GB2308905A - Protected system processor - Google Patents
Protected system processor Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- GB2308905A GB2308905A GB9600274A GB9600274A GB2308905A GB 2308905 A GB2308905 A GB 2308905A GB 9600274 A GB9600274 A GB 9600274A GB 9600274 A GB9600274 A GB 9600274A GB 2308905 A GB2308905 A GB 2308905A
- Authority
- GB
- United Kingdom
- Prior art keywords
- protected
- processor
- end user
- memory
- system processor
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/75—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
- G06F21/87—Secure or tamper-resistant housings by means of encapsulation, e.g. for integrated circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
- G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
- G06F2207/7219—Countermeasures against side channel or fault attacks
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
A micro-processor 4, memory circuit 5 and control circuit 6, all in 'naked die' form, are combined together on a substrate 'printed' with an electrical circuit to form a single package, hybrid Integrated Circuit capable of executing / storing proprietary programs / data in a secure environment. During normal processor operation, only the internal processor 4 can read from or write to the internal memory 5 prodding protection against unauthorised access to the said memory contents and security for the operation of the system as a whole. The internal memory is 100% end user configurable and is prepared for operation by the end user testing and programming the Device in the PTU (Programming / Testing Unit). Full compatability means no special hardware or software engineering requirement for Device implementation and, due to re-programmability, repeated re-use of the Device in subsequent differing applications.
Description
PROTECTED SYSTEM PROCESSOR
This invention relates to a Protected System Processor.
Security, or the lack of it, is a major problem for computer users large and small. Armed with basic systems knowledge and given a little time and expertise, it is not particularly difficult to 'hack' i.e. break into, a computer system, remoteness from the target system being no obstacle. Once access is gained to a computer system, the system program can be manipulated or worse still, 'viruses' introduced with the end result being anything from irritating to absolutely catastrophic.
Generally speaking, computer systems are basically of an 'open architecture' (Fig. 1) i.e. the processor 1, the system memory 2 and related control elements 3 are in individual I.C. (Integrated Circuit) packages placed at various locations around the motherboard. On such computer systems, there is ready access to both the system program and / or information on the data bus be it by direct physical contact or remotely via keyboard or modem.
The idea for this invention, hereafter referred to as the Device, came about as a perceived need for some form of active system in an attempt to address the ever-increasing problem of computer security. Its development is based on the assumption that the only effective solution is to protect the system program. To do this properly, the system memory 2 must be physically protected whereby the system program is accessible only by its legitimate user i.e. the central processing unit 1.
The prime function of the Device is the protection of the system program, by storing it in, and executing it from, a protected memory area. Referring to Figures 2 and 3, the Device achieves this by integrating a micro-processor 4, system memory 5 and required control circuit elements 6 into a single package so arranged to provide a secure system memory area and secure internal data bus 7.
Referring to Figure 1, in a standard 'open architecture' system, the processor 1, at 'boot-up' (i.e. power-up and / or system reset), fetches and executes instructions from a system memory circuit 2 situated somewhere on the system motherboard whereas, referring to Figure 2, the Protected
System Processor 4, albeit performing the same operation, now does so from the secure internal memory 5 via the secured internal data bus 7.
Because the internal data bus is isolated from the 'outside world' by way of the internal control circuit 6, the internal data transfers are invisible to an external observer and the Device is said to be in 'secure mode'. When the processor requires information (be it program or data) from an external source, it shuts down the internal memory, switches to 'standard' mode and returns to 'secure' mode only when that particular operation is complete.
The Device cannot be switched, either actively or passively, into a mode whereby protected memory contents are externally available i.e. the
Device memory cannot be 'read out' so protecting the contents from unauthorised third party use - this applies equally whether the memory contents be proprietary program or proprietary data.
There is no en-coding / de-coding of the system program nor does the Device make use of, or require, en-coding / de-coding of the system program in any form. It is a fundamental aspect of the Protected System
Processor design that it employs RAM (Random Access Memory) technology allowing protected memory read / write and is supplied to the end user with 'blank' memory i.e. at the 'point of sale', where the Device is shipped to the customer, there is no 'resident' software in any form of which the internal micro-processor can make use.
To prepare the Device for operation, the end user configures the protected memory according to proprietary end user specification. To achieve this, the Device is tested and programmed, by the end-user, with the PTU (Programming / Testing Unit), a dedicated function minicomputer marketed in association with the Device. Only when the Device is inserted in, and being controlled by the PTU, can the internal memory be written to from the 'outside world' i.e. there is no 'normal' mode of operation whereby the Device memory contents can be externally altered the system memory contents therefore remain pristine. A further advantage is the that the 'System Stack', a specially reserved memory area used exclusively by the CPU to 'keep track' of own operations, is afforded protection. After being programmed by the end user, the Device is simply inserted into the target system.
The Device is manufactured using C.O.B. This 'trade' term meaning
cont.
meaning Chip and wire On Board, is a micro-electronic manufacturing process whereby the requisite Integrated Circuits in 'naked' silicon die form are attached to a substrate which has been 'printed' with the appropriate circuit. Fine wires are then connected between the integrated circuits and the substrate circuit. The complete unit is then sealed in some form of encapsulant for protection and to render the 'internals' inaccessable. Because the device employs Random Access Memory to achieve its performance specification, there must be a voltage potential applied across the power connections to the internal memory at all times to maintain the memory contents - this may take the form of,
a) an umbilical connected between the Device and the system battery back-up supply on the target system motherboard or,
b) an integral battery.
The Device is physically connected to its target system by some form of end user specified, 'industry standard' connection.
The actual design and layout of the Protected System Processor as described herein can be adapted to accomodate a variety of commercially available micro-processors. Due to the fact that hardware compatability is a feature of the system, the actual end product can have a variety of physical shapes and dimensions and no Claims whatsoever are made in respect of the shape or appeareance of the end product. For this reason, the drawings supplied as Figures 1,2 and 3 are given as theoretical / graphical representations of critical elements of the design.
Use of the term 'system program' herein is a reference to the main program (i.e. the Operating System or Embedded Control program), in whole or part, whose function it is, in whole or part, to handle the I /O (Input / Output) operations.
Use of the term 'system memory' herein is a reference to that part of a computers' memory which holds, in whole or part, the system program and, where specified by the end user, proprietary data.
Use of the term 'processor' herein is equivalent to and interchangeable with the term 'micro-processor' and / or CPU i.e. Central
Processing Unit.
Use of the term 'Device' herein is a specific reference to the
Protected System Processor.
Claims (9)
1) A Protected System Processor implemented as a hybrid
Integrated Circuit comprising micro-processor, Random Access Memory and requisite control circuit elements so designed to provide a secure memory area and data bus for storage and execution of the said Protected
System Processors' system program.
2) A Protected System Processor as claimed in Claim 1 where the system program residing in the protected internal memory is accessible only by the internal processor and cannot be read out.
3) A Protected System Processor as claimed in Claim 1 or Claim 2 whereby the system program residing in the protected internal memory cannot be copied for unauthorised third party use.
4) A Protected System Processor as claimed in Claim 1 or Claim 2 whereby the system program residing in the protected internal memory cannot be modified or manipulated.
5) A Protected System Processor as claimed in Claim 1 which provides the end user with a fully configurable secure memory area for proprietary system operation.
6) A Protected System Processor as claimed in any preceding
Claim whereby the system Stack (a unique data area required by the processor while in operation) resides in the protected memory area affording protection from unauthorised third party access.
7) A Protected System Processor as claimed in Claim 1 which affords the end user with a secure memory area, parts of which, according to end user definition, may be used for proprietary data storage.
8) A Protected System Processor as claimed in Claim 1 which is repeatedly re-configureable by the end user permitting employment of the
Device in differing subsequent applications.
9) A Protected Sysytem Processor substantially as described herein with reference to Figures 1, 2 and 3, the accompanying drawings.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB9600274A GB2308905A (en) | 1996-01-08 | 1996-01-08 | Protected system processor |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB9600274A GB2308905A (en) | 1996-01-08 | 1996-01-08 | Protected system processor |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
GB9600274D0 GB9600274D0 (en) | 1996-03-13 |
GB2308905A true GB2308905A (en) | 1997-07-09 |
Family
ID=10786721
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
GB9600274A Withdrawn GB2308905A (en) | 1996-01-08 | 1996-01-08 | Protected system processor |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
GB (1) | GB2308905A (en) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN100369224C (en) * | 2005-05-08 | 2008-02-13 | 薛萍 | Chip with built-in software and hardware system and making method thereof |
Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1981002480A1 (en) * | 1980-02-20 | 1981-09-03 | M Kaufman | Memory addressing apparatus and method |
GB2092338A (en) * | 1981-01-31 | 1982-08-11 | Jpm Automatic Machines Ltd | Improvements relating to programmable memories |
EP0136155A2 (en) * | 1983-09-22 | 1985-04-03 | Fujitsu Limited | Single-chip microcomputer comprising means for preventing read-out of its internal ROM |
EP0137995A2 (en) * | 1983-10-14 | 1985-04-24 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Single-chip microcomputer with encryptable function on program memory |
GB2165377A (en) * | 1984-09-19 | 1986-04-09 | Itt Ind Ltd | A computer element |
GB2263348A (en) * | 1992-01-14 | 1993-07-21 | Rohm Co Ltd | Securing program code. |
-
1996
- 1996-01-08 GB GB9600274A patent/GB2308905A/en not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1981002480A1 (en) * | 1980-02-20 | 1981-09-03 | M Kaufman | Memory addressing apparatus and method |
GB2092338A (en) * | 1981-01-31 | 1982-08-11 | Jpm Automatic Machines Ltd | Improvements relating to programmable memories |
EP0136155A2 (en) * | 1983-09-22 | 1985-04-03 | Fujitsu Limited | Single-chip microcomputer comprising means for preventing read-out of its internal ROM |
EP0137995A2 (en) * | 1983-10-14 | 1985-04-24 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Single-chip microcomputer with encryptable function on program memory |
GB2165377A (en) * | 1984-09-19 | 1986-04-09 | Itt Ind Ltd | A computer element |
GB2263348A (en) * | 1992-01-14 | 1993-07-21 | Rohm Co Ltd | Securing program code. |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN100369224C (en) * | 2005-05-08 | 2008-02-13 | 薛萍 | Chip with built-in software and hardware system and making method thereof |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
GB9600274D0 (en) | 1996-03-13 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US10089470B2 (en) | Event-based apparatus and method for securing BIOS in a trusted computing system during execution | |
JP3023425B2 (en) | Data processing device | |
US5892826A (en) | Data processor with flexible data encryption | |
US7210009B2 (en) | Computer system employing a trusted execution environment including a memory controller configured to clear memory | |
US9183394B2 (en) | Secure BIOS tamper protection mechanism | |
EP2874091B1 (en) | Partition-based apparatus and method for securing bios in a trusted computing system during execution | |
US20070180271A1 (en) | Apparatus and method for providing key security in a secure processor | |
TW201712593A (en) | Loading and virtualizing cryptographic keys | |
JPH10228420A (en) | Processing system security | |
EP2874092B1 (en) | Recurrent BIOS verification with embedded encrypted hash | |
WO1998015086A1 (en) | Secure boot | |
US9367689B2 (en) | Apparatus and method for securing BIOS in a trusted computing system | |
JPS59130000A (en) | Method of protecting virtual memory device | |
CN113557500A (en) | Multi-mode protected memory | |
KR20030092264A (en) | Smart card with enhanced security and method for protecting security information stored therein | |
US10049217B2 (en) | Event-based apparatus and method for securing bios in a trusted computing system during execution | |
GB2308905A (en) | Protected system processor | |
US10055588B2 (en) | Event-based apparatus and method for securing BIOS in a trusted computing system during execution | |
US5657444A (en) | Microprocessor with secure programmable read only memory circuit | |
EP1920376A2 (en) | Processor hardware and software | |
JPS6336349A (en) | Preventing circuit for memory writing in microprocessor | |
CN114785512A (en) | Method and apparatus and electronic device for processing security keys | |
US10095868B2 (en) | Event-based apparatus and method for securing bios in a trusted computing system during execution | |
JPH0399346A (en) | Semiconductor storage device | |
JPS61279941A (en) | Fault detector for computer |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WAP | Application withdrawn, taken to be withdrawn or refused ** after publication under section 16(1) |