status: Single men oppose this justification more than married men. Table 21. Attitudes towards the statement "Women exposed to spousal violence are uneducated” in the sample of men Agree Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province The camps in Turkey Idlib Damascus Rural Province Al-Hasakah Damascus Aleppo Homs Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition No clear attitude Disagree 36,6% 54,3% 36,2% 31,3% 27,2% 37,4% 24,7% 17,9% 19,0% 21,9% 26,0% 21,1% 45,8% 49,7% 50,9% 34,1% 35,0% 42,5% 15,3% 25,8% 23,9% 50,7% 39,1% 33,6% 23,0% 26,3% 33,1% 33,8% 35,1% 42,9% 56,9% 16,2% 23,7% 10,5% 41,9% 7,8% 35,7% 12,9% 60,8% 50,0% 56,4% 24,3% 57,1% 21,4% 30,2% 53,3% 16,9% 29,8% 33,3% 17,8% 49,0% 55 Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) 33,8% 41,1% 25,1% 38,7% 29,8% 8,5% 23,6% 52,8% 46,6% 37,8% 36,3% 18,8% 41,3% 43,4% 66,7% 33,9% 41,9% 23 21,2% 25,8% 0 44,9% 32,3% 5 35,1% 38,3% 5 2 22,8% 22,5% 0 0 42,0% 39,2% 4 11 Assuming that there are Logical Reasons for Violence Against Women The Sample of Women This study found a relationship between attitudes towards the justification of violence against women by laying responsibility on the victim and all of the following variables in the sample of women (Table 22): Education: Agreement with this statement declines with the progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people are more supportive of this justification than others. Profession: Housewives are the most supportive of this statement, while students and non-working women support it the least. Ideology: Islamists are more supportive of this justification than Secularists. Income: Respondents with a moderate income are the least supportive of this justification. Province: The majority of women in the camps in Turkey (58.5%) agree with this justification along with the largest proportion of women in Idlib and Homs (42%), while in Aleppo, Al-Hasakah and Damascus Rural Province the greatest proportion oppose it. Region: The majority of those in areas under the control of the Regime and self – governance areas oppose this justification (more than 70%), while the greatest proportion in areas under the control of the opposition (46.8%) agree with it. Those in non-besieged opposition areas are more supportive of this justification than those in besieged areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurds oppose this statement (78.9%), while Arabs are divided between agreement and opposition. 56 Religion-Sect: There is a consensus among Christian respondents to oppose this justification, while Sunni respondents are divided. Civil status: Married women support this statement more than single women. Table 22. Attitudes towards the justification of "The existence of logical reasons for violence against women" in the sample of women Agree No clear attitude Disagree 61,1% 57,2% 41,3% 33,8% 29,0% 8,3% 11,2% 10,5% 12,2% 18,0% 30,6% 31,6% 48,3% 54,1% 53,0% 33,0% 38,9% 51,1% 12,3% 14,5% 17,3% 54,7% 46,6% 31,7% 35,2% 29,3% 29,6% 45,5% 13,2% 20,3% 12,0% 12,9% 51,6% 50,4% 58,3% 41,6% 8,1% 12,5% 39,1% 48,6% 57,6% 9,1% 14,2% 13,2% 18,5% 3,3% 82,8% 73,3% 47,7% 32,9% 39,1% 34,3% 34,9% 33,3% 9,6% 18,4% 10,4% 56,1% 46,7% 56,3% 8,5% 13,2% 14,0% 31,1% 42,0% 44,3% 58,5% 12,1% 13,2% 2,3% 19,8% 26,8% 8,0% 6,1% 79,4% 73,5% 83,7% 49,1% 31,2% 47,7% 35,4% 8,3% 10,7% 81,0% 46,8% 14,3% 38,8% 10,1% 13,5% 76,4% 31,8% 50,0% 15,9% 14,0% 52,3% 36,0% Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Al-Hasakah Homs Damascus Damascus Rural Province Idlib Aleppo The camps in Turkey Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Nationality-Ethnicity 57 Arab Kurdish Turkmen (in figures) Religion-Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced (in figures) 42,5% 11,0% 4 14,5% 10,1% 1 43,0% 78,9% 3 43,7% 0 14,3% 1 42,0% 9 26,7% 41,8% 37,6% 8 12,9% 14,6% 14,1% 1 60,4% 43,7% 48,2% 14 The Sample of Men Table (23) summarizes the variables that are found to have a relationship with attitudes towards the justification of violence against women by laying responsibility on the victim: Education: The proportion of support for this justification drops with the progress in education. Sustenance: The percentage of support increases among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people in comparison to those responsible for a smaller number. Profession: Unemployed respondents are the most supportive of this justification, while students are the least supportive of it. Ideology: Islamists are more supportive of this statement than Secularists. Age: Young men are the most supportive of this justification. Income: The proportion of support for this justification declines with the increase in income. Province: There is a consensus of support among respondents in the camps in Turkey, echoed by the vast majority in Idlib and Aleppo and the majority in Damascus and Damascus Rural Province. The percentage of support drops to approximately 40% in Homs and Al-Hasakah. Region: The vast majority of men in areas under the control of the opposition agree with this statement, along with around one-third in Self – governance areas and a quarter in areas under the control of the Regime. Respondents in besieged areas are less supportive of this justification than those in non-besieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Arabs agree with this justification, while Kurds are divided. Religion-Sect: Around half of the Shiite respondents decline to express a clear attitude, while the majority of Sunnis support this statement. Civil status: Married men oppose this justification more than single men. 58 Table 23. Attitudes towards the justification of "The existence of logical reasons for violence against women" in the sample of men Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Al-Hasakah Homs Damascus Rural Province Damascus Aleppo Idlib The camps in Turkey Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Agree No clear attitude Disagree 9 74,8% 65,7% 55,9% 47,0% 4 9,4% 18,9% 20,1% 15,8% 7 15,7% 15,4% 24,0% 37,3% 52,6% 58,6% 60,4% 12,8% 16,6% 22,3% 34,6% 24,8% 17,3% 57,2% 44,4% 71,9% 18,1% 15,9% 9,0% 24,6% 39,7% 19,1% 36,6% 21,1% 61,9% 78,1% 78,1% 19,5% 33,6% 13,8% 11,8% 9,6% 43,9% 45,3% 24,4% 10,1% 12,3% 62,2% 59,2% 55,3% 50,6% 59,2% 13,8% 13,8% 17,9% 25,9% 25,0% 24,0% 27,0% 26,8% 23,6% 15,8% 67,7% 58,9% 48,6% 9,2% 19,6% 19,4% 23,1% 21,5% 32,0% 36,0% 43,1% 55,2% 57,1% 75,0% 80,1% 87,8% 20,7% 29,4% 11,6% 3,9% 13,1% 16,1% 1,4% 43,2% 27,5% 33,1% 39,0% 11,9% 3,8% 10,8% 28,9% 32,4% 38,7% 74,1% 11,4% 14,5% 36,5% 20,1% 43,4% 64,9% 81,7% 9,9% 12,0% 25,2% 6,3% 59 Nationality – Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Religion-Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) 62,5% 36,3% 16,5% 21,9% 21,0% 41,9% 68,3% 29,0% 2 12,8% 51,6% 7 18,9% 19,4% 19 52,2% 59,6% 5 7 13,0% 19,0% 2 0 34,8% 21,4% 9 6 60 Chapter IV: "Honor Killings" The Perception of the Prevalence of “Honor Killings” Figure 17. Have you heard of any honor crime that took place in your area over the past year? 2,5 15,5 82,0 Yes No No Answer Only 15.5% said they had heard of an honor crime taking place in their area during the last year (Figure 17). The prevalence of honor killings by province and region is summarized in Table (24) as follows: Around one-third of respondents in the city of Al-Hasakah say that they had heard of an honor crime taking place in their area over the past year. The percentage drops to a quarter in Damascus and Homs, to 11.1% in the camps in Turkey and to less than 8% in Damascus Rural Province, Aleppo, and Idlib. Respondents in Self-governance areas reported the most on the occurrence of an honor crime in their area over the past year, followed by respondents in areas under the control of the regime (15.9%) and then by respondents in areas under the control of the opposition (11.6%). The percentage of those who state that they had heard of the occurrence of an honor crime increases in besieged areas compared to nonbesieged opposition areas. Table 24. Have you heard of any honor crime that took place in your area over the past year? (in relation to social and demographic variables) Province Aleppo Idlib Damascus Rural Province The camps in Turkey Homs Damascus Al-Hasakah Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged areas Non-besieged areas Yes No I do not know I prefer not to answer 4,7% 6,4% 7,9% 89,5% 74,7% 69,8% 5,2% 13,9% 15,5% 0,6% 4,9% 6,8% 11,1% 24,5% 25,0% 31,7% 59,5% 71,8% 71,7% 62,5% 28,8% 2,8% 0,8% 5,5% 0,5% 0,9% 2,5% 0,3% 15,9% 79,3% 3,9% 1,0% 11,6% 69,5% 15,6% 3,3% 30,5% 63,5% 5,4% 0,5% 21,0% 7,8% 62,8% 72,0% 10,6% 17,8% 5,6% 2,4% 61 Views on Punishment for the Perpetrator The general attitude is biased towards addressing this type of crime like any other murder (Figure 18). However, women are much stricter on this issue than men, with around a third stating, in almost all cases (except in the event of an illicit relationship), that it must be dealt with like any other murder, compared to around a quarter of the number of men. It seems that the collective (men and women) sway substantially towards the commutation of sentence in the event of the discovery of an illicit relationship between the murderer and the victim (Table 25). We will discuss in detail each of the cases mentioned and focus on the support of dealing with this crime like any other murder; where this support increases and where it drops. Figure 18. In Syria, the sentence against the perpetrator of an honor crime is commuted i.e. a crime committed by a family member against a woman claiming that she has done something that defiles "family honor". How should new Syrian laws deal with this type of crime? 62,6 43,2 29,3 31,4 31,9 29,2 6,4 17,2 13,8 The discovery of an illicit relationship 9,2 18,4 The victim’s choice to get married without the consent of her family Like any other murder 38,5 21,5 9,5 7,4 The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion I do not know/ no answer 30,4 Case by Case The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect Commutation of sentence Table 25. The way in which new laws should deal with honor crimes (by gender) Women The victim’s choice to get married without the consent of her family The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion The discovery of an illicit relationship Men The victim’s choice to get married without the consent of her family The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion The discovery of an illicit relationship Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 21,7 35,7 33,9 8,7 32,2 22,9 34,0 10,9 37,9 18,7 32,5 10,8 56,1 15,3 20,5 8,0 40,7 27,6 25,4 6,3 44,0 20,4 27,3 8,3 47,8 18,1 26,3 7,9 68,3 12,5 14,3 4,9 62 In the Event of the Discovery of an Illicit Relationship The Sample of Women The variables are as follows (Table 26): Education: Those with high school certificates and university graduates are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to those with lower levels of education. A greater percentage of support is noticed among illiterates, but it must be kept in mind that this sample is relatively small (36 people). Sustenance: The support to deal with the crime like any other murder increases among those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people (up to two), in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people. Profession: Around one-third of students say that the crime should be dealt with like any other murder. The percentage drops to around a quarter among unemployed women, to 19.6% among female workers and to 13.6% among housewives. Ideology: Secularist support is higher than Islamist support. Age: Young people and women older than 56 years are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to other age groups. Income: The proportion of support declines among those with a moderate income in comparison to those with a higher and lower income. Province: The support to deal with such a crime like any other murder reaches around half in Aleppo, drops to around one-third in Al-Hasakah, Damascus and Damascus Rural Province, to 14.6% in the camps in Turkey and to 5.9% in Homs. It reaches its lowest level in Idlib, where only 1.3% show support. Region: One-third of women in Self – governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The proportion drops in areas under the control of the Regime to 21.4% and to 17.3% in areas under the control of the opposition. Respondents in besieged areas (28.8%) are more supportive of dealing with such a crime like any other murder than those in non-besieged opposition areas (14.9%.). Nationality-Ethnicity: 33% of Kurds and 17.1% of Arabs support dealing with the crime like any other murder. Religion-Sect: Only one woman from the small Christian sample, consisting of ten women, supports dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with 18.1% of Sunni women. Civil Status: Around one-third of single women support addressing the crime like any other murder, while the proportion drops to less than a quarter among married women and widows. 63 Table 26. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the crime is the discovery of an illicit relationship in the sample of women Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 47,2% 16,7% 27,8% 8,3% 58,6% 20,4% 11,8% 9,2% 57,6% 17,4% 19,8% 5,2% 50,9% 18,9% 23,0% 7,2% 58,4% 58,4% 22,1% 9,3% 46,9% 17,9% 26,9% 8,3% 65,8% 11,1% 15,0% 8,0% 59,0% 18,7% 15,1% 7,2% 56,3% 15,2% 19,6% 8,8% 36,8% 15,0% 36,8% 11,3% 49,1% 17,6% 27,8% 5,6% 64,5% 14,9% 13,6% 6,9% 28,3% 16,2% 46,5% 9,1% 55,8% 15,8% 22,5% 5,8% 43,4% 19,4% 27,0% 10,2% 75,6% 9,3% 7,3% 7,9% 53,3% 23,9% 19,6% 3,3% 46,5% 16,8% 28,1% 8,6% 56,7% 16,0% 18,0% 9,3% Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age Up to 25 years 26-35 years 64 36-45 years 66,8% 12,5% 15,1% 5,6% 58,7% 18,7% 16,0% 6,7% 58,8% 0,0% 29,4% 11,8% 45,0% 18,6% 25,4% 11,1% 61,2% 16,9% 15,3% 6,7% 51,0% 18,8% 26,0% 4,2% Idlib 84,8% 3,9% 1,7% 9,5% Homs 83,8% 10,3% 5,9% 0,0% The camps in Turkey 68,0% 15,0% 14,6% 2,4% Damascus Rural Province 21,7% 22,6% 33,0% 22,6% Al-Hasakah 29,1% 22,0% 36,9% 12,1% Damascus 27,9% 32,6% 37,2% 2,3% Aleppo 18,2% 22,7% 51,1% 8,0% 59,5% 17,9% 21,4% 1,2% 61,3% 13,5% 17,3% 7,8% 28,4% 23,0% 35,8% 12,8% 31,1% 21,2% 28,8% 18,9% 67,8% 11,9% 14,9% 5,4% Arab 60,5% 14,5% 17,1% 7,9% Kurdish 38,5% 19,3% 33,0% 9,2% 2 2 4 0 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Nationality-Ethnicity Turkmen (in figures) 65 Religion-Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) 58,3% 15,6% 18,1% 7,9% 8 1 1 0 34,6% 21,2% 32,7% 11,5% 62,7% 14,6% 16,4% 6,3% 58,8% 7,1% 21,2% 12,9% 15 3 4 1 Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced (in figures) The Sample of Men Table (27) summarizes the variables as follows: Education: The proportion of support for dealing with the crime like any other murder reaches 20.9% among university graduates and around 10% among those with other levels of education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of individuals (more than six) are less supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder. Profession: The support reaches its peak among students (20.6%), followed by working respondents (16.9%), while it drops to less than 10% among the unemployed. Ideology: The percentage of support among Secularists is higher than the percentage of support among Islamists. Age: Respondents older than 46 years are less supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than those in other age groups. Income: The proportion of support declines among those with a moderate income, in comparison to those with a higher and lower income. Province: Around one-third of men in Aleppo and Damascus support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter in Al-Hasakah and Damascus Rural Province, while the percentage drops to less than 4% in Homs, Idlib and the camps in Turkey. Region: Around one-quarter of respondents in Self-governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the support drops to around 12% in areas under the control of the regime and the opposition. Respondents in besieged areas are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than respondents in non-besieged opposition areas. Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while 14.1% of Sunnis do support it. 66 Nationality- Ethnicity Around a quarter of Kurds support dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to 11.8% of Arabs. Civil Status: Single respondents are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder in comparison to married respondents. Table 27. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the crime is the discovery of an illicit relationship in the sample of men Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 5 5 6 4 70,1% 11,8% 13,4% 4,7% 74,3% 10,4% 11,4% 3,9% 74,9% 11,8% 9,9% 3,3% 57,9% 14,5% 20,9% 6,7% 61,3% 15,0% 16,9% 6,8% 64,7% 14,0% 16,2% 5,0% 80,2% 7,9% 8,8% 3,1% 68,5% 12,6% 14,4% 4,5% 55,6% 15,9% 20,6% 7,9% 76,4% 6,7% 9,0% 7,9% 35,0% 25,2% 30,1% 9,8% 64,1% 15,2% 17,0% 3,6% 59,0% 17,3% 17,9% 5,8% 85,6% 4,0% 5,7% 4,6% 85,1% 6,1% 7,9% 0,9% Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Age 67 Up to 25 years 64,6% 11,0% 15,4% 9,1% 64,3% 15,1% 14,9% 5,7% 67,9% 11,4% 17,5% 3,3% 78,7% 11,5% 9,2% 0,6% 77,6% 10,5% 9,2% 2,6% 62,4% 14,8% 17,9% 4,8% 71,0% 10,9% 14,3% 3,9% 63,2% 15,4% 18,2% 3,2% Idlib 91,9% 3,4% 1,7% 3,0% The camps in Turkey 94,6% 2,7% 2,7% 0,0% Homs 92,9% 3,1% 3,9% 0,0% Al-Hasakah 36,0% 31,5% 23,0% 9,5% Damascus Rural Province 54,1% 9,3% 23,3% 13,4% Aleppo 42,9% 21,4% 31,0% 4,8% Damascus 41,6% 23,4% 35,1% 0,0% 78,7% 8,9% 12,4% 0,0% 75,4% 7,5% 12,1% 4,9% 35,6% 31,5% 22,8% 10,0% 66,3% 8,9% 16,7% 8,2% 83,5% 6,3% 7,6% 2,6% 75,6% 8,5% 11,8% 4,1% 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 years 56 years and above Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged Nationality – Ethnicity Arab 68 Kurdish 37,5% 28,8% 24,4% 9,4% 70,9% 10,7% 14,1% 4,4% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 23 2 3 0 56,9% 14,1% 17,8% 11,2% 72,3% 11,8% 13,0% 2,9% 8 1 0 0 6 3 4 0 Religion-Sect Sunnis Shiites Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed (in figures) Divorced (in figures) In the Event of the Victim Choosing to Marry Without the Consent of her family The Sample of Women Table (28) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment if the motive for the murder is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of her family, in the sample of women: Education: Respondents with high school certificates and university graduates are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder (around 40%). Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people are less supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than those responsible for the sustenance a smaller number of people. Profession: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder reaches its peak among students (around one-half), while it reaches its lowest among housewives (around 25%). Ideology: Secularists are more supportive of dealing with this situation like any other crime than Islamists. Income: Those with a lower income (45%) are more supportive, in comparison to those with a higher income. Province: The majority of women in Aleppo, Al-Hasakah and Damascus wish to deal with the crime like any other murder (around 60%), while the percentage substantially drops in other areas, to around one-third in Damascus Rural Province and Homs, and to less than a quarter in Idlib and the refugee camps in Turkey. 69 Region: The majority of respondents in areas under Self - governance wish to deal with the crime like any other murder (57.4%), along with around one-third of those in areas under the control of the Regime and more than a quarter of those in areas under the control of the opposition. Respondents in besieged areas (43.2%) are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than respondents in non-besieged opposition areas (25.9%). Nationality-Ethnicity: Around half the Kurdish women support dealing with the crime like any other murder compared to 29.3% of Arab women. Religion-Sect: Four out of ten Christian respondents from our sample wish to deal with the crime like any other murder, along with 30.9% of Sunni respondents. Civil Status: Single women are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder (45.2%), while married women are the least supportive (29.6%). Table 28. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family, in the sample of women Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people 3-5 people 6 people and above Profession Working Student Unemployed Housewife Ideology Extreme Secularist Secularist Center Islamist Extreme Islamist Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province The camps in Turkey Idlib Homs Damascus Rural Province Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 30,6% 30,3% 23,3% 18,0% 19,0% 33,3% 45,4% 41,3% 33,3% 31,1% 33,3% 15,8% 25,0% 41,4% 40,6% 2,8% 8,6% 10,5% 7,2% 9,3% 16,8% 25,6% 26,6% 33,6% 35,5% 43,2% 43,3% 27,5% 21,6% 6,3% 11,4% 8,6% 22,0% 11,3% 14,8% 27,0% 34,6% 29,3% 35,2% 39,1% 34,0% 49,6% 43,5% 25,7% 9,4% 9,8% 6,5% 8,2% 4,0% 10,0% 15,5% 34,6% 27,2% 28,3% 34,2% 34,5% 36,8% 45,7% 62,6% 45,0% 43,8% 17,4% 19,6% 5,1% 10,8% 6,3% 11,2% 7,6% 16,1% 21,2% 27,1% 32,1% 43,5% 35,4% 45,0% 25,9% 29,2% 6,8% 9,4% 8,3% 33,7% 30,3% 16,2% 8,5% 47,6% 32,5% 35,3% 30,2% 16,3% 23,4% 32,4% 36,8% 2,4% 13,9% 16,2% 24,5% 70 Damascus Al-Hasakah Aleppo Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged Non-Besieged 9,3% 5,0% 12,5% 30,2% 32,6% 19,3% 58,1% 60,3% 63,6% 2,3% 2,1% 4,5% 10,7% 40,5% 35,7% 13,1% 26,4% 35,5% 29,0% 9,2% 4,7% 34,5% 57,4% 3,4% 10,6% 29,9% 26,5% 37,3% 43,2% 25,9% 19,7% 6,9% 24,5% 6,4% 36,4% 37,6% 29,3% 53,2% 9,8% 2,8% 24,5% 0 36,4% 4 30,9% 4 8,3% 2 12,9% 24,1% 24,7% 6 33,2% 38,4% 25,9% 5 45,2% 29,6% 36,5% 9 8,8% 7,9% 12,9% 3 Nationality-Ethnicity Arab Kurdish Religion-Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) Civil Status Single Married Widowed Divorced (in figures) The Sample of Men Variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the murder is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family are summarized in Table (29) as follows: Education: Support to deal with it like any other murder, increases with progress in education. Sustenance: The support among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people drops in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people. Profession: Students are the most supportive (39.7%), while the percentage of support declines to around one-quarter among the employed and unemployed respondents. Ideology: Secularists are more supportive than Islamists. Age: Support substantially drops among respondents older than 46 years. Income: Those with a moderate income are less supportive than those in other income groups. Province: Around half of the men in Damascus, and around one-third in Damascus Rural Province, Al-Hasakah and Aleppo support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The support dramatically drops in the remaining areas and reaches its lowest level in Idlib. Region: More than one-third of men in Self - governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition and 19.1% in areas under the control of the regime. 71 Men in besieged areas (34.4%) are more supportive than those in non-besieged opposition areas (13.9%). Nationality-Ethnicity: Kurds (40%) are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than Arabs (21.7%). Religion-Sect: None of the Shiite respondents agree to deal with the crime like any other murder, while around a quarter of Sunnis support it. Civil Status: Single men (29%) are more supportive than married men (24%) while the least supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder are widows (11.1%). Table 29. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive for the crime is the victim’s choice to get married without the consent of the family, in the sample of men Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 3 7 7 3 45,7% 30,7% 16,5% 7,1% 52,9% 21,1% 20,7% 5,4% 44,6% 28,7% 21,5% 5,2% 25,8% 30,3% 36,4% 7,6% 33,1% 25,2% 33,8% 7,9% 3-5 people 36,6% 29,1% 27,6% 6,7% 6 people and above 54,1% 27,0% 14,5% 4,4% Working 40,9% 28,3% 24,7% 6,1% Student 23,8% 27,0% 39,7% 9,5% Unemployed 50,6% 21,3% 22,5% 5,6% Extreme Secularist 10,6% 42,3% 43,1% 4,1% Secularist 31,8% 32,7% 27,8% 7,6% Center 33,7% 29,8% 30,1% 6,4% Islamist 58,3% 20,1% 15,2% 6,3% Extreme Islamist 56,1% 18,4% 19,3% 6,1% Up to 25 years 40,9% 21,7% 29,1% 8,3% 26-35 years 35,7% 27,3% 28,4% 8,6% 36-45 years 37,8% 30,1% 27,6% 4,5% 46-55 years 50,0% 35,1% 12,1% 2,9% Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people Profession Ideology Age 72 56 years and above 52,6% 23,7% 21,1% 2,6% 33,6% 29,3% 31,9% 5,2% 44,4% 26,3% 22,2% 7,0% 37,7% 27,5% 29,6% 5,3% Idlib 58,9% 25,0% 8,5% 7,6% The camps in Turkey 62,2% 24,3% 13,5% 0,0% Homs 56,5% 23,5% 16,1% 3,9% Aleppo 35,7% 26,2% 32,1% 6,0% Al-Hasakah 16,2% 41,9% 37,4% 4,5% Damascus Rural Province 26,2% 19,2% 38,4% 16,3% Damascus 20,8% 31,2% 48,1% 0,0% 43,6% 32,4% 19,1% 4,9% 47,9% 21,2% 23,4% 7,5% 15,5% 42,5% 37,9% 4,1% Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged 39,0% 16,7% 34,4% 9,9% Non-Besieged 55,5% 24,9% 13,9% 5,8% Arab 46,5% 24,8% 21,7% 7,1% Kurdish 14,4% 41,9% 40,0% 3,8% Sunnis 43,9% 25,2% 24,8% 6,1% Shiites 71,0% 25,8% 0,0% 3,2% 7 11 5 6 Single 35,1% 25,0% 29,0% 10,9% Married 42,8% 28,2% 24,0% 5,0% Widowed 55,6% 33,3% 11,1% 0,0% 2 5 6 0 Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Nationality-Ethnicity Religion-Sect Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status Divorced (in figures) 73 In the Event of the Victim Choosing to Marry a Man from Another Religion The Sample of Women Variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the murder is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion are summarized in Table (30) as follows: Education: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder increases with progress in education. Sustenance: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder drops among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people, in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people. Profession: Almost half of the students support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the percentage of support declines to around one-third among working women and the unemployed and to a quarter among housewives. Ideology: Secularists tend to support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while Islamists oppose it. Province: There is a consensus in Al-Hasakah to deal with the crime like any other murder, along with the majority of those in Aleppo. This proportion drops to around 40% in Homs and Damascus, to around a quarter in Damascus Rural Province, and reaches its lowest levels in Idlib and the camps in Turkey. Region: There is a consensus of support among women in Self–governance areas. The proportion dramatically drops to reach around one-third in areas under the control of the Regime and around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition. Women in besieged areas (36.4%) support dealing with the crime like any other murder more than women in non-besieged opposition areas (19.5%). Nationality-Ethnicity: The vast majority of Kurds show support compared to a quarter of Arabs. Religion-Sect: Four out of ten Christian women support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter of Sunni women. Civil Status: Around half of single women and more than a quarter of married women support dealing with the crime like any other murder. 74 Table 29. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion in the sample of women Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 72,2% 5,6% 19,4% 2,8% 59,2% 13,2% 19,7% 7,9% 45,9% 16,9% 25,0% 12,2% 32,4% 23,4% 34,7% 9,5% 26,0% 20,3% 40,9% 12,9% 29,1% 18,8% 43,0% 9,0% 3-5 people 42,0% 18,1% 26,2% 13,7% 6 people and above 54,7% 20,1% 16,5% 8,6% Working 36,7% 17,9% 34,0% 11,4% Student 19,5% 18,0% 49,6% 12,8% Unemployed 32,4% 25,0% 35,2% 7,4% Housewife 46,8% 18,0% 24,7% 10,5% Extreme Secularist 2,0% 9,1% 83,8% 5,1% Secularist 17,5% 20,0% 51,7% 10,8% Center 27,0% 25,0% 37,2% 10,9% Islamist 57,0% 17,1% 12,6% 13,2% Extreme Islamist 65,2% 13,0% 14,1% 7,6% The camps in Turkey 75,5% 12,2% 10,2% 2,0% Idlib 38,5% 27,7% 13,4% 20,3% Damascus Rural Province 13,2% 32,1% 28,3% 26,4% Damascus 34,9% 20,9% 41,9% 2,3% Homs 14,7% 20,6% 45,6% 19,1% Aleppo 15,9% 12,5% 67,0% 4,5% Al-Hasakah 2,8% 9,9% 83,0% 4,3% 21,4% 26,2% 36,9% 15,5% 46,7% 19,4% 22,5% 11,5% Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people Profession Ideology Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition 75 Self-governance areas 3,4% 11,5% 80,4% 4,7% Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged 15,2% 26,5% 36,4% 22,0% Non-Besieged 53,5% 17,8% 19,5% 9,2% Arab 43,2% 20,2% 24,5% 12,1% Kurdish 4,6% 11,9% 78,9% 4,6% Sunnis 43,3% 19,8% 26,3% 10,6% Christians (in figures) 1 3 4 2 Single 23,5% 18,9% 47,0% 10,6% Married 43,3% 18,1% 28,8% 9,8% Widowed 32,9% 22,4% 24,7% 20,0% Divorced (in figures) 9 5 7 2 Nationality-Ethnicity Religion-Sect Civil Status The Sample of Men Variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment of the perpetrator if the motive of the murder is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion are summarized in Table (31) as follows: Education: The support to deal with the crime like any other murder increases with the progress in education. Sustenance: The support among those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (more than six) drops in comparison to those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people. Ideology: Secularists are more supportive than Islamists. Province: The majority of respondents in Al-Hasakah support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the percentage drops to around one-third in Damascus and Aleppo, and to around a quarter in Damascus Rural Province. It reaches its lowest levels in Idlib and the refugee camps in Turkey. Region: The majority of men (64.4%) in Self – governance areas support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The support declines to 24.4% in areas under the control of the regime and to 14.5% in areas under the control of the opposition. Men in besieged areas (22.7%) support dealing with the crime like any other murder more than men in non-besieged opposition areas (7.6%). Income: The support increases among those with a higher income in comparison to those with a lower income. 76 Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurdish respondents support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while only 18% of Arabs say they support it. Religion-Sect: 20.6% of Sunnis support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with 9.7% of Shiites. Table 31. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion, in the sample of men Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 3 4 10 3 50,4% 23,6% 16,5% 9,4% 57,1% 18,6% 17,9% 6,4% 6,4% 19,0% 26,7% 6,9% 41,2% 14,5% 35,2% 9,1% 44,0% 15,8% 31,2% 9,0% 3-5 people 47,2% 16,6% 28,9% 7,3% 6 people and above 51,9% 22,6% 17,6% 7,9% Extreme Secularist 7,3% 16,3% 68,3% 8,1% Secularist 17,0% 34,5% 39,0% 9,4% Center 47,1% 21,2% 25,6% 6,1% Islamist 75,3% 7,8% 8,6% 8,3% Extreme Islamist 69,3% 11,4% 11,4% 7,9% The camps in Turkey 94,6% 4,1% 1,4% 0,0% Idlib 76,3% 9,7% 2,5% 11,4% Homs 49,4% 25,1% 18,8% 6,7% Damascus Rural Province 44,2% 12,8% 24,4% 18,6% Aleppo 34,5% 28,6% 31,0% 6,0% Damascus 41,6% 19,5% 39,0% 0,0% Al-Hasakah 9,9% 23,4% 63,5% 3,2% 34,2% 33,8% 24,4% 7,6% 64,6% 11,4% 14,5% 9,5% 9,6% 22,8% 64,4% 3,2% Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people Ideology Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas 77 Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged 55,3% 10,3% 22,7% 11,7% Non-Besieged 72,8% 11,8% 7,6% 7,9% 53,7% 16,2% 21,0% 9,2% 50,5% 17,6% 24,4% 7,5% 39,3% 21,9% 32,8% 6,1% Arab 56,1% 17,2% 18,0% 8,7% Kurdish 8,1% 24,4% 63,8% 3,8% Sunnis 57,6% 14,7% 20,6% 7,0% Shiites 45,2% 41,9% 9,7% 3,2% 4 12 7 5 Income (Syrian pound) Less than 25 thousand Between 25-75 thousand More than 75 thousand Nationality-Ethnicity Religion-Sect Alawites ( in figures) In the event of the Victim Choosing to Marry a Man from Another Sect The Sample of Women Table (32) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment if the motive for the murder is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect: Education: Those with high school certificates and university graduates are the most supportive of dealing with such a crime like any other murder. Sustenance: Those who are responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people (up to two) are the most supportive of dealing with such a crime like any other murder, while the least supportive are those responsible for the sustenance of a larger number of people (six and above). Profession: Students are the most supportive (45.9%), followed by working women and the unemployed, while housewives are the least supportive (26.7%). Ideology: The majority of Secularists support dealing with such a crime like any other murder, while the majority of Islamists oppose it. Province: There is a consensus of support for dealing with the crime like any other murder among respondents in Al-Hasakah, along with the majority of respondents in Aleppo and 40% of respondents in Damascus and Homs. The support reaches its lowest level in Idlib and the camps in Turkey, where the percentage of support does not exceed 9% from the women refugees in these camps. 78 Region: There is a consensus among women in Self - governance areas to support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while the percentage of support drops to one-third in areas under the control of the regime and to around a quarter in areas under the control of the opposition. Women in besieged areas are more supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder than women in non-besieged opposition areas. Nationality-Ethnicity: Only around a quarter of Arab respondents support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while there is a near-consensus among Kurds on dealing with the crime like any other murder. Religion-Sect: Four out of ten Christian women support dealing with the crime like any other murder, along with around a quarter of Sunni women. Civil Status: Single women are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder (44.7%) in comparison to those who are married or widowed (around 30%). Table 32. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect, in the sample of women Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 58,3% 13,9% 25,0% 2,8% 55,3% 18,4% 17,8% 8,6% 40,7% 19,8% 27,3% 12,2% 25,2% 26,6% 39,2% 9,0% 21,1% 24,7% 41,1% 13,1% 25,6% 21,7% 43,7% 9,0% 3-5 people 34,5% 22,5% 29,5% 13,5% 6 people and above 47,5% 27,3% 15,1% 10,1% Working 32,0% 20,8% 36,4% 10,9% Student 16,5% 23,3% 45,9% 14,3% Unemployed 27,8% 26,9% 38,0% 7,4% Housewife 39,1% 23,4% 26,7% 10,8% Extreme Secularist 3,0% 8,1% 84,8% 4,0% Secularist 5,0% 27,5% 55,0% 12,5% Center 20,1% 30,6% 38,8% 10,5% Islamist 50,6% 21,1% 14,3% 14,0% Extreme Islamist 68,5% 14,1% 12,0% 5,4% Education Illiterate Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who she has to sustain Up to 2 people Profession Ideology 79 Province The camps in Turkey 70,4% 18,4% 8,8% 2,4% Idlib 26,0% 34,2% 19,9% 19,9% Damascus Rural Province 11,3% 27,4% 33,0% 28,3% Damascus 25,6% 30,2% 41,9% 2,3% Homs 8,8% 29,4% 45,6% 16,2% Aleppo 14,8% 15,9% 62,5% 6,8% Al-Hasakah 2,8% 9,2% 84,4% 3,5% 14,3% 35,7% 36,9% 13,1% 40,1% 24,0% 24,2% 11,8% 3,4% 10,1% 81,1% 5,4% Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged 12,9% 24,2% 40,2% 22,7% Non-Besieged 45,9% 23,9% 20,8% 9,4% Arab 36,8% 24,9% 25,8% 12,4% Kurdish 4,6% 12,8% 79,8% 2,8% 37,2% 23,9% 27,9% 11,0% 0 4 4 2 Single 21,2% 23,5% 44,7% 10,6% Married 36,4% 22,4% 31,0% 10,2% Widowed 30,6% 23,5% 29,4% 16,5% 6 6 8 3 Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Nationality-Ethnicity Religion-Sect Sunnis Christians (in figures) Civil Status Divorced (in figures) The Sample of Men Table (33) summarizes the variables that are related to attitudes towards punishment if the motive for the murder is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect: Education: The support for dealing with the crime like any other murder increases with the progress in education. Sustenance: Those responsible for the sustenance of a smaller number of people are the most supportive. 80 Profession: Students are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder. Ideology: Secularists are more supportive than Islamists. Age: The most supportive are those older than 56 years old (around one-third), while the proportion among younger age groups is around a quarter. Province: The majority of respondents in Al-Hasakah support dealing with the crime like any other murder. The percentage substantially drops in other areas, to a third in Aleppo, Damascus and Damascus Rural Province, while it reaches its lowest in Idlib and the refugee camps in Turkey, where support does not exceed 5%. Region: The majority of support comes from men in Self – governance areas (more than 60%), along with around a quarter in areas under the control of the regime and 16.6% in areas under the control of the opposition. Men in besieged areas (25.2%) are the most supportive of dealing with the crime like any other murder in comparison to those in non-besieged opposition areas (8.9%). Nationality-Ethnicity: The majority of Kurds (over 60%) support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while only 19.3% of Arabs are supportive. Religion-Sect: 21.9% of Sunnis support dealing with the crime like any other murder, while only 3.2% of Shiites are supportive. Civil Status: Single respondents are more supportive (around one-third) than those who are married (around one-quarter). Table 33. Attitudes towards the punishment of the perpetrator, if the motive of the crime is the victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect, in the sample of men Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know/ no answer 1 5 11 3 47,2% 25,2% 17,3% 10,2% 53,6% 17,9% 19,3% 9,3% 45,5% 22,3% 27,0% 5,2% 35,5% 18,2% 36,7% 9,7% 44,7% 14,3% 32,7% 8,3% 3-5 people 43,7% 18,5% 29,3% 8,6% 6 people and above 44,0% 28,6% 19,5% 7,9% Working 43,7% 21,0% 27,1% 8,2% Student 27,0% 22,2% 41,3% 9,5% Unemployed 59,6% 11,2% 20,2% 9,0% Education Illiterate (in figures) Primary Intermediate High School University and above No. of individuals who he has to sustain Up to 2 people Profession 81 Ideology Extreme Secularist 4,1% 14,6% 70,7% 10,6% Secularist 12,6% 38,6% 38,1% 10,8% Center 42,6% 23,7% 26,9% 6,7% Islamist 71,6% 11,2% 8,6% 8,6% Extreme Islamist 68,4% 9,6% 17,5% 4,4% Up to 25 years 50,0% 13,0% 26,8% 10,2% 26-35 years 44,1% 18,6% 27,6% 9,7% 36-45 years 41,1% 24,0% 27,6% 7,3% 46-55 years 39,1% 29,3% 24,7% 6,9% 56 years and above 44,7% 21,1% 32,9% 1,3% The camps in Turkey 87,8% 8,1% 4,1% 0,0% Idlib 72,0% 13,1% 4,2% 10,6% Homs 47,5% 29,4% 16,5% 6,7% Aleppo 38,1% 27,4% 29,8% 4,8% Damascus Rural Province 36,6% 12,2% 33,1% 18,0% Damascus 35,1% 27,3% 37,7% 0,0% Al-Hasakah 6,8% 23,0% 63,1% 7,2% 25,3% 42,7% 24,0% 8,0% 62,1% 12,6% 16,6% 8,7% 7,3% 21,5% 63,9% 7,3% Included within areas under the control of the opposition Besieged 55,3% 8,9% 25,2% 10,6% Non-Besieged 68,6% 15,2% 8,9% 7,3% Arab 51,7% 20,5% 19,3% 8,5% Kurdish 7,5% 21,3% 63,8% 7,5% Sunnis 54,3% 16,8% 21,9% 7,0% Shiites 32,3% 58,1% 3,2% 6,5% 2 12 8 6 Age Province Region Areas under the control of the Regime Areas under the control of the opposition Self-governance areas Nationality-Ethnicity Religion-Sect Alawites ( in figures) Civil Status 82 Single 41,3% 13,8% 33,3% 11,6% Married 44,9% 22,3% 25,5% 7,3% Widowed (in figures) 5 2 1 1 Divorced (in figures) 5 5 3 0 To summarize these results we have used Cluster Analysis, which was also used earlier in this study. The groups are as follows: The first group rejects treating it like any other murder in all cases. The second group would treat it as murder in some cases. The third group would treat it like any other murder in all cases. Figure 19 shows that most men (59.8%) reject treating it like any other murder, while the women are divided amongst themselves between complete rejection (around half) and those who would treat it like any other murder in some cases (about one quarter) and in all cases (also one quarter). Figure 19. The way the law should respond to what is known as honor crimes (by gender) men 59,8 women 22,5 50,6 0% 10% 20% 17,7 23,7 30% 40% 50% 60% 25,7 70% 80% 90% 100% rejects treating it like any other murder in all cases would treat it as murder in some cases would treat it like any other murder in all cases 83 Recommendations The results of this study clearly indicate that there is a need to exert all efforts and employ all possibilities to make real changes in the perceptions of domestic violence against women in Syria, especially among men, as they seem less aware of its danger. It would be useful to use the results of this study in order to determine the demographic and social groups which need to be addressed when developing plans and programs to achieve each of the following recommendations, which we consider necessary to achieve progress in fighting this type of violence:        First: Taking preventive actions that contribute to preventing violence againts women. It is necessary to continue to raise awareness in all ways possible and organize new events. Second: Changing current Constitutional Articles related to honor crimes, which tolerate the killer, is necessary. However, this must be accompanied by tremendous efforts to fight the prevalent perceptions of honor crimes in a society which tends to tolerate the murderer, especially when the murderer’s motive is the discovery of an illicit relationship. Third: Supporting women exposed to domestic violence by working on the formation of organizations at a local level, where women can go in the case of exposure to violence. A great proportion of women say that the absence of such an authority is one of the main reasons why women remain silent about violence occurring against them. Fourth: Giving great importance to the issue of minors involved in domestic violence, as the results show that a considerable proportion of these assaults take place in the presence of minors and in many cases they themselves are exposed to the assault. Fifth: Future authorities must ensure that women have access to all facilities that allow her to proceed with legal procedures against the aggressor, through the provision of legal support in all stages of the procedure from specialized lawyers. Sixth: Following up on the problem by continuing to collect quantitative data concerning the issues that this study was not able to address, especially among groups that have emerged as being more exposed to violence, or more likely to justify it. The comparison of results should take place on a regular basis to trace the development of the problem and to track the efficiency and effectiveness of the actions taken. Seventh: Searching for practical ways to increase the participation of women's associations in the decisions made at both national and local levels regarding fighting discrimination against women. 84 Questionnaire 1- To what extent, in your opinion, is spousal violence against women prevalent in your area? o Widely prevalent o Prevalent to some extent o Not prevalent. o Rarely occurs o I do not know o No answer 2o o o o o Have you ever been personally exposed to or witnessed cases of domestic violence? Yes, personally I witnessed such violence to one of my family members Yes, personally, and also witnessed such violence to one of my family members I have neither been exposed to nor witnessed any such situation (go to question 5) I prefer not to answer (go to question 5) 3- Who was the main aggressor in the most recent incident you were exposed to/witnessed? o Partner o Brothers o Relatives o A parent o Friends o Other o I prefer not to answer 4o o o Did you report this incident to any authority? Yes No I prefer not to answer 85 5- What are the three most important reasons that keep women from filing a complaint when exposed to an assault by a family member? (Choose up to three options) o For the children o Fear of the consequences of the complaint o The shame and desire not to let other people know o The absence of income to support herself o The absence of a credible authority that women can trust to protect them o She considers it normal o She believes her husband is right o Islamic law allows it in some cases o The high cost of litigation o Other o I do not know o No answer 6- How should the law deal with a man who commits any of the following acts against his wife? The perpetrator must be punished Case by case The perpetrator must not be punished I do not know / no answer Physical abuse Verbal abuse Verbal threats Detention (inside the home) 7- Which attitude do you have towards the following statements? Strongly agree Agree Not sure Disagree Strongly disagree Islamic law allows the beating of wives in some cases The violence against wives in Syria is sparse in comparison to neighboring Arab countries Women who suffer spousal violence are uneducated The existence of logical reasons for violence against women 8o o o Do you know a woman who has been assaulted by one of the members of her family? Yes No (go to question 12) No answer (go to question 12) 9o o o Do you know whether the age of the victim is more or less than 18 years? More than 18 years Less than 18 years I do not know 86 o No answer 10- Do you know if there were any minors (younger than 18 years) with the victim? Sons, brothers or relatives? o Yes o No o I do not know 11- Were they also exposed to violence in the incident? o Yes o No o I do not know 12- In Syria, the sentence against the perpetrator of what is known as an honor crime is commuted i.e. a crime committed by a family member against a woman claiming that she has done something that defiles "family honor". How should new Syrian laws deal with this type of crime? The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another religion The victim’s choice to get married to a man from another sect The victim’s choice to get married without the consent of her family The discovery of an illicit relationship Commutation of sentence Case by case Like any other murder I do not know / no answer 13- Have you heard of any honor crime that took place in your area over the past year? o Yes o No 14- Sex o Male o Female 15- Age (…….) 16- Current occupation o Farmer o Government employee o Employee in a private company/organization o Combatant o Self-employed o Student o Mid-level manager o High level manager o Unemployed o Housewife o Other 87 17- Education o Illiterate o Primary o Intermediate o High school o University o Postgraduate 21- Religion – Sect o Sunni o Shiite o Alawite o Ismaili o Druze o Azidi o Christian o Murshidi o I prefer not to answer 18- Nationality – Ethnicity o Arab o Kurdish o Armenian o Assyrian o Turkmen o Circassian o I prefer not to answer o Other 22- Current region o Al-Hasakah province o Deir Al-Zour province o Raqqa province o Aleppo province o Idlib province o Lattakia province o Tartous province o Homs province o Damascus province o Rural Damascus province o As-Suwayda province o Quneitra province o Hama province o Daraa province o The camps in Turkey o The camps in Lebanon o The camps in Syria 19- Monthly income (Syrian pound) o Less than 25 thousand o Between 25-75 thousand o More than 75 thousand o I prefer not to answer 20- No. of individuals who you have to sustain (………) 23- When talking about politics and the shape of the next state in Syria, there are two main political trends: Secularists who want to separate religion from the state and groups of Islamists (political Islam) who want to establish a religious state. The following is a set of numbers from 0 to 10, where 0 signifies Extreme Secularist and 10 is Extreme Islamist. Where would you place yourself? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS

Log In

Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

Discrimination Against Women in Syrian Society (II/II): Perception of Domestic Violence

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS