Clara Delavallade

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals have set a triple educational objective: improving access to, quality of, and gender equity in education. This study is the first to document the effectiveness of policies targeting all these objectives simultaneously. We examine the impact of a multifaceted educational program—delivered to 230 randomly selected primary schools in rural India—on students’ participation and performance. We also study the heterogeneity of this impact across gender and initial school performance, and its sustainability over two years. Although the program specifically targeted outof-school girls for enrollment, the learning component of the program targeted boys and girls equally. We find that the program reduced gender gaps in school retention and improved learning during the first year of implementation. However, targeting different educational goals (access, quality, and equity) did not yield sustained effects on school attendance or learning, nor did it bridge gender inequalities in school performance over the two-year period.

Budget management reforms in Burkina Faso aim at strengthening transparency in the budgetary process and at rationalizing budgetary choices through the reduction of the discretionary power of public officials in the process of credit allocation. Assessing the effectiveness of budget management reforms with respect to the fight against corruption raises two questions. Does increased transparency allow the limiting of discretionary power and increase the probability of detection? To what extent does the concentration of political power hinder the population's capacity to control corruption? Although reducing discretionary power and strengthening transparency in budgetary choices raises the probability of detection in the short term, in a context of a high concentration of power, agents then take into account the lack of effective monitoring ? whether by the local population or by independent institutions ? which in turn reduces the probability of detection. The anti-corruption imp...

Understanding how best to incentivize worker teams in a prosocial setting is crucial for improving the quality of public service delivery in developing countries. We use a randomized field experiment to elicit social workers’ performance and test whether workers respond better to private feedback on performance or to competing for a public award and whether image motivation may crowd out intrinsic motivation. Female school-feeding teams in 454 schools in South Africa were randomly assigned to receiving either (i) private feedback: information on performance and ranking using scorecards, (ii) image motivation using public recognition, (iii) a combination of both or (iv) no intervention. The analysis yields two main findings. First, while instruments are more potent when offered in isolation, private feedback on performance is more effective at eliciting effort in a prosocial setting than competing for a public award. Second, image motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation. Third, th...

The Sustainable Development Goals set a triple educational objective: improve access to, quality of, and gender equity in education. This paper documents the effectiveness of a multifaceted educational program, pursuing these three objectives simultaneously. Using an experiment in 229 schools in rural Rajasthan (India), the study measures the effects of the program on students’ school participation and academic performance over two years, while also examining heterogeneous impacts across gender and initial learning ability. It finds that the program increased student enrollment, with the largest effects among girls (7.2 percent in the first year, 12.8 percent in the second). There were large learning gains of 0.329 standard deviations (SDs) in the first year and 0.206 SDs at the end of the second year. The learning component of the intervention targeted both boys and girls – boys and girls benefited equally from the program in terms of test score gains.

ABSTRACT Through indirect inference, we investigate the extent to which religions’ supposed pronatalism is detrimental to growth via the fertility/education channel. Using censuses from South-East Asia, we first estimate an empirical model of fertility and show that having a religious affiliation significantly raises fertility. This effect is stronger for couples with intermediate to high education levels. We next use these estimates to identify the parameters of a structural model of fertility choice. On average, catholicism is the most pro-child religion (increasing spending on children), followed by Buddhism, while Islam has a strong pro-birth component (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). We show that pro-child religions depress growth in the early stages by lowering saving, physical capital, and labor supply. These effects account for 10% to 50% of the actual growth gaps between countries over 1950-1980. At later stages of growth, pro-birth religions lower human capital accumulation, explaining between 10% and 20% of the gap between Muslim and Buddhist countries over 1980-2010.

... This paper brings an empirical contribution, showing that corruption distorts public spending allocation, that is to say the portion of ... ratio can negatively affect the budget allocated to culture and religion, which first concerns the working-age population ... C u'tuxe" ~seI and Energy. ...

ABSTRACT Dans cette thèse, nous analysons les sources et les implications de plusieurs formes de corruption administrative et législative. Nous proposons d’abord une analyse de l’impact de la corruption sur la structure des dépenses publiques, qui n’a jusqu’ici fait l’objet que d’études consacrées à un ou deux secteurs en particulier. À partir d’une analyse économétrique portant sur une soixantaine de pays et pour l’ensemble des secteurs d’intervention de l’État, nous montrons que la corruption favorise les dépenses en capital physique au détriment des dépenses en capital humain. Nous examinons ensuite les fondements théoriques de cette distorsion : la qualité du système juridique et le degré de concentration du pouvoir politique influencent le niveau de corruption et la nature de cette distorsion qui, dans tous les cas, affaiblit la croissance. Nous nous concentrons ensuite sur l’étude des pratiques de corruption des entreprises. Une analyse fondée sur des données originales collectées au Maghreb révèle que la corruption constitue un recours pour des firmes en perte de compétitivité, souffrant d’une insécurité juridique (pour la corruption législative) et pratiquant la fraude fiscale (pour la corruption administrative). Cependant, au-delà d’un certain degré de fraude fiscale, les entreprises réduisent leur offre de corruption. Ces résultats remettent partiellement en cause d’autres études portant sur les pays en transition – que nous actualisons – et sur l’Ouganda. Enfin, sur la base de ces résultats et de la littérature, nous proposons une lecture critique du processus de réforme de la gestion budgétaire au Burkina Faso, et nous montrons que la lutte contre la corruption au niveau budgétaire se heurte notamment à un contrôle peu efficace et à une insuffisante répartition des pouvoirs.

ABSTRACT We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of speciflc types of spending for which rent- seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose an optimal growth model where a planner chooses the composition of public spending subject to an incentive constraint re∞ecting households' choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. We test the implications of the model on a panel of countries estimating a system of equations with instrumental variables.

ABSTRACT Utilizing a randomized experiment in rural Rajasthan, India, we evaluate the effectiveness of an education program aimed to increase girls’ retention, enrollment and learning. While enrollment and community sensitization were specifically aimed at promoting girls education, the learning component of the program involved and targeted boys and girls equally. Approximately 230 primary schools were randomly assigned to the program or to a control and we evaluate the effect after two years of program implementation. We find moderate gains in retention and enrollment after one year of the program, primarily among girls who are most likely to be disadvantaged. After the completion of the second year of the program, we find large gains in learning in Hindi, English, and Math, equivalent to approximately one additional year of schooling with no significant difference in learning across gender.

ABSTRACT Après avoir dressé une typologie de la corruption, cet article en analyse les implications pour les dépenses publiques et la croissance. Il montre également comment l’environnement économique, institutionnel et politique des pays à faible revenu favorise la corruption, perpétuant ainsi le cercle vicieux pauvreté-corruption au niveau des États. After having established a typology of corruption, this article analyses its implications for public spending and growth. It also shows how the economic, institutional and political environment of low-income countries favours corruption, thus perpetuating the vicious circle between poverty and corruption at the state level.

Micro health insurance faces challenges in expansion and sustainability. Low perceived or real value of the product seems to be a major factor of the low demand for micro health insurance. This study assesses the extent to which providing guaranteed benefits to micro health insurance clients (both claimants and non-claimants) may retain them in the scheme. Half of the clients of a micro-health insurance policy in Kolkata slums (India) were randomly offered a free health check-up as an additional benefit to the insurance scheme. We show that the demand for preventive health care was relatively high: take-up was at 40%. The check-up offer raised the demand for the MHI scheme (measured by reported willingness to pay) and this impact was driven by two mechanisms: the perception of a positive income shock despite the absence of a real income shock and an improvement in the satisfaction with the scheme and trust in the health service and insurance provider. There was no impact on the clie...

While firms often pay large amounts of bribes, very few empirical studies have investigated the reasons why they are involved in corruption and how their involvement interacts with regulatory structures. Our analysis of the corruption behavior of North African firms challenges the theoretical prediction that corruption increases with a firm’s profitability and competitiveness and sheds new light on the link between tax evasion and corruption.

ABSTRACT Après avoir dressé une typologie de la corruption, cet article en analyse les implications pour les dépenses publiques et la croissance. Il montre également comment l’environnement économique, institutionnel et politique des pays à faible revenu favorise la corruption, perpétuant ainsi le cercle vicieux pauvreté-corruption au niveau des États. After having established a typology of corruption, this article analyses its implications for public spending and growth. It also shows how the economic, institutional and political environment of low-income countries favours corruption, thus perpetuating the vicious circle between poverty and corruption at the state level.

ABSTRACT This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of two forms of corruption supply, administrative corruption and state capture, by Maghrebi firms. This study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. I show that tax evasion is a major factor of the engagement of firms in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the share of sales hidden by the firm as long as it is below half of total sales, and slightly decreases thereafter. State capture is fostered by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Interestingly, less competitive firms appear to engage more in both forms of corruption than the most dynamic ones. After as-sessing the robustness of my empirical results, I draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries.

ABSTRACT Micro health insurance faces challenges in expansion and sustainability. Low perceived or real value of the product seems to be a major factor of the low demand for micro health insurance. This study assesses the extent to which providing guaranteed benefits to micro health insurance clients (both claimants and non-claimants) may retain them in the scheme. Half of the clients of a micro-health insurance policy in Kolkata slums (India) were randomly offered a free health check-up as an additional benefit to the insurance scheme. We show that the demand for preventive health care was relatively high: take-up was at 40%. The check-up offer raised the demand for the MHI scheme (measured by reported willingness to pay) and this impact was driven by two mechanisms: the perception of a positive income shock despite the absence of a real income shock and an improvement in the satisfaction with the scheme and trust in the health service and insurance provider. There was no impact on the clients' objective financial and health situation and, interestingly, check-up attendees did not substitute the free service for a consultation they would have paid for otherwise, suggesting that there are cash constraints in the poor access to quality health care. Most of the effects are concentrated on households in a poorer health condition at the date of enrolment. Lastly, the free medical consultation raised the reported demand for the MHI scheme provided by NGO offering the check-up and the scheme, not for MHI schemes provided by other insurance, yielding useful results for MHI companies willing to design products increasing the demand the face but not the whole market demand. for very helpful suggestions and comments. I thank Calcutta Kids and especially Noah Levinson for numerous discussions and excellent implementation as well as Jonathan Bertscher, Tirtha Chatterjee and Alex Montgomery for dedicated research assistance. This project was supported by grants from the International Labour Organization, the Centre for Insurance and Risk Management and the University of Cape Town.

ABSTRACT Utilizing a randomized experiment in rural Rajasthan, India, we evaluate the effectiveness of an education program aimed to increase girls’ retention, enrollment and learning. While enrollment and community sensitization were specifically aimed at promoting girls education, the learning component of the program involved and targeted boys and girls equally. Approximately 230 primary schools were randomly assigned to the program or to a control and we evaluate the effect after two years of program implementation. We find moderate gains in retention and enrollment after one year of the program, primarily among girls who are most likely to be disadvantaged. After the completion of the second year of the program, we find large gains in learning in Hindi, English, and Math, equivalent to approximately one additional year of schooling with no significant difference in learning across gender.

ABSTRACT Dans cette thèse, nous analysons les sources et les implications de plusieurs formes de corruption administrative et législative. Nous proposons d’abord une analyse de l’impact de la corruption sur la structure des dépenses publiques, qui n’a jusqu’ici fait l’objet que d’études consacrées à un ou deux secteurs en particulier. À partir d’une analyse économétrique portant sur une soixantaine de pays et pour l’ensemble des secteurs d’intervention de l’État, nous montrons que la corruption favorise les dépenses en capital physique au détriment des dépenses en capital humain. Nous examinons ensuite les fondements théoriques de cette distorsion : la qualité du système juridique et le degré de concentration du pouvoir politique influencent le niveau de corruption et la nature de cette distorsion qui, dans tous les cas, affaiblit la croissance. Nous nous concentrons ensuite sur l’étude des pratiques de corruption des entreprises. Une analyse fondée sur des données originales collectées au Maghreb révèle que la corruption constitue un recours pour des firmes en perte de compétitivité, souffrant d’une insécurité juridique (pour la corruption législative) et pratiquant la fraude fiscale (pour la corruption administrative). Cependant, au-delà d’un certain degré de fraude fiscale, les entreprises réduisent leur offre de corruption. Ces résultats remettent partiellement en cause d’autres études portant sur les pays en transition – que nous actualisons – et sur l’Ouganda. Enfin, sur la base de ces résultats et de la littérature, nous proposons une lecture critique du processus de réforme de la gestion budgétaire au Burkina Faso, et nous montrons que la lutte contre la corruption au niveau budgétaire se heurte notamment à un contrôle peu efficace et à une insuffisante répartition des pouvoirs.

... This paper brings an empirical contribution, showing that corruption distorts public spending allocation, that is to say the portion of ... ratio can negatively affect the budget allocated to culture and religion, which first concerns the working-age population ... C u'tuxe" ~seI and Energy. ...

... Using Gov-ernment Financial Statistics data on national budgetary accounts, we try to answer the following ... This analysis is led system-atically for the first time, that is for all spending ... In section 2, we investigate the relation between corruption and public spending allocation. ...