P HILOSOPHIA S CIENTIÆ
JAIME N UBIOLA
C.S. Peirce: pragmatism and logicism
Philosophia Scientiæ, tome 1, no 2 (1996), p. 109-119
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C.S. Peirce: Pragmatism and Logicism
Jaime Nubiola
University ofNavarra - Spain
Philosophia Scientiœ, 1 (2), 1996, 109-119.
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Abstract.- This paper has two separate aims, with obvious links between
them. First, to présent Charles S. Peirce and the pragmatist movement in a
historical framework which stresses the close connections of pragmatism with the
mainstream of philosophy; second, to deal with a particular controversial issue,
that of the supposed logicistic orientation of Peirce's work.
1. Pragmatism, Analytic Philosophy and Peirce
American pragmatism has commonly been seen as something
parochial and outside the mainstream of philosophy. Among
European philosophers pragmatism is often understood as an
'American way' of dealing with knowledge and truth, but as
something alien to the gênerai discussion. As Rorty noted, although
philosophers in Europe study Quine and Davidson, "they tend to
shrug offthe suggestion that thèse contemporary philosophers share
their basic outlook with American philosophers who wrote prior to
the so-called linguistic turn" [Rorty 1990, 1]
It was not so in the first décade of our century. In the World
Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg on 1908 the pragmatist
movement held a central position in the debates [Elsenhans 1909].
With the ascent of logical empiricism in the 1920s pragmatism began
to fade from the philosophical scène, as if pragmatism had exhausted
its créative potential [Bernstein 1992, 815]. The dispersion of the
Vienna Circle and the Second World War moved the center of
philosophical discussion from Europe to the United States. In my
view, that transplantation of the Vienna Circle was successful owing
to the common ground established by the gênerai pragmatist
orientation of American académie philosophy in the previous
décades. Analytic philosophy in the hands of European émigrés took
over the departments of philosophy in the American universities of
the fifties. With few exceptions [Nagel 1956, xii; Murphy 1991], a
deep affinity between analytical philosophy and the pragmatist
tradition has been commonly overlooked. Not only were many of the
issues and basic ideas common, but both movements — in a broadbrush philosophical approach — shared similar goals, similar views
about the relation between philosophy and science and about how
philosophical work had to be conducted.
In récent years there has been an increasing amount of
scholarship trying to understand both pragmatism and analytic
philosophy as différent aspects of one broad philosophical attitude.
In my view, a key source for developing an integrated study of both
currents is to be found in Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder
of pragmatism, who was interpreted by Karl-Otto Apel as the
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C.S. Peirce: Pragmatism and Logicism
milestone in the semiotic transformation of transcendental
philosophy into analytic philosophy [Apel 1972, 1981, 1993]. Very
recently, von Wright said along thèse lines that Peirce "may infact be
counted anotherfounding father of analytic philosophy —alongside
Russell andMoore and the figure in their background, Frege" [von
Wright 1993,41]
In this 'flashback' process, it is even possible to discover a
continuous tradition within American thought, which has its
beginnings in the work of Peirce, James and Dewey, and flourishes
in Quine, Putnam and Rorty [Putnam 1990, 267]. Instead of viewing
the analytic movement as representing a sharp rupture with
pragmatism, the most récent résurgence of pragmatism suggests that
there has been on the contrary a continuity between both movements
[Bernstein 1992, 823]: the later one can be understood as a
refinement, as a genuine development of the earlier movement.
The figure of Charles S. Peirce has an ever increasing
relevance in very différent areas of knowledge [Fisch, 1980], and his
influence is still growing [von Wright 1993, 41]: in astronomy,
metrology, geodesy, mathematics, logic, philosophy, theory and
history of science, semiotics, linguistics, econometrics, and
psychôlogy. In ail thèse fields Peirce has been considered a pioneer,
a forerunner or even a 'father' or 'founder' (of semiotics, of
pragmatism). It is very common to find gênerai évaluations like
Russell's: beyond doubt /.../ he was one ofthe most original minds
of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American
thinker ever" [Russell 1959, 276], or Umberto Eco's: "Peirce was
[„.] the greatest American philosopher ofthe turn ofthe century and
beyond doubt one the greatest thinkers ofhis time" [Eco 1989, x-xi].
Popper described Peirce as "one of the greatest philosophers of ail
times" [Popper 1972, 212] and Putnam called him "a towering giant
among American philosophers" [Putnam 1990, 252].
Factors which hâve increased the growing interest in Peirce's
thought are his personal participation in the scientific community of
his time, his valuable contribution to the logic of relatives, and his
sound knowledge of the philosophy of Kant as well as of the
Scholastic tradition, in particular Duns Scotus. It should be noted that
the interprétation of Peirce's thought and its évolution from his early
writings in 1865 until his death for many years provoked wide
disagreement amongst Peirce scholars. In part this was caused by the
fragmentary présentation ofhis work in Peirce's Collée ted Pape rs. In
more récent years a deeper understanding of the architectural nature
of his thought and of his whole évolution has been gaining gênerai
agreement [Hausman 1993, xiv-xv; Houser 1992, xxix]. In the last
décade the basic cohérence and undeniable systematization of
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Peirce's thought has been widely recognized by the Peircean
scholarship [Santaella 1993, 401].
Christopher Hookway has characterized Peirce as a traditional
and systematic philosopher, but one dealing with the modem
problems of science, truth and knowledge from a very valuable
Personal expérience as a logician and an expérimental researcher in
the bosom of an international community of scientists and thinkers
[Hookway 1985, 1-3]. Moreover, it has been held that the best
approach for understanding Peirce is to see him as an analytic
philosopher avant la lettre, anticipating the intersubjective 'linguistic
turn' in philosophy with his gênerai theory of signs [Hookway 1985,
141; Bernstein 1992, 814]. Although Richard Rorty detected the
similarities between Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
(1953) and the philosophical framework of Peirce thirty years ago
[Rorty 1961], académie philosophy in the English speaking world
has virtually neglected the study of Peirce and pragmatism. It may be
even said that Peirce's thought has been rediscovered by Continental
philosophers (such as Popper, Habermas, and Eco) and reintroduced
by them into the world of philosophical reflection.
In Peirce's work there is not only a parallel development of
thèmes found in the work of Frege, Russell or Wittgenstein, but also
the framework for an integraied theory of culture [Hookway 1985,120].
Peirce saw the pursuit of truth as a corporate task rather than an
individual search for foundations. This framework "not only
challenges the characteristic Cartesian appeal to foundations, but
adumbrates an alternative understanding of scientific knowledge
without such foundations" [Bernstein 1983,71-72]
In this sensé — as Debrock highlighted — Peirce's thought
offers suggestions for tackling some of the most stubborn problems
in contemporary philosophy, but in particular he may help us to
résume a philosophical responsibility which has been largely
abdicated by much of 20th century philosophy [Debrock 1992, 1].
2. Peirce and Logicism: Logic, Mathematics, and Continuity
In this framework, the second goal of my paper is to explore
tentatively the issue of how the relation between Peirce and logicism
has been understood, as a way of throwing some light on the essential
harmony of Peirce's thought. I will summarize the récent debate
between Susan Haack and Nathan Houser about that issue, but trying
to présent a more historical perspective, Peirce's work has sometimes
been understood as a forerunner in some substantial areas of
Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica [Collected Papers
3.43-4n.; Weiss 1934, 400; Nagel 1939, xvii; Eisele 1979, 12;
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C.S. Peirce: Pragmatism and Logicism
Haack 1993,34-5], but scholars who seek to classify Peirce under the
label of logicism find it extremely difficult to accommodate his exact
words.
Justus Buchler, in his séminal work on Peirce, noticed some
— at least apparent — contradiction between Peirce's words about
the relation between mathematics and logic and what Buchler
called "Peirce's attempts to dérive arithmetic from logic"
[Buchler 1939a, 224]. Richard Dedekind, "one of the principal
logico-mathematicians of Peirce's dayy\ regarded mathematics as a
branch of logic. Peirce opposed that claim arguing that both
disciplines hâve widely divergent aims. Peirce provided in défense of
his position the distinction — which he says was intended by his
father Benjamin, a well known Harvard mathematician — between
mathematics as the science that draws necessary conclusions
and logic as the science of drawing necessary conclusions
[Collected Papers 4.239, 1902][Kent 1987,72][Murphey 1961,229].
The mathematician draws conséquences, the logician studies and
classifies the conditions under which thèse conséquences are drawn.
Far from mathematics being a branch of logic, it is almost [...] the
only science which stands in need of no aid from a science of
logic [Collected Papers 2.81; c. 1902][Buchler 1939a, 221].
Mathematics — Peirce wrote in the same year 1902 — has no neèd
of any appeal to logic. [...] Just as it is not necessary, in order to talk,
to understand the theory of the formation of vowel sounds, it is not
necessary, in order to reason, to be in possession of the theory of
reasoning [Collected Papers 4.242 c. 1902]. The aims of both
sciences are very différent: while the function of logic is the
'analysis and theory of reasoning', the function of mathematics is
'the practice of it* [Collected Papers 4.134].
Buchler concluded that Peirce's studies toward defining traditional
mathematical relations in terms of 'logical', and deriving mathematical
propositions from a small set of analytic propositions, were an important
contribution, "foreshadowing modem logistic and culminating in the
work ofthe Whitehead-Russell Principia Mathematica". In support of
that claim Buchler mentioned Lewis's account of Peirce's work along
thèse Unes in A Survey of Symbolic Logic [1918]. Buchler eschewed
the apparent inconsistency by explaining that "although mathematical
propositions may be derivedfrom logical propositions, the process of
dérivation is on this view itself a 'mathematical process, with a
mathematical criterion of validity independent of logical analysis"
[Buchler 1939a, 224], but at last he had to assert that Peirce's thought
"on the foundations of mathematics and logic does not form a
systematic body of opinion" [Buchler 1939a, 227 and 1939b, 215].
Peirce's approach to this relation between philosophy,
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mathematics and logic may be better understood recalling his own
words in the Cambridge Lectures (1898):
metaphysics must draw its principles from logic, and that logic must
draw its principles [...] from mathematics. [Peirce 1992, 123]
According to Peirce, mathematics is an observational science,
and mathematical knowledge dépends on expérience,1 on the
construction, manipulation and observation of diagrams, created by
the human mind [Goudge 1950, 56; Haack 1995]. As Hilary Putnam
suggested, it is fascinating that Peirce and Frege,
the two inventors of predicate calculus disagreed on sp fundamental
a rnetaphysical issue, Frege seeing logic as totally nonempirical and
Peirce seeing logic itself as involving something like mental
expérimentation with diagrams. [Peirce 1992, 72]
It is possible to achieve greater clarity on this question through
the récent debate between Susan Haack and Nathan Houser on
Peirce's disputed commitment to logicism. After providing an
impressive set of texts from Peirce, Haack concludes that Peirce was
and was not a logicist, because logicism is a two-fold doctrine:
Logicism is a formai thesis (Mathematics, at least arithmetics, is
reducible to logic) and an epistemological thesis (Logic is more
basic, and epistemically foundational for mathematics). Haack
claims that Peirce resolutely rejected that epistemological logicism,
but sympathized with the formai thesis, with the reducibility of at
least arithmetic to logic. Houser, on the contrary, doubts that Peirce
was a formai logicist and holds that if the reducibility of a part of
mathematics to logic is accepted that logic would be epistemically
prior to mathematics, or which would be the same, that it is not
possible to disentangle both faces of logicism [Houser 1993; Haack
1993].
According to Haack, the explanation for Peirce's apparent
sympathy with the formai thesis and his clear répudiation of the
epistemological thesis "lies, at least in part, in an ambiguity on
Peirce's use of the tenu 'logic'" between 'logic' meaning
"mathematical formalization of necessary reasoning" and 'logic'
meaning "theory of reasoning" [Haack 1993, 45]. But, in my view,
the key to understanding Peirce's position should be traced back,
first, as Haack and Houser realized, to Peirce's classification of the
sciences [Collected Papers 4.134, 1895], and second, to the
acknowledgement of two différent mathematical traditions.
During his life, Peirce made many attempts to work out a
gênerai classification of the sciences, understood as an epistemic
ladder ofthe sciences [Collected Papers 1.180ff ; Kent 1987, 71-72],
as the différent "branches ofendeavor to ascertain truth" [Peirce L75].
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C.S. Peirce: Pragmatism and Logicism
The mature Peirce established a clear-cut distinction between formai
logic as a mathematical branch of the science of discovery and pure
theoretical mathematics as the most abstract of ail sciences
[Collected Papers 4.244, 4.263, c.1902; 1.180, 1903; 1.52, c. 1896].
According to Peirce's classification of the sciences, there is a
hierarchy in human knowledge: mathematics is at the head and logic
occupies a subordinate position [Haack 1993, 48].
Reasonings of pure mathematics are perfectly évident and hâve no
need of any separate theory of logic to reinforce them. Mathematics
is its own logic. [Peirce L75, draft A, 29-33]
Logic is not a foundational science, but a normative one.
Human reasoning is not a Cartesian search for foundations, but a
coopérative and fallible activity of inquiry, which has no need of any
such foundations [Bernstein 1992, 814]. In particular mathematics,
the highest type of human reasoning, requires no foundation; as
Goudge wrote, the only thing from which mathematics can be
'derived' is our native capacity for thinking rigorously, "our natural
power of reason" [Collected Papers 4.242] or "a natural instinct for
right reasoning" [Collected Papers 2.3] [Goudge 1950, 58].
Peirce did not seek to reduce mathematics to logic.
Reductionism was not an aim of Peirce's conception of scientific
inquiry, nor did he think that mathematics need appeaï to logic to
ascertain the validity of its reasoning, "for nothing can be more
évident thon its own unaided reasonings" [Collected Papers 7.524,
n.d.; Kent 1987, 72]. This leads us to the second reason that may
enable us to understand better Peirce's position in a historical
framework. As Grattan-Guinness has highlighted, Peirce belongs to
a mathematical tradition ("algebraic logic, rooted in French
revolutionary 'Logique' and algebras and culminating, via Boole
and De Morgan, in the Systems of Peirce and Schroeder") really
différent from 'mathematical logic' of Frege, Whitehead and Russell
where the logicist project was pursued [Grattan-Guinness 1988]. The
contrast is striking:
the algebraic logicians, following Boole, applied mathematics to
logic and drew upon algebras for their mathematical background
whereas logicism entailed the application of logic to mathematics
and took its main Unes out of mathematical analysis. [GrattanGuinness 1990, 297]
Putnam has noted that the standard historiography of modem
logic tends to stress the importance of Frege, dismissing "the entire
Boolean school — of which Peirce was, in a sensé, the last and
greatest figure." [Putnam 1990, 252-260]
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This biased account blurs the différences between both
traditions, making then really difficult to grasp the contrast between
them.
Instead of looking for a réduction of mathematics to logic
Peirce, especially in his later period, realized that the idea of
continuity was "the keystone of the arch" of ail his thought, as he
wrote to William James on 25 November 1902 [Collected Papers
8.257]. "Of ail conceptions continuity is byfar the most difficult for
philosophy to handle", Peirce said in the opening words of his eighth
Cambridge Lecture entitlecl The l&gic of Continuity [Peirce 1992,
242]. His reflections on continuity stem from mathematics and
geometry, but he extended the principle of continuity to the human
mind and the universe, as a reply to the inadequacy of mechanicist
scientific explanations:
the universe is not a mère mechanical resuit ofthe opération of blind
law. The most obvious of ail its characters cannot be so explained. It
is ihe multitudinous facts of ail expérience that show us this; but that
which has opened our eyes to thèse facts is the principle of
fallibilism. [Collected Papers 1.162]
The idea of continuity, which is the "leading idea" of differential
calculus and of ail the useful branches of mathematics, and which has
a décisive rôle in scientific thought, is the master key which unlocks
the arcana of philosophy [Collected Papers 1.163].
As Hausman has stressed, in Peirce's thought the idea of
spontaneity and radical creativity is interwoven with his view on
continuity:
Both continuity and spontaneity are constitutive of the universe
through the function of infinitesimals [Hausman 1993, 190].
In that gênerai framework of an evolutionary realism the
search for a logicist foundation for mathematics would appear as
totally doomed to failure.
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