- Social Theory, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Economics (Philosophy), Social Research Methods and Methodology, General Philosophy of Science, Politics of Science, and 11 moreSocial Epistemology, Economics of Science, Sociology of Science, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy, Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science, Values in Science, Scientific explanation, Democratic Theory, Epistemology of the Social Sciences, and Science and Technology Studiesedit
- see: https://sites.google.com/view/jeroen-van-bouwel/homeedit
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Contents: Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences and Democracy; J.Van Bouwel PART I: DEMOCRATIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: BALANCING EXPERTISE AND DIALOGUE Social Sciences and the Democratic... more
Contents:
Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences and Democracy; J.Van Bouwel
PART I: DEMOCRATIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: BALANCING EXPERTISE AND DIALOGUE
Social Sciences and the Democratic Ideal: From Technocracy to Dialogue; P.Baert, H.Mateus Jerónimo& A.Shipman
Stakeholders or Experts? On the Ambiguous Implications of Public Participation in Science; S.Solomon
Scientific Knowledge: A Stakeholder Theory; K.Rolin
PART II: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
Improving Democratic Practice: Practical Social Science and Normative Ideals; J.Bohman
Fact and Value in Democratic Theory; H.Kincaid
PART III: DEMOCRATIC THEORY ELUCIDATING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Problem With(Out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism; J.Van Bouwel
Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science - Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies; A.Bouvier
PART IV: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Public Sociology and Democratic Theory; S.P.Turner
Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy; E.Weber
Some Economists Rush to Rescue Science From Politics, Only to Discover in Their Haste, They Went to the Wrong Address; P.Mirowski
PART V: (FUTURE) OBSTACLES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEMOCRACY
Fuller and Mirowski on the Commercialization of Scientific Knowledge; F.Remedios
Humanity: The Always Already – or Never to be – Object of the Social Sciences?; S.Fuller
Index
Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet: An Introduction to the Social Sciences and Democracy; J.Van Bouwel
PART I: DEMOCRATIZING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: BALANCING EXPERTISE AND DIALOGUE
Social Sciences and the Democratic Ideal: From Technocracy to Dialogue; P.Baert, H.Mateus Jerónimo& A.Shipman
Stakeholders or Experts? On the Ambiguous Implications of Public Participation in Science; S.Solomon
Scientific Knowledge: A Stakeholder Theory; K.Rolin
PART II: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
Improving Democratic Practice: Practical Social Science and Normative Ideals; J.Bohman
Fact and Value in Democratic Theory; H.Kincaid
PART III: DEMOCRATIC THEORY ELUCIDATING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Problem With(Out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism; J.Van Bouwel
Joint Commitment, Coercion and Freedom in Science - Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies; A.Bouvier
PART IV: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Public Sociology and Democratic Theory; S.P.Turner
Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy; E.Weber
Some Economists Rush to Rescue Science From Politics, Only to Discover in Their Haste, They Went to the Wrong Address; P.Mirowski
PART V: (FUTURE) OBSTACLES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEMOCRACY
Fuller and Mirowski on the Commercialization of Scientific Knowledge; F.Remedios
Humanity: The Always Already – or Never to be – Object of the Social Sciences?; S.Fuller
Index
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science, Social Research Methods and Methodology, and 14 morePolitical Theory, Computer Networks, Political Science, Democratization, Collective Action, Deliberative Democracy, Philosophy of Social Science, Democracy, Social and Political Philosophy, Economics of Science, Databases, Software, Science and Democracy, and Science and Technology Studies
Research Interests: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Social Research Methods and Methodology, Research Methods and Methodology, History of Science, and 8 moreHistory of Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Social Science, Explanation, Causality, Scientific explanation, All sciences, Methods of explanation and reasoning in social sciences, and History of Philosophy
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PhD Thesis, Ghent University.
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In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accounts of action. A genuine causal explanation of intentional action must track how people actually deliberate to arrive at action. And,... more
In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accounts of action. A genuine causal explanation of intentional action must track how people actually deliberate to arrive at action. And, deliberation is necessarily enculturated or situated “. . . we take human agents to reason their way to action, using the concepts that are available to them in the currency of their culture” (p. 220). When deciding how to act, “. . . people find their way to action in response to properties that they register in the options before them, properties that are valued in common with others and that can be invoked to provide at least some justification of their choices” (p. 272). That people seek to make justified decisions implies that, at times, their own goals or objectives will be modified in deliberation. Something that rational choice theory cannot allow.
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Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2003. “When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy.” Philosophica (gent) 71: 81–98. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2003). When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the... more
Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2003. “When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy.” Philosophica (gent) 71: 81–98. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2003). When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. PHILOSOPHICA (GENT), 71, 81–98. ... Van Bouwel J. When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. PHILOSOPHICA (GENT). 2003;71:81–98. ... Van Bouwel, Jeroen. “When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy.” PHILOSOPHICA ...
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"Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009,... more
"Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways.
Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined."
Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined."
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Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2009. “The Problem With(out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism.” In The Social Sciences and Democracy, ed. Jeroen Van Bouwel, 121–142. Palgrave Macmillan. ... Van... more
Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2009. “The Problem With(out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism.” In The Social Sciences and Democracy, ed. Jeroen Van Bouwel, 121–142. Palgrave Macmillan. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2009). The problem with(out) consensus: The scientific consensus, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism. In J. Van Bouwel (Ed.), The Social Sciences and Democracy (pp. 121–142). Palgrave Macmillan. ... Van Bouwel J. The problem with(out) consensus: The scientific consensus, deliberative ...
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In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field... more
In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty & Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.
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In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats... more
In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies, we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy. Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and democratic modulation—three aspirations that are at the heart of most pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and process in science and technology.
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Research Interests: Sociology, Social Theory, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Social Research Methods and Methodology, and 13 morePhilosophy of Social Science, Sociological Theory, Individualism, Pluralism, Holism, Epistemology of the Social Sciences, Structure and Agency, Scientific explanation, Dialectics, Methodological Individualism, Explanatory Coexistence, Sociological Theories, and Explanatory Pluralism
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Commenting on recent articles by Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle, the author questions the way in which the debate between methodological individualists and holists has been presented and contends that too much weight has been given to... more
Commenting on recent articles by Keith Sawyer and Julie Zahle, the author questions the way in which the debate between methodological individualists and holists has been presented and contends that too much weight has been given to metaphysical and ontological debates at the expense of giving attention to methodological debates and analysis of good explanatory practice. Giving more attention to successful explanatory practice in the social sciences and the different underlying epistemic interests and motivations for providing explanations or reducing theories (which ask for different kinds of explanatory information to be found on the social or on the individual level) might lead to real progress in the debate on methodological individualism, and away from the unending battles of (metaphysical) intuitions.
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Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than... more
Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.
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The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for... more
The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution.
In this chapter, I want to analyze the narrator’s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.
In this chapter, I want to analyze the narrator’s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.
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Van Bouwel, Jeroen, and Erik Weber. 2011. “Explanation in the Social Sciences.” In The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, ed. Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora-Bonilla, 633–646. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage. ... Van Bouwel, J.,... more
Van Bouwel, Jeroen, and Erik Weber. 2011. “Explanation in the Social Sciences.” In The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, ed. Ian Jarvie and Jesus Zamora-Bonilla, 633–646. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage. ... Van Bouwel, J., & Weber, E. (2011). Explanation in the social sciences. In I. Jarvie & J. Zamora-Bonilla (Eds.), The sage handbook of the philosophy of social sciences (pp. 633–646). Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage. ... Van Bouwel J, Weber E. Explanation in the social sciences. In: Jarvie I, Zamora-Bonilla J, editors. The sage ...
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Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on... more
Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with “anything goes”: we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.
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Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of... more
Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of heterodoxy, Tony Lawson. This scrutiny will focus on Lawson’s alternatives concerning ontology and explanation to mainstream economics. Subsequently, I will raise some doubts about Lawson’s pluralism, and identify questions that will have to be addressed by heterodox economists in order to maintain the claim of pluralism.
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In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social... more
In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social scientists—and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.
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In this paper, we show that the so-called “green cheese” and “red herring” problems, which have been raised in connection to Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of scientific explanation, lead to two theoretical (or epistemological) tasks... more
In this paper, we show that the so-called “green cheese” and “red herring” problems, which have been raised in connection to Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of scientific explanation, lead to two theoretical (or epistemological) tasks for philosophers of science and two practical (or methodological) tasks. After clarifying these tasks we argue that the theoretical tasks are extremely difficult. We are pessimistic about their accomplishment and motivate this. The practical/methodological tasks are easier to handle, and we make some substantial contributions with respect to these tasks. Finally, we compare our practical/methodological results to Kareem Khalifa’s hands-on contextualism.
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This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then... more
This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.
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Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of... more
Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.
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Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to... more
Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in
favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
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Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical... more
Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer’s use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.
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Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide... more
Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level.
The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism.
This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.
The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism.
This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.
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We defend a pragmatic approach in the philosophy of causation and explanation. Our approach is grounded in the more general pragmatic stance that we take towards the goals of the sciences. By means of our pragmatic view on explanation and... more
We defend a pragmatic approach in the philosophy of causation and explanation. Our approach is grounded in the more general pragmatic stance that we take towards the goals of the sciences. By means of our pragmatic view on explanation and causal reasoning we primarily want to do justice to the diversity in scientific practice. We show how this approach leads us to the defence of explanatory and causal pluralism. We further argue that a pragmatic approach, at least in the philosophy of causation and explanation, can lead to knowledge that is better achievable, more interesting, and more useful for practice, in comparison with the traditional approach which is routed in monistic presuppositions and which denies the diversity of scientific practice.
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In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations... more
In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.
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Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than... more
Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.
Research Interests:
In this article we defend the view that the criteria by which the explanatory power of causal explanations is to be judged, are context-dependent. Explanation-seeking questions (even if we confine ourselves to causal explanations) can... more
In this article we defend the view that the criteria by which the explanatory power of causal explanations is to be judged, are context-dependent. Explanation-seeking questions (even if we
confine ourselves to causal explanations) can have different motivations. The criteria for explanatory power depend on the motivation. We will argue that:(1) in most contexts, a posteriori
probability is important; (2) explanatory depth (going back further and further in time) is relevant in only one context; (3) in most contexts, there is an extra criterion (e.g. familiarity or manipulability). Though we will have several criteria for explanatory power, unification is not among them. We will motivate this absence in a separate section.
confine ourselves to causal explanations) can have different motivations. The criteria for explanatory power depend on the motivation. We will argue that:(1) in most contexts, a posteriori
probability is important; (2) explanatory depth (going back further and further in time) is relevant in only one context; (3) in most contexts, there is an extra criterion (e.g. familiarity or manipulability). Though we will have several criteria for explanatory power, unification is not among them. We will motivate this absence in a separate section.
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Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2008. “Explanatory Pluralism.” In Pluralist Economics, ed. Edward Fullbrook, 151–170. London: Zed Books. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2008). Explanatory Pluralism. In E. Fullbrook (Ed.), Pluralist Economics (pp. 151–170).... more
Van Bouwel, Jeroen. 2008. “Explanatory Pluralism.” In Pluralist Economics, ed. Edward Fullbrook, 151–170. London: Zed Books. ... Van Bouwel, J. (2008). Explanatory Pluralism. In E. Fullbrook (Ed.), Pluralist Economics (pp. 151–170). London: Zed Books. ... Van Bouwel J. Explanatory Pluralism. In: Fullbrook E, editor. Pluralist Economics. London: Zed Books; 2008. p. 151–70. ... Van Bouwel, Jeroen. “Explanatory Pluralism.” Pluralist Economics. Ed. Edward Fullbrook. London: Zed Books, 2008. 151–170. Print.
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Amidst both philosophers of science and social scientists one finds people defending the thesis that explanations of particular facts should refer to proximate causes (ie remote causes are no good at all), or that explanations referring... more
Amidst both philosophers of science and social scientists one finds people defending the thesis that explanations of particular facts should refer to proximate causes (ie remote causes are no good at all), or that explanations referring to remote causes are inferior to explanations that invoke proximate causes. This point of view is defended by eg Jon Elster (1983: 28):“Both probabilistic models and models involving remote temporal action reflect our ignorance of the local deterministic causality assumed to be operating.” So any ...
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Résumé/Abstract En réponse à un article de J. Lachapelle consacré à «l'évolution culturelle,(au) réductionnisme dans les sciences sociales, et (au) pluralisme explicatif», l'A.... more
Résumé/Abstract En réponse à un article de J. Lachapelle consacré à «l'évolution culturelle,(au) réductionnisme dans les sciences sociales, et (au) pluralisme explicatif», l'A. critique la notion de réductionnisme ontologique, ainsi que les concepts de causalité et explication, définis par l'auteur, d'une part, mais reconnaît partager avec lui la thèse du pluralisme explicatif, d'autre part.
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Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories... more
Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in Sec. 2, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in Sec. 3, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and questiondriven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with ...
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In her contribution Pleas for Pluralism to this journal, Esther-Mirjam Sent (2003) suggests that the plea for pluralism, as found in many contributions to the post-autistic economics movement, has a strategic motivation. Although I tend... more
In her contribution Pleas for Pluralism to this journal, Esther-Mirjam Sent (2003) suggests that the plea for pluralism, as found in many contributions to the post-autistic economics movement, has a strategic motivation. Although I tend to agree that this is true of some contributions, it seems necessary to spell out the non-strategic motivations by which one can defend plurality and pluralism before we evaluate whether (heterodox) contributions are not really pluralistic.
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L Upon a first encounter with the field of International Relations (IR) studies, we stumble into a plurality of theoretical perspectives some of which, such as realism and liberalism, have already been around for decades, while others,... more
L Upon a first encounter with the field of International Relations (IR) studies, we stumble into a plurality of theoretical perspectives some of which, such as realism and liberalism, have already been around for decades, while others, such as constructivism, are more recent. A recent survey among IR scholars working in the United States gives us a rough idea of the weight attached to these different perspectives. Answering the question “What paradigm in International Relations are you primarily committed to in your research?” 25 percent chose ...
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Abstract Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact re-lation between these two types of... more
Abstract Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact re-lation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
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In this paper, I analyse a controversy that is taking place within the (relatively young) discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). This very lively controversy was triggered by a paper of Benjamin J. Cohen (2007), which offers... more
In this paper, I analyse a controversy that is taking place within the (relatively young) discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). This very lively controversy was triggered by a paper of Benjamin J. Cohen (2007), which offers us a way of slicing up the field (a dichotomy of American versus British approaches to IPE) as well as a proposal for the future development of IPE as an academic discipline.
Abstract Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, eg, Unifying social science: A critical realist approach in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might... more
Abstract Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, eg, Unifying social science: A critical realist approach in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might unify social science. Secondly, I focus on the relation between the ontology and methodology of Critical Realism, and unveil the politics of metaphysics. Subsequently, it is argued that the division of labour between social scientific disciplines should not be metaphysics-driven, but rather question-driven.
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In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly... more
In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in
the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real
economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.
the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real
economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.