Rolando Vitali

Die Absicht unseres Beitrages ist es den Standpunkt Adornos im Bezug auf den hegelschen Systemsbegriff auszulegen: genauer gesagt, möchten wir beweisen wie seine Auseinandersetzung mit dem hegelschen systematischen Denken nicht in eine einfältige Kritik mündet, sondern, einerseits, wie die dialektische und immanente Kritik Adornos den Wahrheitsmoment innerhalb der positiven Totalität des Hegelschen Systems zu erhellen versucht, und, andererseits, wie der Vergleich zwischen den systematischen Ansprüchen der positivistischen Standpunkte und der dialektischen Struktur des hegelschen Systems Adorno zu dem Versuch eines neuen kritischen Denkens führt: der eine der Modell und der Konstellation. Wir werden versuchen zu zeigen wie die antisystematische Denkweise Adornos einen negativen Totalitätsbegriff, in eine ständige Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel, stets hält, und wie seine negatives Verfahren im Bezug auf den systematischen Denken als eine radikalisierung und nicht als eine Ablehnung des hegelschen Denkens bewiesen werden kann.

Il pensiero di Nietzsche continua a essere spesso superficialmente identificato con l’affermazione secondo la quale «non ci sono fatti, ma solo intepretazioni»: negando la possibilità di accedere ai fatti “in sé” Nietzsche pone la necessità di una visione prospettivisitica e non dogmatica della filosofia. A partire dal successo che il pensiero nietzschano ha riscosso all’interno di quel movimento di pensiero che – sbrigativamente – viene chiamato post-modernismo, sembra essersi imposta una declinazione “debole” del compito del pensiero: più volte accusato di essere un pensatore “relativista”, Nietzsche è stato utilizzato per avvalorare un concetto pragmatico di verità, intesa come risultante del fecondo incontro di prospettive diverse all’interno di un ambito discorsivo: essa consisterebbe quindi nella coerenza di un costrutto linguistico all’interno di un contesto specifico, priva di ogni validità intrinseca, ma risultante dall’armonizzazione di prospettive differenti,.
Ma è soltanto questo ciò che intende il «prospettivismo» nietzschano, una forma di innocuo scetticismo liberaldemocratico? Non somiglia forse questo gioco delle opinioni al mondo dell’indifferenza e dell’uguaglianza cui accenna Zarathustra parlando dell’ultimo uomo? Come cercheremo di mostrare, più che un relativismo epistemico o un’idea pragmatica del linguaggio, l’idea di prospettivismo esige il passaggio dal problema della verità a quello del valore: il concetto di verità si dimostra infatti, ad un’analisi genealogica, risultato di un bisogno di porre valori e, solo in questo senso, criterio per la determinazione di quest’ultimi. Nietzsche afferma più volte come essi non siano altro che espressione di forze, di bisogni, di volontà di potenza: se allora ogni prospettiva esprime una forza – la quale opera al di là dell’orizzonte epistemico, determinandone l’impulso – la questione centrale deve spostarsi dallo statuto della verità alla determinazione della potenza. Questo comporta la necessità di pensare in modo unitario la dottrina della volontà di potenza e il lavoro genealogico, in un’operazione di ribaltamento del platonismo che fa della materialità degli impulsi e dei bisogni il piano su cui si innesta l’umana volontà di sapere. Nel mio intervento cercherò di mostrare la centralità del concetto di forza del prospettivismo nietzschiano per depurarlo da ogni relativismo epistemico, per un Nietzsche liberato dal vizio dell’«ultimo uomo».

The aim of our contribution is to enlighten the meaning of the concept of the praxis in Adorno's work: the transition to praxis is the consequence of a double recognition in his philosophical activity. On the one hand, the impossibility for philosophy to grasp the totality of reality in the thought; on the other, the recognition of the philosophical pre-emincence of contents over form. The first point is bounded to the second one, but in order to understand this constellation of concepts we have to analyze the two moments separately. The analysis will lead us to understand the reciprocity between the so called Übergang zur Praxis and the pre-eminence of content.

Our aim in this contribution is to analize the Adornian position toward the hegelian concept of system and, more precisely, to show how his attitude toward systematic thought does not end in a rough critic of it: the dialectical and immanent critic made by Adorno, on one hand, tries to enlight the moment of truth within the positive Totality in the Hegelian system – in particular in the parts about the Philosophie des Rechts and the Geschichtsphilosophie. On the other hand, the comparison between the current systematic claim of the positivistic positions and the dialectical structure of the hegelian system, leads Adorno to the formulation of a new critical procedure: the one of the model and the constellation. We will try to show how the antisystematic thought of Adorno always maintains a negative concept of totality, in a constant comparison with Hegel; and how his negative attitude to the systematic thought can be read as a radicalization of the hegelian thought and not simply as a critic to it. Point of departure of our discussion is a quotation from Adornos " Aspekte hegels Philosphie " : " Die Analyse des absoluten Subjekt muß die Unauflöslichkeit eines empirischen, nichtidentischen Moments daran anerkennen, das die Lehren vom absoluten Subjekt, die idealistischen Identitätssysteme als unauflöslich nicht anerkennen dürfen. Insofern ist Hegels Philosophie nach dem Richtspruch ihres eigenes Begriffs unwahr. Wieso aber ist sie dann doch wahr? " (Ivi, p. 28). In this statement we find, I think, the core of the adornian attitude towards Hegels philosopy. The Idealistic hypostasis of a non residual identity between subject and object sentences the fail of the system, its immanent falsity: as Adorno expresses it in the Negative Dialektik: " cosed System, rougly expressed, are fertig, ruined ". Unfaithful to his own effort to build up a dinamic totality, to articulate a dinamic concept of truth, Hegel chooses to constitute a self closing system: but " if we want the system fully closed [...] than, as a positive infinity it becomes finite, static, even though it is conceived dynamically " (Adorno, dialettica negativa, p. 27). To understand properly where lays the lack of theoretical coherence in Hegel system, why the system in its conclusiveness betrays his own concept of truth, we have to put in into relationship the hegelian idea of truth with the place of its development: that is " was ohne je sich dingfest machen zu lassen, die gesamte Hegelshe Philosophie durchherrscht. Das ist der Geist ". The idea of Geist is what articulates the concept of substance as a subject, the truth as a movement: even though Hegel always formally maintains the dinamic concept of the truth, when he reduces the particular, in the stream of the universal History, only as a mean for it, he abandones the strong concept of Geist he once has defined as a processual stream, moved under the pressure of the negative. As Hegel in the Phaenomenologie asserts: " Er (der Geist) gewinnt seine Wahrheit nur, indem er in der absoluten Zerrissenheit sich selbst findet ". Much more, the Geist " ist diese Macht nur, indem er dem Negativen ins Angesicht shaut, bei ihm verweilt " (Hegel, Ph.d.G. p. 29). Whilst in the late lessons about the rationality of History, the aim of the philosophical effort assumes the character of a theodicy " which can be reached only trhough the knowledge of the positive, in wich this negative element solve itself as something subordinated and sublated [...] rejected by the thinking reason, wich want a positive end " (Hegel, Lezioni filosofia della storia, p. 30). Comparing these two quotations, we can test all the difference between their statement of the problem. While in the Phaenomenologie the concept of truth radically assumes on itself the principle of the adeguatio rei atque cogitationis, up to innervates of a radically temporal dialectic, immanent to the thing itself, the same veritative process, in the late systematic hardening the universal spirit of the history is described as " eternally with itself; is what has no past, wich, always identical, endure in its force and power " (ibidem, p. 13). Even the truth of history is described, paradoxically, as something non historical. The adornian position toward this problem tends to radicalize the first attitude in order to develop the hegelian dialectical method " gegen " the hardening of its late speculation: but, more than an abstract critic to the identity principle, the interest in the adornian interpretation lays on the ambivalent value he accords to this hardening. Far from being simply a mistake in the hegelian philosophy, the positive assertion of the Identity of subject and object in the absolute Geist is the last attempt to conciliate in the thought the social contraddictions of the capitalistic society: the hegelian attempt to close the system in a conciliated wholeness shows not simply the incoherence of this totality with its own concept, but, negatively,

Il contributo affronta lo Zauberberg di Thomas Mann e la figura del suo protagonista a partire dalla figura romantica del genio artistico, mostrando come in tale categoria sociologica ed estetica si intersechino elementi di radicalizzazione e di critica dell'ideologia borghese. L'interpretazione che viene avanzata dell'episodio dello Schneetraum chiarisce in che senso il genio artistico porti alla luce il rimosso della società borghese, proprio nel momento in cui ne immagina la realizzazione compiuta.

Nietzsches interest in economics in his late posthumous production can be seen as an attempt to provide his project of a "Transvaluation of value" with a logical, scientific and sociological framework, able to solve some problem of the evolution theory and to link natural and social events in a unique process. We are going to interpret Nihilism, Eternal recurrence and God-Death within this framework as cardinal concepts able to interpret the metaphysical bedrock of the present time, i.e. the epoch of the full extension of the capitalist mode of production and his supremacy over the whole globe.