Mark Tessler

The one-state reality has dramatically changed the discursive landscape of the movement of Israeli settlers and their supporters who have waged a half century campaign to prevent territorial compromise as a basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Analysis of the discourse of the Sovereignty movement, as reflected in the pages of its journal, Ribonut, traces these changes and highlights the new challenges posed to the annexationist project by the prospect of the attainability of its goals and the necessity to confront the “Arab problem.”

Institutional frameworks powerfully determine the goals, violence, and trajectories of identitarian movements—including secessionist movements. However, both small-Nand large-Nresearchers disagree on the question of whether “power-sharing” arrangements, instead of repression, are more or less likely to mitigate threats of secessionist mobilizations by disaffected, regionally concentrated minority groups. The PS-I modeling platform was used to create a virtual country “Beita,” containing within it a disaffected, partially controlled, regionally concentrated minority. Drawing on constructivist identity theory to determine behaviors by individual agents in Beita, the most popular theoretical positions on this issue were tested. Data were drawn from batches of hundreds of Beita histories produced under rigorous experimental conditions. The results lend support to sophisticated interpretations of the effects of repression vs. responsive or representative types of power-sharing. Although ...

Emphasizing the importance of temporal considerations, as discussed in this volume’s introductory chapter, the present chapter summarizes the circumstances of Israel’s Arab citizens in the 1970s and reviews the historical trajectory of experience and reaction that brought them to the situation and to the challenges they faced at that time. The discussion of these challenges includes consideration of the actions of, and the relationships with, the Israeli state. Particular attention is given to the tying of Israel’s national identity and political mission to the religion of the country’s Jewish majority, which makes Israel’s Arab citizens a religious minority in a Non-Secular state, as this minority group type is described and defined in the introductory chapter. The results of the historical trajectory of Israel’s Arab citizens and of this minority’s unavoidably inferior political status are discussed with respect to economic underdevelopment, land alienation, constraints on political mobilization, and continuity and change in social and cultural orientations.

What prolonged implications does conflict escalation have on voting behavior? The literature focuses primarily on the immediate effect of violent events on voting in nearby elections, leaving open questions about longer-term consequences. This article examines this question by studying Israel, where violent escalation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the early 2000s was followed by an unexpected electoral outcome: the emergence and consolidation of a new centrist bloc that transformed a longstanding Left-Right partisan divide into a three-bloc system. Using two decades of survey data, it is argued that this shift is best explained by a long-term attitudinal change toward the conflict by many Israelis after the escalation. Rather than a strictly hawkish shift, many voters have become ‘Doubtful Doves’: supportive of territorial compromise in principle, but skeptical about reaching an agreement with the Palestinians in practice. This underdiscussed attitudinal structure, dovish but doubtful, has formed a new electoral base for centrist parties, breaking the traditional Left-Right dichotomy. These findings illustrate that violent periods in conflicts can cause non-trivial long-term changes in popular attitude structures and voting patterns, which, under the right conditions, can trigger electoral re-equilibration.

Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel are religious minorities in non-secular states. This minority group status defined the circumstances of the three communities in the early and mid-1970s, when the research on which the chapters in this volume are based was carried out. Reengaging with these research reports in late 2018 and the first half of 2019, as he brought them together for publication in the present volume, the author reflected on the present-day circumstances of the three minorities and on the salience and significance of the analytical categories, regional trends, and normative orientations that guided his research more than four decades earlier. This concluding chapter presents these reflections. These include the author’s observations about the utility and staying power of religious minority in a non-secular state as a minority group type, about whether the place of Islam and Judaism in political affairs continues to bring a rejection of secularism by states in the Middle East and North Africa, about whether and in what way the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has impacted the circumstances of Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel, and, finally, about what all this means for the present-day circumstances and significance of the three minorities.

After a brief review of the history of Jews in North Africa, including Jews in Algeria, the chapter picks up the concern for minority group type discussed in the introductory chapter. Jews in both Tunisia and Morocco are religious minorities in non-secular states, and in the early and mid-1970s, they were similar in other ways as well. But they were also different in important respects, including size, complexity, organizational strength, and the ideology and priorities of the host country government. Even though both minority groups were small and vulnerable at the time of the research reported in this chapter, these differences reflected substantially greater weakness and vulnerability on the part of the Jewish community in Tunisia. Compared to the community of Jews in Morocco, the one in Tunisia was in a much greater state of demographic dislocation and institutional decay. Against this background, the chapter then investigates the explanatory significance of attributes with respect to which the two religious minorities differ, in effect holding minority group type constant while considering whether or not variation in demographic dislocation and institutional decay accounts for variance in areas of communal importance. Presenting findings from public opinion surveys, particular attention is given to the views about Arab-Islamic culture and about the host society held by Jews in Tunisia and Jews in Morocco and, within each community, by Jews in different demographic categories. The survey data show notable attitudinal differences both between the two Jewish communities and within each as a function of age and education. The chapter concludes with reflections on the future of the two North African Jewish communities.

The chapters brought together in this volume present findings from research that was carried out in the early and mid-1970s among the Jewish minorities in Tunisia and Morocco and the Arab minority in Israel. Detailed accounts of the characteristics and circumstances of the three minorities at that time, and of the response of each community to these circumstances, are presented in half—the second half—of the chapters in this volume. These chapters, of which there are seven, are in Part III and Part IV, with Part III focusing on the Jewish minorities in Tunisia and Morocco and Part IV focusing on Israel’s Arab minority. More specifically, in the case of all three minorities, these chapters focus on the attributes and actions of the groups themselves, on the nature and impact of relevant “host” country actions and policies—the host country being that of which the minority’s members were citizens at the time of the research—and on what all this meant for the political, economic, and social life of each minority group. Readers with a particular interest in one or more of the three minorities, and especially in their individual or respective lived experience during a period marked by important transitions, will find instructive descriptive information in these chapters.

Preface to the Second Edition Preface A Note on Transliteration Part I. Jews and Arabs Before the Conflict: The Congruent Origins of Modern Zionism and Arab Nationalism 1. Jewish History and the Emergence of Modern Political Zionism 2. Arab History and the Origins of Nationalism in the Arab World Part II. Emergence and History of the Conflict to 1948 3. The Conflict Takes Shape 4. The Dual Society in Mandatory Palestine Part III. Routinization of the Conflict, 1948-1967 5. The Palestinian Disaster and Basic Issues after 1948 6. Israel and the Arab States through June 1967 Part IV. The Palestinian Dimension Reemerges: From the June War through Camp David 7. Postwar Diplomacy and the Rise of the Palestine Resistance Movement 8. Israel, the Palestinians, and the Occupied Territories in the 1970s Part V. The High Price of Stalemate and Futile Diplomacy in the 1980s 9. Violent Confrontations in the Early 1980s 10. Futile Diplomacy in the Mid-1980s Part VI. Efforts to Break the Stalemate: From the Intifada through the Oslo Peace Process 11. The Intifada and Beyond 12. The Oslo Peace Process Epilogue: The Post-Oslo Period

Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel are religious minorities in non-secular states. This minority group status defined the circumstances of the three communities in the early and mid-1970s, when the research on which the chapters in this volume are based was carried out. Reengaging with these research reports in late 2018 and the first half of 2019, as he brought them together for publication in the present volume, the author reflected on the present-day circumstances of the three minorities and on the salience and significance of the analytical categories, regional trends, and normative orientations that guided his research more than four decades earlier. This concluding chapter presents these reflections. These include the author’s observations about the utility and staying power of religious minority in a non-secular state as a minority group type, about whether the place of Islam and Judaism in political affairs continues to bring a rejection of secularism by states ...

After a brief review of the history of Jews in North Africa, including Jews in Algeria, the chapter picks up the concern for minority group type discussed in the introductory chapter. Jews in both Tunisia and Morocco are religious minorities in non-secular states, and in the early and mid-1970s, they were similar in other ways as well. But they were also different in important respects, including size, complexity, organizational strength, and the ideology and priorities of the host country government. Even though both minority groups were small and vulnerable at the time of the research reported in this chapter, these differences reflected substantially greater weakness and vulnerability on the part of the Jewish community in Tunisia. Compared to the community of Jews in Morocco, the one in Tunisia was in a much greater state of demographic dislocation and institutional decay. Against this background, the chapter then investigates the explanatory significance of attributes with resp...

Emphasizing the importance of temporal considerations, as discussed in this volume’s introductory chapter, the present chapter summarizes the circumstances of Israel’s Arab citizens in the 1970s and reviews the historical trajectory of experience and reaction that brought them to the situation and to the challenges they faced at that time. The discussion of these challenges includes consideration of the actions of, and the relationships with, the Israeli state. Particular attention is given to the tying of Israel’s national identity and political mission to the religion of the country’s Jewish majority, which makes Israel’s Arab citizens a religious minority in a Non-Secular state, as this minority group type is described and defined in the introductory chapter. The results of the historical trajectory of Israel’s Arab citizens and of this minority’s unavoidably inferior political status are discussed with respect to economic underdevelopment, land alienation, constraints on politic...

The Future of International War: Global Trends and Middle Eastern Implications/James Lee Ray Democracy and Deterrence/Jo-Anne Hart A Search for Security and Governance Regimes/I. William Zartman Democracy in the Third World: Definitional Dilemmas/Robert L. Rothstein Arab and Western Conceptions of Democracy: Evidence from a UAE Opinion Survey/Jamal Al-Suwaidi Islam and Democracy/Shukri B. Abed Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli Conflict/Mark Tessler and Marilyn Grobschmidt Domestic Political Violence, Structural Constraints, and Enduring Rivalries in the Middle East, 1948ETH1988/Zeev Maoz Democracy and Foreign Policy in the Arab World/Michael C. Hudson Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Egypt/Ann M. Lesch Democracy among the Palestinians/Emile F. Sahliyeh Israel and the Liberalization of Arab Regimes/Gabriel Sheffer

... women are simply more inclined to rely on broadcast media for news and information ... in television viewing and attitudes towards Western music is much more profound among younger Moroccans ... the latter defined more broadly than the topics of media consumption and musical ...

... interviewer in 1989 by a Jewish resident of Kiryat Arba, a large Israeli settlement near Hebron. ... For example, a March 1989 survey conducted for the New York Times by the Hanoch Smith Research Center in Jerusalem found that 54 percent of all Israelis would be willing to give ...

This paper provides partial summaries of two interrelated works that use survey data to map and explain the views held by Middle Eastern publics about the role Islam should play in government and political affairs. The first part introduces and presents recent data from the Arab Barometer. It examines trends across the region, as well as in individual countries, and it both offers and invites reflection about some of the regional and country-specific dynamics that may account for observed patterns. The second part uses a more inclusive dataset and presents some of the results of regression analyses that test hypotheses in which support for political Islam is the dependent variable. Findings are mapped across both demographic categories and county-level characteristics and, again, reflection is invited about the mechanisms and pathways to which the findings may call attention. In both cases, only selected findings will be presented, the goal being not only to introduce the projects and solicit feedback and interpretative insights but also to indicate the availability of two datasets that are now in the public domain.

Who Supports Political Islam and Why? An Individual-Level and Country-Level Analysis Based on Data from 56 Surveys in 15 Muslim-Majority Countries in the Middle East and North Africa Background and Significance Islam today occupies a central place in discussions and debates about governance in the Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, whether, to what extent, and in what ways Islamic institutions, officials and laws should play a central role, or at least an important role, in government and political affairs are among the most important, and also the most contested, questions pertaining to governance in the region at the present time. As Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, wrote in April 2011 in connection with the democratic transition struggling at the time to take shape in his country, Islamist groups can no longer be excluded from political life but neither does one group speak for Islam nor should the nation's religious heritage interfere with the civil nature of its political processes. Thus, he concluded, Egypt's revolution has swept away decades of authoritarian rule but it has also “highlighted an issue that Egyptians will grapple with as they consolidate their democracy: the role of religion in political life.” Concerns about the place of Islam in political affairs, and about the relationship between democracy and Islam, are equally important elsewhere in the region. The Secretary General of Tunisia's Islamist al-Nahda Party, Hamadi Jebali, described the political challenges facing his country in a May 2011 public lecture and asked, “What kind of Democracy for the New Tunisia: Islamic or Secular?” And again, about the same time, an Iraqi constitutional lawyer and media personality, Tariq Harb, wrote that a central element in the struggle to define his country's political future is the question of how “to balance religion and secularism.” These and many similar statements addressed to the question of Islam's role in government and political affairs were made against the background of political transitions set in motion by the spontaneous and frequently massive popular uprisings that shook the Arab world at the end of 2010 and the first months of 2011 – events popularly known at the time as the Arab Spring. Initially in Egypt and Tunisia, but soon elsewhere as well, most notably in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and Libya but also in other countries, protesters came into the streets and public squares to express their anger at decades of what they believed to be misrule by governing regimes that were authoritarian, corrupt, and concerned only with their own privilege and that of their friends. Islamist parties and movements were not in the forefront of these uprisings, although in at least some countries they were involved, sometime heavily, in subsequent political developments. But the questions raised at the time by Gomaa, Jebali, Harb and many others were not only, or not primarily, about the political space that should or should not be given to Islamist movements. These questions were deeper and more fundamental, and they were not new even if possibility of a political transition gave them increased salience and greater urgency in some countries. At most, the uprisings and possibilities for a political transition intensified long-standing and largely unresolved debates about whether, how, and to what extent a country with an overwhelmingly Muslim population should be ruled by a government and legal system that are in some significant way meaningfully Islamic. Hypotheses and Analyses It is against this background that my study focuses on the perceptions, judgments and preferences of ordinary citizens about the role that Islam should play in government and political affairs. Drawing on a new dataset constructed by the merging of 56 nationally representative public opinion surveys carried out between 1988 and 2014, I test hypotheses about the explanatory power in shaping attitudes toward political Islam of (1) cultural values, such as those pertaining to the status and rights of women; (2) political evaluations, specifically those concerning the legitimacy and performance of the government in power; (3) economic factors, specifically the degree to which the economic circumstances of the individual are advantageous or disadvantageous; and (4) information and exposure, particularly the variation in the learning experiences associated with education. Judgment about political Islam is the dependent variable in the regression analyses by which these hypothesis and the causal stories associated with each are tested. The analysis includes control variables, including, and particularly, personal religiosity. Although the data are pooled in the initial analyses, they are subsequently disaggregated by gender and age, taken in combination, in order to see if whether or not each hypothesis and the associated causal story has more explanatory power among some subsets of the population…

The socialization literature has examined whether indi- viduals who pass through their formative years during definable historical eras constitute political generations characterized by shared dispositions or collective memories that outlast the eras themselves. Drawing upon 1995 public opinion data from Algeria, we ask whether political genera- tions are discernible in a non-Western society in which the government and politics have undergone fundamental transformations in character and normative orientation. We find evidence that shared attitudes char- acterize Algerians who came of age during the regime of President Houari Boumedienne-a stable 13-year period from 1965 to 1978 marked by centralized political leadership, low grassroots political participation, and state-led socialism. Other cohorts are not similarly distinguishable, however, nor does the Boumedienne cohort differ from others with respect to a number of political, economic, and cultural orientations. Like other studies, this research indicates that some historical periods produce durable generation effects while others do not and that some attitudes acquired during the formative years of late adolescence and early adulthood persist over time while others do not.

... the Impact of religious Orientations on attitudes toward democracy in Four arab Countries (2002) / Mark teSSler 56 4. Political Generations in developing Countries: evidence and Insights from algeria (2004) / Mark teSSler, CarrIe kOnOld, and MeGan reIF 74 5. the democracy ...

... PPP SDFLP 60' PFLP [-- FIDA "Nationalist 4Independents ... Time of Poll Note: Lesftist Factions include PPP, PFLP, and DFLP. Islamic Factions include Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Independents. Nationalist Independents include Nationalist Independents and FIDA. Page 4. ...

The Israeli election of 1977 has been described as an "earthquake election."1 It brought to power the Likud Union headed by Menachem Begin, which until a few years before had been regarded by most observers as posing little threat to the political preeminence of Israel's Labor Alignment.2 Every government coalition since the Jewish state's independence in 1948 had been dominated by Labor. As recently as 1969, Likud's institutional predecessor, Gahal, had won only 26 seats in elections for the country's 120-member parliament, or Knesset. By contrast, the Labor Alignment won 56 seats in the 1969 elections. Thus the Likud victory of 1977, which took most observers by surprise, shook the political landscape. Moreover, although Labor was weakened by a number of internal crises in 1977, it became clear within a few years that the rise of Likud was not a temporary aberration. Likud repeated its electoral victory in 1981 and very nearly did so again in 1984. Another important change that took place about this time concerned Israel's religious parties, most notably the National Religious party (NRP), also known by its Hebrew acronym Mafdal. The NRP had since 1948 been a consistent partner in government coalitions led by Labor and, in this context, it had routinely given support to Labor's foreign and economic policies in return for concessions on matters of religious observance. Indeed, the alliance between Labor and the religious movement out of

يمثل هذا التقرير الموجز أبرز نقاط المسح الشامل لعام 2012 ،وهو المسح الثالث في سلسلة المسوح الشاملة التي نفذها معهد البحوث الاجتماعية والاقتصادية المسحية بجامعة قطر. حيث يتم في المسوح الشاملة إجراء مقابلات مع عينة ممثلة لشرائح واسعة من المواطنين القطريين والمقيمين والعمال. وقد تم من خلال المسح الشامل لعام 2012 جمع معلومات قيمة عن الإحصائيات السكانية كما تم طرح أسئلة حول عدد من القضايا المهمة للمجتمع القطري، إذ وجهت أسئلة للمستجيبين حول آرائهم ونشاطاتهم المتعلقة بتربية الأطفال، والتبرعات الخيرية، والسياسة، وقضايا اجتماعية، ووسائل الإعلام والعمال الوافدين. وتم التأكيد للمستجيبين بأن إجاباتهم ستحظى بالسرية التامة.

The socialization literature has examined whether indi- viduals who pass through their formative years during definable historical eras constitute political generations characterized by shared dispositions or collective memories that outlast the eras themselves. Drawing upon 1995 public opinion data from Algeria, we ask whether political genera- tions are discernible in a non-Western society in which the government and politics have