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Earlier this month Ian Taylor reviewed India and China in Africa, a new book about Asian engagement in the West African oil industry. Here, the book’s author Raj Verma responds to Taylor’s comments, outlining the rationale and evidence... more
Earlier this month Ian Taylor reviewed India and China in Africa, a new book about Asian engagement in the West African oil industry. Here, the book’s author Raj Verma responds to Taylor’s comments, outlining the rationale and evidence for the framework used in the study. India and China in Africa: A comparative perspective of the oil industry. Raj Verma. London: Routledge. 2017.
In China and the New Maoists, Kerry Brown and Simone Van Nieuwenhuizen examine the endurance of Mao as a figure with continued, albeit controversial, resonance in contemporary China, with particular focus on the emergence of ‘new Maoism’.... more
In China and the New Maoists, Kerry Brown and Simone Van Nieuwenhuizen examine the endurance of Mao as a figure with continued, albeit controversial, resonance in contemporary China, with particular focus on the emergence of ‘new Maoism’. This compelling book is a must-read for those looking to get a better understanding of China’s recent history and its internal politics, writes Raj Verma.
Raj Verma finds that Jeff Smith’s “Cold Peace” offers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of Sino-Indian relations.
There are three images in international relations. The first examines the role of the leader or decision maker in foreign policy (FP) decision making and emphasises the personality, cognition and beliefs of the leader. The second examines... more
There are three images in international relations. The first examines the role of the leader or decision maker in foreign policy (FP) decision making and emphasises the personality, cognition and beliefs of the leader. The second examines the role of the state in FP with focus on the executive or government, state structure, elite perception and elite cohesion, role of bureaucracy, domestic societal actors and interest groups, social cohesion and political economy among others. The third looks at the level of external vulnerability in the anarchical international system due to the difference in the material capabilities or hard power (economic, political and military) between countries in the international system.
In Asia’s New Battlefield: The US, China and the Struggle for the Western Pacific, Richard Javad Heydarian addresses how changing relations between the US and China have impacted on their rivalry in the Western Pacific and the disputes in... more
In Asia’s New Battlefield: The US, China and the Struggle for the Western Pacific, Richard Javad Heydarian addresses how changing relations between the US and China have impacted on their rivalry in the Western Pacific and the disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Raj Verma finds that this well-researched book provides clear analysis of the varied ambitions and strategies of different states in the region, but questions whether it makes a significant contribution to the field.
The Handbook of Indian Defence Policy aims to provide an authoritative, compelling and comprehensive survey of India’s defence policy since it gained its independence in 1947. Raj Verma finds it an essential read for students, scholars... more
The Handbook of Indian Defence Policy aims to provide an authoritative, compelling and comprehensive survey of India’s defence policy since it gained its independence in 1947. Raj Verma finds it an essential read for students, scholars and especially policymakers interested in the external and internal security challenges facing India, the numerous problems and limitations which might stymie India’s rise to great power status and possible solutions to overcome these.
As India becomes an increasingly important player on the global stage scholars have picked over different facets of India’s foreign policy in order to understand past priorities and predict future aspirations. Raj Verma assesses two new... more
As India becomes an increasingly important player on the global stage scholars have picked over different facets of India’s foreign policy in order to understand past priorities and predict future aspirations. Raj Verma assesses two new studies published this year and their contributions to the growing literature in this area. Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview. Harsh V. Pant. Manchester University Press. 2016. Engaging the World: India’s Foreign Policy Since 1947. Sumit Ganguly. Oxford University Press. 2016.
This article contends that increasing centralisation of decision-making in China will undermine the country’s future economic growth. It highlights the declining role of private enterprises and the increasing role of state-owned... more
This article contends that increasing centralisation of decision-making in China will undermine the country’s future economic growth. It highlights the declining role of private enterprises and the increasing role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, and the extension of Communist Party influence in both SOEs and the private sector through the Party’s Organization Department and United Front Work Department. It argues that the increasing role of the state in the economy over the past decade has stifled growth through a decline in ‘total factor productivity’ because of increasing misallocation of resources. Centralisation, with associated losses in efficiency, objectivity, agility, speed and finesse regarding allocations of risks and investment, has debilitated decentralised decision-making and reduced the incentives for undertaking risks and innovation. The article argues that increasing Party control over the SOEs and the private sector will negatively impact the corporate structure and management decisions, exacerbate the fundamental problems of corporate governance and limit or hamper innovation.
Résumé/Abstract A potyvirus causing severe economic damage to zucchini squash was recently identified from Pune, India. The virus was isolated from leaves and fruits of zucchini (Cucurbita pepo L.) collected from commercial fields near... more
Résumé/Abstract A potyvirus causing severe economic damage to zucchini squash was recently identified from Pune, India. The virus was isolated from leaves and fruits of zucchini (Cucurbita pepo L.) collected from commercial fields near Pune during 2001. The infected ...
In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, editors David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan aim to offer an authoritative and up-to-date survey of foreign policy in India since 1947. Raj Verma writes that, despite some... more
In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, editors David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan aim to offer an authoritative and up-to-date survey of foreign policy in India since 1947. Raj Verma writes that, despite some limitations, the book is an essential read for students at all levels and scholars who want to familiarise themselves with India’s foreign policy debates.
Many analysts and policy makers agree that the withdrawal of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and formation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will exacerbate the political, social, ethnic and religious fault lines... more
Many analysts and policy makers agree that the withdrawal of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and formation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will exacerbate the political, social, ethnic and religious fault lines in Afghanistan and may lead to civil war and chaos in Afghanistan reminiscent of the 1990s. This will also exacerbate non-traditional security threats such as Islamic fundamentalist and transnational terrorism, drugs/narcotics trade and human migration/refugee crisis in the neighbouring countries and beyond. This article argues that tackling the non-traditional security threats facing the region and beyond is a public good. It analyses the tackling of non-traditional security threats –terrorism, narcotics trade and human migration/refugee inflow –through the prism of collective action problem that is joint production of a good or joint action to tackle the problem. It illustrates that difference in threat perception, clash/conflict of interests and geopolitical rivalries will hinder cooperation and intelligence sharing, and lead to uncoordinated action and free riding. It will also create problems of leadership and affect the choice and efficacy of the organisation/institution to tackle the threats. The article highlights that in the absence of collective action, it will be extremely difficult
In February 2020, the United States (US) and the Taliban signed a peace deal in Doha, Qatar which stipulated US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021. The Biden administration extended the deadline to 11 September 2021. The Doha... more
In February 2020, the United States (US) and the Taliban signed a peace deal in Doha, Qatar which stipulated US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021. The Biden administration extended the deadline to 11 September 2021. The Doha agreement does not augur peace and stability in Afghanistan with the country predicted to suffer from protracted violence and even a civil war. The instability in Afghanistan will also cascade into the neighbourhood and beyond and lead to non-traditional threats/challenges. In the new millennium, while Russia, Iran and some Central Asian countries have borne the brunt of the narcotics trade emanating from Afghanistan, these countries along with India, China and Pakistan have also suffered from increase in terrorist attacks due to an unstable Afghanistan. Human migration has also negatively impacted the socio-economic and political milieu of Pakistan and Iran. This special section assesses the non-traditional security challenges/threats such as transnational Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, drugs/narcotics trade and human migration in the region and beyond posed by increasing instability and protracted violence in Afghanistan as a consequence of US withdrawal, and discusses the role (or the lack) of international and regional organizations and country initiatives in providing solutions to overcome or mitigate these problems.
The intra-Afghan dialogue stalled despite hectic diplomatic efforts by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, and other countries to revitalize the dialogue and reach a political settlement before Western troops... more
The intra-Afghan dialogue stalled despite hectic diplomatic efforts by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, and other countries to revitalize the dialogue and reach a political settlement before Western troops left Afghanistan. This article argues that there were three main reasons for disagreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and these issues remained a major stumbling block in the peace process and will prevent lasting peace. First, the Taliban were unwilling to reduce violence or declare a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire,” as stated in the US-Taliban peace deal. Second, the Taliban would not accept Afghanistan’s democratic political system and insisted on establishing an “Islamic Emirate.” The group also showed its reluctance to respect women’s rights and advances made with respect to their social position. Third, the Taliban consistently refused to respect ethnic and religious tolerance of minorities, especially the Shia Hazara. The Hazara have declared that they will take up arms to protect themselves against the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul, which does not bode well for peace and stability in Afghanistan
In West Africa, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have outbid their Indian competitors. Indeed, over the years Chinese companies have proved to be less risk averse and are preferred as partners by international oil companies and... more
In West Africa, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have outbid their Indian competitors. Indeed, over the years Chinese companies have proved to be less risk averse and are preferred as partners by international oil companies and African NOCs. This article attempts to explain why. It does so by examining factors such as foreign exchange reserves, access to capital, rate of return on investment, valuation of asset, risk aversion, ability to acquire technology and the difference in the economic, political and diplomatic support received by the Indian and Chinese oil companies from their respective governments.
India is being ravaged by a second COVID-19 wave. As of last week, India had approximately 28.5 million infections and more than 340,000 deaths, although experts are unanimous that the death rate is under reported and the actual count is... more
India is being ravaged by a second COVID-19 wave. As of last week, India had approximately 28.5 million infections and more than 340,000 deaths, although experts are unanimous that the death rate is under reported and the actual count is much higher. Print, television and social media have highlighted the suffering of people. Television news channels have broadcast heart-breaking images of people begging for oxygen, admission into hospitals and beds for their friends and relatives, and standing in queues for hours for life saving medicines, ventilators and refilling of oxygen cylinders. Tens of thousands have died simply because they could not get access to oxygen. The Narendra Modi government’s vaccination drive has also hit a road block and there is an acute shortage of vaccines across India. The question that arises is could this suffering, these deaths, have been avoided? Could the Modi administration have done better? I argue that not only could the second wave have been prevented, but also the Modi government is responsible for exacerbating the second wave and the suffering of people because of its disastrous response. While the Modi administration’s complacency, inaction, and hubris are responsible for its failure to prevent the second wave, missteps, callousness, poor planning, and obfuscations further compounded the crisis.
Kashmir has been a thorn in the side of Indo-Pakistani relations since partition and remains a highly contentious issue today. In Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century, political scientist Sumit Ganguly... more
Kashmir has been a thorn in the side of Indo-Pakistani relations since partition and remains a highly contentious issue today. In Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century, political scientist Sumit Ganguly traces the conflict from its inception to the fallout from terrorist attacks in the 2000s. Raj Verma writes that the book is an essential read for students at all levels, as well as scholars, policymakers and government officials who want to familiarise themselves with India-Pakistan relations.
The article asserts that China’s NOCs have trumped Indian oil companies in four ways. First, Chinese NOCs have more oil blocks in Angola and Nigeria relative to Indian oil companies. Second, NOCs from China are able to outbid Indian oil... more
The article asserts that China’s NOCs have trumped Indian oil companies in four ways. First, Chinese NOCs have more oil blocks in Angola and Nigeria relative to Indian oil companies. Second, NOCs from China are able to outbid Indian oil companies if and when they directly compete for the same oil blocks. Third, Chinese NOCs have better quality oil blocks compared to Indian oil companies. Fourth, Chinese NOCs are preferred as partners by African NOCs and international oil companies. It provides a more comprehensive explanation of the above observations by examining macro level factors such as difference in the economic, political and diplomatic support received by the Chinese and Indian oil companies from their respective governments and foreign exchange reserves and micro level factors such as access to capital, rate of return on investment, pricing of oil and risk aversion.
In their new book The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy, Pant and Joshi explore India's response to the USA's strategic balancing approach in the Asia-Pacific region. Raj Verma finds the book a wide-ranging examination of... more
In their new book The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy, Pant and Joshi explore India's response to the USA's strategic balancing approach in the Asia-Pacific region. Raj Verma finds the book a wide-ranging examination of US-China-India relations but argues it would have benefitted from a more focused approach.
Raj Verma asked Indian experts and academics what foreign policy challenges India should prepare to tackle in the new year.
LSE’s Raj Verma deconstructs the Depsang Valley border conflict between India and China in April and its implications for bilateral relations between the rising Asian powers.
Raj Verma argues that despite increasing strategic and economic cooperation with Japan, India does not want to be a part of an alliance to contain a rising China.
Raj Verma discusses the key challenges that threaten to South Asian stability in 2016, from tensions between India and Pakistan, India’s “unofficial blockade” of Nepal, Afghan instability and the renewed rise of Islamic fundamentalism in... more
Raj Verma discusses the key challenges that threaten to South Asian stability in 2016, from tensions between India and Pakistan, India’s “unofficial blockade” of Nepal, Afghan instability and the renewed rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.
In only a decade, the BRICS group has achieved policy coordination among five very disparate countries and has started presenting a serious challenge to the status quo in global governance. It is now collaborating on many policy issues... more
In only a decade, the BRICS group has achieved policy coordination among five very disparate countries and has started presenting a serious challenge to the status quo in global governance. It is now collaborating on many policy issues and delegating authority to a range of BRICS organizations. Since the inception of BRICS, the protracted India–China rivalry has cast a dark shadow over the group. In the aftermath of the India–China standoff in Ladakh, especially the Galwan Valley clash evoking memories of more serious clashes such as those at Nathu La in 1967 and even the 1962 border war, a crucial axis of BRICS cooperation – the India–China relationship – has deteriorated. This Special Section examines whether the India–China rivalry will render BRICS dysfunctional. Will the BRICS group be broken? The contributors will analyse whether BRICS can be a pacifying force and outline the prospects for the development of BRICS in light of the India–China crisis.
This article seeks to provide an answer to the question: in the new millennium, why did China continue to block India’s (and other countries’) attempts to designate Pakistani citizens as terrorists under UNSC 1267 committee rules?... more
This article seeks to provide an answer to the question: in the new millennium, why did China continue to block India’s (and other countries’) attempts to designate Pakistani citizens as terrorists under UNSC 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China’s actions are explained by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in an “all-weather” strategic partnership between China and Pakistan against their mutual enemy India. However, the article argues that China’s actions are also explained by its concerns regarding terrorism/extremism/splittism in Xinjiang and the role of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)/ Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) which threatens its national unity and territorial integrity. China is wary that the listing of Pakistani citizens as terrorists under the UNSC 1267 rules will lead to instability in Pakistan (and Afghanistan), which will provide a breeding ground for terrorists of all forms and colors including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS/IS/ Daesh). Daesh is a bane for China because it has links with ETIM/TIP and in recent years Uyghurs have also joined Daesh.
The world has declared COVID-19 (a disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus or novel coronavirus) to be a pandemic. China has been chastised by various countries, especially the United States, for suppressing information and not taking... more
The world has declared COVID-19 (a disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus or novel coronavirus) to be a pandemic. China has been chastised by various countries, especially the United States, for suppressing information and not taking necessary measures which could have helped in controlling the spread of and/or eradicating the disease in the earlier stages. Consequently, China has undertaken numerous measures to change the COVID-19 narrative and disassociate itself from COVID-19. It launched a campaign to question the origins of SARS-CoV-2, blamed the United States for spreading COVID-19, claimed victory in combating COVID-19 domestically, and provided aid (“mask diplomacy”) to countries. These actions betray China’s concern about its image. The country wants to portray itself as a Good Samaritan, a responsible and reliable partner, and an essential global power. Additionally, China has grave concerns about regime stability and survival. President Xi’s legitimacy is built on technoc...
Abstract The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India’s (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar –... more
Abstract The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India’s (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China's actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in a strategic and ‘all weather partnership between China and Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China’s actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensuing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China’s geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socio-economic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China’s geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China’s reluctance to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist.
The ever increasing rise of China economically and militarily, especially since the beginning of the 21st century has undoubtedly boosted its relative power capabilities. This is what Gideon Rose and his fellow neoclassical realists... more
The ever increasing rise of China economically and militarily, especially since the beginning of the 21st century has undoubtedly boosted its relative power capabilities. This is what Gideon Rose and his fellow neoclassical realists elucidate as a state’s political, economic and military or hard power capabilities. This, thus, gives the Asian giant a higher leverage over many of its competitors in the global power and economic politics, especially those regional rivals, including India which is regarded as China’s major regional and to some extent, global rival. India has also risen as an economic power and like China, is a member of BRICS and also categorized as an emerging economy. Indeed, while we have tomes of literature on China and its activities in Africa, little is known about that of India and more especially, how the two Asian rivals compete in the resource-rich African continent. Both states are involved in what has been termed as ‘the scramble for resources in Africa’ in the 21st century.’
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the party no longer took the position that, as the only party with an all-India presence, it had a right to lead. The BJP prime minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee’s well-publicised bus trip to Lahore in February... more
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the party no longer took the position that, as the only party with an all-India presence, it had a right to lead. The BJP prime minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee’s well-publicised bus trip to Lahore in February 1999 was building on a rapprochement with Pakistan whose foundations had been laid over the previous year by the prime minister of the United Front, Inder Kumar Gujral, who had shared with his counterpart in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, their “Punjabi heritage and personal bonhomie”. In his short tenure, Gujral also signed off on moves to improve relations both with Nepal, in restoring trade, and with Bangladesh, in resolving the longstanding Ganges waters dispute. Apart from a ‘new direction’ in foreign policy, Ruparelia attributes to the Third Front experiments a gradual rapprochement with the communist left and a general improvement in relations between the centre and the States. The first Janata government in 1977 had strengthened democracy by abolishing Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule, and successive Fronts had extended the scope of their cooperation.
in other words, they are social, civil and political rights. In the conclusion of Chapter 7 and also of the book, Pun Ngai sums up her key arguments around the emergence of workers’ agency, collective consciousness and shared interests... more
in other words, they are social, civil and political rights. In the conclusion of Chapter 7 and also of the book, Pun Ngai sums up her key arguments around the emergence of workers’ agency, collective consciousness and shared interests out of their class experiences in the nexus of power and domination, as well as the crystallisation of workers’ desires to claim their agency. The notion of justice, while potentially significant in the framing of workers’ claims, are missing from her conclusion. The scant attention elsewhere in this book to this promising issue and the extent to which it may leverage workers’ rights-based claims and potentially unite formal and informal workers can be seen as an open ground for future research. Overall, this book is an enjoyable and enlightening read. It gives an intricate account and provides impassioned analysis of the contradictions surrounding the work and lives of migrant workers in China’s “miracle growth.” At the end of Made in China, Pun Ngai’s highly acclaimed book published in 2005 by Duke University Press, she opened up the possibility of social transformation brought about by new dreams and new desires of the migrant working class, despite all their sufferings, despair and their immiseration. Readers will find a similar spirit of hope in this book, albeit a bigger one for democracy in China and labour internationalism. Amid this turbulent time of Chinese labour politics, what some may see as Pun Ngai’s romanticisation, I find justifiable.
India’s long-standing involvement in African affairs has only recently shifted to the pursuit of economic interests (the economic-diplomacy angle of this switch is discussed further in Chap. 5). Operating under the shadow of media frenzy... more
India’s long-standing involvement in African affairs has only recently shifted to the pursuit of economic interests (the economic-diplomacy angle of this switch is discussed further in Chap. 5). Operating under the shadow of media frenzy over China’s decade-long economic thrust into the continent, the Indian presence has gone relatively unnoticed outside sectoral engagements in some African countries. And yet in many respects the Indian position on Africa is characterized by a diversity and depth that set it apart from other emerging (and even traditional) powers engaged in continental affairs. From global multinational Tata to hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, the foundational dimensions of Indian interests in Africa argue for a stronger representation in economic affairs commensurate with this broad-based position.
Many analysts and policy makers agree that the withdrawal of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and formation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will exacerbate the political, social, ethnic and religious fault lines... more
Many analysts and policy makers agree that the withdrawal of the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and formation of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will exacerbate the political, social, ethnic and religious fault lines in Afghanistan and may lead to civil war and chaos in Afghanistan reminiscent of the 1990s. This will also exacerbate non-traditional security threats such as Islamic fundamentalist and transnational terrorism, drugs/narcotics trade and human migration/refugee crisis in the neighbouring countries and beyond. This
article argues that tackling the non-traditional security threats facing the region and beyond is a public good. It analyses the tackling of non-traditional security threats –terrorism, narcotics trade and human migration/refugee inflow –through the prism of collective action problem that is joint production of a good or joint action to tackle the problem. It illustrates that difference in threat perception, clash/conflict of interests and geopolitical rivalries will hinder cooperation and intelligence sharing, and lead to uncoordinated action and free riding. It will also create problems of leadership and affect the choice and efficacy of the organisation/institution to tackle the threats. The article highlights that in the absence of collective action, it will be extremely difficult
In February 2020, the United States (US) and the Taliban signed a peace deal in Doha, Qatar which stipulated US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021. The Biden administration extended the deadline to 11 September 2021. The Doha... more
In February 2020, the United States (US) and the Taliban signed a peace deal in Doha, Qatar which stipulated US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by 1 May 2021. The Biden administration extended the deadline to 11 September 2021. The Doha agreement does not augur peace and stability in Afghanistan with the country predicted to suffer from protracted violence and even a civil war. The instability in Afghanistan will also cascade into the neighbourhood and beyond and lead to non-traditional threats/challenges. In the new millennium, while Russia, Iran and some Central Asian countries have borne the brunt of the narcotics trade emanating from Afghanistan, these countries along with India, China and Pakistan have also suffered from increase in terrorist attacks due to an unstable Afghanistan. Human migration has also negatively impacted the socio-economic and political milieu of Pakistan and Iran. This special section assesses the non-traditional security challenges/threats such as transnational Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism, drugs/narcotics trade and human migration in the region and
beyond posed by increasing instability and protracted violence in Afghanistan as a consequence of US withdrawal, and discusses the role (or the lack) of international and regional organizations and country initiatives in providing solutions to overcome or mitigate these problems.
LSE’s Raj Verma describes how India and China differ in their approaches to mobilising crude oil in West Africa. Read more articles in the “Why India-Africa relations matter” blog series.
The intra-Afghan dialogue stalled despite hectic diplomatic efforts by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, and other countries to revitalize the dialogue and reach a political settlement before Western troops... more
The intra-Afghan dialogue stalled despite hectic diplomatic efforts by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, and other countries to revitalize the dialogue and reach a political settlement before Western troops left Afghanistan. This article argues that there were three main reasons for disagreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and these issues remained a major stumbling block in the peace process and will prevent lasting peace. First, the Taliban were unwilling to reduce violence or declare a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire,” as stated in the US-Taliban peace deal. Second, the Taliban would not accept Afghanistan’s democratic political system and insisted on establishing an “Islamic Emirate.” The group also showed its reluctance to respect women’s rights and advances made with respect to their social position. Third, the Taliban consistently refused to respect ethnic and religious tolerance of minorities, especially the Shia Hazara. The Hazara have declared that they will take up arms to protect themselves against the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul, which does not bode well for peace and stability in Afghanistan
What is the future of the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) group? BRICS has transformed in record time from a global nonentity into an informal institution that pursues global policy leadership, features extensive policy... more
What is the future of the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) group? BRICS has transformed in record time from a global nonentity into an informal institution that pursues global policy leadership, features extensive policy coordination among five powerful countries, and creates its own organizations. While BRICS momentum seemed unstoppable, a militarized dispute between India and China in 2020 raised questions about the group's future. This contribution concludes the Special Section by arguing that the BRICS group is not broken. Instead, it faces a range of strategic, geopolitical and operational challenges: how it addresses them will define its future trajectory and its impact on global governance. This essay analyses the situation from a conflict resolution perspective while bringing together insights from the five BRICS countries. It conceptualizes new directions for the BRICS group. Two possible internal conflict management scenarios are outlined: circumventing conflict and making institutional adjustments. Yet the real test of the group's resilience is its ability to exert collective leadership and improve global governance. BRICS' response to COVID-19 and to the challenge of sustainable development offers insights into the group's ability to advance community goals.
In only a decade, the BRICS group has achieved policy coordination among five very disparate countries and has started presenting a serious challenge to the status quo in global governance. It is now collaborating on many policy issues... more
In only a decade, the BRICS group has achieved policy coordination among five very disparate countries and has started presenting a serious challenge to the status quo in global governance. It is now collaborating on many policy issues and delegating authority to a range of BRICS organizations. Since the inception of BRICS, the protracted India-China rivalry has cast a dark shadow over the group. In the aftermath of the India-China standoff in Ladakh, especially the Galwan Valley clash evoking memories of more serious clashes such as those at Nathu La in 1967 and even the 1962 border war, a crucial axis of BRICS cooperationthe India-China relationshiphas deteriorated. This Special Section examines whether the India-China rivalry will render BRICS dysfunctional. Will the BRICS group be broken? The contributors will analyse whether BRICS can be a pacifying force and outline the prospects for the development of BRICS in light of the India-China crisis.
There is a broad consensus that the US-Taliban peace deal does not augur peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, most of the experts have ignored the role of regional powers and their interests and their impact on the US-Taliban... more
There is a broad consensus that the US-Taliban peace deal does not augur peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, most of the experts have ignored the role of regional powers and their interests and their impact on the US-Taliban peace deal. This paper explores the case of Iran as a potential spoiler and exacerbating violence and instability in Afghanistan. It discusses three reasons for Iran's intervention: the Taliban dominating the inclusive national unity government or trying to establish an Islamic Emirate through military force and Iran-Pakistan clash of interests, the continued persecution of Shias and Hazaras by the Taliban and worsening of US-Iran relations. It highlights the various tools especially the non-state actors at Iran's disposal to achieve its political, economic and strategic objectives in Afghanistan. It also analyses the potential constraints that might limit/inhibit Iran in meeting its foreign policy and security objectives in Afghanistan and the broader region.
India is being ravaged by a second COVID-19 wave. As of last week, India had approximately 28.5 million infections and more than 340,000 deaths, although experts are unanimous that the death rate is under reported and the actual count is... more
India is being ravaged by a second COVID-19 wave. As of last week, India had approximately 28.5 million infections and more than 340,000 deaths, although experts are unanimous that the death rate is under reported and the actual count is much higher. Print, television and social media have highlighted the suffering of people. Television news channels have broadcast heart-breaking images of people begging for oxygen,
admission into hospitals and beds for their friends and relatives, and standing in queues for hours for life saving medicines, ventilators and refilling of oxygen cylinders. Tens of thousands have died simply because they could not get access to oxygen. The Narendra Modi
government’s vaccination drive has also hit a road block and there is an acute shortage of vaccines across India.

The question that arises is could this suffering, these deaths, have been
avoided? Could the Modi administration have done better? I argue that not only could the second wave have been prevented, but also the Modi
government is responsible for exacerbating the second wave and the
suffering of people because of its disastrous response. While the Modi
administration’s complacency, inaction, and hubris are responsible for its
failure to prevent the second wave, missteps, callousness, poor planning, and obfuscations further compounded the crisis.
The loss in West Bengal and the COVID-19 disaster have both tarnished “Brand Modi”—the image of a strong, efficient, credible, and able administrator who both fights and works for the masses and is able to deliver on his promises—and... more
The loss in West Bengal and the COVID-19 disaster have both tarnished “Brand Modi”—the image of a strong, efficient, credible, and able administrator who both fights and works for the masses and is able to deliver on his promises—and raised doubt regarding Modi’s appeal, his capacity to connect with the masses, and his ability to win elections in 2024. However, despite the twin setbacks, Modi remains a formidable opponent and it would be misguided to write him off in the 2024 national elections. Four trends underlie this. First, there is no opposition leader who can match Modi’s persona, mass connect, and national appeal. Second, Modi has three years to repair his image. Third, state elections are fought on local issues and do not reflect the national sentiment. Finally, a lack of a unified opposition will not pose a big challenge to Modi and the BJP.
This article asserts that China is aware of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) superiority on the border and is either pursuing a strategy of “deterrence by denial” or “deterrence by punishment” through its missile arsenal with respect to the... more
This article asserts that China is aware of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) superiority on the border and is either pursuing a strategy of “deterrence by denial” or “deterrence by punishment” through its missile arsenal with respect to the IAF. However, given the IAFs superiority, India is better prepared for a “deterrence by punishment” strategy to compel China to restore status quo ante. While “deterrence by denial” aims to deter China from gaining territory along the LAC, “deterrence by punishment” aims to raise the cost for China by threatening to take the battle to the PLA and destroy and reduce its potential to undertake war. Given India’s edge over China on the Sino-Indian border, India can signal a deterrence by punishment strategy. The challenge for India, however, is how to credibly signal its capabilities and its intentions to China.
Since May 5, India and China have been witnessing tense border skirmishes and standoffs in Sikkim and Eastern Ladakh along the un-demarcated and disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). Initially bringing back memories of the Doklam... more
Since May 5, India and China have been witnessing tense border skirmishes and standoffs in Sikkim and Eastern Ladakh along the un-demarcated and disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). Initially bringing back memories of the Doklam standoff in June 2017, the recent clashes resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers have seemed to hearken back to the more serious clashes, such as those at Nathu La in 1967 and even the 1962 border war. As the tensions continue, analysts and commentators have provided numerous unconfirmed reasons for the renewed standoff and what has been seen by some as surprising Chinese aggression. This analysis has seen a growing focus on domestic factors, such as a potential weakening of President Xi's position in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after COVID-19 or precipitating actions in India's foreign policy as possible causes for the standoff. However, this article argues that the primary reason for China's aggression is security and strategic concerns related to India's road and infrastructure construction along the LAC rather than domestic factors. Explanations for the Current Border Standoff The primary reason given for the current India-China border standoff(s) is India's building of roads and infrastructure along the LAC. China's more favorable topography, metaled roads and other infrastructure to deploy troops and military equipment in the event of a war with India, has given it a strategic advantage on its side of the border. India is well aware of this disadvantage and under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has prioritized building infrastructure to negate China's advantage and is fast catching up. China perceives Indian construction, especially
The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India’s (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of... more
The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India’s (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China’s actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry
resulting in a strategic and ‘all weather partnership between China and
Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China’s actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensuing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China’s geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socioeconomic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China’s geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides
a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China’s reluctance to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist.
This article seeks to provide an answer to the question: in the new millennium, why did China continue to block India’s (and other countries’) attempts to designate Pakistani citizens as terrorists under UNSC 1267 committee rules?... more
This article seeks to provide an answer to the question: in
the new millennium, why did China continue to block India’s
(and other countries’) attempts to designate Pakistani citizens
as terrorists under UNSC 1267 committee rules? According
to the extant literature, China’s actions are explained
by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in
an “all-weather” strategic partnership between China and
Pakistan against their mutual enemy India. However, the
article argues that China’s actions are also explained by its
concerns regarding terrorism/extremism/splittism in Xinjiang
and the role of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)/
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) which threatens its national
unity and territorial integrity. China is wary that the listing
of Pakistani citizens as terrorists under the UNSC 1267 rules
will lead to instability in Pakistan (and Afghanistan), which
will provide a breeding ground for terrorists of all forms and
colors including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS/IS/
Daesh). Daesh is a bane for China because it has links with
ETIM/TIP and in recent years Uyghurs have also joined Daesh.
The world has declared COVID-19 (a disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus or novel coronavirus) to be a pandemic. China has been chastised by various countries, especially the United States, for suppressing information and not taking... more
The world has declared COVID-19 (a disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus or novel coronavirus) to be a pandemic. China has been chastised by various countries, especially the United States, for suppressing information and not taking necessary measures which could have helped in controlling the spread of and/or eradicating the disease in the earlier stages. Consequently, China has undertaken numerous measures to change the COVID-19 narrative and disassociate itself from COVID-19. It launched a campaign to question the origins of SARS-CoV-2, blamed the United States for spreading COVID-19, claimed victory in combating COVID-19 domestically, and provided aid ("mask diplomacy") to countries. These actions betray China's concern about its image. The country wants to portray itself as a Good Samaritan, a responsible and reliable partner, and an essential global power. Additionally, China has grave concerns about regime stability and survival. President Xi's legitimacy is built on technocratic competence. The outbreak has the potential to seriously dent his personal legacy.
The article asserts that China’s NOCs have trumped Indian oil companies in four ways. First, Chinese NOCs have more oil blocks in Angola and Nigeria relative to Indian oil companies. Second, NOCs from China are able to outbid Indian oil... more
The article asserts that China’s NOCs have trumped Indian oil
companies in four ways. First, Chinese NOCs have more oil
blocks in Angola and Nigeria relative to Indian oil companies.
Second, NOCs from China are able to outbid Indian oil companies
if and when they directly compete for the same oil
blocks. Third, Chinese NOCs have better quality oil blocks
compared to Indian oil companies. Fourth, Chinese NOCs are
preferred as partners by African NOCs and international oil
companies. It provides a more comprehensive explanation of
the above observations by examining macro level factors such
as difference in the economic, political and diplomatic support
received by the Chinese and Indian oil companies from their
respective governments and foreign exchange reserves and
micro level factors such as access to capital, rate of return on
investment, pricing of oil and risk aversion.
In West Africa, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have outbid their Indian competitors. Indeed, over the years Chinese companies have proved to be less risk averse and are preferred as partners by international oil companies and... more
In West Africa, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have outbid their Indian competitors. Indeed, over the years Chinese companies have proved to be less risk averse and are preferred as partners by international oil companies and African NOCs. This article attempts to explain why. It does so by examining factors such as foreign exchange reserves, access to capital, rate of return on investment, valuation of asset, risk aversion, ability to acquire technology and the difference in the economic, political and diplomatic support received by the Indian and Chinese oil companies from their respective governments.