Tine Gade

Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counter-example. Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in next-door Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable – despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover into Lebanon from the perspective of the country's Sunni Islamists. Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon's conflicting factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting to violenc...

Après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 février 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de fédérer un public politique mobilisé contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothèse de l’échec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la durée les différents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne réussirent-ils pas à mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement opposé au régime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Répondant à cette question, la thèse utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus réunis dans l’action politique à travers la perception d'avoir des intérêts communs. La thèse commence en 1967 et s’arrête en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques après 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La première analyse la vague de mobilisation à Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxième partie étudie la déstructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafism...

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the British Middle East Studies Society (BRISMES), London School of Economy (LSE), 26-28 March 2012. This paper analyses the crisis of Sunni leadership in Tripoli (Lebanon) and argues that it reflects a more global crisis of political and religious Sunnism in the entire Levant. Indeed, the city lies at the crossroads of two structural crises currently faced by various regions in the Middle East are: The first one is the weakening and fragmentation of political leadership in the Levant since the 1970s, the second is the problem of authority in Sunni Islam, aggravated by the communications revolution since the 1990s and 2000s. Internet made it easier for local religious leaders to circumvent the official, statist religious institutions and network directly with the transnational Umma. In addition, all the components of the social, cultural and urban crisis identified by different Arab Human Development Reports are also present in Tripoli. Tripo...

This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.

Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – despite the influx of some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and an internal political crisis involving supporters of opposing Syrian factions. Lebanon’s resilience can be explained by the high opportunity cost of state breakdown for domestic, regional and international political actors. Moreover, international economic assistance, diaspora remittances and informal networks established by refugees help to prevent outright economic breakdown. However, stability remains extremely precarious. Primary tipping points include (1) an IS strategy to spread the conflict to Lebanon, with consequent disintegration of the army along sectarian lines, (2) democratic decline and people’s dissatisfaction, (3) Hizbullah’s domestic ambitions and Israeli fears over the group’s growing military powers and (4) the potential that frustration between refugees and host communities may erupt into recurrent violence. T...

Apres l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri le 14 fevrier 2005 et le retrait syrien du Liban (avril 2005), son fils, Sa‘d, essaya de federer un public politique mobilise contre la Syrie, le Hezbollah et l’Iran. Ce travail fait l’hypothese de l’echec de Sa‘d Hariri de mobiliser dans la duree les differents composantes du champ politique tripolitain. Pourquoi Hariri et le Futur ne reussirent-ils pas a mobiliser le potentiel politique fortement oppose au regime syrien abondant au nord-Liban ? Repondant a cette question, la these utilise la notion de John Dewey (1859-1952) d’un public politique, un collectif d’individus reunis dans l’action politique a travers la perception d'avoir des interets communs. La these commence en 1967 et s’arrete en 2011, avec une postface sur les dynamiques apres 2011. Elle se divise en trois parties. La premiere analyse la vague de mobilisation a Tripoli entre 1967 et 1985. La deuxieme partie etudie la destructuration du sunnisme politique et l’essor du salafism...

After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, the military defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test case for both Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the region, such as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in Nineveh and Iraq, a new radical group may emerge, with far-reaching consequences.

Gade and Boas examine the question: Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the state and opt for violence, while other groups that may be equally frustrated with the state remain engaged with the existing polity? This question is addressed by analyzing case studies from Lebanon and Mali. Focus is put on the political behaviour of Islamist groups and individuals, and in particular on the factors that determine the acceptance, or not, of engaging in peaceful reconciliation. Revisiting the lessons learned from the divided societies of Lebanon and Mali, the authors assess the conditions under which reconciliation efforts and power-sharing agreements in Syria may become sustainable.

A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called “sensitive” zones where the Syrian war threatens to spread into Lebanon. While the Syrian army withdrew from North Lebanon in April 2005, Tripoli’s destiny remained intrinsically linked to Syria. This was because of the numerous historical, political, family, and economic ties linking the social space of north Lebanon to its Syrian hinterland. The demographic composition of the city resembles Syria. Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9%) and includes, in addition to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (8,9 %, or 28,525 persons) 1 . This paper analyses the consequences of the Syrian intervention and presence in Lebanon on political leadership in Tripoli. It shows how the Syrian presence created alliances, conflicts and divisions still present in Tripoli today. The main argument is that the Syrian presence in Tripoli destructured Sunni leadership in N...

Tiende januar 2015 sprengte to unge islamister seg selv på en kafé i Tripoli, Nord-Libanons største by. Angrepet, som drepte ni personer, ble gjennomført på et kjent samlingssted i Baal Mohsen, alawittgettoen i Tripoli. Angrepet var det alvorligste på alawitter i Tripolis historie, og illustrerer den store spenningen mellom militante sunniislamister og alawittene i byen.

Tiende januar 2015 sprengte to unge islamister seg selv på en kafé i Tripoli, Nord-Libanons største by. Angrepet, som drepte ni personer, ble gjennomført på et kjent samlingssted i Baal Mohsen, alawittgettoen i Tripoli. Angrepet var det alvorligste på alawitter i Tripolis historie, og illustrerer den store spenningen mellom militante sunniislamister og alawittene i byen.

This article assesses how social movement continuity may vary in non-democratic and repressive contexts. Using a single case study of Islamist networks in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli over three decades, I ask: Under what conditions is social movement continuity possible, and in what form? Former studies have three levels of abeyance - activist network and personnel; movement goals and repertoires; and collective identities and symbols - are instructive. Network survival and abeyance structures can facilitate rapid mass protests in case of a facilitating external conjuncture. This analysis relies on data collected during fieldwork conducted over a decade in Tripoli, triangulated with secondary literature and primary sources in Arabic. I find that four individual-level continuity pathways are available in authoritarian contexts: continuation of activism; disengagement; co-optation; and arena shifts. These pathways should not be seen as final and stable outcomes but as fluctuating and contingent processes, or pathways. Due to the ambiguity of informal networks, co-opted movements may easily turn against the authorities once again. Moreover, local legacies of protests may be used as resources by new protest leaders.

Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the
potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counterexample.
Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in nextdoor
Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable –
despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and
almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on
ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from
Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover
into Lebanon from the perspective of the country’s Sunni Islamists.
Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists
are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often
serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that
the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the
Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon’s conflicting
factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting
to violence inside Lebanon to be too high. Even those Lebanese
Sunnis who have crossed the borders to fight in Syria do so
because of domestic reasons, that is, to fight against Hezbollah on
Syria soil, where they can do so without risking an explosion of the
Lebanese security situation. Sectarianism, in the sense of
opposition to Hezbollah and the Lebanese Shia, is the main driver
of radicalization for Lebanese Sunnis.