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of dialogue and face-to-face encounters’’ (p. 97) just as ‘‘Ostpolitik was a key factor behind the collapse of East Germany’’ (p. 90). After the North’s demise, ‘‘the antagonistic identity constructs that emerged with the division of the... more
of dialogue and face-to-face encounters’’ (p. 97) just as ‘‘Ostpolitik was a key factor behind the collapse of East Germany’’ (p. 90). After the North’s demise, ‘‘the antagonistic identity constructs that emerged with the division of the peninsula will undoubtedly survive and pose problems’’ (p. 99). Bleiker therefore advocates an ‘‘ethics of difference’’ that ‘‘would go beyond tolerance, for tolerance assumes a basic standard [whereas] [a]ccepting alterity . . . requires abandoning this privileged standpoint’’ (p. 100). Historians should challenge dominant narratives, protect minority accounts, and ‘‘forget’’ or overlook prior identities. This is neither essentialism (because recognizing differences never justifies a static apartheid) nor relativism (since saying that historical ‘‘representation is always incomplete’’ is the opposite of claiming ‘‘all is true’’) (p. 112). Bleiker offers no concrete policy recommendations, nor does he comment on the effect of China’s rise and of the unprecedented ‘‘Korean Wave’’ on Korean identity. But even his theory is limited. That an enemy is needed to define the self echoes down famously from Homer, Heraclitus, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, William James on war, Durkheim on deviance, Freud, structuralism, and so many others. Bleiker’s citations, however, are strictly au courant. But this is a pioneering work of synthesis in which theory and data are necessarily pared down. Hardheaded, it offers no easy solutions (in fact, it illuminates paradox and complexities). It is essential reading in the field. Kevin D. Kim University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa
Contrary to its image abroad as a servile tool of industry and government, the Japanese news media has worked hard to keep alive memories of Japan's wartime military aggression and harsh colonial rule. Given the weakness of Japanese civil... more
Contrary to its image abroad as a servile tool of industry and government, the Japanese news media has worked hard to keep alive memories of Japan's wartime military aggression and harsh colonial rule. Given the weakness of Japanese civil society and the marginal influence of opposition parties, the steady stream of newspaper articles, and regular airing of documentaries on the horrors of war and the humiliation of defeat are about all that have prevented conservative nationalist politicians from prettifying the past. It was thanks to a year-long series of articles in the liberal Asahi that a generation of Japanese came to know about the horrors of the 1937 Rape of Nanking more than 30 years after the fact. And it was also an editorial in the same paper that led to Japan and South Korea jointly hosting the 2002 Football World Cup, ushering in a period of good relations between the two countries. But Japan's news professionals have been able to focus on their country's need to confront past horrors and to ask who was responsible for them not only as journalists but also as activists, establishing exchanges with colleagues in neighboring countries, organizing symposiums, conferring and receiving prizes, writing books, advising politicians, and on occasion cooperating with political and business leaders. They can function simultaneously as observers and actors because Japanese news reporting differs in its historical origins and moral-ethical underpinnings from Western ideals of adversarial media-state relations. How and why a highly visible group of prominent news professionals could work to confront their country's difficult past is the theme of this paper.
Though difficult to define as a clear set of moral precepts, aspects of so-called “samurai values”, the combination of orally-transmitted Confucian and Buddhist lore to which Nitobe Inazō refers in his Bushido, can clearly be discerned in... more
Though difficult to define as a clear set of moral precepts, aspects of so-called “samurai values”, the combination of orally-transmitted Confucian and Buddhist lore to which Nitobe Inazō refers in his Bushido, can clearly be discerned in Japanese society today. As evidence for the influence of “samurai values”, I have provided examples from two fields with which I am personally familiar: journalism and education. Although in recent years several academic works have exposed historical anomalies in widely-held beliefs about actual samurai behaviour, I argue that the effectiveness of ideologies does not depend on historical accuracy. For example, justification for the right of newspapers to criticise governments in Japan does not stem from inalienable rights originating with European Enlightenment philosophers. Instead, it is linked to the view that the former samurai who in the 1870s became Japan’s first news reporters could be trusted intermediaries between the government and the pe...
Contrary to its image abroad as a servile tool of its country's establishment, the Japanese news media has a proven track record of influencing official policy in ways that have benefited society.This paper argues that while it is true... more
Contrary to its image abroad as a servile tool of its country's establishment, the Japanese news media has a proven track record of influencing official policy in ways that have benefited society.This paper argues that while it is true that the Japanese news media and its practitioners maintain far closer ties to power than would be considered ideal from a Western perspective, it is precisely those close connections that have enabled Japanese news reporters to act in the public interest.
N.B. The uploaded paper is a slightly longer, earlier version of “Rashomon perceived: The challenge of forging a transnationally shared view of Kurosawa’s legacy,” in Davis, Blair, Robert Anderson, Jan Wall eds., Rashomon Effects:... more
N.B. The uploaded paper is a slightly longer, earlier version of “Rashomon perceived: The challenge of forging a transnationally shared view of Kurosawa’s legacy,” in Davis, Blair, Robert Anderson, Jan Wall eds., Rashomon Effects: Rashomon, Kurosawa and their legacies. Routledge, Abingdon, 2016. The present version, which carries a title different from the chapter in the above book, contains more citations which may be of value to researchers.
This paper represents an attempt to place the debate on history in Northeast Asia in a structural context and to see it as an outcome f tensions in state-civil society organization (CSO) relationships in Japan and South Korea. The paper... more
This paper represents an attempt to place the debate on history in Northeast Asia in a structural context and to see it as an outcome f tensions in state-civil society organization (CSO) relationships in Japan and South Korea. The paper uses as an analytical tool the work of Lily Gardner Feldman, who has focused on the roles of transnational non-state actors (TNAs) in post-World War II reconciliation in Europe. Although Northeast Asian CSOs and European TNAs do not always overlap precisely, most of Gardner Feldman’s TNAs qualify as CSOs according to standard definitions of civil society. This paper argues that geopolitical differences notwithstanding, moves toward reconciliation after World War II in Europe were greatly helped by the presence of legally sanctioned, transnationally active, broad-based CSOs. Conversely, the past suppression of civil society activity in both South Korea and Japan – in the former physically under successive military-backed authoritarian regimes and in...
In 2011, after the explosions and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant, policy makers around the world sought answers to why such a major accident could have occurred in a country synonymous with rational planning and good... more
In 2011, after the explosions and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant, policy makers around the world sought answers to why such a major accident could have occurred in a country synonymous with rational planning and good design. This paper, originally written as a book chapter, aims to shed light on the foreign policy constraints and domestic political infighting that led Japanese leaders to ignore alternatives – and scientific advice -- and to opt for an inefficient, one-size-fits-all reactor design in large part because of its American origins. I am uploading this paper in the hope that it may offer some background information to discussions at a time when nuclear energy is being positively re-evaluated as a result of spiraling energy costs triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.