- Political Science, Contentious Politics, Political communication, Political Discourse, Trust, Social Capital, and 11 moreEnvironmental Politics, Chinese Politics, Social Trust, Chinese Media Studies, Chinese Society, China, Conflict Resolution, China studies, Journalism, Contemporary China, and National Identityedit
- My research is concerned with state-society relations and the evolution of the political regime in China, examining p... moreMy research is concerned with state-society relations and the evolution of the political regime in China, examining popular protest, environmental politics, social and political trust as well as political identities. I use both qualitative and quantitative methods and work with interviews, documentary, textual, survey and event data. My writing has been published in journals such as European Political Science Review, Political Studies, Modern China, The China Journal or The Journal of Contemporary China.
I hold an MA (Diplom) in social science from Humboldt University Berlin (2006) and a Ph.D. in political science from The Chinese University of Hong Kong (2012). Previously I have been a pre-doctoral Fulbright fellow at the University of California, Irvine, a post-doctoral visiting research fellow at the National University of Singapore, and and assistant professor at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. I am currently assistant professor at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna.edit
How good is media-elicited protest event data from autocracies, where the media are censored? Based on a source-specific model of event selection and a multi-source dataset of over 3,100 protests from three Chinese mega-cities, we show... more
How good is media-elicited protest event data from autocracies, where the media are censored? Based on a source-specific model of event selection and a multi-source dataset of over 3,100 protests from three Chinese mega-cities, we show that major advantages in information gathering and reporting translate into social media capturing 116-times more protests than English-language international news, 74-times more than domestic news and 10-times more than dissident websites. Social media is most likely to cover small and non-violent events that other sources often ignore. Aside from anti-regime protests, it is less affected by censorship than often assumed. A validity test against public holidays and daily rainfall shows that social media data outperforms dissident websites and traditional news. Social media, and to a lesser extent dissident media, are promising new sources for protest event analysis in autocracies. News media-based event data from regimes with heavy censorship should be treated with caution.
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How does the elevated threat of protests during sensitive periods affect state repression in a high-capacity authoritarian regime? Drawing on a dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities, this study provides three key... more
How does the elevated threat of protests during sensitive periods affect state repression in a high-capacity authoritarian regime? Drawing on a dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities, this study provides three key findings: first, the frequency of protests before and during national-level focal events and subsequent to national-level disruptive events is depressed, suggesting preemptive repression is taking place. Second, the likelihood of responsive repression is marginally reduced before and during local-level focal events and slightly elevated after national-level disruptive events. Third, contention is intensified when local political elites meet. Sensitive periods do not bring contention to a standstill and costly bursts of responsive repression were not observed. Stability maintenance during times of increased regime-vulnerability was thus less rigid than often assumed.
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Despite the Chinese state’s long-standing wariness of strong horizontal linkages among nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and a deteriorating political climate for civil society activism, cross-regional alliances among NGOs have become a... more
Despite the Chinese state’s long-standing wariness of strong horizontal linkages among nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and a deteriorating political climate for civil society activism, cross-regional alliances among NGOs have become a persistent phenomenon in recent years. This article draws on the case of the Zero Waste Alliance—a nationwide coalition of environmental NGOs engaged in waste-related matters—to identify structural conditions that encouraged its emergence and illuminate how alliance builders have interpreted their environment. The article argues that developments internal to the environmental NGO sector—an increased need to pool scarce resources and professional knowledge, a stronger inclination to collaborate among a new generation of NGO leaders, and the formation of epistemic communities—combined with conditional state lenience have propelled activists to embark on a strategy of alliance building. This case illustrates how the perceived boundary of the permissible shifts when structural conditions incentivize entrepreneurial activists to explore new strategies, and these attempts do not provoke repressive responses. It also highlights that the state has remained conditionally tolerant of boundary-pushing NGO behavior in a sector aligning with its interests, while strengthening political control over civil society.
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How do authoritarian states respond to, and seek to defuse, popular protest? This study answers this question by developing the concept of discursive accommodation and tracing the co-evolution of contention and strategic elite... more
How do authoritarian states respond to, and seek to defuse, popular protest? This study
answers this question by developing the concept of discursive accommodation and tracing the co-evolution of contention and strategic elite communication in China. It reveals that the Chinese Communist Party leadership has responded to waves of intense unrest with increasing, yet not unconditional, sympathy for protesters. It argues that the rationale behind this response pattern has been first, to deflect discontent from the regime and, second, to temper local official and protester behavior. And yet, the unintended consequence of discursive accommodation may well have been the acceleration of mobilization. Investigating elite discourse provides an alternative angle to understand why contention in China has become endemic, but remains conspicuously moderate. It helps to unpack the one-party state’s ability of coexisting with considerable popular pressure and not be washed away by it, and managing protest without institutionalizing it.
answers this question by developing the concept of discursive accommodation and tracing the co-evolution of contention and strategic elite communication in China. It reveals that the Chinese Communist Party leadership has responded to waves of intense unrest with increasing, yet not unconditional, sympathy for protesters. It argues that the rationale behind this response pattern has been first, to deflect discontent from the regime and, second, to temper local official and protester behavior. And yet, the unintended consequence of discursive accommodation may well have been the acceleration of mobilization. Investigating elite discourse provides an alternative angle to understand why contention in China has become endemic, but remains conspicuously moderate. It helps to unpack the one-party state’s ability of coexisting with considerable popular pressure and not be washed away by it, and managing protest without institutionalizing it.
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This article suggests that despite the state’s extensive efforts to curtail Chinese intellectuals’ expression, other state behaviors also stimulate and enable boundary-pushers to expand the limits of the permissible. It argues that... more
This article suggests that despite the state’s extensive efforts to curtail Chinese intellectuals’ expression, other state behaviors also stimulate and enable boundary-pushers to expand the limits of the permissible. It argues that intensifying intellectual criticism in the domain of social stability and protest during the Hu Jintao era was an unintended consequence of the political leadership’s accommodating responses to rising societal pressures. First, leaders became considerably more outspoken on proliferating protests and articulated stricter prescriptions for local official behavior. Second, adapting to a more assertive Internet and news media, censorship was relaxed and major protests became much more visible. The resulting discursive opportunities enabled trailblazing academics to question the prevailing logic of stability and open the sensitive topic to a broad circle of commentators. Subsequently, the central government has initiated a round of ongoing policy and institutional adjustments. Criticism thus has both stabilizing and destabilizing implications. It contributes to the rectification of policy and institutional failure, but it weakens the Communist Party’s legitimatory narrative and has pushed regime-defining questions, in particular the lack of protest institutionalization, onto the public agenda.
http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/22/0097700415581158.abstract
http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/22/0097700415581158.abstract
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In recent years, popular protest in China has emerged from a state of near-invisibility. Drawing on a diachronic analysis of news media coverage, this paper traces how a number of major protest events gradually entered the Chinese media’s... more
In recent years, popular protest in China has emerged from a state of near-invisibility. Drawing on a diachronic analysis of news media coverage, this paper traces how a number of major protest events gradually entered the Chinese media’s spotlight and came to be portrayed in an increasingly protester-sympathising fashion over the course of the Hu-Wen administration. It argues that these changes were triggered by structural transformations of the Chinese public sphere, but underlines that deliberate policy choices by the political leadership served as a crucial agent of change. Facing proliferating unrest and an increasingly unimpeded flow of information, the central authorities have gradually shifted propaganda policy from a suppressive to a more proactive approach. They have thereby created critical opportunities for netizens and investigative journalists to push the envelope further towards protester-sympathizing accounts. The development is significant as there are good reasons to surmise that increased media coverage has exacerbated the dynamics of popular contention. Theoretically, it deserves to be noted that non-inevitable choices by an authoritarian leadership have led to an outcome in which media coverage of citizens who challenge the state on the streets has become substantially more frequent and positive than before.
Free access: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xF2F6mW7mE5XfrsPzzMQ/full
Free access: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xF2F6mW7mE5XfrsPzzMQ/full
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Although China is an outlier in terms of generalized trust, it has attracted little scholarly attention so far. Employing survey data from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, this article seeks to address this gap. The article makes use... more
Although China is an outlier in terms of generalized trust, it has attracted little scholarly attention so far. Employing survey data from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, this article seeks to address this gap. The article makes use of the comparative leverage provided by political and socio-cultural variation to investigate two plausible reasons for the high levels of measured trust in Mainland China: a spillover from high institutional confidence; and problems of measurement validity. The study finds a comparatively strong link between institutional confidence and trust in Mainland China, which suggests that high confidence in institutions contributes to high levels of generalized trust in this context. By situating the Chinese case in the debate on the institutional foundation of generalized trust, the article suggests a heuristic to interpret this finding and points out its theoretical implications. The findings on measurement validity are mixed. While the results do not suggest that political fear causes a significant distortion in measured trust levels, the study finds circumstantial evidence for a culturally induced response bias to the standard item in Mainland China. This would have crucial implications for comparative research on generalized trust beyond the Chinese context.
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Diese Studie geht der Frage nach den Determinanten von Sozialkapital, gemessen als soziales Vertrauen, im chinesischen Kontext nach. Dazu werden Umfragedaten aus Taiwan analysiert. Nach der Diskussion relevanter Literatur aus der... more
Diese Studie geht der Frage nach den Determinanten von Sozialkapital, gemessen als soziales Vertrauen, im chinesischen Kontext nach. Dazu werden Umfragedaten aus Taiwan analysiert. Nach der Diskussion relevanter Literatur aus der generellen Forschung und dem speziell chinesischen Kontext werden Theorien der Bildung von sozialem Vertrauen in einem multivariaten Regressionsmodell getestet. Engagement in brückenbauenden und bindenden zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen, ein Gefühl der Lebenskontrolle und das Alter wurden als signifikante Determinanten des sozialen Vertrauens in Taiwan identifiziert. Im Ganzen deuten die Resultate auf eine Ähnlichkeit von – mittels Umfragen gemessenem – sozialem Vertrauen in chinesischen und westlichen Gesellschaften hin. Dieser Befund war aufgrund der theoretischen Literatur in vieler Hinsicht nicht zu erwarten.
Germany’s fairly successful management of the first eight months of the COVID-19 pandemic proceeded through three phases of government response: ranging from being caught off-guard, decisive action and a comparatively mild lock-down, to... more
Germany’s fairly successful management of the first eight months of the COVID-19 pandemic proceeded through three phases of government response: ranging from being caught off-guard, decisive action and a comparatively mild lock-down, to finding a path to a “new normal” of managing the disease. An elite consensus regarding the severity of the threat to public health and the necessity for counter-measures was supported by a large majority. Although noisy opposition emerged on the fringes, so far political polarisation over the pandemic remained limited.
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Since the mid-2000s, Chinese citizens have recurrently mobilized against major government-backed developmental projects. This chapter nudges the discussion on this phenomenon forward by posing two questions: first, how are such instances... more
Since the mid-2000s, Chinese citizens have recurrently mobilized against major government-backed developmental projects. This chapter nudges the discussion on this phenomenon forward by posing two questions: first, how are such instances similar or different from other kinds of protests in China and forms of environmental contention elsewhere? Second, do they constitute a new type of contention in China? The study first outlines key attributes of three prominent repertoire concepts: Rightful Resistance, NIMBYism (Not In My Backyard) and Environmental Movement. It then examines 25 major cases of environmental contention between 2007 and 2016, drawing on news reports, Internet materials, interviews and existing scholarly research. The chapter shows that a majority of them do not fit easily into any of the three repertoire types. It therefore sketches out the notion of an Environmental Public Interest Campaign to demarcate more clearly what defines this new species in China’s contentious politics.
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这是关于《德国垃圾分类和处理体系的历史演变与现状》的一个报告的幻灯片.
These are the slides of a Chinese talk on "The evolution and current state of the German waste sorting and management system".
These are the slides of a Chinese talk on "The evolution and current state of the German waste sorting and management system".
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The new Chinese leadership’s recent loosening of controls and reactions from social forces follow an established political playbook. The question is whether a seemingly more assertive society will continue to play by the rules.... more
The new Chinese leadership’s recent loosening of controls and reactions from social forces follow an established political playbook. The question is whether a seemingly more assertive society will continue to play by the rules.
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/04/loosening-controls-in-times-of-an-impatient-society-chinese-state-society-relations-during-xi-jinpings-honeymoon-period/
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/04/loosening-controls-in-times-of-an-impatient-society-chinese-state-society-relations-during-xi-jinpings-honeymoon-period/
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This article analyses the politics of the Chinese green GDP project and its recent deadlock. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the political backdrop of the project, the local politics behind the Chinese environmental... more
This article analyses the politics of the Chinese green GDP project and its recent deadlock. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the political backdrop of the project, the local politics behind the Chinese environmental crisis have been taken as the analytical focus of this paper. Drawing on recent research, it is argued that local cover-ups of frequently illegal environmental exploitation – which is commonly made responsible for China’s environmental problems – are largely induced by the structure of the Party-state. This leads to the conclusion that the causal reason for the deadlock in the green GDP is not, as is often reported, resistance from local leaders, but rather the lack of support from the very top level on the eve of the 17th Party Congress due to the green GDP’s heavy political baggage.