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  • My research is concerned with state-society relations and the evolution of the political regime in China, examining p... moreedit
Geopolitical tensions between China and the West, and hardening authoritarianism in China, have sparked a debate in the German-speaking field of China Studies on how individual scholars and higher education organizations ought to position... more
Geopolitical tensions between China and the West, and hardening authoritarianism in China, have sparked a debate in the German-speaking field of China Studies on how individual scholars and higher education organizations ought to position themselves and how to ensure academic autonomy. Most participants agree that the Chinese government's increasing domestic repression and growing inclination to project state punishments abroad and onto foreign researchers are major problems for China scholarship. However, one side of the debate places China scholars and universities that collaborate with China under suspicion of self-censorship, while the other side fails to address how China scholars can maintain autonomy in an environment of increased Chinese assertiveness. We suggest the following paths to strengthen academic autonomy in the German-speaking China Studies field, and in the process of cooperation between other disciplines and Chinese counterparts: − Funding for China Studies needs to be increased and existing China expertise should be more comprehensively used in academic institutions collaborating with China, as well as in government and business organizations. − In the China field, we advocate for continued exchange with Chinese colleagues wherever possible. International cooperation with China and other countries with problematic records in academic freedom and human rights should, during all its stages, routinely be accompanied by individuals with respective country expertise. These specialists can help to assess whether the type of cooperation is in line with principles of academic freedom or whether potential issues of dual-use technology might occur. − The issues of access (including visas) for scholars who want to do field research in China and restrictions (including sanctions) against scholars directly affects the generation of reliable and open knowledge on China. This is a public good of strategic importance and belongs on the agenda of diplomatic engagements with Chinese counterparts at the national and EU levels. − Foreign government and private funding to public universities and research institutes must be subject to public scrutiny and therefore should be made transparent.
All over the world states and companies have intensified their collection of personal information. Under conditions of rapid digitalization and light regulation in China, government and company data collection has also expanded rapidly.... more
All over the world states and companies have intensified their collection of personal information. Under conditions of rapid digitalization and light regulation in China, government and company data collection has also expanded rapidly. This pronounced exposure of citizens' personal information has the potential to provoke substantial privacy concerns among the public. So far, however, little is known about distinctions individuals make between privacy concerns vis-à-vis government and the private sector. Privacy concerns in China are not yet broadly researched. Drawing on an original online survey from 2019 (N = 1,500), this study explores the magnitudes as well as the structural and ideological roots of concerns about government and company data collection in China. It finds that concerns about data collection by government are low, albeit elevated among individuals who are ideologically not aligned with the state. By contrast, concerns over data collection by companies are both extensive and consensual across most socio-structural and ideological differences. The integration of state and commercial personal information does not multiply concerns, suggesting that the Chinese state is perceived as a safety device for, rather than a threat to, citizens' personal information.
How good is media-elicited protest event data from autocracies, where the media are censored? Based on a source-specific model of event selection and a multi-source dataset of over 3,100 protests from three Chinese mega-cities, we show... more
How good is media-elicited protest event data from autocracies, where the media are censored? Based on a source-specific model of event selection and a multi-source dataset of over 3,100 protests from three Chinese mega-cities, we show that major advantages in information gathering and reporting translate into social media capturing 116-times more protests than English-language international news, 74-times more than domestic news and 10-times more than dissident websites. Social media is most likely to cover small and non-violent events that other sources often ignore. Aside from anti-regime protests, it is less affected by censorship than often assumed. A validity test against public holidays and daily rainfall shows that social media data outperforms dissident websites and traditional news. Social media, and to a lesser extent dissident media, are promising new sources for protest event analysis in autocracies. News media-based event data from regimes with heavy censorship should be treated with caution.
How does the elevated threat of protests during sensitive periods affect state repression in a high-capacity authoritarian regime? Drawing on a dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities, this study provides three key... more
How does the elevated threat of protests during sensitive periods affect state repression in a high-capacity authoritarian regime? Drawing on a dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities, this study provides three key findings: first, the frequency of protests before and during national-level focal events and subsequent to national-level disruptive events is depressed, suggesting preemptive repression is taking place. Second, the likelihood of responsive repression is marginally reduced before and during local-level focal events and slightly elevated after national-level disruptive events. Third, contention is intensified when local political elites meet. Sensitive periods do not bring contention to a standstill and costly bursts of responsive repression were not observed. Stability maintenance during times of increased regime-vulnerability was thus less rigid than often assumed.
Despite the Chinese state’s long-standing wariness of strong horizontal linkages among nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and a deteriorating political climate for civil society activism, cross-regional alliances among NGOs have become a... more
Despite the Chinese state’s long-standing wariness of strong horizontal linkages among nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and a deteriorating political climate for civil society activism, cross-regional alliances among NGOs have become a persistent phenomenon in recent years. This article draws on the case of the Zero Waste Alliance—a nationwide coalition of environmental NGOs engaged in waste-related matters—to identify structural conditions that encouraged its emergence and illuminate how alliance builders have interpreted their environment. The article argues that developments internal to the environmental NGO sector—an increased need to pool scarce resources and professional knowledge, a stronger inclination to collaborate among a new generation of NGO leaders, and the formation of epistemic communities—combined with conditional state lenience have propelled activists to embark on a strategy of alliance building. This case illustrates how the perceived boundary of the permissible shifts when structural conditions incentivize entrepreneurial activists to explore new strategies, and these attempts do not provoke repressive responses. It also highlights that the state has remained conditionally tolerant of boundary-pushing NGO behavior in a sector aligning with its interests, while strengthening political control over civil society.
Theorists have long disagreed about the impact of socio-economic modernization on social trust. The pessimistic school asserts that modernization undermines the structural conditions for high levels of trust. The optimistic account argues... more
Theorists have long disagreed about the impact of socio-economic modernization on social trust. The pessimistic school asserts that modernization undermines the structural conditions for high levels of trust. The optimistic account argues that it delivers economic security and human empowerment and thereby enhances trust. Adapting these contrasting theories to the specific case of China, this article puts them to the test with survey data from the World Values Survey. Exploiting the condition of highly uneven levels of regional development, combined with common political institutions and a shared cultural heritage, the study conducts a multi-level analysis of survey data from over 1,900 individuals and a wide range of regional statistics from 61 county-level units. While trust in family members and particular trust beyond the family are unaffected by levels of regional modernization, we find robust evidence to suggest that regional modernization is associated with substantially higher levels of general trust. The results further suggests that higher general trust in more developed regions does not lead to an enhanced conversion of particular into general trust. This indicates that general trust is nurtured through the contextual effect of residing in more modern social environments. Overall, these findings provide substantial support for modernization optimists and lend themselves to a reinterpretation of a widely discussed “trust crisis” in China, which to date is often interpreted according to the pessimistic view of modernization.
This article addresses the challenges of understanding, measuring and explaining political identities in post-1997 Hong Kong. It shows that national and local identities are better conceptualized as two distinct attitudes and captured... more
This article addresses the challenges of understanding, measuring and explaining political identities in post-1997 Hong Kong. It shows that national and local identities are better conceptualized as two distinct attitudes and captured with separate scaled items than as opposite poles of one attitude measured in a single categorical item. This approach reveals that the key shift occurred not in local identity, but in nationalistic sentiments, which have initially increased but are on a downward trend since 2008. It also shows that national and local identities were perceived as robustly compatible for most years since 1997, but have begun to drift apart in recent years. Considering competing accounts to explain national identity strength, trust in the central government stands out as the dominant factor. Discontent with livelihood conditions and socio-structural variables either have no significant effect or are to a large part the result of differences in political trust.
How do authoritarian states respond to, and seek to defuse, popular protest? This study answers this question by developing the concept of discursive accommodation and tracing the co-evolution of contention and strategic elite... more
How do authoritarian states respond to, and seek to defuse, popular protest? This study
answers this question by developing the concept of discursive accommodation and tracing the co-evolution of contention and strategic elite communication in China. It reveals that the Chinese Communist Party leadership has responded to waves of intense unrest with increasing, yet not unconditional, sympathy for protesters. It argues that the rationale behind this response pattern has been first, to deflect discontent from the regime and, second, to temper local official and protester behavior. And yet, the unintended consequence of discursive accommodation may well have been the acceleration of mobilization. Investigating elite discourse provides an alternative angle to understand why contention in China has become endemic, but remains conspicuously moderate. It helps to unpack the one-party state’s ability of coexisting with considerable popular pressure and not be washed away by it, and managing protest without institutionalizing it.
Since the mid-2000s, China has experienced a wave of large environmental protests against major economic development projects. Based on both interviews and documentary sources, this article examines four prominent cases and identifies... more
Since the mid-2000s, China has experienced a wave of large environmental protests against major economic development projects. Based on both interviews and documentary sources, this article examines four prominent cases and identifies four innovations in China’s popular politics: broadened protest constituencies; mobilization for public goods; a proactive strategy to prevent government projects; and, a mutual reinforcement of street mobilization and policy advocacy. These new traits of popular resistance have also begun to appear outside of the environmental arena. The way was paved for these innovations by transformations in the public sphere, a relative decrease in the risk of protest participation, and development of the environmental NGO sector. Although the new repertoire of contention appears in only some of China’s abundant protests, it is becoming more widespread and some cases have developed longer-lasting policy impacts. Recent environmental protests may well stand at the forefront of broader changes in the landscape of Chinese socio-political activism and contentious politics.
This article suggests that despite the state’s extensive efforts to curtail Chinese intellectuals’ expression, other state behaviors also stimulate and enable boundary-pushers to expand the limits of the permissible. It argues that... more
This article suggests that despite the state’s extensive efforts to curtail Chinese intellectuals’ expression, other state behaviors also stimulate and enable boundary-pushers to expand the limits of the permissible. It argues that intensifying intellectual criticism in the domain of social stability and protest during the Hu Jintao era was an unintended consequence of the political leadership’s accommodating responses to rising societal pressures. First, leaders became considerably more outspoken on proliferating protests and articulated stricter prescriptions for local official behavior. Second, adapting to a more assertive Internet and news media, censorship was relaxed and major protests became much more visible. The resulting discursive opportunities enabled trailblazing academics to question the prevailing logic of stability and open the sensitive topic to a broad circle of commentators. Subsequently, the central government has initiated a round of ongoing policy and institutional adjustments. Criticism thus has both stabilizing and destabilizing implications. It contributes to the rectification of policy and institutional failure, but it weakens the Communist Party’s legitimatory narrative and has pushed regime-defining questions, in particular the lack of protest institutionalization, onto the public agenda.

http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/22/0097700415581158.abstract
In recent years, popular protest in China has emerged from a state of near-invisibility. Drawing on a diachronic analysis of news media coverage, this paper traces how a number of major protest events gradually entered the Chinese media’s... more
In recent years, popular protest in China has emerged from a state of near-invisibility. Drawing on a diachronic analysis of news media coverage, this paper traces how a number of major protest events gradually entered the Chinese media’s spotlight and came to be portrayed in an increasingly protester-sympathising fashion over the course of the Hu-Wen administration. It argues that these changes were triggered by structural transformations of the Chinese public sphere, but underlines that deliberate policy choices by the political leadership served as a crucial agent of change. Facing proliferating unrest and an increasingly unimpeded flow of information, the central authorities have gradually shifted propaganda policy from a suppressive to a more proactive approach. They have thereby created critical opportunities for netizens and investigative journalists to push the envelope further towards protester-sympathizing accounts. The development is significant as there are good reasons to surmise that increased media coverage has exacerbated the dynamics of popular contention. Theoretically, it deserves to be noted that non-inevitable choices by an authoritarian leadership have led to an outcome in which media coverage of citizens who challenge the state on the streets has become substantially more frequent and positive than before.
Free access: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xF2F6mW7mE5XfrsPzzMQ/full
Although China is an outlier in terms of generalized trust, it has attracted little scholarly attention so far. Employing survey data from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, this article seeks to address this gap. The article makes use... more
Although China is an outlier in terms of generalized trust, it has attracted little scholarly attention so far. Employing survey data from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, this article seeks to address this gap. The article makes use of the comparative leverage provided by political and socio-cultural variation to investigate two plausible reasons for the high levels of measured trust in Mainland China: a spillover from high institutional confidence; and problems of measurement validity. The study finds a comparatively strong link between institutional confidence and trust in Mainland China, which suggests that high confidence in institutions contributes to high levels of generalized trust in this context. By situating the Chinese case in the debate on the institutional foundation of generalized trust, the article suggests a heuristic to interpret this finding and points out its theoretical implications. The findings on measurement validity are mixed. While the results do not suggest that political fear causes a significant distortion in measured trust levels, the study finds circumstantial evidence for a culturally induced response bias to the standard item in Mainland China. This would have crucial implications for comparative research on generalized trust beyond the Chinese context.
Diese Studie geht der Frage nach den Determinanten von Sozialkapital, gemessen als soziales Vertrauen, im chinesischen Kontext nach. Dazu werden Umfragedaten aus Taiwan analysiert. Nach der Diskussion relevanter Literatur aus der... more
Diese Studie geht der Frage nach den Determinanten von Sozialkapital, gemessen als soziales Vertrauen, im chinesischen Kontext nach. Dazu werden Umfragedaten aus Taiwan analysiert. Nach der Diskussion relevanter Literatur aus der generellen Forschung und dem speziell chinesischen Kontext werden Theorien der Bildung von sozialem Vertrauen in einem multivariaten Regressionsmodell getestet. Engagement in brückenbauenden und bindenden zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen, ein Gefühl der Lebenskontrolle und das Alter wurden als signifikante Determinanten des sozialen Vertrauens in Taiwan identifiziert. Im Ganzen deuten die Resultate auf eine Ähnlichkeit von – mittels Umfragen gemessenem – sozialem Vertrauen in chinesischen und westlichen Gesellschaften hin. Dieser Befund war aufgrund der theoretischen Literatur in vieler Hinsicht nicht zu erwarten.
Germany’s fairly successful management of the first eight months of the COVID-19 pandemic proceeded through three phases of government response: ranging from being caught off-guard, decisive action and a comparatively mild lock-down, to... more
Germany’s fairly successful management of the first eight months of the COVID-19 pandemic proceeded through three phases of government response: ranging from being caught off-guard, decisive action and a comparatively mild lock-down, to finding a path to a “new normal” of managing the disease. An elite consensus regarding the severity of the threat to public health and the necessity for counter-measures was supported by a large majority. Although noisy opposition emerged on the fringes, so far political polarisation over the pandemic remained limited.
Since the mid-2000s, Chinese citizens have recurrently mobilized against major government-backed developmental projects. This chapter nudges the discussion on this phenomenon forward by posing two questions: first, how are such instances... more
Since the mid-2000s, Chinese citizens have recurrently mobilized against major government-backed developmental projects. This chapter nudges the discussion on this phenomenon forward by posing two questions: first, how are such instances similar or different from other kinds of protests in China and forms of environmental contention elsewhere? Second, do they constitute a new type of contention in China? The study first outlines key attributes of three prominent repertoire concepts: Rightful Resistance, NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard) and Environmental Movement. It then examines 25 major cases of environmental contention between 2007 and 2016, drawing on news reports, Internet materials, interviews and existing scholarly research. The chapter shows that a majority of them do not fit easily into any of the three repertoire types. It therefore sketches out the notion of an Environmental Public Interest Campaign to demarcate more clearly what defines this new species in China’s contentious politics.
这是关于《德国垃圾分类和处理体系的历史演变与现状》的一个报告的幻灯片.

These are the slides of a Chinese talk on "The evolution and current state of the German waste sorting and management system".
This paper reexamines survey data on political identities in Hong Kong since 1997. It refutes the widespread assumption that national and local identities are in a zero-sum relationship and argues for a measurement of identities different... more
This paper reexamines survey data on political identities in Hong Kong since 1997. It refutes the widespread assumption that national and local identities are in a zero-sum relationship and argues for a measurement of identities different from the standard approach. It finds that the major change in recent years was a diminishing sense of Chineseness instead of a strengthening of Hong Kong identity. It also notes substantial political cleavages over Chinese identity and finds that local identity is much more consensual and less politicized than often assumed. Based on this analysis, it provides thoughts on policy premises geared towards defusing tensions in society.
The conventional wisdom in society and policy circles is that local and national identities in Hong Kong are in a zero-sum relationship. Our analysis cast doubts on whether this assumption is empirically justified. We therefore argue that... more
The conventional wisdom in society and policy circles is that local and national identities in Hong Kong are in a zero-sum relationship. Our analysis cast doubts on whether this assumption is empirically justified. We therefore argue that the two identities should not be measured as two poles of a single attitude, as practiced by many studies. This provides not only a more conceptually sound and empirically accurate estimate of identity trends, but also shows that local identity is much more consensual and less politicized than often assumed. Such a reinterpretation will be conducive to the development of a more effective approach towards a sustainable society. This policy paper summarizes this analysis and points to a few possible directions for practical application.
The new Chinese leadership’s recent loosening of controls and reactions from social forces follow an established political playbook. The question is whether a seemingly more assertive society will continue to play by the rules.... more
The new Chinese leadership’s recent loosening of controls and reactions from social forces follow an established political playbook. The question is whether a seemingly more assertive society will continue to play by the rules.

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/04/loosening-controls-in-times-of-an-impatient-society-chinese-state-society-relations-during-xi-jinpings-honeymoon-period/
This article analyses the politics of the Chinese green GDP project and its recent deadlock. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the political backdrop of the project, the local politics behind the Chinese environmental... more
This article analyses the politics of the Chinese green GDP project and its recent deadlock. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the political backdrop of the project, the local politics behind the Chinese environmental crisis have been taken as the analytical focus of this paper. Drawing on recent research, it is argued that local cover-ups of frequently illegal environmental exploitation – which is commonly made responsible for China’s environmental problems – are largely induced by the structure of the Party-state. This leads to the conclusion that the causal reason for the deadlock in the green GDP is not, as is often reported, resistance from local leaders, but rather the lack of support from the very top level on the eve of the 17th Party Congress due to the green GDP’s heavy political baggage.