Colin Irwin
Colin Irwin was born in England where he grew up on the south coast attending school and art collage in Bournemouth. As Scientific Officer of the British Sub-Aqua Club he salvaged a Bronze Age craft from Poole Harbour in 1964 and lived in the first underwater house with an artificial atmosphere in 1965. In 1968 he worked as a diving instructor in the Red Sea but turned his attention to the Canadian Arctic in the 1970s where he sailed the North West Passage, crossed Arctic North America by dog team and voyaged from Scotland to Iceland, Greenland and Hudson’s Bay. In 1978 he was awarded the Royal Cruising Club Medal for Seamanship.
He received his joint Masters Degree in Anthropology, Religious Studies and Philosophy from the University of Manitoba in 1981 with a thesis on Inuit ethics and a Doctorate in Social Science from Syracuse University in 1984 with a dissertation on the nature of human conflict and how the Inuit developed a culture and society without war. After working for Canadian Native organisations he produced the report ‘Lords of the Arctic: Wards of the State’ which led to a Royal Commission on the state of Canada’s First People and an Inuit land claim settlement that established the Territory of Nunavut.
With the support of a Canadian Government fellowship he based himself at Queen’s University Belfast in 1989 to complete a comparative study of the systems of segregated education in Northern Ireland and Israel and the role of integrated schools in conflict resolution. This led him to take a series of Human Rights complaints against the British Government to UNESCO and the UN that established the rights of children to attend integrated schools.
He was the principal investigator on the 'Peace Building and Public Policy in Northern Ireland' project funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and in support of the negotiations of the Belfast Agreement he conducted nine public opinion polls in collaboration with the political parties elected to the Stormont Talks. This work is reviewed in his book, ‘The People’s Peace Process in Northern Ireland’ published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2002.
With funding from various NGOs, the British and Canadian Governments and Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs he has extended his work around the world to include the Balkans, Middle East and Asia completing ‘peace polls’ in Macedonia in 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004, Serbia and Kosovo 2005, UK Muslims in 2006, Kashmir 2007, Israel and Palestine 2008, Sri Lanka 2009/10 and Syria 2014. This work is reviewed in his book ‘The People’s Peace - Pax Populi, Pax Dei’ published in 2012.
Colin Irwin is a member of the World Association of Public Opinion Research. As an expert on public opinion, public diplomacy and peace processes he has advised the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) on their procedures and best practice; lectured in the US, UK, Europe, Middle East and Asia and authored over 100 articles, papers, and books on these topics. As a Research Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool he is presently developing a perceptions based ‘People’s Peace Index’ to globalise and mainstream his ‘peace polls’ methods in all peace processes with research published on his website at: http://www.peacepolls.org
Supervisors: Professor Donald Campbell
Address: Department of Politics, Roxby Building, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 7ZT, United Kingdom
He received his joint Masters Degree in Anthropology, Religious Studies and Philosophy from the University of Manitoba in 1981 with a thesis on Inuit ethics and a Doctorate in Social Science from Syracuse University in 1984 with a dissertation on the nature of human conflict and how the Inuit developed a culture and society without war. After working for Canadian Native organisations he produced the report ‘Lords of the Arctic: Wards of the State’ which led to a Royal Commission on the state of Canada’s First People and an Inuit land claim settlement that established the Territory of Nunavut.
With the support of a Canadian Government fellowship he based himself at Queen’s University Belfast in 1989 to complete a comparative study of the systems of segregated education in Northern Ireland and Israel and the role of integrated schools in conflict resolution. This led him to take a series of Human Rights complaints against the British Government to UNESCO and the UN that established the rights of children to attend integrated schools.
He was the principal investigator on the 'Peace Building and Public Policy in Northern Ireland' project funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and in support of the negotiations of the Belfast Agreement he conducted nine public opinion polls in collaboration with the political parties elected to the Stormont Talks. This work is reviewed in his book, ‘The People’s Peace Process in Northern Ireland’ published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2002.
With funding from various NGOs, the British and Canadian Governments and Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs he has extended his work around the world to include the Balkans, Middle East and Asia completing ‘peace polls’ in Macedonia in 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004, Serbia and Kosovo 2005, UK Muslims in 2006, Kashmir 2007, Israel and Palestine 2008, Sri Lanka 2009/10 and Syria 2014. This work is reviewed in his book ‘The People’s Peace - Pax Populi, Pax Dei’ published in 2012.
Colin Irwin is a member of the World Association of Public Opinion Research. As an expert on public opinion, public diplomacy and peace processes he has advised the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) on their procedures and best practice; lectured in the US, UK, Europe, Middle East and Asia and authored over 100 articles, papers, and books on these topics. As a Research Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool he is presently developing a perceptions based ‘People’s Peace Index’ to globalise and mainstream his ‘peace polls’ methods in all peace processes with research published on his website at: http://www.peacepolls.org
Supervisors: Professor Donald Campbell
Address: Department of Politics, Roxby Building, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 7ZT, United Kingdom
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Books by Colin Irwin
- Senator George J. Mitchell
Thesis Chapters by Colin Irwin
Firstly female infanticide amongst the Eskimo is shown to be a temperature dependent phenomenon. The principle evolutionary ultimate causes are identified as a combination of human birth sex ratio, sex role specialization, male mortality, environmental conditions and optimal foraging strategies. It is noted that the control of the Eskimo sex ratio is not accomplished by a physiological process but rather by a cultural proximate mechanism.
Secondly a brief review is made of the biological and cultural evolutionary theories that could contribute to an evolutionary analysis of kinship. By separating questions of "ultimate cause" from questions of "proximate cause" it is suggested that kinship can perform an instrumental role as a cultural proximate mechanism in the regulation of adaptive behavior. Correlations were found between these kin terms, associated normative behavior and adaptive behavior.
Thirdly it is suggested that aspects of ethnocentrism could be artifacts of our human evolutionary past when hunter/gatherers lived in small populations comprised of inbred demes. By applying the principles of kin selection the parameters for ethnocentric behavior are examined. Correlations were found to be present between cultural, genetic and behavioral variation consistent with the theory that cultural differences could have become proximate mechanisms for group behaviors.
In order to move beyond the limited sociality of the tribe it is suggested that nothing short of a revolution in human affairs must have taken place. Models are developed to help illustrate this sociocultural change. It is hoped that these models, and the theoretical perspective that support them, could possibly be developed to better understand subjects as diverse as descriptive morality and applied social science.
Along with a holistic view of Inuit culture, that came from many years of participant observation, cognitive methodological techniques were employed to describe Inuit ethics. This work focused on life histories, mythology, interviews and linguistic analysis that sought to give emic meanings to Inuit ethical terms by emic standards of truth.
Inuit religious ethics was shown to have only an incidental relationship to shamanism which concentrates on the power of helping spirits rather than the ideas of good and evil. The metaphysics in mythology was shown to be of traditional importance but belief in the name/soul and reincarnation was and is the central Inuit metaphysical concept in Inuit ethics. Naming rules are enumerated along with some modern examples of Inuit names. It is concluded that the Inuit Summum Bonum is the priority of the future generation as demonstrated by the strength and extent of the beliefs in reincarnation.
Inuit philosophic ethics is approached from an analysis of Inuit ethical terms. Firstly a description of the Inuit language is given that points out its agglutinative nature and the important relationship of symbol to form in which symbol can create form. Secondly the synonymity of the concept of human nature and wisdom in the Inuit concept of the good person is explained. This leads to the conclusion that Inuit philosophic ethics is not mere blunt pragmatism but rather a well-refined form of consequentialism.
Some related questions of Inuit ethics are examined that are distinctly concerned with survival, namely, authority, distribution of resources, suicide, invalidicide, senilicide, and female infanticide. This examination demonstrates the functional necessity of Inuit morality in these examples and the associated rationality of Inuit religious and philosophic ethics.
It is suggested that relativism does not offer an adequate explanation for explanation for the divergent nature of ethics described here. Further the giving of priority to the future generations more in keeping with the necessities of survival and an evolutionary explanation.
Comparative Peace Research and Peace Index by Colin Irwin
This task is not easy as such groups can be quite small. The active members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and various opposition Loyalist insurgents in Northern Ireland were never more than 1 per cent of their respective Catholic and Protestant communities, which accounted for only 3 per cent of the UK population as a whole. Additionally, in an age of globalisation, the Internet and social media, such groups are increasingly transnational carried forward by perceptions and beliefs unrestrained by national boundaries. Clearly this sampling problem could be resolved with very large national surveys collected globally using a uniform methodology. But the costs of doing this annually to monitor and track both potential and active conflicts would be prohibitive making such an exercise difficult to sustain year on year.
This paper reviews the various samples collected for the peace polls undertaken in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Israel, Palestine, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Syria as well as the global and sub-global samples collected by Gallup, WIN Gallup International, Globescan, IpsosMORI and others. It also reviews the conflicts monitored by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), identifies the demographics of the relevant parties to those conflicts and determines what samples would be required to minimally capture their perceptions of conflict using the instruments and analysis developed in the previous two studies. Finally, from a review of the demographic questions used in these and other regional and global surveys a final draft of the PPI questionnaire is included in an appendix along with a detailed account for its deployment in a global pilot that will test the robustness of the instrument, modes of analysis, validity of the indexes and effectiveness of the sample design with a view to its full deployment on an annual basis.
For the establishment of the UN Post-2015 Development Agenda and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the UN note that "Without peace, there can be no development" so finding the right indicators to monitor the Peace MDGs is of central importance to these objectives (UN 2013). This is particularly true for the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) being established to monitor the G7+ New Deal for fragile states.
With all these points in mind "A Critical Review of Perception Based and Fact Based Peace Indicators and Indexes" evaluates the fact based Global Peace Index, Positive Peace Index and Global Terrorism Index alongside the available perceptions based indicators including the Gallup World Poll, WIN Gallup International End of Year (EoY) surveys, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and peace polls People's Peace Index (PPI) pilots as well as the hybrid fact and perceptions based indicators proposed to monitor the G7+ New Deal fragile states. These indicators and indexes are also examined in terms of their efficacy to monitor conditions of peace and violence in the context of violence and the problems associated with such violence. Quite simply are they asking the right questions with the right demographics?
This issue is well understood by the UN but in their review of UN peacekeeping operations around the World the Senior Advisory Group noted that the views of local people were not systematically being sought to help resolve conflicts and they strongly recommended that this omission should be rectified. UN DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) policies are presently under review to address this issue. To this end, by mainstreaming 'peace polls' through their global application in an index the views of local people can be made a normal part of every-day conflict discourse and comparative analysis in conditions of both violent conflict and states of peace.
The existing fact-based Global Peace Index (GPI) uses UN and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) data to analyse the peace 'profile' of 162 UN member states annually while the International Crisis Group (ICG) regularly reports on about 60 or 70 countries subject to violent conflict. But these analyses do not systematically sample the views of local populations and their perceptions of peace, violence and the problems that they consider a threat to their security. Peace polls can do this and an instrument for general application has now been refined and tested for global deployment to create a perceptions-based People's Peace Index (PPI).
If all peace processes followed the recent experience of Northern Ireland they too might produce the same positive results. But this is not the case. The interests of governments and political elites, both domestic and international, all too frequently can pervert the will of the people to deny them the peace that they seek. In hindsight the people of Northern Ireland were very fortunate. With elections to negotiations, independent research and an independent Chair the people were able to make their peace through the democratization of their peace process. This was the key to that success. The people owned the peace process and the people’s peace prevailed. This work is described in detail in my earlier WAPOR papers and, The People’s Peace Process in Northern Ireland (Irwin, 2002a, 2012a) written so that the central lessons, of what were then being called peace polls, could be extended to the resolution of other violent conflicts around the world.
To this end the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe (CDRSEE) commissioned me to undertake peace polls in Macedonia as a prelude to free and fair elections in 2002; in Bosnia and Herzegovina to analyse the state of their peace process in 2004; and in Kosovo and Serbia as a prelude to the negotiation of a ‘final status’ agreement for Kosovo in 2005. This was followed up with a poll of British Muslims in the context of what George Bush was calling the ‘War on Terror’ in 2006. With the Cvoter Foundation in Delhi a peace poll was completed in Kashmir in 2008 with follow ups in Pakistan, and that same year a three year programme of peace polling in Sri Lanka was initiated supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Barack Obama was elected President and George Mitchell was appointed his Special Envoy to the Middle East I was asked to complete a peace poll in Israel and Palestine for OneVoice in 2009 and this was followed by a project in Darfur, Sudan funded by the US State Department. Finally I was able to visit Egypt during their revolution in early 2011 but no polling work was undertaken there due to legal restrictions. These polls are reviewed in detail in my recent book The People’s Peace (Irwin, 2012b/c) with highlights explored comparatively in this paper.
Without exception the peace polls identified the problems that had to be resolved at the heart of each conflict and the solutions needed to end the conflict. When this was done and acted on peace was achieved but when this was not done the peace processes continued to fail. The polls also identified repetitive conflict themes: discrimination, bad policing, violent insurgencies, poor governance and corruption, failing economies, lack of democratic accountability and interference by third parties/states. The importance of these conflict elements changed with the cycle of the violence: pre-war, war, post-war. Critically the peace polls could help people achieve peace if the political elites and those responsible for peace used the work constructively to that end. Regrettably this was the exception rather than the rule. All too often the interests of spoilers coincide with the maintenance of the status quo of on-going war, occupation or violence directed against their own people. However, with the support of international institutions and standard setting, independent peacemakers can use peace polls and public diplomacy to challenge the spoilers, and help establish the people’s peace.
Northern Ireland by Colin Irwin
To lose the referendum would have been political and electoral suicide for any party supporting the agreement but a programme of public opinion research had been undertaken to refine and test the agreement at each stage of its development to make sure it would be both a political and electoral success. This paper details this process and suggests that if similar programmes of research were put in place in support of, for example, the proposed European Constitution or even the Final Status Agreement for Israel and Palestine then referendums on these contentious issues might meet with similar success and the parties to such agreements might also enjoy electoral success next time their constituents are asked to vote for them.
Nine surveys of public opinion were completed in support of the Northern Ireland peace process between April 1996 and February 2003. Critically the questions for eight of these polls were drafted and agreed with the co-operation of party negotiators to enhance the peace process by increasing party inclusiveness, developing issues and language, testing party policies, helping to set deadlines and increase the overall transparency of negotiations through the publication of technical analysis and media reports. The focus of this paper will be on polls four and five that refined and tested the agreement.
- Senator George J. Mitchell
Firstly female infanticide amongst the Eskimo is shown to be a temperature dependent phenomenon. The principle evolutionary ultimate causes are identified as a combination of human birth sex ratio, sex role specialization, male mortality, environmental conditions and optimal foraging strategies. It is noted that the control of the Eskimo sex ratio is not accomplished by a physiological process but rather by a cultural proximate mechanism.
Secondly a brief review is made of the biological and cultural evolutionary theories that could contribute to an evolutionary analysis of kinship. By separating questions of "ultimate cause" from questions of "proximate cause" it is suggested that kinship can perform an instrumental role as a cultural proximate mechanism in the regulation of adaptive behavior. Correlations were found between these kin terms, associated normative behavior and adaptive behavior.
Thirdly it is suggested that aspects of ethnocentrism could be artifacts of our human evolutionary past when hunter/gatherers lived in small populations comprised of inbred demes. By applying the principles of kin selection the parameters for ethnocentric behavior are examined. Correlations were found to be present between cultural, genetic and behavioral variation consistent with the theory that cultural differences could have become proximate mechanisms for group behaviors.
In order to move beyond the limited sociality of the tribe it is suggested that nothing short of a revolution in human affairs must have taken place. Models are developed to help illustrate this sociocultural change. It is hoped that these models, and the theoretical perspective that support them, could possibly be developed to better understand subjects as diverse as descriptive morality and applied social science.
Along with a holistic view of Inuit culture, that came from many years of participant observation, cognitive methodological techniques were employed to describe Inuit ethics. This work focused on life histories, mythology, interviews and linguistic analysis that sought to give emic meanings to Inuit ethical terms by emic standards of truth.
Inuit religious ethics was shown to have only an incidental relationship to shamanism which concentrates on the power of helping spirits rather than the ideas of good and evil. The metaphysics in mythology was shown to be of traditional importance but belief in the name/soul and reincarnation was and is the central Inuit metaphysical concept in Inuit ethics. Naming rules are enumerated along with some modern examples of Inuit names. It is concluded that the Inuit Summum Bonum is the priority of the future generation as demonstrated by the strength and extent of the beliefs in reincarnation.
Inuit philosophic ethics is approached from an analysis of Inuit ethical terms. Firstly a description of the Inuit language is given that points out its agglutinative nature and the important relationship of symbol to form in which symbol can create form. Secondly the synonymity of the concept of human nature and wisdom in the Inuit concept of the good person is explained. This leads to the conclusion that Inuit philosophic ethics is not mere blunt pragmatism but rather a well-refined form of consequentialism.
Some related questions of Inuit ethics are examined that are distinctly concerned with survival, namely, authority, distribution of resources, suicide, invalidicide, senilicide, and female infanticide. This examination demonstrates the functional necessity of Inuit morality in these examples and the associated rationality of Inuit religious and philosophic ethics.
It is suggested that relativism does not offer an adequate explanation for explanation for the divergent nature of ethics described here. Further the giving of priority to the future generations more in keeping with the necessities of survival and an evolutionary explanation.
This task is not easy as such groups can be quite small. The active members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and various opposition Loyalist insurgents in Northern Ireland were never more than 1 per cent of their respective Catholic and Protestant communities, which accounted for only 3 per cent of the UK population as a whole. Additionally, in an age of globalisation, the Internet and social media, such groups are increasingly transnational carried forward by perceptions and beliefs unrestrained by national boundaries. Clearly this sampling problem could be resolved with very large national surveys collected globally using a uniform methodology. But the costs of doing this annually to monitor and track both potential and active conflicts would be prohibitive making such an exercise difficult to sustain year on year.
This paper reviews the various samples collected for the peace polls undertaken in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Israel, Palestine, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Syria as well as the global and sub-global samples collected by Gallup, WIN Gallup International, Globescan, IpsosMORI and others. It also reviews the conflicts monitored by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), identifies the demographics of the relevant parties to those conflicts and determines what samples would be required to minimally capture their perceptions of conflict using the instruments and analysis developed in the previous two studies. Finally, from a review of the demographic questions used in these and other regional and global surveys a final draft of the PPI questionnaire is included in an appendix along with a detailed account for its deployment in a global pilot that will test the robustness of the instrument, modes of analysis, validity of the indexes and effectiveness of the sample design with a view to its full deployment on an annual basis.
For the establishment of the UN Post-2015 Development Agenda and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the UN note that "Without peace, there can be no development" so finding the right indicators to monitor the Peace MDGs is of central importance to these objectives (UN 2013). This is particularly true for the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) being established to monitor the G7+ New Deal for fragile states.
With all these points in mind "A Critical Review of Perception Based and Fact Based Peace Indicators and Indexes" evaluates the fact based Global Peace Index, Positive Peace Index and Global Terrorism Index alongside the available perceptions based indicators including the Gallup World Poll, WIN Gallup International End of Year (EoY) surveys, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and peace polls People's Peace Index (PPI) pilots as well as the hybrid fact and perceptions based indicators proposed to monitor the G7+ New Deal fragile states. These indicators and indexes are also examined in terms of their efficacy to monitor conditions of peace and violence in the context of violence and the problems associated with such violence. Quite simply are they asking the right questions with the right demographics?
This issue is well understood by the UN but in their review of UN peacekeeping operations around the World the Senior Advisory Group noted that the views of local people were not systematically being sought to help resolve conflicts and they strongly recommended that this omission should be rectified. UN DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) policies are presently under review to address this issue. To this end, by mainstreaming 'peace polls' through their global application in an index the views of local people can be made a normal part of every-day conflict discourse and comparative analysis in conditions of both violent conflict and states of peace.
The existing fact-based Global Peace Index (GPI) uses UN and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) data to analyse the peace 'profile' of 162 UN member states annually while the International Crisis Group (ICG) regularly reports on about 60 or 70 countries subject to violent conflict. But these analyses do not systematically sample the views of local populations and their perceptions of peace, violence and the problems that they consider a threat to their security. Peace polls can do this and an instrument for general application has now been refined and tested for global deployment to create a perceptions-based People's Peace Index (PPI).
If all peace processes followed the recent experience of Northern Ireland they too might produce the same positive results. But this is not the case. The interests of governments and political elites, both domestic and international, all too frequently can pervert the will of the people to deny them the peace that they seek. In hindsight the people of Northern Ireland were very fortunate. With elections to negotiations, independent research and an independent Chair the people were able to make their peace through the democratization of their peace process. This was the key to that success. The people owned the peace process and the people’s peace prevailed. This work is described in detail in my earlier WAPOR papers and, The People’s Peace Process in Northern Ireland (Irwin, 2002a, 2012a) written so that the central lessons, of what were then being called peace polls, could be extended to the resolution of other violent conflicts around the world.
To this end the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe (CDRSEE) commissioned me to undertake peace polls in Macedonia as a prelude to free and fair elections in 2002; in Bosnia and Herzegovina to analyse the state of their peace process in 2004; and in Kosovo and Serbia as a prelude to the negotiation of a ‘final status’ agreement for Kosovo in 2005. This was followed up with a poll of British Muslims in the context of what George Bush was calling the ‘War on Terror’ in 2006. With the Cvoter Foundation in Delhi a peace poll was completed in Kashmir in 2008 with follow ups in Pakistan, and that same year a three year programme of peace polling in Sri Lanka was initiated supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Barack Obama was elected President and George Mitchell was appointed his Special Envoy to the Middle East I was asked to complete a peace poll in Israel and Palestine for OneVoice in 2009 and this was followed by a project in Darfur, Sudan funded by the US State Department. Finally I was able to visit Egypt during their revolution in early 2011 but no polling work was undertaken there due to legal restrictions. These polls are reviewed in detail in my recent book The People’s Peace (Irwin, 2012b/c) with highlights explored comparatively in this paper.
Without exception the peace polls identified the problems that had to be resolved at the heart of each conflict and the solutions needed to end the conflict. When this was done and acted on peace was achieved but when this was not done the peace processes continued to fail. The polls also identified repetitive conflict themes: discrimination, bad policing, violent insurgencies, poor governance and corruption, failing economies, lack of democratic accountability and interference by third parties/states. The importance of these conflict elements changed with the cycle of the violence: pre-war, war, post-war. Critically the peace polls could help people achieve peace if the political elites and those responsible for peace used the work constructively to that end. Regrettably this was the exception rather than the rule. All too often the interests of spoilers coincide with the maintenance of the status quo of on-going war, occupation or violence directed against their own people. However, with the support of international institutions and standard setting, independent peacemakers can use peace polls and public diplomacy to challenge the spoilers, and help establish the people’s peace.
To lose the referendum would have been political and electoral suicide for any party supporting the agreement but a programme of public opinion research had been undertaken to refine and test the agreement at each stage of its development to make sure it would be both a political and electoral success. This paper details this process and suggests that if similar programmes of research were put in place in support of, for example, the proposed European Constitution or even the Final Status Agreement for Israel and Palestine then referendums on these contentious issues might meet with similar success and the parties to such agreements might also enjoy electoral success next time their constituents are asked to vote for them.
Nine surveys of public opinion were completed in support of the Northern Ireland peace process between April 1996 and February 2003. Critically the questions for eight of these polls were drafted and agreed with the co-operation of party negotiators to enhance the peace process by increasing party inclusiveness, developing issues and language, testing party policies, helping to set deadlines and increase the overall transparency of negotiations through the publication of technical analysis and media reports. The focus of this paper will be on polls four and five that refined and tested the agreement.
In an open ended question the top problem for the Sunni majority was the Syrian Regime followed by the war and shelling while the war was the top problem for Kurds followed by the Syrian Regime and ‘terrorism from both sides’. Using a list of 25 problems common to conflicts globally the severity of the situation in Syria was made apparent with ‘So many killed and displaced by violence’ being the top problem in most areas.
The Syrian Regime is held most responsible for starting the conflict and keeping it going, with, to a lesser extent Regional and International forces. However the Opposition is also partly blamed for the continuation of the conflict with only about a quarter of those interviewed saying they were ‘Not responsible at all’. Those held responsible for human rights abuses followed a similar pattern.
Given the severity of the violence in Syria ‘Fair trials of most responsible persons’ was the top justice priority for the majority of those sampled with what might be characterised as longer term lesser priorities such as ‘Democracy’ and ‘Reconciliation’ much lower on such lists. However, in the longer term ‘Reform of government institutions’ is seen as the most important element for conflict resolution. With regards to justice and restitution the prosecution of those who ordered gross violations of human rights and crimes against humanity would seem to be the only acceptable outcome while loss of property and livelihood could be compensated for financially. All crimes should be documented and in this regard civil society organisations are playing an important role. Although a majority of the Sunni population sampled favour Sharia law and courts with regard to the future administration of justice, significantly, women, those who are better-educated and ethnic minorities do not. They prefer courts operated to international standards and this approach to Justice is only rejected by a conservative minority that appears to be dominated by less well-educated young men in more conservative regions of Syria.
The Sunni majority have suffered more human rights violations than the Kurd minority with the Regime forces held most responsible although the Kurds also identified the Armed Brigades as significant abusers. Abuses were recorded as both widespread and serious and as a consequence the prospects for justice without prosecution through, for example, Truth Commissions, are limited at this time. However, in the longer term a significant majority from all ethnic and religious backgrounds would welcome a national dialogue to resolve Syria’s problems and write a new constitution to international human rights standards.
The preliminary APRC proposals have gained more Sinhala support after the war so that they are now equally acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamils, Up-Country Tamils and Muslims.
Although the majority of Tamils and Muslims across Sri Lanka want a unitary state a significant minority of Tamils from the Northern Province still want to keep the 'right to secession'. However most of them will give this up for the complete 'package' of APRC reforms.
The President, political and religious leaders can all influence support for these preliminary APRC proposals but although Eastern Tamils will follow their politicians on this issue Northern Tamils 'Don't Know' how to respond to theirs.
Although all communities strongly support language and fundamental rights Tamil concerns about the special status of Buddhism has increased after the war as a political issue.
About the poll: The research for this poll was carried out by the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo, on behalf of Dr. Colin Irwin from the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method as part of the successful Northern Ireland peace process. The survey work for the first poll in this series was completed between March and May 2008 and included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. Using the same methods the survey work for the second poll was completed a year later in March 2009 to test the then preliminary APRC proposals against public opinion before the end of the war. A year later in March 2010 these same proposals were tested again but with a larger sample (2400) that included the Northern Province. All interviews were face-to-face and the margin of error varied between +/- 2% and +/- 4.3% depending on the question and version of the questionnaire being analysed.
Introduction: The President of Sri Lanka established the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to draft a set of constitutional reforms that, following the war, would provide the country and all it's citizens with a real opportunity for enduring political stability, increased economic growth and improvements in the quality of life. Critically, when tested against public opinion a year ago these proposals, with some minor reservations were acceptable to a significant majority of both Sinhalese and Tamils. But due to the ongoing conflict the Tamils in the North could not be sampled then. With the end of the war and the defeat of their leadership would they accept the APRC proposals? Additionally 21% of Sinhalese did not know or were unwilling to give an opinion on such important issues at that time. With the end of the war would their views change and if so would this be for or against the APRC proposals?
The poll run in March 2009 also indicated that the President then enjoyed unprecedented popularity (93% 'trust very much or trust quite a bit' amongst the Sinhala) so it also seemed important to test the effects his support and the support of religious and political leaders could have on the acceptability of the APRC proposals. This was done by framing the questions in these terms and also by asking if such support would change the views of the person being interviewed in a neutral version of the questionnaire.
Using methods developed as part of the Northern Ireland peace process 14 proposals for constitutional reform were tested against public opinion. Everyone interviewed was asked which proposals they considered to be 'essential', 'desirable', 'acceptable', 'tolerable' or 'unacceptable'. The proposals included the structure of the state, elections, parliament and devolution; the powers of the President and local authorities; language, religious and fundamental rights; the judiciary, public service and policing; amending the constitution and safeguards against secession.
The research identified two potential problems with these reforms. Firstly, as the President enjoys unparallel popularity amongst the Sinhala people at 93% 'trust very much or trust quite a bit' they clearly do not want to see him step down from office as suggested in this draft of the APRC proposals. Twenty three per cent considered this item 'unacceptable'. Secondly, Tamils are split on the suggestion that 'Buddhism shall have 'pride of place' with religious freedom for all citizens being guaranteed'. Twenty eight per cent considered this proposal 'unacceptable' but 44% also thought it was 'essential'. Religious freedom for Hindus, Muslims and Christians is the key here and this needs to be clarified.
But overall the results are astonishingly good when compared to other conflicts around the world. For example the top priorities for the Tamils are 'Language Rights' at 85% 'essential or desirable' and 'Fundamental Rights' at 76%. The Sinhala also welcome these reforms at 71% 'essential or desirable' for 'Fundamental Rights' and 68% for 'Language Rights'. With only 9% of the Sinhala opposed to 'Language Rights' as 'unacceptable', there should be little political difficultly with their implementation.
Additionally the rejection of the APRC proposals as a 'package' falls to only 9% 'unacceptable' overall for the Sinhalese and just 2% for Tamils as people are willing to accept some proposals that they may not want for the sake of those that they do want. Due to the on going war at the time the poll was run it was not possible to include the Northern Province in the research. However, some indication of the views of these Tamils can be gained from the adjacent Eastern Province, which also only rejected the 'package' at 2% 'unacceptable', and supporters of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) at only 3%.
Given the consistency of these results it seems unlikely that a few minor changes or revisions will significantly alter this outcome and that the people of Sri Lanka will support the APRC or similar set of proposals. 'Winning the peace', is clearly in their leaders grasp.
In this context a subset of the questions asked in Indian administered Kashmir (IaK) last year were repeated in Pakistan administered Kashmir (PaK) this year in the hope of discovering any possibilities at all for a diplomatic intervention that just might help to contribute to a resolution of this crisis and that might also enjoy wide popular support.
Using methods perfected in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and Sri Lanka the Team CVoter Foundation of Delhi and Dr. Colin Irwin from Liverpool University (in collaboration with The Week) asked over 2000 people more than 200 questions on all aspects of the conflict in Indian administered Kashmir. Here are the key results:
From a list of 37 different problems tested in the poll the top five were 'corrupt administration' 1st at 59% 'very significant' followed by 'high levels of unemployment' 2nd at 56%, 'India and Pakistan talking for 20 or 30 years with no result' 3rd at 54% and then 'Pakistan and India are using the Kashmiri people for their own interests' and 'the vested interests of all the groups involved in keeping the conflict going' joint 4th and 5th at 45% 'very significant'. If the poll were run again today perhaps those two items would come out on top. The people of Kashmir understand their politicians very well and the political games they play. It is time for this to stop and that is exactly what the people of Kashmir want.
From a list of 20 options for negotiations the top three were 'resolve the conflict through negotiation' at 81% 'essential or desirable' followed by 'Kashmiri people must be part of any talks and settlement of the Kashmir issue' 2nd at 76% and 'All parties should enter into discussions without delay and express their true opinion' 3rd at 72% 'essential or desirable'. And with regards to security 'The violence should stop from all sides' was first on this list of 24 options at 87% 'essential or desirable' and at the very bottom of this list was 'resolve the conflict through armed struggle' with 70% of Muslims saying this was 'totally unacceptable'.
So the people of Kashmir want negotiations to replace violence, this result is very welcome but is there something more they can agree to? Definitely 'yes'. The top priority for human rights was 'majorities and minorities should be treated the same' at 85% 'essential or desirable'. For refugees the number one solution was 'all Kashmiries should be allowed to live together again as they did in the past' at 83% and the top two general peace building priorities were 'we must learn from the past' at 84% 'essential or desirable' and 'give Kashmir real hope that a solution is coming' at 82%. But it does not end here, these high aspirations were also backed up with some more practical solutions. At the top of the education list came 'improve the education for all disadvantaged people of J and K' at 83% 'essential or desirable' and first on the economic list was 'effective independent Commission to deal with corruption' at a high of 89% 'essential or desirable'.
Remarkably, when it came to the critical issues of the constitution the top priority (from a list of 29) was 'J and K should be a secular state' at 68% 'essential or desirable'. And although it will come as no surprise that 63% of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley reject the constitutional status quo of remaining with India as 'totally unacceptable' 69% of that same population also considered a merger with Pakistan to be 'totally unacceptable'. So a UN plebiscite that is limited to these two options (a priority for Muslims at 71% 'essential or desirable') can not solve the problem of Kashmir. The only way forward is negotiation and that is what the people want. Not the corrupt street politics of sectarian division and communal strife.
Using methods perfected in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and Sri Lanka the Team CVoter Foundation of Delhi and Dr. Colin Irwin from Liverpool University (in collaboration with The Week) asked over 2000 people more than 200 questions on all aspects of the conflict in Indian administered Kashmir. Here are the key results:
From a list of 37 different problems tested in the poll the top five were 'corrupt administration' 1st at 59% 'very significant' followed by 'high levels of unemployment' 2nd at 56%, 'India and Pakistan talking for 20 or 30 years with no result' 3rd at 54% and then 'Pakistan and India are using the Kashmiri people for their own interests' and 'the vested interests of all the groups involved in keeping the conflict going' joint 4th and 5th at 45% 'very significant'. If the poll were run again today perhaps those two items would come out on top. The people of Kashmir understand their politicians very well and the political games they play. It is time for this to stop and that is exactly what the people of Kashmir want.
From a list of 20 options for negotiations the top three were 'resolve the conflict through negotiation' at 81% 'essential or desirable' followed by 'Kashmiri people must be part of any talks and settlement of the Kashmir issue' 2nd at 76% and 'All parties should enter into discussions without delay and express their true opinion' 3rd at 72% 'essential or desirable'. And with regards to security 'The violence should stop from all sides' was first on this list of 24 options at 87% 'essential or desirable' and at the very bottom of this list was 'resolve the conflict through armed struggle' with 70% of Muslims saying this was 'totally unacceptable'.
So the people of Kashmir want negotiations to replace violence, this result is very welcome but is there something more they can agree to? Definitely 'yes'. The top priority for human rights was 'majorities and minorities should be treated the same' at 85% 'essential or desirable'. For refugees the number one solution was 'all Kashmiries should be allowed to live together again as they did in the past' at 83% and the top two general peace building priorities were 'we must learn from the past' at 84% 'essential or desirable' and 'give Kashmir real hope that a solution is coming' at 82%. But it does not end here, these high aspirations were also backed up with some more practical solutions. At the top of the education list came 'improve the education for all disadvantaged people of J and K' at 83% 'essential or desirable' and first on the economic list was 'effective independent Commission to deal with corruption' at a high of 89% 'essential or desirable'.
Remarkably, when it came to the critical issues of the constitution the top priority (from a list of 29) was 'J and K should be a secular state' at 68% 'essential or desirable'. And although it will come as no surprise that 63% of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley reject the constitutional status quo of remaining with India as 'totally unacceptable' 69% of that same population also considered a merger with Pakistan to be 'totally unacceptable'. So a UN plebiscite that is limited to these two options (a priority for Muslims at 71% 'essential or desirable') can not solve the problem of Kashmir. The only way forward is negotiation and that is what the people want. Not the corrupt street politics of sectarian division and communal strife.
These two competing views of the 'War on Terror' have been the subject of unprecedented levels of public enquiry and debate since the events of 9/11 because these two competing views have profoundly different implications for the foreign policy of the US and her allies. Are their policies in the Middle East and through the 'War on Terror' fuelling that conflict or are they defeating it? That is the critical question that is being asked and a very great deal of public opinion research has quite rightly been undertaken in this context. Sometimes this is done in an effort to find an answer to this critical question, but, also, with apparent equal energy and effort this is sometimes done so as not to ask or answer this critical question and/or to support one thesis over the other.
This is particularly true in the UK since the events of the London bombings of 7/7. Another great tragedy that some have argued should have been foreseen and as a consequence have repeatedly asked for a full public enquiry. This paper critically examines the public opinion research undertaken in the UK since the events of 9/11 and suggests that the methods adopted in support of the successful Northern Ireland peace process should now be employed in an effort to help resolve the so called 'War on Terror'. The Northern Ireland conflict took more than a generation to solve. We are told that the 'War on Terror' may last as long. This protracted engagement, I would like to suggest, can be shortened by applying all the positive lessons from Northern Ireland including the lessons of objective public opinion research and its associated descriptive power as a tool for transparent independent conflict analysis and effective public diplomacy.
By the time I got to Khartoum in July 2009 my work in Sri Lanka was well under way, I had completed a project with colleagues in Kashmir and as my first 'peace poll' had been carried out in the Canadian Arctic I was very pleased to find my self working with nomads again. Following several trips to Sudan that year including Darfur, as well as meetings with other stakeholders in Washington, Philadelphia, New York and London (State Department, World Bank, US Institute of Peace, UN and rebel spokespersons in Europe) a questionnaire was developed for pre-testing in November 2009.
The project was being carried out under the direction of Professor Monroe Price of the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania in partnership with colleagues of his at Albany Associates and I was brought in as a consultant. As it turned out the development of the questionnaire went very well and with minor adjustments following the pilot everyone was ready to collect the full sample. Through the good offices of UNAMD (African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur) and their DDDC program (Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Communication) the results of their work were incorporated into the questionnaire along with all the suggestions from IDPs, nomads, tribal leaders, rebels, local and national government officials etc. etc.
By the time I got to Khartoum in July 2009 my work in Sri Lanka was well under way, I had completed a project with colleagues in Kashmir and as my first 'peace poll' had been carried out in the Canadian Arctic I was very pleased to find my self working with nomads again. Following several trips to Sudan that year including Darfur, as well as meetings with other stakeholders in Washington, Philadelphia, New York and London (State Department, World Bank, US Institute of Peace, UN and rebel spokespersons in Europe) a questionnaire was developed for pre-testing in November 2009.
The project was being carried out under the direction of Professor Monroe Price of the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Pennsylvania in partnership with colleagues of his at Albany Associates and I was brought in as a consultant. As it turned out the development of the questionnaire went very well and with minor adjustments following the pilot everyone was ready to collect the full sample. Through the good offices of UNAMD (African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur) and their DDDC program (Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Communication) the results of their work were incorporated into the questionnaire along with all the suggestions from IDPs, nomads, tribal leaders, rebels, local and national government officials etc. etc.
As part of this research effort, scholars from across Canada were invited to submit research proposals to the Review Secretariat in 1986. In 1987 I participated in a three-day workshop to discuss regional issues; later that year, 21 of a possible 96 proposals were accepted for funding. This proposal, which attempts to describe the social and economic changes brought about by the resettlement of the Inuit in villages and the growth of the Inuit population in the Canadian Arctic, was included.
Since the Inuit were moved into permanent settlements in the late l950s and early 1960s, a new generation has grown up in the social and cultural environment of houses, villages, schools, hospitals, jobs, and television. Some of the changes brought about by resettlement have been neutral with respect to demographic, social, and economic change; others have had positive effects (e.g., lower death rates); and yet others may have been detrimental (e.g., higher unemployment). In the absence of a reversal of this resettlement process, the Inuit living in arctic communities in 2025 will be made up of individuals barely able to recollect a life lived independently "out on the land". Given the almost compelling certainty of this conclusion, a sense of the direction in which social and economic change is moving is essential if the social and economic expectations desired by the Inuit are to be realized.
Looking almost half a century into the future is very difficult. This is probably especially true of the Arctic, where resettlement and a clash of cultures has produced very rapid social, cultural, and economic change. During the past half-century, this change has been marked most notably by an abandonment of the aboriginal life-style. At best, this research can only attempt to predict the directions of change into the future by working from the assumption that there will be no change in current government policies for regional development in the Arctic. Inevitably, this assumption will be false, but, hopefully, by making this assumption, there will emerge a picture of some future existence for the Inuit which will stand as a bench-mark from which desired futures might be better drawn and systematically planned.
If it is found that Inuit hopes and expectations closely match the social and economic reality emergent in their communities, then there may be little cause for concern or need for new government policies. However, if it is found that the most modest expectations, particularly for the young, are not in keeping with the emergent reality, then, hopefully, this research will be able to identify specific areas of policy that may require revision.