JP4481086B2 - Vehicle anti-theft device - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a vehicle antitheft device for preventing vehicle theft by illegally using an engine starter or the like by remote control.

  In particular, the key storing the identification code is used to start the engine, the identification code of the key is verified by the code verification unit, and the verification result of the code verification unit is transmitted from the vehicle body control means to the engine control means. The present invention relates to an anti-theft device mounted on a vehicle that transmits a cell drive permission signal to an engine start control means and transmits an engine operation signal from the engine control means to the engine start control means.

  In a conventional antitheft device for vehicles, an immobilizer antenna is arranged on the vehicle side, a transponder is built in an ignition key (hereinafter referred to as key 2b), and an identification code (ID code) stored in the key 2b is stored in the vehicle. There is a device in which the identification code is collated and the engine is not started if the collation does not match (for example, Patent Document 1).

  That is, in the conventional vehicle antitheft device as shown in FIG. 5, by applying a magnetic field to the transponder when starting the engine, the identification code owned by the transponder is sent to the immobilizer antenna on the vehicle side, and the correct key 2b is used. Is checked by the code verification unit 9 arranged in the BCM 3 as the vehicle body control means.

  When the identification code matches the identification code registered in the vehicle 1 in advance, collation such as sending the collation result from the BCM 3 to the ECU 4 as engine control means for controlling the operation of the engine is performed.

  In addition to this communication, a cell drive permission signal is transmitted from the BCM 3 to the IPDM 5 as the engine start control means.

  The flow of signals until the engine is started will be described with reference to the data flow diagram of FIG.

  First, the identification code is collated between the key 2b and the BCM 3.

  When the identification codes match, the ECU 4 transmits random number data A to the BCM 3. This random number data A is data updated every time the key 2b is turned on (IGN ON).

  In BCM3, encryption B1 corresponding to the received random number data A is calculated.

  The ECU 4 also calculates the corresponding encryption B2 based on the sent random number data A.

  Then, the code match signal indicating that the identification codes match and the calculated encrypted B1 signal are returned from the BCM 3 to the ECU 4.

  The ECU 4 that has received the reply signal collates the cipher B2 calculated by itself with the cipher B1 and determines whether or not they match.

  If the cipher B1 and the cipher B2 match, a cipher match signal is transmitted from the ECU 4 to the BCM 3.

  Further, the BCM 3 that has received the encryption match signal returns a confirmation signal indicating that the verification has been completed to the ECU 4.

  As a result, the engine 6 is in a state in which normal operation is possible, and an engine operation signal such as a fuel injection timing signal and an ignition timing signal is transmitted from the engine control unit 4 to the engine start control unit 5.

  On the other hand, an engine starter that can start the engine by remote control in order to set the warm-up operation or the room temperature of the vehicle 1 to a comfortable temperature is commercially available at car accessory stores and the like.

  This engine starting device is configured by an in-vehicle device 7 installed on the vehicle 1 side and a transmitter 8 carried by an operator.

  When the operator operates the transmitter 8 and sends an engine start instruction signal to the in-vehicle device 7, the in-vehicle device 7 is activated and starts decoding the identification code, the cipher B1 and the like.

For example, if the in-vehicle device 7 is a device that reads all the patterns of the cipher B1 sent back from the BCM 3 to the ECU 4, the in-vehicle device 7 performs a collation operation with the ECU 4 in place of the legitimate BCM 3, and activates the engine 6. it can.
Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 9-221022 (FIG. 9, paragraphs 0003 to 0015)

  However, there is a possibility that a conventional vehicle antitheft device combining an immobilizer antenna and a transponder may be released by a person who uses the engine starting device for an unauthorized purpose.

  That is, if the in-vehicle device 7 is attached to a predetermined position and the collation operation can be intercepted, the engine 6 becomes operable by an unauthorized person's operation, and the cell motor is activated by the IPDM 5 to which the cell drive permission signal that does not require the collation operation is transmitted. Driven, the engine 6 can be started.

  Accordingly, the present invention provides a vehicle antitheft device capable of determining that an abnormality has occurred in a vehicle and preventing the vehicle from traveling when the engine starter is illegally attached and an attempt is made to start the engine. It is intended to provide.

In order to achieve the above object, the vehicle antitheft device of the present invention uses a key storing an identification code when starting the engine, collates the identification code of the key with a code collation unit, and the collation result of the code collation unit Is transmitted to the engine control means via the vehicle control communication network from the vehicle body control means, and a cell drive permission signal is transmitted from the vehicle body control means to the engine start control means. In the vehicle antitheft device for transmitting an engine operation signal to the engine start control means, the code coincidence signal which is a condition for transmitting the engine operation signal is represented by an identification code indicating a source in the control communication network of the vehicle. If it is determined to have been transmitted from the other control unit, and monitoring means for detecting an abnormality of the vehicle, the monitor hand Abnormality is characterized by having a locking means for preventing the driving of the vehicle when it is detected by.

The locking means stops transmission of an engine operation signal from the engine control means to the engine start control means, and stops transmission of a cell drive permission signal from the vehicle body control means to the engine start control means. It can be set as the structure which has a signal stop part .

Furthermore, the locking means may be configured to have a CAN stop for stopping the flow of control communication control network of the vehicle.

The lock unit may include an engine operation stop unit that stops transmission of an engine operation signal from the engine control unit to the engine .

  According to the first aspect of the present invention configured as described above, an abnormality of the vehicle is monitored by the monitoring unit, and the vehicle is prevented from traveling by the locking unit when an abnormality is detected.

  For this reason, if an abnormality occurs in the vehicle by an unauthorized means such as arranging a decryption device, the abnormality can be detected to prevent the vehicle from being stolen.

Also, the code coincidence signal and the encryption signal With legitimate key from the vehicle control means is returned to the engine control unit has a monitoring means for monitoring either not transmitted from another terminal device.

  That is, even if the key is collated by an unauthorized interception means, if the signal source is not correct, it is determined that an abnormality has occurred in the vehicle 1.

  For this reason, it is possible to prevent the vehicle from being stolen by using an improper vehicle-mounted device that impersonates the regular vehicle body control means.

Further, the prior SL signal stop unit stops the transmission of the engine operating communication to the engine start control means from said engine control means, the transmission of the cell drive permission signal to the engine start control unit from the vehicle body control unit Stop.

  For this reason, the engine is not started when unauthorized access is detected.

Further, stopping the flow of control communication control network of the vehicle by the previous SL CAN stop.

  If the flow of control communication is all stopped, the operation of the terminal connected to the control communication network stops, so that the vehicle cannot travel normally.

Further, to stop the transmission of the engine operation signal toward the engine from the engine control unit by the previous SL engine operation stop.

  For this reason, even if the engine is started by unauthorized means, the vehicle can be prevented from traveling unless the engine is normally controlled.

  The best mode for carrying out the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

  1 and 4 show a configuration of a vehicle antitheft device according to the best mode.

First, in terms of configuration, the vehicle antitheft device of such an embodiment includes a code verification unit 9, BCMs 10 and 13 as vehicle body control means, and an ECU 4 as engine control means for controlling the operation of the engine. , An IPDM 5 serving as an engine start control means for controlling the start of the engine, a monitor means for monitoring an abnormality of the vehicle 1, and a lock means for preventing the vehicle from traveling.
[Embodiment 1]
In the present embodiment, a configuration in which the code matching unit 9 is incorporated in the BCM 10 will be described.

  The code verification unit 9 verifies whether the identification code (ID code) of the key 2b owned by the transponder matches the identification code stored in advance in the rewritable storage device (EEPROM) of the vehicle 1.

  A code match signal is generated when the identification codes of the two match.

  The BCM 10 transmits the verification signal received from the code verification unit 9 to the ECU 4 together with a later-described encryption B1 signal.

  ECU4 is a control part for operating engine 6 normally by controlling each part including fuel injection quantity according to the signal from each sensor, each switch, etc.

  During engine operation, various control signals (engine operation signals) are transmitted from the ECU 4 to the engine 6 so that normal operation of the engine continues.

  An engine operation signal is also transmitted from the ECU 4 to the IPDM 5 in order to assist in starting the engine 6.

  The engine operation signal includes a fuel timing signal for instructing the injection timing of the fuel injection device, an ignition timing signal for instructing the ignition timing of the ignition device, and the like.

  The ECU 4 transmits the random number data A to the BCM 10 after code verification. The random number data A is data updated every time the key 2b is turned on (IGN ON).

  Based on the random number data A, the BCM 10 calculates the cipher B1 through arithmetic processing. Also in the ECU 4, the encryption B <b> 2 is calculated from the random number data A by the same arithmetic processing.

  That is, the arithmetic processing unit of the same method is incorporated in the BCM 10 and the ECU 4, and the same value is calculated for the randomly generated random number data A.

  For this reason, if the encryption B1 and the encryption B2 calculated separately from the same data in the respective control means match, it can be determined that each control means is a regular control means.

  The IPDM 5 receives the cell drive permission signal from the BCM 10 and drives the cell motor for starting the engine 6. This cell drive permission signal is a signal that is generally transmitted regardless of the collation result with the code collation unit 9.

  The IPDM 5 receives an engine operation signal from the ECU 4 and makes the engine 6 ready for starting.

  The monitor unit 11 as a monitoring unit monitors the origin of the code match signal and the encryption B1 signal that are returned from the BCM 10 to the ECU 4 when the engine 6 is started using the valid key 2b.

  When the code coincidence signal and the encrypted B1 signal transmitted from a device other than the legitimate device (BCM 10) are detected by the monitor unit 11, a lock unit that prevents the vehicle 1 from traveling is activated.

  In the monitor unit 11, for example, it is determined whether or not the identification code attached to the transmitted signal is a regular identification code.

  Normally, an identification code indicating the source is attached to a signal transmitted by CAN communication, so that the monitor 11 confirms the identification code when the engine control unit 4 receives the code match signal and the encryption B1 signal. .

  At this time, if it is a normal signal, an identification code unique to the BCM 10 is attached. However, for example, if an identification code of a device other than the BCM 10 such as the in-vehicle device 7 is attached, the monitor unit 11 indicates that the vehicle 1 is abnormal. Judge that it occurred.

  The lock control unit 12 as the lock means uses a signal stop unit that stops transmission of a certain signal to prevent the engine 6 from starting, and stops all control communication flows of the control communication network of the vehicle 1. There are cases where a CAN stop section is used, an engine operation stop section that stops transmission of an engine operation signal toward the engine 6 is used, and a combination thereof.

  The signal stop unit stops transmission of the engine operation signal from the ECU 4 to the IPDM 5 and stops transmission of the cell drive permission signal from the BCM 10 to the IPDM 5.

  When the transmission of the engine operation signal is stopped, the IPDM 5 cannot receive the engine operation signal required when the engine 6 is started, so the engine 6 is not started.

  When transmission of the cell drive permission signal is stopped, the cell motor cannot be driven and the engine 6 is not started.

  The CAN stop unit stops all movements of the electric operating unit of the vehicle 1 by stopping all the flow of control communication (CAN communication) to terminals such as electrical devices connected to the control communication network.

  In CAN communication, for example, the IPDM 5, automatic transmission control unit, power steering or various lamps are connected to the BCM 10. For this reason, when the flow of CAN communication stops, not only the engine 6 does not start, but also the automatic transmission or the like does not operate, so the vehicle 1 cannot travel normally.

  In the engine operation stop unit, transmission of an engine operation signal transmitted to normally control the operation of the engine 6 is stopped.

  Since the engine 6 operates normally by the control by the engine operation signal even after starting, the engine 6 does not operate normally if transmission of this signal is stopped.

  Next, referring to the data flow diagram shown in FIG. 2, the signal flow when the valid key 2b is used will be described.

  First, the key 2b incorporating the transponder is inserted into the key cylinder 2a. When the key 2b is turned to turn the ignition on (IGN ON), the identification code stored in the transponder of the key 2b is transmitted, and code verification is performed with the BCM 10 incorporating the code verification unit 9.

  When the identification code held by the key 2 b matches the identification code stored in the code verification unit 9, the random number data A is transmitted from the ECU 4 to the BCM 10.

  The BCM 10 calculates a cipher B1 corresponding to the random number data A. The ECU 4 also calculates a cipher B2 corresponding to the transmitted random number data A.

  Then, the code match signal generated when the identification codes of the keys 2b match and the calculated encryption B1 signal are returned from the BCM 10 to the ECU 4.

  When the engine 6 is started using the valid key 2b, the monitor unit 11 can detect the flow of the code match signal and the encryption B1 signal from the BCM 10 to the ECU 4.

  For this reason, the lock control unit 12 does not operate, and a cell drive permission signal is transmitted from the BCM 10 to the IPDM 5.

  Also, the cipher B2 calculated by the ECU 4 and the received cipher B1 are collated, and if they match, a cipher match signal is transmitted from the ECU 4 to the BCM 10.

  When the BCM 10 that has received the encryption match signal returns a confirmation signal indicating that the verification has been completed to the ECU 4, the engine 6 is in a state where it can operate normally.

  On the other hand, the flow of signals when an engine starting device constituted by the transmitter 8 and the in-vehicle device 7 is used will be described with reference to FIG.

  The in-vehicle device 7 is installed so as to interrupt the communication between the BCM 10 and the ECU 4 as shown in FIG.

  When a signal for starting the engine is transmitted from the transmitter 8 to the vehicle-mounted device 7, the vehicle-mounted device 7 starts to decode the identification code and the cipher B1.

  The in-vehicle device 7 accesses the BCM 10 including the code verification unit 9 and decodes the identification code in order to obtain a code matching signal generated when the identification codes match. The decryption of the identification code can be performed by repeated trial and error access.

  The decryption of the cipher B1 can be performed by reading all the patterns of the cipher B1 returned from the BCM 10 to the ECU 4.

  The decrypted encrypted B1 signal is transmitted from the in-vehicle device 7 to the ECU 4 together with the decrypted code match signal.

  However, when the ECU 4 receives the code match signal and the cipher B1 signal in this way, the monitor unit 11 detects that the code match signal and the cipher B1 signal are received from a place that is not a valid path.

  Therefore, it is determined that an abnormality has occurred in the vehicle 1, and the lock control unit 12 is operated. That is, the transmission of the cell drive permission signal from the BCM 10 to the IPDM 5 is stopped.

  Further, the transmission of the engine operation signal from the ECU 4 to the IPDM 5 is stopped by stopping the exchange of the encryption match signal and the confirmed signal between the ECU 4 and the BCM 10.

  Next, the operation of the vehicle antitheft device will be described with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG.

  First, it is confirmed by code verification whether the identification code stored in the key 2b used for starting the engine matches the identification code stored in the vehicle 1 (S1).

  Here, if the valid key 2b is not used, the engine cannot operate normally (S10).

  However, the in-vehicle device 7 attached by unauthorized means can proceed to the next step by deciphering the identification code and assuming that the identification code matches.

  If the identification codes match, the random number data A is transmitted from the ECU 4 to the BCM 10 (S2).

  By impersonating the in-vehicle device 7, the random number data A is received in the same manner as the BCM 10. Then, the decryption of the cipher B1 is started.

  While the BCM 10 or the vehicle-mounted device 7 is calculating the encryption B1, the ECU 4 also calculates the encryption B2 based on the random number data A (S3).

  When the engine is started using the valid key 2b, a code match signal indicating that the identification codes of the key 2b match and a cipher B1 signal are returned from the BCM 10 to the ECU 4.

  The monitor unit 11 monitors whether the code match signal and the encrypted B1 signal are transmitted to the ECU 4 from a device other than the BCM 10 (S4).

  When the in-vehicle device 7 is used, the regular cipher B1 can be decrypted by repeatedly transmitting the code match signal and the encryption signal. Then, the code match signal and the encryption B1 signal are transmitted to the ECU 4.

  However, the signal transmitted from the in-vehicle device 7 that is impersonating the BCM 10 to the ECU 4 is detected as an illegal signal by the monitor unit 11 (S4).

  When the code coincidence signal and the encryption B1 signal are transmitted from the in-vehicle device 7 to the ECU 4 as described above, the lock control unit 12 is activated because it is not a signal from the regular BCM 10 to the ECU 4 (S5).

  Also, if the cipher B1 does not match the cipher B2, the engine does not operate normally (S6, S10).

  When the cipher B1 and the cipher B2 match, a cipher match signal is transmitted from the ECU 4 to the BCM 10 (S6, S7).

  Further, the BCM 10 that has received the encryption match signal returns a confirmed signal that the confirmation for operating the engine is completed to the ECU 4 (S8).

  As a result, the engine can be operated normally (S9).

  In the embodiment described above, it is determined whether or not an abnormality has occurred in the vehicle 1, and when the vehicle 1 is in an abnormal state, traveling is blocked.

  For this reason, it is possible to prevent the vehicle 1 from being stolen such that the engine is started by an unauthorized means without using the valid key 2b.

  Further, the monitor unit 11 monitors whether the code match signal and the encrypted B1 signal received by the ECU 4 are transmitted from the BCM 10.

  For this reason, even if the code match signal and the encrypted B1 signal are transmitted to the ECU 4 by an unauthorized terminal device, since the signal is not transmitted by the legitimate BCM 10, it is possible to prevent the vehicle 1 from traveling by operating the lock control unit 12. .

  Further, if the transmission of the engine operation signal from the ECU 4 to the IPDM 5 is stopped by the signal stop unit, the fuel injection device and the ignition device do not operate and the engine 6 cannot be started.

  Furthermore, if the transmission of the cell driving permission signal from the BCM 10 to the IPDM 5 is stopped, the driving of the cell motor can be prevented, so that the engine can be prevented from being started by unauthorized means.

  Moreover, if the control communication flow is completely stopped by the CAN stop unit, the operation of the electrical devices connected to the control communication network is stopped. For example, if the supply of electric power to an automatic transmission, power steering, etc. is stopped, the vehicle 1 cannot be run normally.

Furthermore, if transmission of the engine operation signal is stopped by the engine operation stop unit, even if the engine 6 is started by unauthorized means, it is not normally controlled and the vehicle 1 can be prevented from traveling.
[ Reference example ]
A reference example will be described with reference to FIG.

  In the first embodiment, the monitor unit 11 is used as the monitoring unit, and the abnormality of the vehicle 1 is detected by monitoring the signal by the monitor unit 11. However, the abnormality of the vehicle 1 can also be detected by another unit.

  In the configuration shown in FIG. 4, the counter unit 14 is used as the monitoring means.

  The counter unit 14 confirms the number of terminals connected to the control communication network (CAN communication network) and monitors whether an unauthorized terminal is connected.

  First, the number of regular terminals is registered in a storage unit (such as an EEPROM) of the counter unit 14.

  The counter unit 14 detects the number of terminals connected to the control communication network at the time of ignition on.

  Then, the number of registered regular terminals and the number of terminals detected by the counter unit 14 are compared. When the number of detected terminals is larger, the lock control unit 12 is activated.

  If the in-vehicle device 7 is attached by unauthorized means, the number of terminals connected to the control communication network increases by one. Thus, when a terminal device is attached without permission, it is determined that an abnormality has occurred in the vehicle 1 and the lock control unit 12 is operated.

  The lock control unit 12 may be any one of the means using the signal stop unit described in the first embodiment, the unit using the CAN stop unit, the unit using the engine operation stop unit, or a combination thereof. Good.

  Thus, when the presence or absence of abnormality of the vehicle 1 is determined by the counter unit 14, it is possible to prevent the vehicle 1 from being stolen by retrofitting an unauthorized terminal device.

  The preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail with reference to the drawings, but the specific configuration is not limited to these embodiments, and the design changes are within the scope of the present invention. Are included in the present invention.

  For example, in the above description, the code verification unit 9, the monitor unit 11, the counter unit 14, and the lock control unit 12 have been described as being incorporated in the BCM 10, but these configurations may be provided separately from the BCM 10. .

It is a typical block diagram for demonstrating the structure of the antitheft device of the vehicle of the best embodiment of this invention. It is a data flow figure for demonstrating the signal flow of the antitheft device of a vehicle. It is a flowchart for demonstrating operation | movement of the antitheft device of a vehicle. It is a typical block diagram explaining the structure of the antitheft device of the vehicle of a reference example . It is a typical block diagram for demonstrating the structure of the conventional vehicle antitheft apparatus. It is a data flow figure for demonstrating the flow of the signal of the conventional vehicle antitheft device.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Vehicle 2a Key cylinder 2b Key 3 Car body control means 4 ECU (engine control means)
5 IPDM (Engine start control means)
6 Engine 7 In-vehicle device 8 Transmitter 9 Code verification unit 10, 13 BCM (body control means)
11 Monitor unit 12 Lock control unit 14 Counter unit

Claims (4)

The key storing the identification code is used to start the engine, the identification code of the key is collated by the code collation unit, and when the collation result of the code collation unit matches, the code coincidence signal is sent from the vehicle body control means to the vehicle control communication network In the vehicle antitheft device, the vehicle drive control signal is transmitted from the vehicle body control means to the engine start control means, and the engine operation signal is transmitted from the engine control means to the engine start control means. ,
Detected as a vehicle abnormality when it is determined that a code match signal, which is a condition for transmitting the engine operation signal, has been transmitted from other than the vehicle body control means by an identification code indicating the origin in the control communication network of the vehicle. A vehicle antitheft device comprising: monitoring means for performing the operation and locking means for preventing the vehicle from running when an abnormality is detected by the monitoring means. The locking means stops signal transmission to stop transmission of an engine operation signal from the engine control means to the engine start control means and stop transmission of a cell drive permission signal from the vehicle body control means to the engine start control means. The antitheft device for a vehicle according to claim 1, further comprising a portion. It said locking means, the antitheft apparatus for a vehicle according to claim 1 or claim 2 characterized by having a CAN stop for stopping the flow of control communication control network of the vehicle. It said locking means, theft vehicle according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that it has an engine operation stop unit that stops the transmission of engine operation signal toward from the engine control unit to the engine Prevention device.

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