Received: 29 June 2023 Revised: 27 February 2024 Accepted: 17 April 2024 DOI: 10.1111/nana.13021 ARTICLE Reaching out beyond the national border? How far-right actors in Germany and Norway evaluate transnationalism Katrine Fangen 1 1 | Manès Weisskircher 2 Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway 2 Institute of Political Science, TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany Correspondence Manès Weisskircher, Institute of Political Science, TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany. Email: manes.weisskircher@tu-dresden.de Abstract Research has emphasised the importance of far-right transnationalism, in terms of both ideology and practice. Yet, the literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of how far-right actors themselves reflect their transnational practices (or lack thereof), such as party-level exchange, joint protest events, or online communication. Drawing on original inter- Funding information We are grateful for the support of the Research Council of Norway (Reaching out to Close the Border, grant numbers 256205 and 303219) and Germany's Federal Ministry of Education and Research (REXKLIMA, 01UG2240A). view data from Germany and Norway, our research unveils that while far-right ‘nationalists’ generally endorse transnational activities, only a minority actively participates. The interviewees perceive transnational practices as opportunities for strategic learning, showcasing of collective strength, and networking. Simultaneously, they express concerns about being associated with extremists and getting entangled in conflict-ridden areas. Theoretically, we discuss the role of ideology and everyday life as well as the importance of only limited strategic incentives for understanding far-right transnationalism. In doing so, we draw parallels to experiences made by left-wing actors. Moreover, we underline the potential of Granovetter's ‘strength of weak ties’ for far-right diffusion. KEYWORDS far-right politics, political parties, populist radical right, social movements, strategy, transnationalism This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2024 The Author(s). Nations and Nationalism published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Nations and Nationalism. 2024;1–17. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/nana 1 1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N During its contemporary fourth wave (Mudde, 2019), far-right politics has become an increasingly international phenomenon. Research has drawn attention to the fact that many ‘nationalist’ parties, movements, and knowledge producers try to establish transnational connections, pointing to the ‘unwritten history of the globalisation of right-wing politics’ (Motadel, 2019: 81). Accordingly, scholars have highlighted the need to focus on the ‘global dimensions of populist nationalism’ (Miller-Idriss, 2019). The literature has emphasised the ideational foundations of far-right transnationalism. Far-right actors are not merely ‘nationalists’: they also positively identify with exclusionary visions of Europe, mainly directed against Muslim immigration (Brubaker, 2017; Caiani & Weisskircher, 2022; Fangen & Nilsen, 2021; Ganesh & Froio, 2020). A smaller strand of research has studied the role of transnational practices, i.e., cooperation on an individual and organisational level. Also here, the trend seems clear: ‘Today, right-wing extremist organizations across the world, whether parties or non-party organizations, are adapting to transnational politics’ (Caiani, 2018: 407). At the same time, we should not exaggerate the extent of this trend, which has found to be limited when it comes to common protest events (Macklin, 2013), the diffusion of movement organisations (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016), or online ties (Froio & Ganesh, 2019). While scholarship has shown that far-right actors ‘talk the talk’ of transnationalism in terms of a ‘Europeanised’ ideology; it seems less clear to what extent they also ‘walk the walk’, in terms of practices, and why they should aim to reach out beyond national borders to begin with. Our article provides an exploratory study of how far-right actors evaluate transnational practices. We ask: How do far-right actors assess the relevance of transnational cooperation both in principle and in their everyday political life? Why do they perceive transnational practices as positive or negative? To answer these questions, the article draws on original semi-structured interviews conducted with a broad variety of far-right actors in Germany and Norway, including party politicians, social movement activists, and knowledge producers such as intellectuals or bloggers. The need to understand the meaning of activism by actors themselves is emphasised both in research on the far right (e.g., Art, 2011; Damhuis & de Jonge, 2022) and on activism more generally (e.g., Choudry, 2015). Our work provides key empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, we shed light on common trends in both countries: We show that far-right ‘nationalists’ generally approve of transnational practices, such as party-level exchange, joint protest events, or online communication, although most do not consider them essential for their routine political activities. When discussing the pros and cons of transnational practices, interviewees emphasise opportunities for strategic learning, demonstrations of strength, and networking, but they also acknowledge the risk of associations with extremists and involvement in conflict-ridden arenas. Theoretically, we analyse our empirical findings by reflecting on the role of ideology, everyday life worlds, and especially strategy for understanding far-right transnational practices. We cast doubt on the perception that the limited importance of transnational practices for far-right actors' everyday political action is primarily grounded in their nativist ideology. Instead, we highlight the only limited strategic incentives for transnational engagement in the face of the high resources that effective transnational action requires, a pattern also visible among left-wing social movements (Císař & Vráblíková, 2013; Kymlicka, 1999; Tarrow, 2005). Additionally, we emphasise Granovetter's (1973) famous notion of the ‘strength of weak ties,’ pointing to the potential of even limited direct exchange for the transnational diffusion of far-right identities and practices. The next section clarifies our theoretical perspectives on transnationalism. We then discuss our methodological approach and case selection. In the empirical section, we present our findings in detail, before discussing them in a broader theoretical context. Our conclusion points to open questions for future scholarship. 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 2 2 | 3 F A R - R I G H T TR A N S N A T I O N A LI S A T I O N : I D E O L O G Y A N D P R A C T I C E S Transnationalism is a concept most commonly used within migration studies, but with a wider relevance and usability. One of the most influential definitions indicates the many different faces of transnationalism by conceptualising it as ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions’ across national borders' (Vertovec, 1999: 447). Taking a transnational perspective often implies focusing on non-state actors ‘and their cross-border activities, connections, linkages, positions and belongings’ (Dahinden, 2017: 1482). We refer to transnationalisation as the move towards (more) transnationalism. There is reason to expect that far-right transnationalism is a relevant phenomenon also because of similar trends in other areas of right-wing and authoritarian politics. For example, in the domain of right-wing religious family policies, transnational initiatives on ‘family mainstreaming’ and the ‘pro-life movement’ date back to the 1990s } , 2018). Illiberal transnationalism on gender-related questions extends to the governmental level, (Grzebalska & Peto as seen, for instance, when a Moscow-based campaign to discredit LGBTQ+ ideas spread to other countries (Cooley & Nexon, 2022: 111). In the EU, during the ‘refugee crisis’, the Visegrád countries emerged as a collective actor to oppose liberal migration policies (Koß & Séville, 2020). Also, authoritarian regimes have long cooperated internationally to prevent democratisation (Von Soest, 2015). Moreover, authoritarian leaders such as Brazilian an use foreign policy to gain legitimation, also by using ‘populist’ President Bolsonaro and Turkish President Erdog discourse when propagating a conflict between ‘the people’ and ‘elites’ at the international stage (Wajner, 2022). We understand the phenomenon of far-right transnationalism as part of a broader trend in illiberal politics, but focus on far-right actors in western Europe and embed our study mainly in the literature on the subject (most influentially Mudde, 2007).1 More specifically, scholars of the far right have shown that far-right transnationalism has a long history: In the immediate postwar decades, efforts aiming at ‘the Europeanization of fascism … has become … a striking feature of the post-1945 fascist radical right’ (Griffin, 2000: 166). It was mainly on the level of ideology where a shift towards transnationalism occurred, in line with the ‘metapoliticization’ of the far right due to its widespread political marginalisation in the second half of the 20th century (Griffin, 2000). This ideological shift towards Europeanism has drawn from previous generations of far-right activism and, most importantly, the writings of far-right intellectuals (Bar-On, 2008, 2011; Griffin, 2000). From the 1960s onwards, it has been the French New Right, centred around its key protagonist Alain de Benoist, that has propagated an updated version of a ‘radical rejection of liberalism, unfettered capitalism, representative democracy and the United States’ (Bar-On, 2011: 219) that could serve as common ground for the European far-right scene. Over time, these common ideological visions have evolved further. Emphasising European civilisation, far-right parties now highlight a common Europe of equal fatherlands that should form a ‘fortress of Europe,’ in opposition to Muslim immigration (Brubaker, 2017; Caiani & Weisskircher, 2022; Ganesh & Froio, 2020). Beyond ideas, the literature has also studied the role of far-right transnational practices (Caiani, 2018). Here, the picture has been more ambivalent. Even in the European Parliament, an institutional setting that strongly incentivises transnational cooperation, far-right parties were long unable to form a durable joint parliamentary group (Almeida, 2010). However, since 2014, a group that includes the key (Western European) actors has been in existence and relatively stable — though it does not include all ideologically similar parties, partly because of divisions over relations with Russia (McDonnell & Werner, 2020). Far-right offline and online networks in Europe have been found to be broad, too, with regular exchanges not just of ideas, but also of individuals (Berntzen, 2020; Nissen, 2022). At the same time, common protest events have remained only a rare occurrence (Macklin, 2013). Even though some of the most successful instances of far-right protest have quickly moved across borders, such cases of transnational diffusion are usually only short-lived (Berntzen & Weisskircher, 2016; Volk, 2019). In addition, while some far-right actors indeed seek to establish transnational online ties (Caiani & Kröll, 2015), transnational interaction on social media is limited, too, at least when compared with national-level exchange (Froio & Ganesh, 2019). 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER In this article, we focus on transnational practices. In line with the literature discussed above, we understand the variety of far-right transnational practices as marking a continuum that stretches from individual instances of contact to sustained forms of cooperation, online and/or offline. Importantly, individual instances of contact might be a private exchange over a political matter, online interaction, the one-time attendance of a protest event abroad, acting as a guest speaker in another country, inviting a guest speaker from abroad, or participating in an international networking event. Sustained forms of cooperation point to the regularity of these practices and may include the regular contribution to a magazine or online blog abroad, regular delegations to foreign parties or groups, building up alternative media sites in other countries, or the creation and maintaining of common organisational structures and networks. So far, the literature has mainly looked at transnational practices that can be externally observed, but it has neglected the question of how far-right actors themselves perceive the relevance of transnational engagement (but see Caiani & Kröll, 2015; McDonnell & Werner, 2020). At the same time, research that mainly measures easily observable connections such as online links or joint protest events is unable to understand the meaning of far-right transnationalisation for the actors involved. This article aims to shed light on the evaluations that far-right actors have about whether and why it is important to reach out — or not. A perspective on the actor's own perceptions provide us with a better theoretical understanding of the role of ideology, everyday life worlds, and especially strategy for understanding far-right transnational practices. Importantly, we cast doubt on the perception that the limited importance of transnational practices for far-right actors' everyday political action is primarily grounded in their nativist ‘thick’ ideology (Mudde, 2007). Instead, in times of globalisation, an interest in reaching out beyond the national border has become an essential part of the everyday life (McCluskey, 2024) or even life worlds (Frankenberger et al., 2023) of far-right individuals. A fundamental disinterest in transnational processes, especially after the rise of a European far-right ‘party family’ mobilising on the transnational issue of immigration from outside of Europe, is an unlikely theoretical expectation. Even far-right actors cannot escape from key macro-processes in our societies. Moreover, the Europeanisation of far-right ideology discussed above should make us expect affirmative views towards reaching out beyond the national border. Still, our article highlights the limited strategic incentives to reach out, especially in the face of the high resources that effective transnational action requires — a challenge not only for the far right, but for political players more generally, also among the political left (Císař & Vráblíková, 2013; Kymlicka, 1999; Tarrow, 2005). Scholarship has recently questioned the dualism between ‘national’ and ‘foreign’ politics, highlighting the strong overlap between both ‘spheres’ and that political actors move from one arena to another depending on their strategic interest (e.g., Guiraudon, 2000; Wajner, 2022). A focus on the domestic arena can be expected from party politics research that emphasises domestic office-seeking in national elections as key strategic incentive (Müller & Strøm, 1999) — for achieving this goal, transnational practices are secondary, at most. Lastly, we emphasise Granovetter's (1973) famous notion of the ‘strength of weak ties,’ pointing to the importance of even limited direct exchange for the transnational diffusion of identities and strategy among political actors in general, including the left (McAdam & Rucht, 1993), and therefore also among the far right. This theoretical point further underlines the broader importance of even only limited transnational practices for understanding the development of far-right politics more generally. 3 | M E TH O DO LO GI C A L A P P R OA CH A N D CA S E SE L E CT I ON In most studies referred to above, transnational practices are understood as externally observable behaviour. Importantly, however, as the forms of transnational practices listed above indicate, many such actions are not necessarily directed at a broader, external audience. Therefore, this article bridges the literature on far-right transnationalism with recent methodological calls for internalist perspectives on the far right that improve our understanding of the 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 4 5 relevance of specific acts of political behaviour (Castelli Gattinara, 2019; Goodwin, 2006; McCluskey, 2019; Pilkington, 2016). To study how far-right activists evaluate transnational practices, we rely on semi-structured interviews, which were conducted from 2020 to 2022,2 usually lasting between one and three hours, and covering a range of questions on biography, forms of action, networking, and impact. In total, we draw on 35 interviews.3 In our sample, we aimed for the inclusion of party politicians, social movement activists, and knowledge producers such as alternative media editors and public intellectuals, reflecting the organisational diversity of the contemporary far right (Mudde, 2019). Most importantly, we did not select our interviewees based on previous knowledge of their transnational practices and did not actively seek out those who transnationalise. Instead, a diverse sample of far-right actors allows us to gain a more realistic understanding of the relevance of transnationalisation among the broader universe. This included leading figures of their respective organisation – rather decision-makers – but also ‘backbenchers’ in parliaments or regular activists – rather decision-takers. We especially tried to avoid the bias of only talking to those actors that can be expected to have strong transnational ties, such as MEPs, in order to gain an understanding for the general relevance of transnational ties within the far right. While our exploratory study primarily provides an individual-level analysis, the interviewees' perception of transnational practices also regularly included references to the organisational level. Contact with far-right actors was established through electronic communication and/or telephone.4 Some actors were recruited through snowball sampling. We protect the anonymity of interviewees while retaining the names of the majority of the organisations they are involved with. However, we may omit names of very small parties or organisations for the sake of anonymisation. In the empirical section, interview excerpts have been edited for readability, but the content has been kept intact. Of the interviewees, 16 were based in Germany and 19 were based in Norway (see Tables 1 and 2). Most of our interviewees were men, reflecting the fact that men are overrepresented in far-right organisations. Importantly, too, some of these actors cannot clearly be categorised as either a party politician or a knowledge producer. Often, these categories overlap. Accordingly, we classified the interviewees in multiple categories whenever appropriate. Here, we acted in a conservative way: For example, Interviewee 16 is both an AfD politician and the organiser of a social movement group — he was, therefore, classified as both party politician and social movement activist. Interviewee 8, however, is an AfD politician and had attended several far-right protest events, in one case even as speaker, but was classified solely as a party politician because the other activities were of relatively minor importance. In the Norwegian sample, Interviewee 22 is an Alliance politician and has his own online channel in which he shares his political views. Further, Interviewees 18 and 19 are Democrats politicians but also regular contributors to a far-right alternative media site. These three latter examples were therefore classified as both politicians and knowledge producers. Despite our considerable number of interviews, we interpret our data conservatively, as our interviewees still constitute a small subsample of the overall universe. In line with our exploratory approach, we highlight common trends among the far right instead of overemphasising differences between types of actors. Within western European politics, Germany and Norway differ on several important dimension relevant for our research questions. Germany has a strong, well-organised far-right scene (Weisskircher, 2024) that includes a parliamentary party, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), that mainstream parties have refused to cooperate with (Arzheimer, 2019; Heinze, 2024). The National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD) has become an extra-parliamentary fringe party. However, the country has a strong farright protest environment, both when it comes to anti-immigration stances, for example, PEGIDA and Generation Identity (Identitäre Bewegung, IB). Geographically, the country lies in the centre of Europe, which is likely to facilitate personal exchange. Norway's only parliamentary far-right party, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP), is less authoritarian but equally anti-establishment and anti-immigration as many of its European counterparts (Fangen & Vaage, 2018; Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). The party was part of government coalitions. Norway also hosts several extra-parliamentary far-right parties (Norgesdemokratene, Alliansen, De kristne). The far-right protest scene in Norway is currently modest, mainly dominated by Stop Islamization of Norway (SIAN). When it comes to knowledge 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER TABLE 1 Interviewees in Germany. No. Gender Party politics Partya Social movement activism Knowledge production 1 Male Yes AfD No No 2 Male Yes AfD No No 3 Male Yes NPD No Yes 4 Male No n/a Yes Yes 5 Male No n/a No Yes 6 Male Yes NPD No No 7 Female Yes AfD No No 8 Male Yes AfD No No 9 Male Yes AfD No Yes 10 Male Yes AfD No No 11 Male Yes AfD No No 12 Male No n/a No Yes 13 Female Yes Anonymous No Yes 14 Male Yes AfD No No 15 Male Yes AfD No No 16 Male Yes AfD Yes No Total Male: 14; female: 2 13 AfD: 10; NPD: 2; Freie Wähler: 1 2 6 a Some of the German and Norwegian interviewees who worked as politicians had been involved in several different parties. Their move from one party to another happened either because they were expelled (owing to extremist or national conservative standpoints), because they themselves disagreed with the current policies of a party, or because they had individual conflicts with other party members. To ensure anonymity, we have only listed their party membership at the time of the interview. producers, however, Norway has several far-right alternative media with a wide outreach (Dammen & Fangen, 2024). Moreover, while Germany is an EU member, Norway is not, which might also be relevant for transnational cooperation. When it comes to both countries, again in line with our exploratory approach, we also highlight common trends rather than exaggerating cross-national differences. 4 | AN INTERNALIST PERSPECTIVE: HOW FAR-RIGHT ACTORS E V A L U A T E T H E I M P O R T A N C E OF TR A N S N A T I O N A L P R A C T I C E S 4.1 | The desirability of transnational practices Crucially, our interviewees generally approved of reaching out beyond the borders of their countries. Many of these ‘nationalists’ hoped for stronger transnational practices in their respective organisations. In both countries, some respondents' evaluation of the idea of transnational cooperation was so positive that they felt the need to criticise the status quo of their own organisations or networks. In Germany, several AfD politicians supported an extension of institutionalised exchange with foreign parties. For instance, one employee of an AfD MP (9)5 criticised his party for not having an international office and was in favour of the creation of such a body. Similarly, an AfD regional deputy (8) wanted MEPs to extend international 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 6 TABLE 2 7 Interviewees in Norway. No. Gender Party politics Party Social movement activism Knowledge production 17 Male Yes Demokratene No No 18 Male Yes Demokratene No Yes 19 Male Yes Demokratene No Yes 20 Male Yes Demokratene No No 21 Male Yes Alliansen Yes No 22 Male Yes Alliansen No Yes 23 Male Yes De kristne No No 24 Male Yes Fremskrittspartiet No Yes 25 Male No n/a Yes No 26 Female No n/a Yes No 27 Female No n/a No Yes 28 Female No n/a No Yes 29 Female No n/a No Yes 30 Male No n/a No Yes 31 Male No n/a No Yes 32 Male No n/a No Yes 33 Male No n/a No Yes 34 Male No n/a No Yes 35 Male Yes Fremskrittspartiet FB group moderator No Total Male: 15; female: 4 9 Fremskrittspartiet: 2; Demokratene: 4; Alliansen: 2; De kristne: 1 3 12 contacts and expressed her dissatisfaction about the lack of such efforts. An AfD MP (14) even thought that the party should have an external representative in its headquarters who focused solely on international contacts. He also expressed criticism of the fact that a recent FIDESZ congress had taken place without AfD involvement. In a similar vein, another AfD regional deputy (2) favoured a stronger intra-party focus on international exchange. Outside the AfD, a far-right blogger (12) lamented the failure to establish an international alternative media network. He reported on attempts to formalise a network of German-speaking bloggers, including several Austrian platforms. However, to his dismay, they failed to build sustainable structures, arguing about financial aspects. In Norway, the Democrats aimed at cooperation with Swedish and Danish far-right parties — regretting that they had no ongoing collaboration so far. One leading Democrats politician (17) had previously held a prominent local position within the more ‘moderate’ Progress Party but became disappointed about the latter's reluctance to cooperate with the (more radical) Swedish Democrats. Now in a leadership position within the Democrats, he had ideas of collaboration among Nordic ‘national conservative’ parties and emphasised: ‘It's on our wish list.’ A younger local leader from the Democrats (18) mentioned the Danish far-right political party New Conservatives (Nye Borgerlige) as natural ally for sharing experiences. He had similar views about the Sweden Democrats, Alternative for Sweden, and AfD. Even though he was convinced that it was important to build up a strong organisation in Norway first, he was positive about establishing transnational contacts in the future. Another local leader from the Democrats (20) was previously active in the leadership of the Progress Party, when it still cooperated with the Danish Progress Party. He, too, was disappointed with the current Progress Party 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER and its unwillingness to collaborate with Swedish and Danish counterparts, and hoped to see stronger transnational practices in the future. He maintained that it was natural to have contact with like-minded politicians in the Scandinavian countries, who would also be close to each other in terms of language. 4.2 | Low importance for everyday politics Despite the widely shared desire for having transnational contacts, most interviewees did not regard their own transnational ties as key for their everyday political work, even if they reached out occasionally. The AfD Bundestag MP (14) reported international contacts that did not shape his political routine, for example, with the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), but also with actors in France, Italy, and Serbia. He attended various international network events at home and abroad. A regional MP from AfD (8) reported that she had organised an international event, inviting politicians from many European countries. She had also reached out to the women's association of the FPÖ, attending two events in Austria. Nevertheless, for her, international collaboration did not constitute a key part of her everyday work. Similarly, another regional AfD deputy (11) said that transnational contacts only mattered in his everyday political work on rare occasions. He reported having limited contacts abroad, for example, with the German minority in Poland. He argued that while members of this group could obtain German citizenship quite easily, strategically, owing to its small size, it did not make sense for the AfD to mobilise their support. He also met the key FPÖ politician Herbert Kickl once at an event in Berlin and had a friendly conversation with him — but the interaction was not of broader relevance to his political work. Also for another AfD regional MP (10), international contacts were not particularly important. Every now and then, based on personal contacts, there was some cooperation: For example, he once did a podcast with a prominent foreign activist. Although his party branch organised many demonstrations in its own region, he never felt the need to attend demonstrations abroad. A far-right blogger (12) mentioned cooperation with an Austrian website that was also connected to several Southern European outlets. Here, activists shared articles on social media and translated content. Similarly, an NPD politician (3) infrequently relied on international contacts for media production, talking to a key figure of the British National Party, for example. A local deputy and knowledge producer (13) had a prominent foreign far-right activist as guest in an online format but still would not consider herself to be part of a strong international political network. The Norwegian far-right alternative media journalists had sporadic contact with actors from other countries when inviting prominent far-right politicians or thinkers from abroad to common meetings. An administrator of one of the alternative media platforms (29) said that when they invited journalist and UKIP politician Kathie Hopkins, they had ‘a lot of fun’, as she had many stories to tell from Trump's birthday parties, for example. Even though this particular alternative media outlet has had an important role in inviting far-right commentators, including British author Douglas Murray, contact was not very substantial. Several of the Norwegian interviewees had been present when the outlet invited Donald Trump's chief strategist Steve Bannon. Many of them were enthusiastic about Bannon's visit, which had included a dinner, but one public intellectual (34) thought that the encounter lacked impact. He said that there were many who thought it was ‘cool’ to meet Bannon, but they were disappointed when they found that he did not listen to anyone, but only wanted to tell them what to do. However, other visits were experienced as more fruitful. A leading politician of Norway's party The Christians (De kristne, now called Konservativ) (23) reported that the most common form of contact is what he called ‘punctual networking’: ‘As a politician, the whole networking thing is one of the most important things you do. You build relationships, and you attend conferences, and you meet people, and things like that.’ His party, despite its rather small size, had invited speakers from other countries to its conferences on several occasions. The politician himself had a broad international network and had invited speakers from Israel, Kurdistan, and other countries or regions. The main criterion for such an invitation was that the 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 8 9 presentation was relevant for the party's politics — for example, on ‘persecution of Christians in the Middle East’ or how ‘Christianity in the Middle East is disappearing’. The manifesto of the former Norwegian extra-parliamentary far-right Independence Party (Selvstendighetspartiet) was inspired by the AfD's party programme, but also by the manifestos of Alternative for Sweden and the Danish People's Party. Some of the younger party members had transnational contact with politicians in these sister parties. The Independence Party also had links to the Danish movement-party Hard Line (Stram Kurs). A former leading figure of the Independence Party reported that when Rasmus Paludan, the leader of Stram Kurs, visited the Independence Party's info desk in Oslo during an electoral campaign, he had stayed in her home. She mentioned that Paludan had an unrestricted invitation to join a demonstration alongside the anti-Islamic organisation, of which she had now become a prominent figure. However, she added that he was the sole individual abroad with whom they had regular contact. A local leader of the Alliance (21) stated that they had had some cooperation with Alternative for Sweden, which is an extra-parliamentary far-right party, but the contact had only taken the form of ‘a few conversations’. Similarly, a leading politician of the Democrats (20) reported that during the party's founding period, representatives of the Sweden Democrats attended one of their national meetings, but that there was only little contact afterwards. 4.3 | High importance for everyday politics Only a few individual brokers recognised the significance of regular international connections in their political endeavours. These links did not occur ‘automatically,’ but the actors made a special effort to cultivate them. For these actors, reaching out beyond their national border was an important part of their political repertoire. The AfD employee (9), who had studied and done internships abroad, focused on transnational linkages. He had been at many far-right events abroad — for example, those organised by CasaPound, a group that he thought could partially serve as a role model for Germany's far right. Sometimes he established connections between foreign journalists and AfD politicians. A leading activist from the NPD youth organisation (6) had met with several far-right groups abroad — for example, when organising common events with groups from across Europe or when visiting CasaPound in Italy, whose cultural and social activities he appreciated. For him, international contacts were a regular part of youth activism in particular. Two German knowledge producers (4 and 5) had published books on European politics and had ties to activists in several European countries, for example, in France. For these interviewees, it was almost natural to have strong international ties: this was part of their regular political work and important to their political agenda. The NPD politician (3) said that, while he himself had not done so, the party's former MEP had focused strongly on international networking, both within and even outside Europe, including in countries such as Syria — and thus also underlined the important role of individual brokers for transnational networking. Similarly, a minority of the far-right actors in Norway had serious transnational ambitions, prioritising the establishment of networks of like-minded individuals. Beyond politicians, alternative media editors were the most proactive in fostering international connections, first and foremost with similar platforms in Sweden and Denmark. One alternative media outlet, Document.no, had initiated similar websites in these neighbouring countries (Document.se and Document.dk, respectively). One interviewee who was a leading figure of the Democrats as well as a journalist for Document (19) emphasised that the Document sites in Sweden and Denmark were still small. Nevertheless, he maintained that they had writers in many countries across Europe as well as in the USA. In addition, another journalist working for Document (29) said that they had strategically built up a pool of writers who knew various languages – Spanish, German, Arabic, etc. – to write for the website. As already mentioned, this platform had also been involved in inviting well-known far-right actors from other countries, such as Bannon and Murray, to meetings, while individuals responsible for the platform had themselves participated in meetings in Denmark, especially with the 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. 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Another Norwegian alternative media journalist (28) stated that she had extensive transnational contact, not just with alternative media producers in the neighbouring countries but also with parliamentary politicians, and claimed that she even had directly influenced Danish immigration policy some years ago by almost acting as a ‘personal adviser to the immigration minister at the time.’ She claimed that her think-tank also frequently collaborated with the Henry Jackson Society, a political think-tank in the UK, in which Murray was a central figure and with whom she had contact already since 2004. 4.4 | No importance for everyday politics For a smaller number of actors in both countries, transnational practices did not matter at all. For them, transnational processes seemed either something infeasible or far away from their everyday experience. One AfD politician (1) was a spokesperson for Europe in his regional AfD parliamentary group, yet, reported that international connections were irrelevant to his political work. Similarly, another AfD regional MP (2) had studied abroad and had been inspired by living in the United Kingdom, but still did not report any relevant international political connections. Another AfD regional MP (7) showed not even the slightest interest in developing international contacts and completely dismissed their relevance to his political work in the eastern German countryside. An AfD regional MP and social movement campaigner (16) said that, for his context of regional politics, transnational ties were irrelevant. Among the Norwegian interviewees, the most explicit dismissal of international cooperation was expressed by a moderator of a Facebook group (35) in support of a Progress Party politician. He said that he knew of many groups in other countries, ‘but I have never been deeply fascinated or feel that it is that that got me started.’ An anti-Islamic organisation in Norway also had very little transnational interaction. Apart from their somewhat loose collaboration with the leader of Stram Kurs in Denmark, the leading figures only reported about domestic contacts. One of them (25) declared: ‘There is really no good reason why you should spend a lot of resources on or to have such a wide international cooperation.’ Therefore, he said, their organisation had no formalised or significant cooperation with anti-Islamic groups in other countries, although occasional informal discussions did occur. 4.5 | The benefits of transnational practices Importantly, transnational practices are linked to strategic considerations. Those interviewees that had established some transnational contacts highlighted several benefits of reaching out: These were strategic learning, the showcasing of collective strength, and networking experiences. The AfD MP (14) said that he had learned from Austria. For this interviewee, it was fun to experience that when the Bundestag sent a parliamentary delegation to Austria, a key representative in their host country was an FPÖ politician ideologically close to AfD — a very unusual experience for him, as he was typically surrounded by political adversaries in Germany. Through this international contact, he had learned about Austrian policies at the subnational level that the interviewee deemed important. He emphasised that he had received this type of international inspiration less because of intra-party mechanisms, but because of Bundestag exchange. If AfD ever entered government, he would be interested in actively reaching out to the FPÖ for advice — for example, on how the FPÖ minister for internal affairs ran his ministry. The employee of an AfD MP (9) highlighted how international contacts had helped him to learn from the experiences of others, especially regarding the importance of community life. In his view, the German far right could learn 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 10 11 from subcultures in other countries: Festivals and regular meetings and events that did not focus solely on political debate were deemed essential. Such informal gatherings would facilitate participation by creating much stronger social bonds and trust than when individuals just listened to politicians speaking at a party event. In his view, Germany's far-right scene lacked such a form of community life. What he liked about getting to know some foreign organisations was the higher shares of female followers, activists coming from many different professional backgrounds and all sectors of society, and less ‘intellectual narrowness’ than in Germany. The AfD regional deputy (8) said that her motives for fostering international contacts were to share experiences and to learn from others. In Austria, she had made an important political contact with whom she was still regularly in touch. Before entering politics, she said that she had visited several multicultural districts in major European cities as a tourist to learn about the realities elsewhere. A leading activist from NPD (6) said that international contacts were very useful as they facilitated tactical inspiration and provided possibilities for the showing of collective strength. Several of the Norwegian alternative media journalists told about an earlier period when they had extensive contact with a group of publishers in Denmark and participated in their meetings. At that time, there had also been more contact and exchange between the different Norwegian alternative media outlets. Further, some of the editors of these outlets cooperated with organisations in the UK, and reported that this made it easier to accomplish goals. One of them mentioned a case of a human rights violation that both the Norwegian and the British organisations reported to the police. In addition, they had writers stationed in many countries around the world, not just in Europe, which made it possible to translate news from these countries and publish it on their media sites. Having such contacts made it easier to report the latest international news. In other words, the transnational networking experience made it possible to increase content production, and also to learn how to strategically reach a wider audience. One of the alternative media editors (28) even listed the experience of travelling to and spending time in Muslim-majority countries in itself as a way of learning by first-hand experience. A public intellectual said that, particularly during the early 2000s, there was a lot of strategic learning across borders within the Nordic countries, and some of the Norwegian alternative media pages adopted strategies used by their Swedish counterparts, such as the practice of disclosing the identity of criminals, which led to more ‘clicks’ among their readers. 4.6 | The disadvantages of transnational contact Even though many interviewees thought that fostering transnational contact had some significant advantages, many of them also felt that putting too much effort into transnational engagement also had its disadvantages, such as the risk of being associated with extremists and of entering a conflict-ridden arena. The AfD employee (9) warned that transnational contacts could also be harmful — for example, if the contact persons turned out to be extremists or to be associated with extremists. He did not want to be made into a ‘pariah’ at home, so he tried to be cautious. An AfD regional deputy (11) expressed similar concerns. At the same time, some AfD politicians reported experiencing the same type of caution from other foreign parties: An AfD regional MP (8) said that when the FPÖ entered national government, the Austrians became sceptical of close and open contact with the AfD, fearing damage to its domestic reputation. Ahead of one event she attended in Austria, FPÖ politicians told her that she was welcome to join, but that she should not go public about her participation, for example, via social media. Another regional AfD deputy (11) confirmed the FPÖ's hesitant behaviour and added that other governing parties with potential sympathies, such as some Central and Eastern European ones, did not have strong incentives to meet with AfD politicians because the German government would regard such encounters as a provocation. Other actors reported conflicts as potential drawbacks of transnationalisation efforts. The far-right blogger (12) lamented the failure to establish an international alternative media network, describing attempts to formalise a network of German-speaking bloggers, including several Austrian ones. However, to his dismay, the bloggers failed to build sustainable structures and remained disunited, arguing and even exchanging verbal offences. The NPD youth 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER activist (6) reported that Russian and Ukrainian activists starting to physically fight each other at one point. Moreover, he rejected the presence of a black activist when visiting CasaPound. Among Norwegian actors, some of the more moderate ones also feared the association with extremists. An example was the Progress Party's reluctance to be in contact with the Sweden Democrats. One young local leader of the extra-parliamentary party the Democrats (18) said that when he was the leader of a local team in the Progress Party's youth organisation (FpU, Fremskrittspartiets ungdom), he had had some contact with the Danish People's Party, but that this was very unpopular among his fellow members. On the whole, in his view, the FpU had become an organisation he could not recognise anymore, far less radical than the Progress Party, concerned with climate and wind power. Norwegian actors also reported that transnational outreach might lead to conflict. One leading figure of a farright alternative website (29) stated that one reason for not wanting to devote too much energy to transnational networking was that the scene contained many individualists who wanted full control over the political profile of others. A Norwegian blogger (30) closed down a far-right publishing venture in a neighbour country after conflict. Moreover, one Norwegian public intellectual (34) referred to frustration and misunderstanding because of differences between the various factions of what he called the ‘New Right’ in Europe. 5 | DISCUSSION Our comprehensive empirical findings point to the role of ideology, everyday life, and strategy for understanding farright transnational practices. At first, the often only limited importance of transnational practices for the political routines of far-right actors may lead observers to assume that any reported positive views on their desirability are mere lip service, not based on ‘true convictions’. If transnational practices were indeed their preference, why would these actors only talk the talk, and not also walk the walk? Important answers can be found in research on ‘progressive’ social movements and their transnational practices in Europe (della Porta & Caiani, 2009; della Porta, 2020). This research has clearly shown the relevance of pro-European identities for contemporary left-wing actors. Even in the case of the anti-austerity protests of the early and mid-2010s, activists held pro-European identities (Kaldor & Selchow, 2013; Pianta & Gerbaudo, 2015). Moreover, many progressive social movements, such as labour activists, pro-immigration actors, or environmentalists, have put forward their own ‘visions of Europe’ and can be understood as ‘anti-nationalist Europeans’ (Caiani & Weisskircher, 2022) — despite being critical of the reality of EU politics. Nevertheless, despite these actor's strong transnational views, also here scholarship points to the limits of transnational engangement. This is the case even for protestors with explicit transnational goals: Activists from the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, an organisation that campaigns for fundamental EU reform, seem overburdened with the challenges of transnational action, such as organisational issues and language barriers (Císař & Weisskircher, 2022). Protestors that tried to prevent TTIP, an international trade agreement between the EU and the USA, very much relied on distinct national framing strategies (Oleart, 2020; Rone, 2018). Even when both the grievance and institutional opportunities are transnational, successful transnational mobilisation among left-wing forces seems to be the exception rather than the rule (Weisskircher, 2020; but see, for example, Golden & Erne, 2022). Apart from social movement activists, also left-wing governments in Latin America tried to institutionalise transnational cooperation. While some international organisations they created indeed led to limited political integration, a key aspect of their transnational discourses about ‘Nuestra América’ was to rhetorically emphasise collective strength (Wajner & Roniger, 2022). Research on the far right often lacks a comparative element and assumes that any empirical findings are not only typical for the far right, but also specific to it. However, a broader comparison with left-wing actors indicates that transnational ideologies do not automatically translate into transnational practices. Still, in times of globalisation and the Europeanisation of far-right ideology, an interest in reaching out beyond the national border has become an essential part of the everyday experiences (Frankenberger et al., 2023; 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 12 13 McCluskey, 2024) of far-right individuals, too — which explains why they normatively approve of reaching out. For example, our German interviewees include activists of the ‘Erasmus generation’ that are used to travel abroad (e.g., 4, 5, 9) or upper-class individuals that love travelling (e.g., 7). In Norway, several of the alternative media journalists had undertaken extended stays abroad to deepen their understanding of the countries they cover, particularly those in the Arab world, while others have spent significant periods in the USA and the UK, two nations that greatly inspired them (23, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34) (for more about how such exchange matters see Fangen, 2024). For these interviewees, being interested in developments abroad seemed self-evident. Therefore, the causes for limited transnational practices may be less found in their nativist core ideology (Mudde, 2007), but more in the only selected and typically rather limited strategic incentives: Even left-wing players struggle with cultural differences and a lack of a transnational common public sphere, high requirements in terms of cultural and material capital, and limited institutional opportunities (see, for example, Císař & Vráblíková, 2013; Císař & Weisskircher, 2022; Flesher Fominaya, 2016; Imig & Tarrow, 2001; Kymlicka, 1999; Tarrow, 2005). In the short and medium term, political gains such as public office (Müller & Strøm, 1999) might be more feasible to achieve at the national or subnational level. The advantages reported by our interviewees – strategic learning, the showcasing of collective strength, and networking experiences – may not compensate for that. Research has indicated that domestically more marginalised far-right actors, often the ideologically more extreme (Macklin, 2013; Zúquete, 2015), may have a stronger incentive to find strength in international collaboration, while domestically successful organisations may focus on their home turf. This is indicated in our German data, where many AfD politicians find little practical reasons to regularly reach out. How do limited transnational practices, then, matter for the contemporary far right? Famously, Granovetter (1973) referred to ‘the strength of weak ties,’ suggesting that weak ties are important for the diffusion of controversial or marginal content (Granovetter, 1973: 1367), and also that ‘whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance (i.e., path length), when passed through weak ties rather than strong’ (Granovetter, 1973: 1366). In both Germany and Norway, we find that the reported transnational ties are mostly ‘weak’: sporadic contact or one-time visits are more common than sustained contact over time. According to Granovetter (1973: 1361), the strength of a tie is measured by the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services involved in the relation. An equivalent to the difference between weak and strong ties is the difference between an acquaintance and a (close) friend. Many of our interviewees have far-right ‘acquaintances’ in other countries, that is, actors they have met only once or only had digital contact with, whereas only a few of them have far-right contacts with whom they have become ‘friends’. According to Granovetter's theory, strong ties should not be necessary for the diffusion of ideas; rather, many weak ties can contribute to a much faster spread of ideas, ways of working, and an increase in the number of contacts. In that sense, many weak ties might in the end contribute to ‘strength.’ In our data, for example, even though Norwegian actors only had occasional contact with the Danish far-right activist Paludan, SIAN's burning of Qur'an actions are clearly inspired by his actions (Bangstad & Linge, 2023), thus underlining that diffusion of action repertoires does not necessarily require sustained contact. Also here, findings on the cross-national diffusion of left-wing social movement ideas are of help for understanding the role of weak ties for the far right. McAdam and Rucht (1993: 73–74) emphasise the role of personal ties for transnational diffusion: direct relational ties – even if minimal in number – between adopters and transmitters increase dramatically the chances of this process taking place. At least in the case of social movements, we think cross-national diffusion depends more on the interplay of relational and nonrelational channels than on the replacement of the former by the latter. Early relational ties encourage the identification of adopters with transmitters, thereby amplifying the information available through non-relational channels. 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER Even though our interviewees typically reported only limited transnational engagement, the perceived advantages of opportunities for strategic learning, the showing of strength, and networking as a value in itself also reinforce far-right transnational collective identities beyond an attachment to the nation. Weak ties may be important exactly because transnational practices and transnational ideas are very much interrelated. Our findings are therefore not necessarily in contradiction to studies that find an increasingly strong far-right European collective identity, but help to shed light on one of the explanatory factors for its emergence. 6 | C O N CL U S I O N This article has studied how far-right actors reflect about transnational practices based on original ‘internalist’ interview data in Germany and Norway. Empirically, the article has shown that while far-right activists indeed agree on the desirability of transnational engagement, for many of them, it does not matter strongly for their everyday politics. The interviewees consider transnational practices as opportunities for strategic learning, the showcasing of collective strength, and networking, but also refer to the risk of being associated with extremists and of entering a conflictridden arena. Overall, our results indicate that so far, the ‘transnationalisation of nationalism’ beyond ideas has been limited. Theoretically, we have discussed the relevance of strategy for understanding far-right transnational practices. At the same time, the article has also emphasised that even weak ties may play an important role for transnational diffusion. Our findings point to important new research avenues. Crucially, future research should take a more explicit comparative angle. In this article, we have primarily focused on common trends in Germany and Norway. We regard the similar tendencies as support for the generalisability of our findings. However, we only approximately know where these actors reach out to: While not explicitly discussed in the article, we observe that activists most strongly link to their counterparts in neighbouring countries with cultural and language similarities. Norwegian actors cooperate most extensively with actors in Sweden and Denmark, whereas German actors collaborate most often with actors in Austria or Switzerland. Empirically, a study of far-right transnationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and between Southern Europe and Latin America should provide relevant insights. Moreover, when do far-right actors manage to overcome cultural distance? And what are the hubs of far-right transnationalism — after the peak period of the French New Right seems to be over? Certainly, the study of far-right transnationalism will remain an important research area in a period when the far right has been in government in many countries — for example, in Hungary, Italy, or the United States. Here, research should also study whether ‘thin ideology’ – i.e., ‘populist’ features of anti-elitist discourse – matters for far-right actors in power: This phenomenon may be particularly important at the international level, where far-right actors may construct a transnational ‘people’ or propagate a division between the domestic people and international elites such as international institutions, financial markets, or global powers (Chryssogelos, 2024; Wajner, 2022). In the future, it may be crucial to understand how far-right parties in government office act in terms of foreign policy — in particular, should governing actors share the key preference of almost all of our interviewees: the strong desire to further strengthen their transnational ties. ACKNOWLEDGEMEN TS We especially thank the MAM-Team – Kristian Berg Harpviken as well as Raffaele Bazurli, Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Thais França, and Aleksandra Lewicki – for their support and feedback. We also thank MAM member Kristine Brastad Dammen for conducting interviews in Norway. Moreover, Katrine Fangen thanks colleagues at the Race, Ethnicity and Migration seminar at Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo. Manès Weisskircher thanks his REXKLIMA research group – Manuela Beyer, Zadekia Krondorfer, and Elisabeth Oertel – as well as Christin Jänicke – commenting on the manuscript at a colloquium at the WZB Center for Civil Society Research – for valuable and detailed feedback. Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER 14 15 ORCID Katrine Fangen https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8268-8536 Manès Weisskircher https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2938-0951 ENDNOTES 1 While our study is mainly embedded in the broader literature on the ‘populist radical right’, we prefer the use of the umbrella term ‘the far right’ because it focuses on the thick ideology of nativism instead of populism and acknowledges the heterogeneity of radical and extreme players (Pirro, 2023). 2 A challenge of our study was that the interviews were conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, many of our interviewees might have had less transnational contact than usually. 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How far-right actors in Germany and Norway evaluate transnationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.13021 14698129, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13021 by Norwegian Institute Of Public Healt Invoice Receipt DFO, Wiley Online Library on [22/05/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License FANGEN and WEISSKIRCHER