Gertjan Hoetjes

This thesis examines the impact of the introduction of the Internet in Kuwait and Oman on the dynamics of mobilisation in both countries, applying the concept of ‘contentious politics.’ It is argued that the Internet has affected the dynamics of mobilisation in Kuwait and Oman by providing new opportunities for brokerage, diffusion and organisation of coordinated action. This argument is made on the basis of primary material obtained from semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observations that distinguish this thesis from previous research on the topic, alongside a wide variety of secondary sources. In Kuwait, the Internet has offered a virtual space in which brokerage, diffusion and the organisation of coordinated action is enabled, alongside physical spaces such as societies, civil associations and diwaniyyas, as well as mass media. Since 2006 particularly, the Internet has provided new opportunities for mobilisation to subaltern groups such as the Bidun and the youth. They can use the Internet to circumvent limited access to civil society institutions, and exploit the opportunities blogs and Social Networking Sites (SNS) offer to diffuse their frames, set up new networks and organise protests. In Oman, the Internet has become an auxiliary for the absence of a vibrant civil society, and has helped to foster mobilisation by creating new activist networks and diffusing frames through blogs, forums and SNS. In addition, it has proved to be vital for the organisation of coordinated action. The Internet has cultivated inter-group connections that transcend rigid tribal hierarchies in Oman, as exemplified during the Omani Spring. At the same time, the interviews revealed that the Internet has also had an important cognitive impact, as it has helped citizens in both countries to become cognisant of different perspectives. This in turn has encouraged criticism of existing political, social and economic hierarchies. However, the Internet is a contested space, where the balance of power between governments and activists is affected by capabilities, access to resources and the technological architecture of the dominant platforms. Both the Kuwaiti and Omani governments have used repression, and to a much lesser extent co-optation, in order to stymie online mobilisation. So far, they have been effective in preventing any large-scale protests occurring since 2013 through the implementation of counter-measures fostering a process of demobilisation

The distribution of oil rents still plays a significant role in the Kuwaiti economy. According to figures of the World Bank released in 2019, oil rents contributed to 36.6 per cent of Kuwait’s total gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017, which is higher than that of any of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (World Bank, 2019). The decline in global crude oil prices that commenced in 2014 has stimulated the Kuwaiti government to implement new initiatives to reduce state spending, particularly revolving around the removal of subsidies on fuel and utilities in order to tackle growing deficits and ensure the sustainability of fiscal expenditure in the long term. At the same time, the decline in oil prices has spurred plans for economic diversification, encapsulated in the ‘NewKuwait’ vision. However, these initiatives which aim to reduce fiscal expenditure and the country’s dependence on oil have faced public resistance. This resistance has been particularly articulated in the National Assembly, a popularly elected institution with significant legislative power that exercises checks on the power of the Kuwaiti government. This chapter analyses the resilience of rentierism in Kuwait, conceptualised as the dependence of the domestic economy on external rents, and the central role of the state in the allocation of wealth to the population. Recognising the importance of pre-oil social formations in Kuwait in the allocation of rents and the structure of the political economy, the chapter will first examine the impact of rents on state–society relations in Kuwait.This will be followed by an overview of the process of modern state formation in the country. After that, this chapter scrutinises previous episodes of fiscal adjustment in the mid-1980s and the period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, followed by an analysis of the limited fiscal adjustment and effortstowards economic diversification that were initiated before and after the drop in oil prices in 2014.

As the protest illustrated, the affordability of food has been an issue of concern among Omani citizens. As a result of its arid climate, the salinity of the country's soil and water scarcity, there are restrictions to the number of products that are commercially viable to produce. Over the years, problems have deteriorated as a result of overpumping, which has enhanced the salinity of groundwater and even resulted in some agricultural lands becoming unsuitable for cultivation. Simultaneously, farming has not been a profitable business, as large segments of Omani farmers live below the poverty line, as they are struggling to sell their products to retailers and often lack access to finance for their operations. As a result, the number of farmers has significantly decreased since the 1970s, reducing self-sufficiency in wheat and livestock production making Oman largely depended on the world food markets to satisfy domestic demand. This makes the country vulnerable to external supply shocks, such as the ones that occurred from 2006 to 2008 and in 2010.

Driven by increasing self-confidence and encouraged by Western states, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have gained a prominent role in multilateral efforts to foster peacebuilding in Yemen since the country experienced increased conflict from 2004 onwards. Based on the “negative and positive peace framework” proposed by Johan Galtung, it is possible to argue that the lack of focus of the GCC on fostering “positive peace” and disagreements between the Gulf monarchies heightened by hyper-nationalist tendencies inhibit the ability of this sub-regional organisation to facilitate peacebuilding in Yemen.

This Al-Sabah paper is an edited volume that consists, apart from my introduction, of three excellent student essays written for the module Politics of the Middle East's Oil Monarchies. I taught this module at Durham University from October 2018 until June 2019. The three essays cover a wide range of subjects, including regional integration in the Gulf region (Lucy Forster), the foreign policies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring (Rosie Trainor) and Economic Diversification among the Gulf states (Stanislav Kudryashov).

In 2001 the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries signed the Economic Agreement, which envisioned the establishment of a GCC Monetary Union in 2010. The project faced its biggest setback in 2009, when the UAE (United Arab Emirates) after Oman, decided to withdraw. In this dissertation, I examine the opt-out of the UAE from the Monetary Union by studying the economic consequences of participation in the Monetary Union and the ideational factors that have influenced the decision to withdraw. I will argue that the withdrawal mainly can be explained by ideational factors, which is symbolised by the fact that the withdrawal has been caused by a diplomatic rift with over the location of the Central Bank of the Monetary Union. The decision to locate the Central Bank has been perceived as an indication that Saudi Arabia intends to dominate the future Monetary Union, which clashes with a more assertive UAE that aims to carve out a more independent role for itself and refuses to accept Saudi domination. In addition, the decision has touched upon the pride of the UAE, as it feels entitled to hosting the Central Bank as there is a perception that it outperforms other GCC countries in the economic sphere. Furthermore, it should be noted that ideational factors have been allowed to play an important role as there are limited economic imperatives for the UAE to participate in the Monetary Union, while some costs can be associated with participation. On top of that, the centralised, closed and personalised decision-making structure in the UAE has contributed to the importance of ideational factors, as there are no checks on the power of the ruling elite, there is limited accountability and there is a fear among the ruling elite to give away sovereignty in order to preserve their power position.

In this paper, I propose to look through the prism of Iran’s ‘identity’, alongside the effect of the wider domestic and international context on relations. The ‘identity’ I am concerned with here comes in three ‘flavours’: Persian nationalism, Islamism and revolutionary anti-imperialism, which all have influenced Iranian-Saudi relations since 2005. The paper first discusses how these types of identity can influence foreign-policy making in Iran. Next, this is set in the wider context of how the domestic and international context have affected foreign policy making in Iran. This then allows us to move to an
analysis of, specifically, the relationship between Iran and Saudi-Arabia from 2005 onwards, considering in particular to what extent these three different types of identity, along with the wider domestic and international context, have influenced the relationship – or perhaps more accurately, Iran’s policy towards the Kingdom. In turn, this should allow us to determine the relative impact of the three types of identity on the relationship between Iran and Saudi-Arabia.

The distribution of oil rents still plays a significant role in the Kuwaiti
economy. According to figures of the World Bank released in 2019, oil rents contributed to 36.6 per cent of Kuwait’s total gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017, which is higher than that of any of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (World Bank, 2019). The decline in global crude oil prices that commenced in 2014 has stimulated the Kuwaiti government to implement new initiatives to reduce state spending, particularly revolving around the removal of subsidies on fuel and utilities in order to tackle growing deficits and ensure the sustainability of fiscal expenditure in the long term. At the same time, the decline in oil prices has spurred plans for economic diversification, encapsulated in the ‘NewKuwait’ vision. However, these initiatives which aim to reduce fiscal expenditure and the country’s dependence on oil have faced public resistance. This resistance has been particularly articulated in the National Assembly, a popularly elected institution
with significant legislative power that exercises checks on the power
of the Kuwaiti government.

This chapter analyses the resilience of rentierism in Kuwait, conceptualised as the dependence of the domestic economy on external rents, and the central role of the state in the allocation of wealth to the population. Recognising the importance of pre-oil social formations in Kuwait in the allocation of rents and the structure of the political economy, the chapter will first examine the impact of rents on state–society relations in Kuwait.This will be followed by an overview of the process of modern state formation in the country. After that, this chapter scrutinises previous episodes of fiscal adjustment in the mid-1980s and the period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, followed by an analysis of the limited fiscal adjustment and effortstowards economic diversification that were initiated before and after the
drop in oil prices in 2014.

Despite pressure from other GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to follow a tougher line against Iran, Oman has been able to enhance its political, economic and military relations with Iran while not completely alienating itself from Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states. It has even been able to reduce the isolation of Iran in the region, by hosting secret talks between American and Iranian officials that eventually led to the signing of the Nuclear Deal on Iran’s nuclear program between the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, France, Great Britain and Germany) and Iran on July 14, 2015.

This chapter examines the main drivers that influence the policy of Oman towards Iran, using the rich academic literature on international relations and foreign policy of the Middle East. Scholars working in this tradition such as Dawisha, Korany and Dessouki, Hinnebusch, Telhami and Barnett, Nonneman and Halliday argue that domestic developments are important to understand the international behaviour of the Middle East states, in combination with regional and international contexts. The analysis of foreign policy in their research accordingly starts at the domestic level and studies how factors emanating from the domestic, regional and international context affect the decision-making process and the implementation of foreign policy. 

This chapter will reflect their approach, examining the influence of Oman’s geostrategic position on its relationship with Iran and its domestic environment by analysing how Oman’s population and social structure and the economic challenges it faces affect its foreign policy and its relationship with Iran.