- MD2008, Chișinău, Mateevici str., 60, State.University of Moldova
In acest articol este reluată problema asumării de către domnul moldovean, Ştefan cel Mare, a ipostazei de ‘Ultim Impărat’ din tradiţia apocaliptică bizantină. Ca punct de plecare este luată Cronica de curte in care sunt narate scene de o... more
In acest articol este reluată problema asumării de către domnul moldovean, Ştefan cel Mare, a ipostazei de ‘Ultim Impărat’ din tradiţia apocaliptică bizantină. Ca punct de plecare este luată Cronica de curte in care sunt narate scene de o cruzime inegalabilă (masacre ale populaţiei civile, ale prizonierilor, mutilări etc.), cu elemente de violenţă ritualică care au fost operate in cadrul războiului purtat cu otomanii (1473-1486). Analizând izvoarele, autorul ajunge la concluzia că aceste fapte au fost nu doar inspirate de textele veterotestamentare (Deuteronom) si tradiţia apocaliptică (Apocalipsa lui Pseudo-Methodie din Patara si Viziunile lui Pseudo-Daniel), dar si urmate pas cu pas intr-un mod programatic. Astfel, violenţa demonstrativă la adresa inamicilor si ‘renegaţilor’ Crestinătăţii, ca o caracteristică a ‘războiului final’, trebuie privită ca parte a unui amplu cod cultural, in care se anunţa demararea scenariului apocaliptic si Sfârsitul Lumii. In this paper the author que...
Research Interests:
On the 29th of June 1946, Nichita Salogor, the ad interim prime secretary of the Central Committee of Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Moldavia sent a letter to Stalin asking for the ceding of the former South and Northern Bessarabian... more
On the 29th of June 1946, Nichita Salogor, the ad interim prime secretary of the Central Committee of Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Moldavia sent a letter to Stalin asking for the ceding of the former South and Northern Bessarabian territories to the
Moldavian SSR. After August 1940 in the aftermath of Soviet occupation of Romanian Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, these territories were included in the Ukrainian SSR,
contrary to the expectation of many, including the editors of “Pravda”. The letter has been accompanied by 5 annexes, only the last one being dated: December 9 1943 – an essay on
the borders of historical Moldavia since mid 14th century to mid 19th century, elaborated by the Institute of Ethnography of USSR’s Academy of Sciences and quoting Russian, Soviet and Romanian authors. One of the other 4 annexes represented a letter signed by
Fiodor Brovco, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Moldavian SSR sent to Bureau of CC of CP (b) of Moldavia asking for the need to reunite the entire
“Moldavian people” in one Soviet Moldavian state. He urged for all territories of historical Principality of Moldavia from Carpathian Mountains in the West to Dniester River and Black Sea in the East and South, i.e. raising territorial claims not only to Soviet
Ukraine, but also to Romania. The other 4 parts of annexes represented analytical chapters written probably between December 1943 and June 1946, some of them focusing on the
idea of “Greater Bessarabia” and others on “Greater Moldavia”, based mainly on Romanian medieval documents and Romanian historians’ works like Iorga and Xenopol. In less than a month, Salogor was demoted from his post as ad interim firstsecretary of Moldavian Communist organization and retrograded to insignificant second hand posts in various ministries until his retiring in 1959. This was for sure a reprisal and
the editors of the dossier are raising the question if that was a direct consequence of his letter sent to Stalin on June 29 1946. The tentative conclusions are circumscribed to justify
this hypothesis. The editors embarked in this sense on an analyses that considers other potential causes that could be at the origins of Salogor’s demotion and his further
marginalization even though he was only 45 years old at that time and he had certain merits to the Soviet regime during the Great Patriotic War (he coordinated from the rear the partisan movement in Bessarabia). Reprisal hypothesis is backed also by the fact that even though Nicolae Coval, the head of the Council of Ministers of Moldavian SSR who was listed along with Salogor in the letter sent to Stalin in June 1946 did not signed it.
And this was crucial as to his subsequent career as he became fully fledged first secretary of CC of CP (b) of Moldavia for the next 4 years, replacing thus Salogor who was approved only as ad interim from September 1942. One can thus conclude that there were elements of elite competition in the elaboration and denouement of this border revision question.
As to the aim and timing of the first part of the dossier – December 1943,
previous analyses focused on the assumption that there was linked to Tehran
Conference (November 29 – December 2 1943) and to the anticipation of Romania’s
entry in Soviet sphere of influence after the war. As to the time of sending the letter and
adjacent documents in June 29 1946 it was argued that is was also connected to the
international events, namely that it happened exactly one month before the starting of
the Paris Peace Conference. That is, Moldavian Soviet leadership hoped that is was the
right moment to push for territorial pretensions against Romania based on the idea to
unite the whole “Moldavian people” in one Soviet Moldavian state. The editors of the
whole dossier of June 1946 embarked however on other explications. In brief, it is about
the hypothesis that the inception of the dossier in December 1943 was indeed a result of
changing international status of USSR, but it was instrumentalized to press Romania’s
leader Ion Antonescu or the democratic opposition to decide on an immediate
withdrawal from the Axis camp if Romania wanted to save Western Moldavia from
Soviet annexation. In June 1946, the fact that Paris Peace Conference was to start in a
month was secondary to the motivations and timing of sending the letter to Stalin. It
was rather internal phenomena (such as the beginning of the mass famine) and elite
competition that contributed to the raising of the border revision question to Stalin.
More exactly, Salogor mentioned only territorial pretensions against Ukraine, excluding
the ones against Romania. Why? It seems that he thought that this was less problematic
and easy as it was a problem of administrative borders inside Soviet Union and did not
presupposed international complications. Another important element mentioned in the
letter to Stalin was to link implicitly the poor situation of Moldavian postwar economy
and famine to the fact that the 2 Bessarabian southern counties ceded to Ukraine in 1940
– Ismail and Akkerman – counted for more than a third of grain harvest before the
October Revolution. This was, for sure, a hint that the deficit of food and especially
grain could be easier met if these territories would be transferred to MSSR.
Salogor however seemed to misunderstand that territorial pretensions of MSSR to
Ukraine mentioned in the Moscow document of December 1943 was not the main target
of the question and it was just a part of the story to make territorial pretensions against
Romania to look coherent and thus to make the threat of territorial dismemberment to
Romania look very likely not virtual. In the summer 1946 Moscow agreed already on
the postwar borders of Romania and it was undesirable from various motives to change
them in the detriment of Bucharest. In other words, Salogor, the only Moldavian Soviet
leader singing the letter to Stalin did not understand that Moscow will not agree to a
border revision between MSSR and Romania (which he implied by annexing the
December 1943 Institute of Ethnography essay and other pieces justifying the inclusion
of Western Moldavia to MSSR) and even less to one between MSSR and Ukrainian SSR.
The editors of the June 1946 border revision question’s dossier formulated a hypothesis
that the sending of Salogor’s letter to Moscow had long lasting effects on center
periphery relations and pattern of elite recruitment in Soviet Moldavia up to late 1980s.
More exactly, Salogor was the first and last Moldavian Communist leader that raised
directly the question of border revision with Ukraine as probably Kiev insisted that this
becoming a taboo forever. Khrushchev played presumably a key role in this story as he
is known to be the person that insisted on the drawing of borders with MSSR in 1940
and his insisting on territorial expansion of Ukraine in detriment to Byelorussia too in
the fall of the previous year, 1939. Khrushchev is known as Ukraine protector while
being Soviet supreme leader after 1953 – in 1954 he transferred Crimea from RSFSR to
Ukraine. Thus one can deduce that Khrushchev was determined after this incident of
1946 to keep an open eye on who was to rule MSSR in the aftermath. Coval, Salogor
successor, was the right person as under his rule (in 1947) MSSR lost the only 5 km
of sea border (in area of Dniester Liman) to Ukraine, only 340 meters access of MSSR
to the Black Sea via the Danube remaining in the area of Giurgiuleşti village.
Moldavian SSR. After August 1940 in the aftermath of Soviet occupation of Romanian Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, these territories were included in the Ukrainian SSR,
contrary to the expectation of many, including the editors of “Pravda”. The letter has been accompanied by 5 annexes, only the last one being dated: December 9 1943 – an essay on
the borders of historical Moldavia since mid 14th century to mid 19th century, elaborated by the Institute of Ethnography of USSR’s Academy of Sciences and quoting Russian, Soviet and Romanian authors. One of the other 4 annexes represented a letter signed by
Fiodor Brovco, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Moldavian SSR sent to Bureau of CC of CP (b) of Moldavia asking for the need to reunite the entire
“Moldavian people” in one Soviet Moldavian state. He urged for all territories of historical Principality of Moldavia from Carpathian Mountains in the West to Dniester River and Black Sea in the East and South, i.e. raising territorial claims not only to Soviet
Ukraine, but also to Romania. The other 4 parts of annexes represented analytical chapters written probably between December 1943 and June 1946, some of them focusing on the
idea of “Greater Bessarabia” and others on “Greater Moldavia”, based mainly on Romanian medieval documents and Romanian historians’ works like Iorga and Xenopol. In less than a month, Salogor was demoted from his post as ad interim firstsecretary of Moldavian Communist organization and retrograded to insignificant second hand posts in various ministries until his retiring in 1959. This was for sure a reprisal and
the editors of the dossier are raising the question if that was a direct consequence of his letter sent to Stalin on June 29 1946. The tentative conclusions are circumscribed to justify
this hypothesis. The editors embarked in this sense on an analyses that considers other potential causes that could be at the origins of Salogor’s demotion and his further
marginalization even though he was only 45 years old at that time and he had certain merits to the Soviet regime during the Great Patriotic War (he coordinated from the rear the partisan movement in Bessarabia). Reprisal hypothesis is backed also by the fact that even though Nicolae Coval, the head of the Council of Ministers of Moldavian SSR who was listed along with Salogor in the letter sent to Stalin in June 1946 did not signed it.
And this was crucial as to his subsequent career as he became fully fledged first secretary of CC of CP (b) of Moldavia for the next 4 years, replacing thus Salogor who was approved only as ad interim from September 1942. One can thus conclude that there were elements of elite competition in the elaboration and denouement of this border revision question.
As to the aim and timing of the first part of the dossier – December 1943,
previous analyses focused on the assumption that there was linked to Tehran
Conference (November 29 – December 2 1943) and to the anticipation of Romania’s
entry in Soviet sphere of influence after the war. As to the time of sending the letter and
adjacent documents in June 29 1946 it was argued that is was also connected to the
international events, namely that it happened exactly one month before the starting of
the Paris Peace Conference. That is, Moldavian Soviet leadership hoped that is was the
right moment to push for territorial pretensions against Romania based on the idea to
unite the whole “Moldavian people” in one Soviet Moldavian state. The editors of the
whole dossier of June 1946 embarked however on other explications. In brief, it is about
the hypothesis that the inception of the dossier in December 1943 was indeed a result of
changing international status of USSR, but it was instrumentalized to press Romania’s
leader Ion Antonescu or the democratic opposition to decide on an immediate
withdrawal from the Axis camp if Romania wanted to save Western Moldavia from
Soviet annexation. In June 1946, the fact that Paris Peace Conference was to start in a
month was secondary to the motivations and timing of sending the letter to Stalin. It
was rather internal phenomena (such as the beginning of the mass famine) and elite
competition that contributed to the raising of the border revision question to Stalin.
More exactly, Salogor mentioned only territorial pretensions against Ukraine, excluding
the ones against Romania. Why? It seems that he thought that this was less problematic
and easy as it was a problem of administrative borders inside Soviet Union and did not
presupposed international complications. Another important element mentioned in the
letter to Stalin was to link implicitly the poor situation of Moldavian postwar economy
and famine to the fact that the 2 Bessarabian southern counties ceded to Ukraine in 1940
– Ismail and Akkerman – counted for more than a third of grain harvest before the
October Revolution. This was, for sure, a hint that the deficit of food and especially
grain could be easier met if these territories would be transferred to MSSR.
Salogor however seemed to misunderstand that territorial pretensions of MSSR to
Ukraine mentioned in the Moscow document of December 1943 was not the main target
of the question and it was just a part of the story to make territorial pretensions against
Romania to look coherent and thus to make the threat of territorial dismemberment to
Romania look very likely not virtual. In the summer 1946 Moscow agreed already on
the postwar borders of Romania and it was undesirable from various motives to change
them in the detriment of Bucharest. In other words, Salogor, the only Moldavian Soviet
leader singing the letter to Stalin did not understand that Moscow will not agree to a
border revision between MSSR and Romania (which he implied by annexing the
December 1943 Institute of Ethnography essay and other pieces justifying the inclusion
of Western Moldavia to MSSR) and even less to one between MSSR and Ukrainian SSR.
The editors of the June 1946 border revision question’s dossier formulated a hypothesis
that the sending of Salogor’s letter to Moscow had long lasting effects on center
periphery relations and pattern of elite recruitment in Soviet Moldavia up to late 1980s.
More exactly, Salogor was the first and last Moldavian Communist leader that raised
directly the question of border revision with Ukraine as probably Kiev insisted that this
becoming a taboo forever. Khrushchev played presumably a key role in this story as he
is known to be the person that insisted on the drawing of borders with MSSR in 1940
and his insisting on territorial expansion of Ukraine in detriment to Byelorussia too in
the fall of the previous year, 1939. Khrushchev is known as Ukraine protector while
being Soviet supreme leader after 1953 – in 1954 he transferred Crimea from RSFSR to
Ukraine. Thus one can deduce that Khrushchev was determined after this incident of
1946 to keep an open eye on who was to rule MSSR in the aftermath. Coval, Salogor
successor, was the right person as under his rule (in 1947) MSSR lost the only 5 km
of sea border (in area of Dniester Liman) to Ukraine, only 340 meters access of MSSR
to the Black Sea via the Danube remaining in the area of Giurgiuleşti village.
Research Interests: European History, Soviet History, Romanian History, Border Studies, South East European Studies, and 17 moreIdentity politics, Nationalism, Romanian Studies, History of the USSR, Romanian Language, Soviet Union (History), Stalin and Stalinism, Romania, History of Communism, Romanian Foreign Policy, Romanian History, Istoria Romaniei, Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Borders and Borderlands, Romanian security, Communism and national question, and Soviet Moldavia
«În luna Februarie în ziua de 27 porni Ştefan Vodă asupra Brăilei în Muntenia şi vărsă din plin mult sânge şi arse cu desăvârşire târgul şi n-a lăsat viu nici pe copilul din pântecele mamei şi spintecă sânul mamelor şi smulse copiii din... more
«În luna Februarie în ziua de 27 porni Ştefan Vodă asupra Brăilei în Muntenia şi vărsă din plin mult sânge şi arse cu desăvârşire târgul şi n-a lăsat viu nici pe copilul din pântecele mamei şi spintecă sânul mamelor şi smulse copiii din el» Abstract: În acest articol este reluată problema asumării de către domnul moldovean, Ştefan cel Mare, a ipostazei de 'Ultim Împărat' din tradiţia apocaliptică bizantină. Ca punct de plecare este luată Cronica de curte în care sunt narate scene de o cruzime inegalabilă (masacre ale populaţiei civile, ale prizonierilor, mutilări etc.), cu elemente de violenţă ritualică care au fost operate în cadrul războiului purtat cu otomanii (1473-1486). Analizând izvoarele, autorul ajunge la concluzia că aceste fapte au fost nu doar inspirate de textele veterotestamentare (Deuteronom) şi tradiţia apocaliptică (Apocalipsa lui Pseudo-Methodie din Patara şi Viziunile lui Pseudo-Daniel), dar şi urmate pas cu pas într-un mod programatic. Astfel, violenţa demonstrativă la adresa inamicilor şi 'renegaţilor' Creştinătăţii, ca o caracteristică a 'războiului final', trebuie privită ca parte a unui amplu cod cultural, în care se anunţa demararea scenariului apocaliptic şi Sfârşitul Lumii. Abstract: In this paper the author questions the issue related to the idea that Stephen the Great, prince of Moldavia, assumed the messianic hypostasis of the 'Last Emperor' announced in the eschatological byzantine tradition. The starting point of his analysis is the official Moldavian Chronicle. Where scenes of unparalleled cruelty (such as massacres of civilians, of prisoners, mutilations etc.) were narrated with some elements of ritual violence that have been produced during the war against the Ottomans (1473-1486). Analyzing the sources the author concludes that those facts were not only inspired by the text of the Old Testament (Deuteronomy) and apocalyptic tradition (Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius and Pseudo-Daniel's Visions), but also was closely followed step by step in a programmatic manner. The demonstrative violence against enemies and 'apostates' of Christianity as a feature of the 'Final Battle' must be seen as part of a comprehensive cultural code connected to the announcing of beginning of Doomsday scenario and the End of the Age.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Between 1914 and 1921, the population inhabiting the region of Bessarabia witnessed, although from behind the frontline, the world conflagration, which was followed by major political changes that detached the region from the Russian... more
Between 1914 and 1921, the population inhabiting the region of Bessarabia witnessed, although from behind the frontline, the world conflagration, which was followed by major political changes that detached the region from the Russian Empire, then created the conditions for a short independence period, to finally attach the province to " Greater Romania " in 1918. The history of the city of Chișinău during this tumultuous time period is discussed – for the first time – with a specific focus on its dynamics as a place in which two political systems, defined by the imperial and the national model, confronted each other while also coexisting in different settings. The authors are especially interested in the trajectories of individuals, communities, and institutions linked to the city. They reconstruct the way local actors acknowledged political changes, but also how they exercised agency and imposed their own agendas, frequently based on local, group, or personal needs. The case of Chișinău is relevant for the understanding of the major impact of political transition(s) on the local level. It shows that there were various local actors, all of them being part and parcel of this transition, within which they had their own story to tell. Whereas for some political or social groups 1918 meant a new beginning, for others it was the time of political vacuum, from which certain dividends could be extracted. At the same time, for the third group, i.e., for most members of the former imperial elite, it meant the beginning of the struggle for the preservation of imperial loyalty, including the former empire's symbolic institutions, cultural spaces, and " places of memory. "