Vasko Sutarov

Returnees, foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), women, and children from North Macedonia are classified into several groups: those still abroad waiting to return to the country; repatriated or arrested and are in a different status serving their prison sentences; those who already left prisons and returned in their community. Various examples illustrate the repatriation process. State institutions led resocialization and rehabilitation process in cooperation with civil society. Activities within correctional institutions are considered crucial, especially if are followed by post-prison phase. For women and children, there is a specially designed approach. The National Committee coordinating state institutions lead inter-disciplinary approaches in cooperation with civil society. The National plan outlines activities implemented at a central and local level. Civil society organizations (CSOs) provide valuable contribution through specially designed projects for returnees and families. There are already registered threats from the returned FTFs that have not been deradicalized and rehabilitated.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the nature and main characteristics of the current<br> threat of terrorism in Europe and its impact and influence on particular EU member<br> states, the EU institutional and legislative mechanism and its basic values. In this<br> regard, focus is placed on the threats originating from the so-callled "Islamic State",<br> foreign terrorist fighters and radicalized individuals, in the context of the Syrian<br> conflict and refugee/migration crisis. The impact of threats on particular member<br> states is presented through a comparative overview of Belgium, France and Germany<br> in the face of recent counterterrorism efforts. The response at EU level, is presented<br> through new initiatives regarding coordination, cooperation and information sharing<br> among the European member states. The threat of Terrorism also has an influence on<br> basic EU values, bringing about differ...

The CVE concept has been intensively promoted since 2015 and counters the process of radicalization through various stakeholders within the civil society intending to raise awareness and build resilience among vulnerable target groups. The UN since 2006 has recognized the important role of civil society in the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. Civil society has many advantages in CVE, especially through answering grievances in society; improving societal inclusion, and facilitation of government-citizen relations. Civil society in the Western Balkans has been actively engaged in CVE since 2015 with the exaggerating problem of radicalization and recruitment in the Syrian context. Public awareness about the radicalization and terrorism phenomena within the society, promotion of the CVE concept, research on the local specifics of radicalization, organization of conferences and workshops, and inter-sectoral cooperation were the main response of the civil society. The example from Albania is presented through the efforts of the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) and their project based on a research study serving as a basis for public awareness activities in different municipalities, especially within schools as well as representatives of different state institutions. The example from Kosovo is presented through the work of the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) as a leader in the field. KCSS has been active in several CVE areas of activities such as research on various aspects of the radicalization phenomena, public awareness, emphasizing the role of different stakeholders within society, specialized training for target groups, and organization of workshops, conferences, and roundtables. From the extensive KCSS CVE program, selected project examples at the municipal level are presented that illustrate public awareness campaigns, especially among students and inter-sectoral cooperation and coordination. The example of Serbia is presented through the "whole of community" approach by Cultural Center "DamaD" focused on Sandzak area, especially the activities related to the referral mechanism for preventing extremism and radicalism, sensibilization of different stakeholders from the central and local government, development fo training packages and related activities for strengthening community's resilience

This paper analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on extremist and terrorist actors with a special focus on the "Islamic State" (IS), "Al Qaeda" (AQ), their affiliates, and other active groups. The first aspect is the religious and ideological approach to the pandemic, misuse of religious scripts, and portraying the pandemic within extremist ideology. This is transferred in propaganda and inspiration and recruitment of new fighters and supporters, mainly via social media. The second aspect is the operational level, how extremists took the opportunity to implement a new strategy, "modus operandi", and even use the virus as a weapon. There was a significant increase in activity especially in countries with the previous presence of those groups. The pandemic has also affected prisons and refugee camps as especially vulnerable, as well as the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). These aspects are analyzed through a comparative view of different countries and regions.

The Syrian conflict has its reflection at the global level, mainly through the processes of radicalization and recruitment most visible through the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon (FTF), as well as terrorist threats and plots on sensitive targets within urban centers. These phenomena also affected the security of the Republic of North Macedonia imposing previously unknown challenges for the security services, but also society as a whole. The quick radicalization and recruitment of FTF for the terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq required a quick and adequate response by government institutions, and other actors in society as well. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept promoted globally in 2015 gives a primary role in prevention from radicalization and engagement in terrorism. It involves stakeholders not traditionally connected to security. The first response to the FTF phenomenon by the Republic of North Macedonia and other countries was mainly through its security institutions, legal and repressive measures. While the CVE efforts were promoted mainly by international partners, the important prevention role was recognized by Macedonian policymakers recently. The government established new institutions, introduced new strategies, and with other actors, especially within the civil society, started to focus more on the local community. This paper critically explores and assesses measures taken by different stakeholders: government, religious communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), international and partner countries. It illustrates the level of implementation of CVE measures by type of projects, target audience, opportunities, and obstacles. The paper is based on desk research and the personal experience of the author in interaction with involved stakeholders and serves as a useful basis for future projects and initiatives.

In the past two years, the European continent has experienced a wave of terrorist attacks mainly executed by small cells or individual perpetrators, self-radicalized or directed by extremist structures in the Middle East (predominantly Syria). The nature of the threat, which is difficult to detect and deter, has imposed many challenges on the security and intelligence agencies, especially regarding their internal strengths and capacities, coordination on national level and their international cooperation. The aim of this paper is to present a comparative view of the measures taken to strengthen the capacities of the security sector and the efforts to improve the intelligence sharing at national level. The examples of Belgium and France are presented, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia. The research shows that the main challenge for the different agencies is cooperation and coordination and how to better detect and deter threats originating from radicalized persons.

Radicalization in prisons presents a long-standing challenge receiving importance with hundreds of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) captured, indicted, sentenced or waiting repatriation. Some received short sentences and have been already released and more to be at large either without going through de-radicalization programs, or be further radicalized. This paper presents the experience of different Western Balkans (WB) countries, including the current status of terrorism related prisoners, their activities and interaction, existing de-radicalization and re-socialization programs or further radicalization in prisons. The paper also focuses on the approach of the penitentiary institutions, capacities development (training), cooperation with religious communities, and the support provided by foreign partners. The comparative view contributes to the ongoing debate on de-radicalization in prisons but also the national efforts of the Republic of North Macedonia where these processes are still at initial phase.

The outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2012 brought the phenomenon of the so called Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) characterized with hundreds of young men from the Western Balkans traveling to Syria to join terrorist groups. In parallel, governments, but also international community, tried to search methods how to stop this process which brought the concept of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The aim of this paper is to make an overview of the approach of Western Balkans countries to prevent radicalization and the FTFs phenomenon and present various forms of engagement and various actors involved in the CVE efforts. For this purpose, the paper will include the activities and measures taken by the government, civil society, religious communities, and the international community in terms of support to local actors, as well as outlines regional approach initiatives.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the nature and main characteristics of the current threat of terrorism in Europe and its impact and influence on particular EU member states, the EU institutional and legislative mechanism and its basic values. In this regard, focus is placed on the threats originating from the so-callled " Islamic State " , foreign terrorist fighters and radicalized individuals, in the context of the Syrian conflict and refugee/migration crisis. The impact of threats on particular member states is presented through a comparative overview of Belgium, France and Germany in the face of recent counterterrorism efforts. The response at EU level, is presented through new initiatives regarding coordination, cooperation and information sharing among the European member states. The threat of Terrorism also has an influence on basic EU values, bringing about different attitudes to migration and Islam, whilst demonstrating the importance of inter-religious and inter-cultural relations in Europe.