Matthew J. Brown
Southern Illinois University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Southern Illinois University, Center for Dewey Studies, Faculty MemberUniversity of Texas at Dallas, Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology, Faculty Memberadd
- Pragmatism, Feminist Philosophy of Science, Paul K. Feyerabend, John Dewey, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, and 36 moreSituated Cognition, Science and values, History of Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Psychology, American Philosophy, Distributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Philosophy of Technology, Edwin Hutchins, Applied Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Normative Epistemology, Epistemology, Philosophy, Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science, Values in Science, Politics of Science, Applied Ethics, Sociology of Science, Metaphilosophy, History of Philosophy, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Research Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Social Epistemology, Science and Technology Studies, Science Policy, Feminist Epistemology, History of Science, Charles S. Peirce, Thomas S. Kuhn, Embodied Mind and Cognition, and Climate Changeedit
- I am a Professor of Philosophy and the Jo Ann & Donald N. Boydston Chair of American Philosophy at Southern Illinois ... moreI am a Professor of Philosophy and the Jo Ann & Donald N. Boydston Chair of American Philosophy at Southern Illinois University (Carbondale); I am also the Director of the Center for Dewey Studies, which focuses both on the study of John Dewey’s life and works as well as carrying on the living legacy of John Dewey.
I received my Ph.D. in Philosophy in Spring 2009 at the University of California, San Diego. From 2009-2022, I taught at the University of Texas at Dallas, in philosophy, history, history of ideas, humanities, cognitive science, and emerging media and communication.
The main areas of my research and teaching are the history of philosophy, history and philosophy of science, and cognitive science. In the history of philosophy, I focus on the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly on the history and legacy of John Dewey and American pragmatism, as well as the history of philosophy of science. I also work on topics in history and philosophy of science including the role of values in science and engineering, the role and authority of science in politics and policymaking, feminist science, scientific evidence, models, objectivity, the social structure of science, climate science, the history of psychology and cognitive science, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, I am interested in contemporary theory and methods in cognitive science, particularly related to the emergence of theories of cognition called social, distributed, extended, etc. I conduct research using the methods of cognitive ethnography, especially to the study of laboratory research and education in science and engineering. I am also broadly interested in issues in the theoretical or philosophical foundations of psychology and cognitive science. I also do research and teach in the field of comics studies.edit
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that its assessment reports are "policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive." Here, we investigate the meaning of that statement and conclude... more
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that its assessment reports are "policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive." Here, we investigate the meaning of that statement and conclude that at least one of the components within the statement—the claim to policy-neutrality—is extremely misleading. Misunderstandings of this neutrality claim have resulted in harm to the IPCC’s efforts and image. In an effort to help the IPCC restore its credibility, we explore possible interpretations of "neutrality," expose likely sources of misunderstanding, and suggest a plausible way of interpreting the term that is both defensible as a goal and fits with the IPCC’s actual activities. Future science advising efforts should carefully choose how they present their aims, to avoid the confusions created by unfortunate connotations of "neutrality."
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There can be no doubt that John Dewey had a philosophical interest in science. The term appears in every volume of his 38-volume collected works, hundreds of times in each of many of them.1 However, looking at the last several decades of... more
There can be no doubt that John Dewey had a philosophical interest in science. The term appears in every volume of his 38-volume collected works, hundreds of times in each of many of them.1 However, looking at the last several decades of work by Dewey scholars, this interest seems like it must have been superficial, rather than a deep and significant feature of his body of work. Reading the contemporary literature on Dewey, or attending sessions at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, it seems clear that Dewey’s primary interests lie elsewhere—education, ethics, political philosophy, art, religion, naturalistic metaphysics. Though Dewey frequently discussed science, the scholarship would lead to to believe that he didn’t have much of a philosophy of science, or if he did, that it didn’t play much of a role in his philosophical oeuvre.
In the first part of this paper, I will sketch the main features of traditional models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I will then proceed to elaborate on an alternative... more
In the first part of this paper, I will sketch the main features of traditional models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I will then proceed to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, which I will call dynamic evidential functionalism. I will demonstrate its application to an illuminating example of scientific inquiry, and defend it from some likely objections. In the second part, I will use that alternative to solve a variety of classic and contemporary problems in the literature on scientific evidence having to do with the empirical basis of science and the use of evidence in public
This paper attempts to resolve a vexed interpretive problem for scholars of John Dewey’s logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science; namely, what is a “situation,” and what role does it play in Dewey’s theory of inquiry? I argue that... more
This paper attempts to resolve a vexed interpretive problem for scholars of John Dewey’s logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science; namely, what is a “situation,” and what role does it play in Dewey’s theory of inquiry? I argue that these questions properly belong to the history of logic as well as epistemology and philosophy of science, and that scholars who have ventured interpretations of these ideas, from Dewey’s contemporaries to today, have misunderstood Dewey’s ideas. I provide an alternative interpretation of Dewey’s “situation” concept and the situational theory of inquiry that makes use of it, and I briefly trace some implications of these interpretations for thinking about the philosophy of scientific inquiry in particular.
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This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist... more
This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the Pragmatists have interesting and innovative, pluralistic views that can be illuminated through the lens of perspectivism. I pursue this inquiry primarily through examining relevant sources from the Pragmatist tradition. I will illustrate productive engagements between pragmatism and perspectivism in three areas: in the pragmatists’ fallibilistic theories of inquiry and truth, in their pluralistic metaphysics, and in their views on cultural pluralism. While there are some potential sticking points between pragmatism and perspectivism, particularly around the visual metaphor of perspective, these philosophical approaches nonetheless have much to learn from each other. Perspectivism is in danger of falling b...
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Mary Parker Follett was a feminist-pragmatist American philosopher, a social-settlement worker, a founding figure in the community centers movement, a mediator of labor disputes, and a theorist of political and social organization and... more
Mary Parker Follett was a feminist-pragmatist American philosopher, a social-settlement worker, a founding figure in the community centers movement, a mediator of labor disputes, and a theorist of political and social organization and management. I argue that she is a model for a certain kind of public philosopher, and I unpack the respects in which she serves as such a model. I emphasize both her virtues as a public thinker and the role played in her work by the process of integration and the creative process.
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Research Interests: Psychology and Weaving
In contemporary histories of psychology, William Moulton Marston is remembered for helping develop the lie detector test. He is better remembered in the history of popular culture for creating the comic book superhero Wonder Woman. In his... more
In contemporary histories of psychology, William Moulton Marston is remembered for helping develop the lie detector test. He is better remembered in the history of popular culture for creating the comic book superhero Wonder Woman. In his time, however, he contributed to psychological research in deception, basic emotions, abnormal psychology, sexuality, and consciousness. He was also a radical feminist with connections to women's rights movements. Marston's work is an instructive case for philosophers of science on the relation between science and values. Although Marston's case provides further evidence of the role that feminist values can play in scientific work, it also poses challenges to philosophical accounts of value-laden science. Marston's work exemplifies standard views about feminist value-laden research in that his feminist values help him both to criticize the research of others and create novel psychological concepts and research techniques. His scient...
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Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief... more
Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.
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Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt... more
Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for avoiding the wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science.
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In contemporary histories of psychology, William Moulton Marston is remembered for helping develop the lie detector test. He is better remembered in the history of popular culture for creating the comic book superhero Wonder Woman. In his... more
In contemporary histories of psychology, William Moulton Marston is remembered for helping develop the lie detector test. He is better remembered in the history of popular culture for creating the comic book superhero Wonder Woman. In his time, however, he contributed to psychological research in deception, basic emotions, abnormal psychology, sexuality, and consciousness. He was also a radical feminist with connections to women's rights movements. Marston's work is an instructive case for philosophers of science on the relation between science and values. Although Marston's case provides further evidence of the role that feminist values can play in scientific work, it also poses challenges to philosophical accounts of value-laden science. Marston's work exemplifies standard views about feminist value-laden research in that his feminist values help him both to criticize the research of others and create novel psychological concepts and research techniques. His scientific work includes an account of the nature of psycho-emotional health that leads to normative conclusions for individual values and conduct and for society and culture, a direction of influence that is relatively under-theorized in the literature. To understand and evaluate Marston's work requires an approach that treats science and values as mutually influencing; it also requires that we understand the relationship between science advising and political advocacy in value-laden science.
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This study explores engineering students’ understanding of engineering ethics as a socially situated and distributed feature of project teams. An important component of human understanding is implicit understanding, which is difficult to... more
This study explores engineering students’ understanding of engineering ethics as a socially situated and distributed feature of project teams. An important component of human understanding is implicit understanding, which is difficult to articulate and to study. To explore engineering students’ implicit understanding of ethics, a group discussion of the ethical and social issues involved in students’ ongoing engineering design projects was observed. Eight discussions from four senior design project (SDP) teams were observed and recorded. The video data were analyzed using cognitive ethnography and micro-scale discourse analysis. The results showed that each team had different implicit understanding of ethics; there was also a difference between each team’s explicit understanding and implicit understanding of ethical issues. Explicitly, students in all teams expressed some version of the view that they could not be responsible for the indirect consequence from their design, and instead it is mostly users’ or the third parties’ responsibility. Implicitly, however, there was significant variation between the teams. For example, one team’s discussion, their language choices and gestures, revealed an empathetic connection with the users. Another team understood potential ethical concerns as threats or attacks and became defensive about their design. These findings show that there are complicated layers of understanding about engineering ethics among SDP teams, and those layers are sometimes in tension. Understanding these layers and their development may be an important resource for training socially responsible engineers.
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1338735.
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1338735.
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Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief... more
Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.
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We outline several main themes in the work of Paul Feyerabend and argue that it is time for a reappraisal of his significance to the historical development and contemporary concerns of the philosophy of science.
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I sketch the main features of traditional philosophical models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I then proceed to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is... more
I sketch the main features of traditional philosophical models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I then proceed to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, a view I call dynamic evidential functionalism (DEF). This alternative builds on insights from philosophy of scientific practice, Kuhnian philosophy of science, pragmatist epistemology, philosophy of experimentation, and functionalist philosophy of mind. Along the way, I raise concerns about the total evidence condition, requirements of certainty or incorrigibility on evidence, and accounts that restrict the type of things that can serve as evidence (to, e.g., sense-data, facts about particulars). DEF can also help us see the special value of novel predictions and experiments as evidence, as well as help us think about how to critically evaluate the putative evidence to determine wither it is evidence.
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The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend’s metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend’s late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and... more
The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend’s metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend’s late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic claims about the epistemic and cultural authority of science, claims incompatible with situating science properly in democratic societies. I show how Feyerabend’s metaphysical view, which I call “the abundant world” or “abundant realism,” constitute a sophisticated and challenging form of ontological pluralism that makes interesting connections with contemporary philosophy of science and issues of the political and policy role of science in a democratic society.
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The thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires social value-judgment, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden, has been gaining acceptance among philosophers of science. The main proponents of... more
The thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires social value-judgment, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden, has been gaining acceptance among philosophers of science. The main proponents of the value-ladenness of science rely on either arguments from the underdetermination of theory by evidence or arguments from inductive risk. Both arguments share the premise that we should only consider values once the evidence runs out, or where it leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of {lexical priority of evidence over values}. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. {The problem of wishful thinking} is indeed real---it would be an egregious error to adopt beliefs about the world because they comport with how one would prefer the world to be. I will argue, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake, and unnecessary for adequately avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science than proponents of the underdetermination and inductive risk arguments have suggested.
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The framework of quantum frames can help unravel some of the interpretive difficulties in the foundation of quantum mechanics. In this paper, I begin by tracing the origins of this concept in Bohr's discussion of quantum theory and his... more
The framework of quantum frames can help unravel some of the interpretive difficulties in the foundation of quantum mechanics. In this paper, I begin by tracing the origins of this concept in Bohr's discussion of quantum theory and his theory of complementarity. Engaging with various interpreters and followers of Bohr, I argue that the correct account of quantum frames must be extended beyond literal space-time reference frames to frames defined by relations between a quantum system and the exosystem or external physical frame, of which measurement contexts are a particularly important example. This approach provides superior solutions to key EPR-type measurement and locality paradoxes.
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"This chapter develops and applies ideas drawn from and inspired by John Dewey's work on science and democracy to the field of international relations (IR). I will begin by presenting Dewey's views on the nature of democracy. Next, his... more
"This chapter develops and applies ideas drawn from and inspired by John Dewey's work on science and democracy to the field of international relations (IR). I will begin by presenting Dewey's views on the nature of democracy. Next, his related views on the philosophy of science receive close attention. I will show that scientific and policy inquiry are inextricably related processes, and that they both have special requirements in a democratic, global context."
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Philosophy of Science After Feminism is an important contribution to philosophy of science, in that it argues for the central relevance of advances from previous work in feminist philosophy of science and articulates a new vision for... more
Philosophy of Science After Feminism is an important contribution to philosophy of science, in that it argues for the central relevance of advances from previous work in feminist philosophy of science and articulates a new vision for philosophy of science going in to the future. Kourany's vision of philosophy of science's future as ``socially engaged and socially responsible'' and addressing questions of the social responsibility of science itself has much to recommend it. I focus the book articulation of an ethical-epistemic ideal for science, the Ideal of Socially Responsible Science, compare it to recent work in the same vein by Heather Douglas, and argue for some advantages of Kourany's approach. I then ask some critical question about the view, particularly with respect to the source of values that are to be integrated into science and the status of values that are to be so integrated. I argue that Kourany is too sanguine about where the values that inquirers will use come from and that these values seem to be accorded too fixed a status in her account.
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""I discuss two popular but apparently contradictory theses: T1. The democratic control of science - the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny via democratic processes of representation and... more
""I discuss two popular but apparently contradictory theses:
T1. The democratic control of science - the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny via democratic processes of representation and participation.
T2. The scientific control of policy, i.e. technocracy - political processes should be problem-solving pursuits determined by the methods and results of science and technology.
Many arguments can be given for (T1), both epistemic and moral/political; I will focus on an argument based on the role of non-epistemic values in policy-relevant science. I will argue that we must accept (T2) as a result of an appraisal of the nature of contemporary political problems. Technocratic systems, however, are subject to serious moral and political objections; these difficulties are sufficiently mitigated by (T1). I will set out a framework in which (T1) and (T2) can be consistently and compellingly combined.""
T1. The democratic control of science - the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny via democratic processes of representation and participation.
T2. The scientific control of policy, i.e. technocracy - political processes should be problem-solving pursuits determined by the methods and results of science and technology.
Many arguments can be given for (T1), both epistemic and moral/political; I will focus on an argument based on the role of non-epistemic values in policy-relevant science. I will argue that we must accept (T2) as a result of an appraisal of the nature of contemporary political problems. Technocratic systems, however, are subject to serious moral and political objections; these difficulties are sufficiently mitigated by (T1). I will set out a framework in which (T1) and (T2) can be consistently and compellingly combined.""
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In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey's work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical... more
In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey's work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical empiricists and their critics, on problems of both traditional and more recent vintage. Dewey's work ought to be of special interest to recent philosophers of science committed to the program of analyzing ``science in practice.'' The core of Dewey's philosophy of science is his theory of inquiry---what he called ``logic.'' There is a major lacuna in the literature on this point, however: no contemporary philosophers of science have engaged with Dewey's logical theory, and scholars of Dewey's logic have rarely made connections with philosophy of science. This paper aims to fill this gap, to correct some significant errors in the interpretation of key ideas in Dewey's logical theory, and to show how Dewey's logic provides resources for a philosophy of science.
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This paper addresses the political constraints on science through a pragmatist critique of Philip Kitcher’s account of “well-ordered science.” A central part of Kitcher’s account is his analysis of the significance of items of scientific... more
This paper addresses the political constraints on science through a pragmatist critique of Philip Kitcher’s account of “well-ordered science.” A central part of Kitcher’s account is his analysis of the significance of items of scientific research: contextual and purpose-relative scientific significance replaces mere truth as the aim of inquiry. I raise problems for Kitcher’s account and argue for an alternative, drawing on Peirce’s and Dewey’s theories of problem-solving inquiry. I conclude by suggesting some consequences for understanding the proper conduct of science in a democracy.
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I want to make plausible the following claim:Analyzing scientific inquiry as a species of socially distributed cognition has a variety of advantages for science studies, among them the prospects of bringing together philosophy and... more
I want to make plausible the following claim:Analyzing scientific inquiry as a species of socially distributed cognition has a variety of advantages for science studies, among them the prospects of bringing together philosophy and sociology of science. This is not a particularly novel claim, but one that faces major obstacles. I will retrace some of the major steps that have been made in the pursuit of a distributed cognition approach to science studies, paying special attention to the promise that such an approach holds out for bridging the rift between philosophy and the social studies of science.
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Ron Giere’s recent book Scientific perspectivism sets out an account of science that attempts to forge a via media between two popular extremes: absolutist, objectivist realism on the one hand, and social constructivism or skeptical... more
Ron Giere’s recent book Scientific perspectivism sets out an account of science that attempts to forge a via media between two popular extremes: absolutist, objectivist realism on the one hand, and social constructivism or skeptical anti-realism on the other. The key for Giere is to treat both scientific observation and scientific theories as perspectives, which are limited, partial, contingent, context-, agent- and purpose-dependent, and pluralism-friendly, while nonetheless world-oriented and modestly realist. Giere’s perspectivism bears significant similarity to earlier ideas of Paul Feyerabend and John Dewey. Comparing these to Giere’s work not only uncovers a consilience of ideas, but also can help to fill out Giere’s account in places where it is not fully developed, as well as helping us understand the work of these earlier authors and their continuing relevance to contemporary concerns in philosophy of science.
Keywords: Ronald Giere; Paul Feyerabend; John Dewey; Perspectivism; Pragmatism; Pluralism
Keywords: Ronald Giere; Paul Feyerabend; John Dewey; Perspectivism; Pragmatism; Pluralism
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Carlo Rovelli's relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that a system's states or the values of its physical quantities as normally conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or measuring... more
Carlo Rovelli's relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that a system's states or the values of its physical quantities as normally conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or measuring instrument. Furthermore, on Rovelli's account, the appearance of determinate observations from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to the interaction of the system and observer. Jeffrey Barrett ([1999]) has pointed out that certain relational interpretations suffer from what we might call the ‘determinacy problem', but Barrett misclassifies Rovelli's interpretation by lumping it in with Mermin's view, as Rovelli's view is quite different and has resources to escape the particular criticisms that Barrett makes of Mermin's view. Rovelli's interpretation still leaves us with a paradox having to do with the determinacy of measurement outcomes, which can be accepted only if we are willing to give up on certain elements of the ‘absolute’ view of the world.
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Common wisdom includes expressions such as “there is no accounting for taste'’ that express a widely-accepted subjectivism about taste. We commonly say things like “I can’t stand anything with onions in it'’ or “Oh, I’d never eat sushi,'’... more
Common wisdom includes expressions such as “there is no accounting for taste'’ that express a widely-accepted subjectivism about taste. We commonly say things like “I can’t stand anything with onions in it'’ or “Oh, I’d never eat sushi,'’ and we accept such from our friends and associates. It is the position of this essay that much of this language is actually quite unacceptable. Without appealing to complete objectivism about taste, I will argue that there are good reasons to think that there will be fairly wide agreement between experienced palates on aesthetic preferences, and that this result will not necessarily agree with unexperienced and unreflective opinions on the matter. Subjectivism about aesthetic preference can be taken to justify the practice of picking eating (after all, who is better to say what I’ll enjoy than me?), while the position of this paper is that such picky eating is a moral failing. To be a picky eater is to have a significant lack of openness to new experiences. It involves an irresponsible level of fallibilism with respect to taste. Never venturing into new aesthetic landscapes leads to a sort of repetitiveness, which in turn leads to a life full of blandness and banality.
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I resolve several pressing and recalcitrant problems in contemporary philosophy of science using resources from John Dewey's philosophy of science. I begin by looking at Dewey's epistemological and logical writings in their historical... more
I resolve several pressing and recalcitrant problems in contemporary philosophy of science using resources from John Dewey's philosophy of science. I begin by looking at Dewey's epistemological and logical writings in their historical context, in order to understand better how Dewey's philosophy disappeared from the limelight, and I provide a reconstruction of his views. Then, I use that reconstruction to address problems of evidence, the social dimensions of science, and pluralism. Generally, mainstream philosophers of science with an interest in Dewey pay little attention to the body of scholarship on Dewey and tend to misinterpret or miss important features of his work, while Dewey scholars generally do not connect his work to the nuanced problems of the contemporary scene (with some notable exceptions). My dissertation helps to fill this important gap and correct common interpretive mistakes by reconstructing and clarifying Dewey's philosophy of science and using it to resolve several contemporary problems.
Though his is the road less traveled, Dewey's views provide a good starting place for addressing current concerns. He worked towards a model of science that is both fully naturalistic and fundamentally oriented towards human practice, demands that have been strongly argued for but poorly assimilated by most mainstream philosophers of science. He treats scientific practice, and human thinking generally, as not only embodied but also socially and technologically embedded, and thus can be used to open up a dialogue with much of the social studies of science. He has an anti-foundationalist but structured epistemology, and he offers a way to navigate the narrow paths between an immodest and simplistic realism and the pessimistic extremes of anti-realism and social constructivism, a pursuit of interest to many major philosophers of science at present. Philosophy of science took a different path in the twentieth century, beginning with the ``received view'' of logical positivism that left many of the nuances of the original movement by the wayside. No aspect of that starting point has avoided disrepute in recent decades. I show that Dewey avoided the wrong turns of mid-century philosophy of science which are now blocking the way forward.
Though his is the road less traveled, Dewey's views provide a good starting place for addressing current concerns. He worked towards a model of science that is both fully naturalistic and fundamentally oriented towards human practice, demands that have been strongly argued for but poorly assimilated by most mainstream philosophers of science. He treats scientific practice, and human thinking generally, as not only embodied but also socially and technologically embedded, and thus can be used to open up a dialogue with much of the social studies of science. He has an anti-foundationalist but structured epistemology, and he offers a way to navigate the narrow paths between an immodest and simplistic realism and the pessimistic extremes of anti-realism and social constructivism, a pursuit of interest to many major philosophers of science at present. Philosophy of science took a different path in the twentieth century, beginning with the ``received view'' of logical positivism that left many of the nuances of the original movement by the wayside. No aspect of that starting point has avoided disrepute in recent decades. I show that Dewey avoided the wrong turns of mid-century philosophy of science which are now blocking the way forward.
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In the first part of this paper, I will sketch the main features of traditional models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I will then proceed to elaborate on an alternative... more
In the first part of this paper, I will sketch the main features of traditional models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I will then proceed to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, which I will call dynamic evidential functionalism. I will demonstrate its application to an illuminating example of scientific inquiry, and defend it from some likely objections. In the second part, I will use that alternative to solve a variety of classic and contemporary problems in the literature on scientific evidence having to do with the empirical basis of science and the use of evidence in public policy. (An extract of the first part of this was published in 2015 in Metaphilosophy as "The Functional Complexity of Scientific Evidence." The paper is a long-term labor of love going back to my dissertation, but it hasn't gone well trying to get it published. Perhaps I will revisit it again eventually.)
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There is a movement afoot in philosophy of science to render our field more "socially relevant" and "politically engaged." At first glance, this would appear to be a revolutionary development; since the early days, philosophers of science... more
There is a movement afoot in philosophy of science to render our field more "socially relevant" and "politically engaged." At first glance, this would appear to be a revolutionary development; since the early days, philosophers of science have been concerned mostly with topics that seem socially irrelevant and politically disengaged: the logic of science, reductionism, realism vs. instrumentalism, theories of explanation, and so on. But recent work in history of philosophy of science by George Reisch, Thomas Uebel, and many others has shown us that the standard potted history misses much of the richness that existed in early philosophy of science, both in terms of projects that have been erased from the history and surprising social/political engagements *within* traditional topics like verificationism and the unity of science. In this paper, I will explore some provocative ideas found within the early Unity of Science movement that provide a politically engaged role for philosophy of science. In particular, I begin from the contributions of Otto Neurath and John Dewey to volume 1, issue 1 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, arguing that their approaches are very far from our stereotype of the unity of science and provide resources for rethinking the relation of science, politics, and philosophy. The unity of science called for is not theoretical, but pragmatic and social, and extends far beyond the bounds of science ordinarily conceived. These relatively underappreciated threads in the work of Dewey, Neurath, and the Unity of Science movement provide fertile soil for contemporary projects.
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In 1909, the 50th anniversary of both the publication of Origin of the Species and his own birth, John Dewey published "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy." This optimistic essay saw Darwin's advance not only as one of empirical or... more
In 1909, the 50th anniversary of both the publication of Origin of the Species and his own birth, John Dewey published "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy." This optimistic essay saw Darwin's advance not only as one of empirical or theoretical biology, but a logical and conceptual revolution that would shake every corner of philosophy. Dewey tells us less about the influence that Darwin exerted over philosophy over the past 50 years and instead prophesied the influence it would (or should) take in the future. I will discuss this landmark paper and the key lessons Dewey draws from Darwinism for philosophy, and give a preliminary assessment of how well we've done so far. (Dewey would be largely disappointed.)
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Philosophers of science have increasingly come to accept the thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires value-judgments, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden, indeed, that good science is... more
Philosophers of science have increasingly come to accept the thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires value-judgments, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden, indeed, that good science is morally and socially responsible. The main proponents of the value-ladenness of science rely on either arguments from the underdetermination of theory by evidence or arguments from inductive risk (i.e., the statistical risk of error). Both arguments share the assumption that we should only consider values once the evidence runs out, or where it leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind this assumption is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. The problem of wishful thinking is indeed real—it would be an egregious error to adopt beliefs about the world because they comport with how one would prefer the world to be. I will argue, however, that giving lexical priority to epistemic considerations over values is a mistake and unnecessary for adequately avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. Values have a deeper role to play in science than proponents of the underdetermination and inductive risk arguments have suggested.
I will argue for two popular but apparently contradictory theses: (1) the democratic control of science - the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny and oversight via democratic processes. (2) Technocracy -... more
I will argue for two popular but apparently contradictory theses: (1) the democratic control of science - the aims and activities of science should be subject to public scrutiny and oversight via democratic processes. (2) Technocracy - political processes are problem-solving pursuits subject in many ways to the methods and results of science and technology.
Many arguments can be given for (1), both epistemic and moral/political; I will focus on an argument based on the role of non-epistemic values in policy-relevant science. I will argue that we must accept (2) as a result of an appraisal of the nature of contemporary political problems. Technocratic systems, however, are subject to serious moral and political objections; these difficulties are sufficiently mitigated by (1). I will set out a framework in which (1) and (2) can be consistently and compellingly combined.
Many arguments can be given for (1), both epistemic and moral/political; I will focus on an argument based on the role of non-epistemic values in policy-relevant science. I will argue that we must accept (2) as a result of an appraisal of the nature of contemporary political problems. Technocratic systems, however, are subject to serious moral and political objections; these difficulties are sufficiently mitigated by (1). I will set out a framework in which (1) and (2) can be consistently and compellingly combined.
In psychology today, William Moulton Marston is remembered for making small contributions to the development of the lie detector test. In his time, however, he was a major figure both within the discipline of psychology and in the public... more
In psychology today, William Moulton Marston is remembered for making small contributions to the development of the lie detector test. In his time, however, he was a major figure both within the discipline of psychology and in the public eye, contributing to psychological research in deception, basic emotions, personality types, abnormal psychology, sexuality, and consciousness. Despite his historically minor impact on the field of psychology, Marston's work is instructive in several ways for philosophers of science and philosophers of psychology. Besides his interesting early attempts to draw conclusions about emotions and cognition on the basis of work in neuroscience, Marston's research is an interesting case study in the relation between science and values. I will show how Marston's work draws on his (unorthodox) feminist values and implies normative conclusions about psycho-emotional health and education. Further, I will show how Marston makes use of the popular press as an unusual venue of the application of his scientific research, including popular psychology books, magazine articles, a novel, and his comic book character, Wonder Woman. I will argue that this case has significant similarities much more recent exemplars of value-laden research, as well as posing new challenges.
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Book review of Leon N. Cooper: Science and human experience: Values, culture, and the mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 256pp, $28.99 HB
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Research Interests:
Philip Kitcher's Science in a Democratic Society makes powerful and original contributions not only to general philosophy of science, but also to ethical theory, political philosophy, social epistemology, and speculative anthropology... more
Philip Kitcher's Science in a Democratic Society makes powerful and original contributions not only to general philosophy of science, but also to ethical theory, political philosophy, social epistemology, and speculative anthropology and sociobiology. Kitcher radically extends the agenda of his earlier work, Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), which sought to provide a framework for determining the role of values in determining the ideal research agenda for science in a democratic society. Where Science, Truth, and Democracy ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Reviewing a book like A Companion to Pragmatism, with its substantive introduction, thirty-eight essays, and over four hundred pages of material, is a fool's task, too large to do in a way that is fair, unified, or representative. A look... more
Reviewing a book like A Companion to Pragmatism, with its substantive introduction, thirty-eight essays, and over four hundred pages of material, is a fool's task, too large to do in a way that is fair, unified, or representative. A look at the list of contributors will tell you that this is bound to become a crucial introductory and secondary source for the study of pragmatism; you do not need me to tell you that.
To most readers of Mind, Culture, and Activity, the thesis of Sanford Goldberg's Anti-Individualism will seem familiar and uncontroversial. He defends the view that the content of language and the mind, the nature of knowledge, and the... more
To most readers of Mind, Culture, and Activity, the thesis of Sanford Goldberg's Anti-Individualism will seem familiar and uncontroversial. He defends the view that the content of language and the mind, the nature of knowledge, and the justification of belief depend not merely upon the properties of an isolated, individual speaker, thinker, or knower but also essentially on the physical and social environment or context in which they are embedded.
Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness.... more
Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument invalid. This flaw is superficial, and a small amendment to it rescues the claim of validity.