- University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, Philosophy, Department Memberadd
According to the thesis of powerism, our world is pervaded by causal powers which are metaphysically basic. The aim of this paper is to defend the existence of the self, defined as a substantial entity, and its mental powers. This claim,... more
According to the thesis of powerism, our world is pervaded by causal powers which are metaphysically basic. The aim of this paper is to defend the existence of the self, defined as a substantial entity, and its mental powers. This claim, which may seem a bold one, should not be deemed as inconsistent with scientific evidence. In fact, this approach does not ignore empirical knowledge, but is not bound only to it in order to understand entities, properties, and the relationship between them. Aristotelian powerism may show that the self, as the subject of one's mental acts, is a substance that has an essential nature. Firstly, we shall analyze the immediate evidence we have in support of the existence of the self as a substantial entity. We will show that the self is a substance because it possesses an essential character, i.e. an individual essence. We will take into account the Aristotelian perspective of substance, trying to show how the presence of a necessary property that makes every subject identical to itself and the phenomenal features of one's private experience point to the existence of a substantial entity that corresponds to the self. Secondly, we will try to justify the adoption of a metaphysical theory of causation based on powers, analyzing it in comparison with the main competing theories, namely hypotheticalism and nomism. Then, we shall proceed to show the causal properties of the substance in question, namely the mental powers. In fact, thirdly, we will embrace the thesis of powerism by defending the existence of a set of mental powers that should be attributed to the self. We will describe the main features of mental powers and we will show that they are conceivable as the pure intentional acts we perform by directing an intentional state towards an intentional object. In this way we show how a classic problem of philosophy of mind, relevant to science as well, can be addressed in an original way by a metaphysical approach involving powers.
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Lo scopo di questo contributo è illustrare l’evoluzione storica dei problemi affrontati dal funzionalismo e riflettere sulle implicazioni che questa prospettiva può avere nel dibattito odierno sulla mente. Nella prima sezione saranno... more
Lo scopo di questo contributo è illustrare l’evoluzione storica dei problemi affrontati dal funzionalismo e riflettere sulle implicazioni che questa prospettiva può avere nel dibattito odierno sulla mente. Nella prima sezione saranno descritte le diverse articolazioni delle teorie funzionaliste nella filosofia della mente contemporanea. Nella seconda sezione saranno considerate le osservazioni critiche mosse nei confronti della visione funzionalista e verranno esposti i principali argomenti elaborati dagli studiosi della mente per mettere in discussione questa prospettiva. Infine, nella terza sezione, cercheremo di comprendere se, in definitiva, la ricerca filosofica possa ancora avvalersi dell’analogia mente-computer al fine di analizzare il rapporto tra il cervello ed il dominio del mentale.
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This article aims to provide a brief overview of the mental causation problem and its proposed solutions. Indeed, mental causation turns out to be one of the most difficult philosophical conundrums in contemporary philosophy of mind. In... more
This article aims to provide a brief overview of the mental causation problem and its proposed solutions. Indeed, mental causation turns out to be one of the most difficult philosophical conundrums in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the first two sections, we offer an outline of the problem and the philosophical debate about it, and show that the mental causation problem is pivotal within the contemporary philosophy of mind. In the third section, we focus on the most popular models of mental causation, namely Kim's and Davidson's accounts, also discussing the objections raised against them. In the final section, we take into consideration some recent proposals poised to solve the mental causation problem, including powerism. Given the logical and metaphysical plausibility of almost all these different options, our conclusion is that mental causation is still an open problem and it is far from being resolved.
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In this paper, I argue that the analysis of Grice’s Cooperative Principle can be useful to comprehend Davidson’s theory of linguistic interaction.
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This paper is focused on the analysis of the relationship between Davidson’s classical essays in Philosophy of Language and the thesis he developed with the article “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (in LePore 1986). I shall argue that... more
This paper is focused on the analysis of the relationship between Davidson’s classical essays in Philosophy of Language and the thesis he developed with the article “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (in LePore 1986).
I shall argue that the idea of language defended by Davidson in the eighties doesn’t present similarities with Wittgenstein’s approach, as it is assumed by some scholars. In this respect, I reject the idea according to which we should assume the existence of an “early” and a “later” Donald Davidson after the publication of “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”. By analyzing his works, I will show that the main elements of his theory of meaning remain unchanged and that there are no radical changes in Davidson’s philosophical perspective on language and meaning.
I shall argue that the idea of language defended by Davidson in the eighties doesn’t present similarities with Wittgenstein’s approach, as it is assumed by some scholars. In this respect, I reject the idea according to which we should assume the existence of an “early” and a “later” Donald Davidson after the publication of “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”. By analyzing his works, I will show that the main elements of his theory of meaning remain unchanged and that there are no radical changes in Davidson’s philosophical perspective on language and meaning.
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In this article, I will propose a comparison between the speaker’s conversational implicatures during a linguistic interaction and the hidden clues scattered by an author in a text when he wants to communicate something about himself to... more
In this article, I will propose a comparison between the speaker’s conversational implicatures during a linguistic interaction and the hidden clues scattered by an author in a text when he wants to communicate something about himself to the reader. This comparison will show that the analysis of the writer’s ability to disclose himself through hidden clues to the reader could be a way to understand what mechanisms the speaker uses in a conversation.
In order to demonstrate this, I will take into account the famous Davidson’s article focused on James Joyce’s literary career. In fact, according to Davidson (1989), James Joyce wants to recreate the language partly to be reconnected to himself, expecting the reader to be able to construe him. This reveals that there exists a sort of dialogue between the creations of the “speaker”, i.e. the writer, and the assumptions the reader-interpreter can make when he tries to decipher a text.
In order to demonstrate this, I will take into account the famous Davidson’s article focused on James Joyce’s literary career. In fact, according to Davidson (1989), James Joyce wants to recreate the language partly to be reconnected to himself, expecting the reader to be able to construe him. This reveals that there exists a sort of dialogue between the creations of the “speaker”, i.e. the writer, and the assumptions the reader-interpreter can make when he tries to decipher a text.
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During the last century, most philosophers of science have tried to expunge teleological explanations from the fields of epistemology. They took for granted that the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and evolution effectively... more
During the last century, most philosophers of science have tried to expunge teleological explanations from the fields of epistemology. They took for granted that the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and evolution effectively dispense us with any presence of goal-directedness in nature: based on an anti-metaphysical attitude, they hold purposes and goals to be of religious and spiritual nature, thereby obstacles to any effective comprehension of biological processes. Accordingly, teleological categories have been abandoned in many ways in favor of mechanical causes and non-teleological processes: since Darwin demonstrated that no teleology is required in order to explain the natural world, causal explanations became the only tools to investigate natural processes.
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Italian translation of "Rationality and Religious Commitment", Oxford University Press, 2011.