Paul van Tongeren

The term "nihilism" is often used as an invective to blame a person or a way of thinking. If used in that way there would be a simple opposition between "nihilism and morality". That opposition could maybe point to a practical problem, but certainly not to a theoretical one. If, however, we follow Fr. Nietzsche's analysis of what he calls "the European nihilism" we must conclude that morality is not so much the opposite of nihilism, but rather itself nihilistic. The inescapable nihilistic "catastrophe" (Nietzsche is never afraid of big words) arises as soon as morality discovers its own nihilist features, which - according to him - is happening at present. The problem indicated in the title refers to the question what could be the result of this self-undermining discovery; and if morality survives - as it seems to be the case - how is this at all possible? In my elaboration of this problem I focus on a particular element of our moral tradition. That tradition can in general be summarized in the three well-known ethical positions: utilitarianism or consequentialism, Kantianism or duty-ethics and eudaimonism or virtue-ethics. In the historical development of the latter, the introduction of Christianity in Western culture was responsible for some additional virtues that were strongly different from the Greek ones. These explicitly religious virtues seem - strangely enough - nevertheless to survive in our present secular context. The question how this survival is possible is being stressed in the article by describing our contemporary situation in the light of Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism. For Nietzsche "nihilism" refers first and foremost to the platonic-christian tradition in which reality is denied or "annihilated" through the fictitious construction of a "true world". This annihilated world can, however, also itself be called "nihilistic", in the sense that this world (this "reality" which is denied by the platonic construction) is characterized by chaos and absurdity. The event of the so-called "death of God" is the collapse of the imaginary construction of the Christian-platonic world. This event characterizes the present age according to Nietzsche. Literary imagination since the 19th century gives us a picture of what it would mean to live in this situation. If we cannot live without morality, what would living under these nihilistic conditions mean? Nietzsche explains why nihilism is a catastrophe, but nevertheless, at least for the time being, remains unnoticed to most people. In a certain sense God seems to survive his own death: platonic philosophy survives in the sciences as Christian morality does in contemporary humanism. But this survival is only relative and temporal. Sooner or later, the catastrophe will break through. Although Nietzsche sometimes speaks of an overcoming of nihilism, he does not seem to be able to conceptualize what that would consist of. Nihilism is, according to him, the inevitable result of a process in which the platonic-Christian structure (most clearly in the form of its "will to truth") undermines itself. The philosopher who understands and describes or even promotes this process cannot get any further than becoming himself the incarnation of the problem that he describes. But Nietzsche's self-descriptions seem to show that this paradoxical or even contradictory identity of the philosopher has a positive reverse side. On the one hand it is the untolerable aporia of not being able to believe in those fictions that one needs in order to live. On the other hand, however, it appears as the continuing attachment to those values and virtues that were undermined. Maybe we can still adhere to even the Christian virtues in a kind of parasitic attitude. Nihilisme en moral Veelal wordt het begrip "nihilisme" gebruikt als een beschuldigende term, doelend op en gericht tegen mensen die "om geen God of gebod" lijken te geven, of met betrekking tot een cultuur of samenleving die goddeloos en immoreel zou zijn. Wanneer de term op die manier gebruikt wordt, bevat de tegenstelling "nihilisme en moraal" misschien een praktisch, maar zeker geen theoretisch probleem. Fr. Nietzsche presenteert een ander en rijker begrip van nihilisme. Volgens hem staat het nihilisme niet slechts tegenover de moraal, maar zit het erin. Die samenhang tussen moral en nihilisme neemt niet weg dat de moraal door de ontwikkeling van het nihilisme ondermijnd wordt. De vraag van dit artikel is hoe dat kan: hoe kan moraal bestaan in het nihilisme en wat betekent dat voor de moraal? Om die vraag op de spits te drijven concentreer ik me op een expliciet christelijk aspect van de moraal, de zogenaamde christelijke deugden.

Is er een verschil tussen theologie en filosofie, en zo ja, waarin ligt dat verschil? Dat lijkt me de kern te zijn van de punten die Johan van der Hoeven als commentaar naar voren brengt in zijn zeer sympathieke bespreking van mijn bijdrage aan het cursusboek van de Open Universiteit. Ik zal proberen duidelijk te maken waarom ik denk dat dit de kern is, hoewel hij zelf een andere “hoofdvraag” lijkt te formuleren. Maar eerst twee opmerkingen vooraf.

O presente artigo examina o conceito, o diagnóstico e o prognóstico feito por Nietzsche a respeito do niilismo europeu e sua história, e o analisa como uma das mais importantes de suas contribuições para a filosofia e a cultura de nosso tempo.

Over the last decades the notions of forgiveness and reconciliation have increasingly been expressed in the public sphere in many countries. + ere is a pervasive trend towards public apologies, forms of national introspection and public appeals to grant forgiveness. Archbishop Tutu’s motto that “there is no future without forgiveness” is well known. He has argued that forgiveness is the only way to liberate oneself from the prison of past animosity and rancour.1 Partly due to Tutu’s e/ orts, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has become an important model and source of inspiration for many other countries that want to deal with their past grievances and internal con3 icts. For others, however, to speak of forgiveness in politics is inappropriate and risky. What is more unforgivable than the atrocities of the powerful? Forgiveness is seldom a servant of justice, some claim.2 + e opposition between proponents and opponents of public forgiveness raises conceptual, philosophical, empirical and practical questions: What does ‘forgiveness’ mean, how does speaking in terms of ‘forgiveness’ function, and under what conditions can it foster transitional justice processes? Section 2 will start with some philosophical questions regarding the meaning of ‘public forgiveness’ and we will relate these to questions about the conditions under which the oratory of public forgiveness does occur. We will elaborate two positions, one labelled ‘minimalist’, in section 3, and the other ‘maximalist’ position, in section 4. In section 5 we will discuss the notion of ‘invitational forgiveness’ and the question whether a forgiving attitude is a necessary aspect of mitigating a confrontational social climate. In section 6 we will pay attention

Eros and Eris: The Trojan War and Heidegger on the Essence of Truth.- Hesiods theogonische Eris.- Wandlungen der Tugendlehre bei Platon und Aristoteles.- Uber den tragischen Charakter des Handelns bei Aristoteles und Hegel.- At War within Oneself: Augustine's Phenomenology of the Will in the Confessions.- Strategien des Begehrens: Liebe und Konflikt bei Augustinus.- L'Absolu et le Relatif dans la Doctrine Bonaventurienne. Le Dernier Horizon de la Pensee.- "Like Straw": Religion and Psychoanalysis.- The Mystical Theology of Cusanus's De Visione Dei.- From Necessity to Possibility.- Kants Idee einer Weltrepublik.- Hegel und das absolute Wissen.- Critique et Systeme de la Metaphysique dans la Derniere Philosophie de Schelling.- "Do Not Forget the Whip". Notes on a Pronouncement of Nietzsche.- Die Einheit der phanomenologischen Philosophie.- Spacing Imagination. Husserl and the Phenomenology of Imagination.- Le Possible et la Revelation.- L'Ardeur de ...

Paul van Tongeren het teologie en filosofie studeer aan die universiteite van Utrecht (Ndl.) en Leuven (B.). Hy het sy PhD aan Leuven behaal met 'n dissertasie oor die moraal van Nietzsche se moraliteitskritiek. Hy is professor in morele filosofie in die Departement Filosofie van die Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (Nederland), 'n buitengewone professor in etiek aan die Instituut van Filosofie in Leuven (Belgie) en 'n navorsings­ genoot by die Universiteit van Pretoria. In 2013 het hy vir twee maande as 'n navorsingsgenoot gewerk by STIAS (Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Study). Hierdie artikel is die resultaat van sy verbintenis met STIAS. Sy navorsing handel hoofsaaklik oor Nietzsche, hermeneutiek en die (geskiedenis) van morele filosofie. Verdere inligting en 'n publikasielys is verkrygbaar by: www.paulvantongeren.nl Paul van Tongeren studied theology and philosophy in Utrecht (Nl.) and Leuven (B.). He got his PhD from Leuven with a dissertation on the morali...

Als filosofie "actualiteitsanalyse" wil zijn, moet zij niet alleen een kritische blik werpen op de eigen actualiteit, maar ook, en daartoe, op de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van een beschrijving en diagnose van die eigen tijd. Actualiteit is de werkelijkheid van "hier en nu". Maar wellicht kan dat "hier en nu" alleen dan doorzien worden op een manier die niet de vooroordelen van de eigen tijd en omgeving herhaalt, wanneer men afstand neemt van dat hier en nu. In dit artikel wordt die afstand ingenomen door Nietzsches beschrijving en duiding van het nihilisme weer te geven op een manier die de actualiteit daarvan suggereert. Wat hij in zijn 19de eeuw aankondigt als de geschiedenis van de komende twee eeuwen, lijkt inderdaad herkend te kunnen worden in onze tijd. Bovendien wordt de suggestie gedaan dat wat volgens Nietzsche een typisch Europees fenomeen is - hij spreekt van "het Europese nihilisme" - ook buiten Europa herkend kan worden. Waarschijn...