Greta Favara

Political realists have devoted much effort to clarifying the methodological specificity of realist theorising and defending its consistency as an approach to political reasoning. Yet the question of how to justify the realist approach has not received the same attention. In this paper, I offer a prudential justification of political realism. To do so, I first characterise realism as antimoralism. I then outline three possible arguments for the realist approach by availing myself of recent inquiries into the metatheoretical basis of realism: the metaethical, the ethical, and the prudential arguments. I explain that the prudential argument offers the most solid basis for political realism because it relies on the least controversial premises. Still, I delve into the metaethical and ethical arguments for two reasons: the prudential argument takes advantage of the theses defended by the rival arguments; and elaborating the other arguments shows the comparative strengths of the prudential argument.

When interest in political realism started to resurge a few years ago, it was not uncommon to interpret realist political theory as a form of non-ideal theorising. This reading has been subjected to extensive criticism. First, realists have argued that political realism cannot be interpreted as merely a form of applied political theory. Second, realists have explained that political realism can defend a role for unfeasible normative prescriptions in political theory. I explain that these developments, besides allowing us to reject interpretations of political realism as a form of non-ideal theory, have given us reason to think of political realism as a form of ideal theory. Yet, when ideal theory enters the picture, a series of methodological questions arise regarding the proper use of ideals. In this paper, I clarify how the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory ought to be conceptualised in realist political theory. I examine the two major interpretations of the role of ideals that have been provided so far-the target and benchmark interpretations-and I show that neither is compatible with some of the fundamental theoretical commitments of realist political theory. This both allows me to point out the requirements that an interpretation of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory must meet to be defined as properly realist and allows me to emphasise the strengths of the realist approach. Accordingly, I propose a new interpretation of the role of ideals, one consistent with realist theoretical commitments: I suggest that realist political ideals ought to be interpreted as models.

For realists, political theories exhibit an anti-moralist character when their normativity stems from an appraisal of the value and the specificities of real political practices. While realists agree on such a characterisation of the realist project, they split when it comes to explaining to what extent realist political normativity can provide us with a critical perspective on the status quo. The most recent contributions on this topic are polarised. Some contributors interpret political realism as an approach to politics that leads to an affirmation of the status quo. Others suggest that political realism might lead to radical transformations of the status quo. In this paper, I argue that it is possible to identify a consistent middle ground between these alternative interpretations: the interpretation of political realism as a form of reformist conservatism. Moreover, I defend the reformist-conservative interpretation of political realism as superior to the extant ones. Contrary to the rival interpretations, I show that the reformist-conservative interpretation consistently reconciles all the fundamental tenets of political realism. Furthermore, I explain that while the conservatist interpretation risks undermining the normative commitment of realism and the radical interpretation leans towards an irresponsible form of political theorising, the reformist-conservative reading avoids these pitfalls.

Some realists in political theory deny that the notion of feasibility has any place in realist theory, while others claim that feasibility constraints are essential elements of realist normative theorising. But none have so far clarified what exactly they are referring to when thinking of feasibility and political realism together. In this article, we develop a conception of the realist feasibility frontier based on an appraisal of how political realism should be distinguished from non-ideal theories. In this realist framework, political standards are feasible if they meet three requirements: they are (i) politically intelligible, (ii) contextually recognisable as authoritative, and (iii) contestable. We conclude by suggesting that our conception of realist feasibility might be compatible with utopian demands, thereby possibly finding favour with realists who otherwise refuse to resort to the notion of feasibility.

In Real Legitimation, Anarchism and Power Loops (Newey 2019), Newey examines whether the use of force in political circumstances could be disciplined by drawing clear boundaries between its admissible and inadmissible uses. The question, as Newey recognizes, is about the very possibility of offering a sound theory of legitimacy. Are there any uses of force that we can deem legitimate, and hence acceptable, as opposed to illegitimate ones? According to Newey, a theory of legitimacy can never achieve what it promises: since politics redefines the conditions upon which justifications can be found legitimating, politics constantly interferes with theoretical definitions of the boundaries of legitimacy. Force, as Newey points out, “destroys legitimacy”. Yet, Newey’s argument works exclusively if we accept that some suitably defined descriptions of politics can ground political normativity. In the specific case considered, if we believe that actual or hypothetical conditions of legitimations have a role in determining the normative criteria for the legitimate use of force. But this is far from obvious.
In this comment, I examine the strength of Newey’s general claim on legitimacy by clarifying how the interplay between political reality and political normativity should be interpreted, and what role it is supposed to play, in Newey’s analysis. In particular, the paper is structured in two main sections. In the first section I recall in a more detailed way Newey’s argument in support of his general conclusion, and I show that, despite its initial ambition, such argument can counter only theories of legitimacy which consider actual or hypothetical legitimations as grounds of legitimacy. However, in the second section, I propose a new argument in support of Newey’s general claim. More specifically, I explain that such defense can be built starting from scattered suggestions already contained in Newey’s discussion.

In "Compromessi di principio. Il disaccordo nella filosofia politica contemporanea", Giulia Bistagnino intende dimostrare come sia possibile trovare una soluzione al problema del disaccordo politico in contesti democratici senza dover necessariamente rinunciare a interrogarsi su chi, tra le parti in causa, abbia ragione. L’obiettivo di Bistagnino è, in altre parole, mostrare come sia possibile difendere una concezione dell’autorità basata sulla verità – ossia giustificare le decisioni politiche sulla base della loro capacità di riflettere ragioni
oggettive – senza che questo implichi l’adesione a una visione assolutistica o autoritaria del potere politico. Si tratta di una sfida ambiziosa, che Bistagnino affronta ripercorrendo una vasta letteratura sul tema e senza timore di difendere una teoria del disaccordo politico radicalmente innovativa all’interno del panorama filosofico contemporaneo. Il libro si distingue, dunque, per la capacità di affrontare un tema classico della filosofia politica – quello della relazione tra verità e politica – riuscendo a proporre, al contempo, una panoramica critica dei paradigmi contemporanei, un approccio originale al problema, e un’argomentazione rigorosa in suo favore.

L’esercizio del pensiero filosofico-politico, specialmente quando è condotto con finalità normativa, è un atto immaginativo. Quando ci chiediamo se le circostanze politiche che abitiamo rispondono pienamente a criteri di adeguatezza normativa – quali, ad esempio, criteri di giustizia o di legittimità – non facciamo altro che chiederci se sia possibile immaginare un mondo politico alternativo al nostro che sia più desiderabile di quello attuale. In modo simile, quando ci interroghiamo sulle scelte che siamo chiamati a compiere in ambito politico, valutiamo quale corso d’azione sarebbe preferibile perseguire prefigurando gli scenari alternativi a nostra disposizione e confrontandoli sulla base della loro maggiore o minore desiderabilità.
Ma quanto in là possiamo condurre la nostra immaginazione politica? Vi sono dei limiti ai mondi politici alternativi, oggetto della nostra immaginazione, che possiamo considerare rilevanti da un punto di vista normativo, ossia in grado di porsi come guide della prassi politica nel mondo reale? Porsi questa domanda equivale a interrogarsi sulla relazione tra fatti e principi in filosofia politica, ovvero a chiedersi se vi siano dei limiti di natura descrittiva che avremmo ragione di porre ai mondi politici alternativi quando questo esercizio immaginativo assume una finalità normativa. Definire i confini dell’immaginazione in filosofia politica normativa e, di conseguenza, il rapporto che dovrebbe intercorrere tra fatti politici e principi politici è dunque cruciale al fine di poter condurre un’indagine normativa adeguata. I limiti che imponiamo all’immaginazione politica hanno un impatto sulle norme che dovrebbero guidare l’agire politico, sul modo in cui valutiamo il mondo politico che abitiamo e sul ruolo che assume il teorico politico stesso.
È dunque ben motivato l’interesse recente che l’indagine metodologica attorno alla relazione tra fatti e principi ha suscitato tra coloro che si occupano di filosofia politica normativa. All’interno di questo articolato dibattito, la corrente filosofica del realismo politico – corrente oggetto di studio di questo libro – ha assunto un ruolo centrale. Coloro che si fanno promotori dell’adozione di un approccio realista in teoria politica, infatti, prendono posizione rispetto questa fondamentale questione metodologica e ne offrono una lettura originale, perlopiù critica verso le metodologie tradizionalmente adottate in filosofia politica contemporanea. In questo libro, mi occupo di analizzare il realismo politico in quanto metodologia di ricerca per la teoria politica normativa e ne offro una sistematizzazione; ossia, mi occupo di chiarire in che modo realtà e teoria si intreccino all’interno di questo paradigma teorico.