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EP1747955B1 - Verification method for a vehicle access legitimation - Google Patents

Verification method for a vehicle access legitimation Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1747955B1
EP1747955B1 EP06117688A EP06117688A EP1747955B1 EP 1747955 B1 EP1747955 B1 EP 1747955B1 EP 06117688 A EP06117688 A EP 06117688A EP 06117688 A EP06117688 A EP 06117688A EP 1747955 B1 EP1747955 B1 EP 1747955B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
transmitter
data
control device
frequency
motor vehicle
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP06117688A
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German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1747955A1 (en
Inventor
Mirko Schindler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huf Huelsbeck and Fuerst GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Huf Huelsbeck and Fuerst GmbH and Co KG
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Publication of EP1747955A1 publication Critical patent/EP1747955A1/en
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Publication of EP1747955B1 publication Critical patent/EP1747955B1/en
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/61—Signal comprising different frequencies, e.g. frequency hopping

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for checking a legitimacy for access to a motor vehicle.
  • a communication between the radio system and the ID transmitter is started as soon as any request is made to the radio system, for example, by a user's hand approaching a door handle of the vehicle. Such communication may also be initiated by the ID transmitter, for example, a car lock remote control integrated in a vehicle key.
  • Vehicle-side radio systems are usually designed so that the signals for communication with the ID transmitter have only a short range. Systems are also known which make a determination of the ID transmitter location based on a field distribution of the radio fields, for example from the EP 1 189 306 A1 ,
  • unauthorized persons attempt to extend short-range communication between the ID transmitter and the control device in the vehicle by interposing a radio link with two transceivers. For example, an unauthorized person requesting verification of legitimacy by touching the vehicle door handle may gain access if he or she has a corresponding transceiver used to receive the signals from the vehicle, sends them to another transceiver and the other transceiver is located in the vicinity of the ID transmitter of an authorized user. Since the communication over the extension route is made in this way with an authorized ID transmitter, the manipulation of the vehicle is not noticed and the unauthorized person gains access to the vehicle. The well-known keyless access to the vehicle is not protected against such manipulation.
  • the present invention is therefore based on the object to make keyless access to the vehicle safer.
  • a control device arranged in the vehicle then codes first data with a first algorithm and transmits the coded first data in a first message by means of a radio transmitting device coupled to the control device.
  • a message is to be understood here as meaning any portion of a signal, for example a signal modulating a carrier frequency.
  • the first message is received in an ID transmitter associated with the vehicle, and the first data is decoded in the ID transmitter.
  • the ID transmitter determines a frequency pattern as a function of the first data.
  • a frequency pattern here is quite generally a frequency-time curve, in the simplest case a selected frequency which does not change within the frequency pattern.
  • a radio communication between a radio transmitting device of the ID transmitter and a receiving device of the control device is carried out, wherein - at least in the transmission of a second message - the carrier frequency of the transmitting device of the ID transmitter is selected according to the frequency pattern.
  • the second message contains coded second data.
  • the receiving device is controlled by the control device in dependence on the first Data matched to the respective carrier frequencies according to the frequency pattern. Depending on the second data, the legitimacy for access to the motor vehicle is then determined.
  • the receiving device of the control device is therefore able to tune to the respectively correct carrier frequency of the frequency pattern, because the controller knows both the first data and the algorithm, with the aid of the frequency pattern is calculated from the first data.
  • the content of a communication between the ID transmitter and the control device in the motor vehicle is not evaluated exclusively for checking the legitimacy.
  • the communication is additionally secured by selecting the communication carrier frequencies according to a frequency pattern. This frequency pattern is determined in response to the first data sent from the controller to the ID transmitter. Only the controller and the ID transmitter are able to determine the frequency pattern and to carry out the communication since only the first data is known to them. If, however, the first data are determined by unauthorized persons from the initial communication, the unauthorized person is at least not aware of the specification for the frequency pattern. Therefore, a maliciously prolonged radio link with transceivers can not follow the communication according to the frequency pattern.
  • the ID transmitter responds with a transmission according to a frequency pattern to which the Extension distance is not set.
  • the receiving device of the "extension” can not follow the frequency pattern of the ID transmitter, then no transfer to the motor vehicle is possible.
  • the "extension” uses a broadband receiver on the ID transmitter side and thus can receive the radiation of the ID transmitter, it is extremely costly on the Motor vehicle side to implement a transmitter that can follow the frequency pattern delay.
  • communication due to a malicious extension does not occur according to the frequency pattern, data transmission will not be established and legitimation will always be denied on the vehicle side.
  • the control device coupled to the receiving device checks whether further carrier frequencies deviating from the frequency pattern (i.e., several carrier frequencies in parallel) are emitted. If it is detected that radiation is taking place on different carrier frequencies which deviate from the specific frequency pattern, this indicates the attempt of a broadband or at least multi-frequency extension of the radio link.
  • the ID transmitter transmits namely with its transmitting device on the frequency determined by the frequency pattern.
  • a corresponding detection can additionally be evaluated in the control device in such a way that malicious extension attempts are distinguished from usual disturbances which are caused, for example, by simultaneous access attempts to other motor vehicles taking place nearby. It can e.g. provision must be made for at least a minimum number or minimum duration of emissions to be present at frequencies deviating from the frequency pattern, before this is considered an attempt at "extension". If this is detected, the radio communication is aborted without further verification of the legitimacy.
  • the content of a communication is linked to the type of communication.
  • the security of communication and access to the motor vehicle is therefore increased in the method according to the invention.
  • An initial legitimacy verification request may be accomplished by known means, such as sensors, switches, or by sending request signals to the controller.
  • the controller encodes the first data with a first algorithm and sends that data in a first message on a first frequency.
  • the type of coding and the frequency may be initially fixed at each check, but may be variable, e.g. can be varied depending on the time.
  • the ID transmitter must have knowledge of the frequency used and the type of coding. In particular, the ID transmitter must be aware of the decoding algorithm.
  • the first data may for example also be coded as a function of an identifier of the addressed ID transmitter.
  • the first frequency may be in the low frequency range, for example at 125 KHz. If the ID transmitter is already in a ready-to-transmit or receive-ready state, a higher frequency of, for example, 433 MHz can also be used.
  • the message with the coded first data is received and decoded by the ID transmitter. If the first data were coded in dependence on an identifier of the ID transmitter, the ID transmitter decodes the data using its own ID transmitter identifier.
  • the ID transmitter When the first data is decoded, the ID transmitter becomes a frequency pattern depending on the first data certainly. It is an unambiguous assignment of the first data to ensure a frequency pattern, otherwise the controller may not determine the identical frequency pattern and subsequent communication is not possible. Then the legitimacy would have to be checked again.
  • a calculation rule or a permanently stored reference table can be used, which has stored an assignment of data to frequency patterns.
  • the control device also determines an identical frequency pattern as a function of the first data. ID encoders and controllers are then prepared for communication and tuned to an initial frequency to be used. Then, the radio communication between a radio transmitting device of the ID transmitter and a receiving device of the control device is started.
  • a second message is transmitted with coded second data.
  • the frequency pattern may include, for example, time-specific frequency changes and / or transmission pauses.
  • a pair of transceivers for maliciously extending the radio link can not extend this communication because they are not tuned to the frequency pattern.
  • the frequency pattern can also provide a variation of the transmission amplitude. In a radio extension path it is then not possible to distinguish whether this amplitude amplification or this amplitude drop is provided, ie is part of the frequency pattern, or whether this change is e.g. is due to a disturbance of the extension route.
  • the controller does not release the access to the vehicle.
  • the second data is checked in the control device and, depending on the second data, the access to the vehicle is released or not released.
  • ID encoders are usually not continuously in an energy-intensive send / receive state. It is therefore advantageous in the inventive method, when after requesting the verification of legitimacy first a wake-up signal using the radio transmitter of the controller is sent, and at least one ID transmitter sends the wake-up signal to a response signal to the controller before the coded first Data is sent.
  • the radio wake-up signal may be radiated in a frequency range in which a transponder in an ID transmitter in a passive state is woken up. For example, a frequency of 125 KHz can be used. Each ID transmitter awakened by the signal sends a response signal to the controller.
  • ID transmitters send a response signal to the control device, preferably one of the ID transmitters is selected by the control device as the ID transmitter assigned to the motor vehicle.
  • the ID transmitter sends an ID transmitter identifier as a response signal to the control device.
  • the control device first checks whether the answering ID encoders belong to the motor vehicle at all. If there are a plurality of ID encoders that belong to the motor vehicle (for example, the driver and front passenger), one of the ID encoders for the communication is selected and regarded as the ID encoders associated with the motor vehicle for the subsequent method.
  • the wake-up signal can also be included a vehicle identifier, which is evaluated in the ID donors. In this case, only those ID transmitters respond to the signal that identify themselves as belonging to the vehicle identifier.
  • identification data for the selected ID transmitter be sent from the coupled to the controller radio transmitter.
  • the ID transmitter selected as assigned ID transmitter is informed of its selection and is available for further communication.
  • the ID donors that have not been selected can accordingly switch to the original passive state, in which they do not disturb the subsequent communication.
  • the second data preferably contains a code that uniquely identifies the ID transmitter.
  • the code uniquely identifying the ID transmitter is preferably not identical to the identification data transmitted during the wake-up process. It is data that are stored in the control device in the motor vehicle and identify those ID encoders that are provided for access to the motor vehicle. This data can in turn be encrypted by the ID transmitter depending on the first data.
  • the code uniquely identifying the ID transmitter is generated in the ID transmitter with an algorithm characteristic of the ID transmitter.
  • the first data contains at least one random number.
  • the first data sent by the control unit thus ensure further security of the communication, since both the contents of the communication, as well as the particular Frequency patterns are varied with each requested verification.
  • the frequency pattern contains at least one frequency determined as a function of the first data.
  • the frequency pattern may include changes in the frequencies, the transmit amplitudes or, for example, information about transmission pauses.
  • there is a fuse with respect to an extension path in particular if at least one frequency is determined as a function of the first data. This may mean, for example, that all communication is carried out at a constant frequency chosen in dependence on the first data.
  • a combination with frequency changes at timed positions or temporal frequency pauses is possible, wherein not each of the changed frequencies must be determined in dependence on the first data.
  • a first communication section may take place at a frequency determined in response to the first data while a subsequent second communication section is performed according to a predetermined frequency pattern consistent with each communication.
  • a control device In a motor vehicle, a control device is installed. In the environment outside the motor vehicle there are several ID encoders, each entitling to access a motor vehicle.
  • a person approaches the motor vehicle and moves his hand to one of the door handles of the motor vehicle.
  • a proximity sensor in the region of the door handle registers this approach and transmits a request signal via a signal line to the central control device of the motor vehicle.
  • the control device has transmitting / receiving means or is coupled to such and transmits at 110 at a frequency of 125 KHz a wake-up signal for the ID transmitter in the surrounding area of the motor vehicle.
  • the wake-up signal also includes a motor vehicle identifier.
  • the ID encoders in the vicinity have a transponder and are awakened by the wake-up signal at 120 from a hibernation and each activate an internal power supply via a battery.
  • Each ID transmitter checks on the basis of the motor vehicle identifier whether the wake-up signal could in principle be intended for it. If an ID transmitter determines that the wake-up signal does not turn on turns it on, the relevant ID transmitter switches back to the previous idle state.
  • those ID transmitters whose internal verification has revealed that they should be addressed by the wake-up signal send a response signal to the controller. It can be several responding ID transmitters, e.g. if the accessing person carries several ID-donors with him, or possibly another person (for example, a passenger) also carries an ID-donor with him.
  • the response signal is transmitted by the now internally powered ID encoders on a frequency in the MHz or GHz range.
  • an ID transmitter identifier is coded, which enables the controller to distinguish the answering ID transmitter.
  • the controller checks for response signals from multiple ID encoders. If this is the case, one of the ID transmitters is selected by the control device at 150 and regarded as the ID transmitter assigned to the motor vehicle for the further method.
  • the selection in the controller may be random, or according to certain criteria such as e.g. the response time of the ID transmitter or the signal strength.
  • the controller sends a signal that the selection of the associated ID transmitter communicates to the ID donors in the vicinity.
  • the non-selected ID encoders switch back to the initial idle state after receiving the signal.
  • the selection is also communicated to a single answering ID transmitter, since the ID transmitter itself is not aware of whether several ID encoders have responded.
  • Fig. 2 shows the further steps of the method after the selection of the associated ID transmitter has been carried out by the control device.
  • the control device generates a random number with an associated arithmetic unit. This random number is encoded or encrypted with a key belonging to the control unit and at 170, possibly with further data, in a first Message sent in the MHz or GHz range to the selected ID transmitter.
  • the controller determines a frequency pattern using a unique calculation rule at 180. For example, depending on the random number, two frequencies can be determined, between being switched. The time of the change is also determined by the random number.
  • the ID transmitter receives the message at 190 and decodes the encoded first data containing the random number.
  • the decoding is possible because each belonging to the motor vehicle ID transmitter has stored information for decrypting messages of its associated control device. Regardless of the controller determines the ID transmitter in knowledge of the random number at 200, the frequency pattern. Since there is an unambiguous assignment between random number and frequency pattern, identical frequency patterns are always generated in the ID transmitter and in the control device.
  • the ID transmitter also determines at 210 a code that uniquely identifies it. For this purpose, an internally stored unique ID-donor identifier is encrypted with the random number, whereby an algorithm associated with the ID donor is applied.
  • the controller and the ID transmitter communicate with each other, wherein the communication is performed on carrier frequencies selected according to the particular frequency pattern.
  • the controller expects, on a first frequency to which it is tuned according to the determined frequency pattern, the start of the communication by the ID transmitter.
  • the control device and the ID transmitter switch the communication frequency after transmission of a specific amount of data or after a certain communication time, wherein the respective amount of data or the specific duration are set for a frequency change according to the frequency pattern.
  • the ID transmitter sends at 230 the code determined at 210 as second data in a second message to the controller.
  • the controller checks if the communication is complete and the complete message has been transmitted. If this is not the case, the communication is continued or restarted at least once after communication problems, again using the particular frequency pattern. If the communication can not be completed successfully because the given frequency pattern is not correctly followed, it is presumed that an attempt is made to extend the radio link between the ID transmitter and the controller. In this case, access to the motor vehicle is denied due to the faulty communication. For such disturbances, which are not caused by a malicious extension, then the authorized user can request the inspection again or open the motor vehicle manually with a key.
  • the control unit at 250 knowing the random number and the algorithm characteristic of the ID transmitter, decodes the second data from the second message containing the ID transmitter identifier. If the ID transmitter identifier identifies the ID transmitter as authorized, the control unit causes the release of the motor vehicle by e.g. Activation of the central locking or targeted release of the door on which a proximity sensor has detected the touch. If the ID transmitter is not recognized as legitimate, no release takes place.
  • the frequency pattern may be arbitrarily determined in dependence on the data that the controller sends to the ID transmitter. It can be used e.g. a permanently stored assignment can be used or a mathematical function.
  • the frequency pattern may also contain only a series of frequencies which are cyclically changed in response to a fixed predetermined change signal.
  • the control device may, for example, request a frequency change at the ID transmitter at random time intervals, which takes place in each case according to the frequency pattern and to which an extension route can not follow.
  • the first data in dependence of which the frequency pattern is determined may, instead of or in addition to a random number, contain any other data, e.g. depending on date or time or environment parameters. It is essential that the radio communication itself and not only its content is affected by the first data.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Control Of Stepping Motors (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)

Abstract

The method involves determining frequency sample independent of coded data in a message received by an ID-sensor. A radio communication is implemented between a radio transmitting device and a receiving device of a control device. A carrier frequency of the transmitting device is selected based on the sample, during the transmission of another message with coded another data. The receiving device is adjusted in dependent of the former data at the carrier frequency according to the sample. The authentication for the access to a vehicle is found in dependent of the latter data.

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren zur Überprüfung einer Legitimation für einen Zugriff auf ein Kraftfahrzeug.The invention relates to a method for checking a legitimacy for access to a motor vehicle.

Es ist bekannt, Benutzern von Fahrzeugen einen schlüssellosen Zugang zum Kraftfahrzeug zu ermöglichen (Keyless-Entry). In entsprechend vorbereiteten Fahrzeugen ist üblicherweise ein Funksystem integriert, das mit einem sogenannten ID-Geber kommunizieren kann, den ein berechtigter Benutzer bei sich trägt.It is known to enable users of vehicles keyless entry to the motor vehicle (keyless entry). In appropriately prepared vehicles usually a radio system is integrated, which can communicate with a so-called ID transmitter, which carries an authorized user with him.

Eine Kommunikation zwischen dem Funksystem und dem ID-Geber wird gestartet, sobald eine beliebig geartete Anforderung an das Funksystem erfolgt, beispielsweise dadurch, daß sich eine Hand des Benutzers einem Türgriff des Fahrzeugs nähert. Eine solche Kommunikation kann auch durch den ID-Geber initiiert werden, zum Beispiel bei einer in einem Fahrzeugschlüssel integrierten Fernbedienung für eine Fahrzeug-Verriegelung.A communication between the radio system and the ID transmitter is started as soon as any request is made to the radio system, for example, by a user's hand approaching a door handle of the vehicle. Such communication may also be initiated by the ID transmitter, for example, a car lock remote control integrated in a vehicle key.

Bei derartigen Zugangs-Systemen ist es wichtig sicherzustellen, daß ausschließlich Berechtigte Zugriff zu dem Fahrzeug erhalten. Insbesondere ist zu prüfen, ob sich der Berechtigte bei Überprüfung der Legitimation in der Nähe des Fahrzeugs aufhält, da nur dann von einer legitimen Zugriffssituation auszugehen ist. Fahrzeugseitige Funksysteme sind meist derart ausgelegt, daß die Signale für eine Kommunikation mit dem ID-Geber nur eine kurze Reichweite aufweisen. Es sind ferner Systeme bekannt, die anhand einer Feldverteilung der Funkfelder eine Bestimmung des ID-Geber-Standorts vornehmen, zum Beispiel aus der EP 1 189 306 A1 .In such access systems, it is important to ensure that only authorized persons gain access to the vehicle. In particular, it must be checked whether the authorized person is in the vicinity of the vehicle when verifying the legitimacy, since only then can a legitimate access situation be assumed. Vehicle-side radio systems are usually designed so that the signals for communication with the ID transmitter have only a short range. Systems are also known which make a determination of the ID transmitter location based on a field distribution of the radio fields, for example from the EP 1 189 306 A1 ,

Es ist auch bekannt, daß Unberechtigte den Versuch unternehmen, die kurzreichweitige Kommunikation zwischen ID-Geber und Steuereinrichtung im Fahrzeug zu verlängern, indem eine Funkstrecke mit zwei Sendeempfängern zwischengeschaltet wird. So kann zum Beispiel ein Unberechtigter, der durch eine Berührung des Fahrzeugtürgriffs die Prüfung der Legitimation anfordert, dann Zugriff erhalten, wenn er einen entsprechenden Sendeempfänger zum Empfang der Signale aus dem Fahrzeug verwendet, diese an einen anderen Sendeempfänger sendet und sich der andere Sendeempfänger in der Nähe des ID-Gebers eines Zugriffsberechtigten befindet. Da die Kommunikation über die Verlängerungsstrecke auf diese Weise mit einem zugriffsberechtigten ID-Geber erfolgt, wird die Manipulation von dem Fahrzeug nicht bemerkt und der Unberechtigte erlangt Zugriff auf das Fahrzeug. Der bekannte schlüssellose Zugang zum Fahrzeug ist vor derartigen Manipulationen nicht geschützt.It is also known that unauthorized persons attempt to extend short-range communication between the ID transmitter and the control device in the vehicle by interposing a radio link with two transceivers. For example, an unauthorized person requesting verification of legitimacy by touching the vehicle door handle may gain access if he or she has a corresponding transceiver used to receive the signals from the vehicle, sends them to another transceiver and the other transceiver is located in the vicinity of the ID transmitter of an authorized user. Since the communication over the extension route is made in this way with an authorized ID transmitter, the manipulation of the vehicle is not noticed and the unauthorized person gains access to the vehicle. The well-known keyless access to the vehicle is not protected against such manipulation.

Das Dokument WO-A-01/23227 offenbart ein System gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Anspruchs 1.The document WO-A-01/23227 discloses a system according to the preamble of claim 1.

Der vorliegenden Erfindung liegt dementsprechend die Aufgabe zugrunde, den schlüssellosen Zugang zum Fahrzeug sicherer zu machen.The present invention is therefore based on the object to make keyless access to the vehicle safer.

Diese Aufgabe wird erfindungsgemäß durch ein Verfahren mit den Merkmalen des Anspruchs 1 gelöst.This object is achieved by a method having the features of claim 1.

Bei dem erfindungsgemäßen Verfahren zur Überprüfung einer Legitimation für einen Zugriff auf ein Kraftfahrzeug wird zunächst die Überprüfung der Legitimation angefordert. Eine in dem Fahrzeug angeordnete Steuereinrichtung codiert dann erste Daten mit einem ersten Algorithmus und sendet die codierten ersten Daten in einer ersten Nachricht mit Hilfe einer mit der Steuereinrichtung gekoppelten Funksendeeinrichtung. Unter einer Nachricht soll hier ein beliebiger Abschnitt eines Signals verstanden werden, beispielsweise eines eine Trägerfrequenz modulierenden Signals. Die erste Nachricht wird in einem dem Fahrzeug zugeordneten ID-Geber empfangen, und die ersten Daten werden in dem ID-Geber decodiert. Der ID-Geber bestimmt ein Frequenzmuster in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten. Ein Frequenzmuster ist hier ganz allgemein ein Frequenz-Zeit-Verlauf, im einfachsten Fall eine ausgewählte innerhalb des Frequenzmusters nicht wechselnde Frequenz. Anschließend wird eine Funk-kommunikation zwischen einer Funksendeeinrichtung des ID-Gebers und einer Empfangseinrichtung der Steuereinrichtung ausgeführt, wobei - zumindest bei der Übertragung einer zweiten Nachricht - die Trägerfrequenz der Sendeeinrichtung des ID-Gebers gemäß dem Frequenzmuster gewählt wird. Die zweite Nachricht enthält codierte zweite Daten. Die Empfangseinrichtung wird von der Steuereinrichtung in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten auf die jeweiligen Trägerfrequenzen gemäß dem Frequenzmuster abgestimmt. In Abhängigkeit von den zweiten Daten wird dann die Legitimation für einen Zugriff auf das Kraftfahrzeug bestimmt. Die Empfangseinrichtung der Steuereinrichtung ist deshalb in der Lage, sich auf die jeweils richtige Trägerfrequenz des Frequenzmusters abzustimmen, weil die Steuereinrichtung sowohl die ersten Daten als auch den Algorithmus kennt, mit dessen Hilfe des Frequenzmuster aus den ersten Daten berechnet wird.In the method according to the invention for verifying a legitimacy for access to a motor vehicle, verification of the legitimacy is first requested. A control device arranged in the vehicle then codes first data with a first algorithm and transmits the coded first data in a first message by means of a radio transmitting device coupled to the control device. A message is to be understood here as meaning any portion of a signal, for example a signal modulating a carrier frequency. The first message is received in an ID transmitter associated with the vehicle, and the first data is decoded in the ID transmitter. The ID transmitter determines a frequency pattern as a function of the first data. A frequency pattern here is quite generally a frequency-time curve, in the simplest case a selected frequency which does not change within the frequency pattern. Subsequently, a radio communication between a radio transmitting device of the ID transmitter and a receiving device of the control device is carried out, wherein - at least in the transmission of a second message - the carrier frequency of the transmitting device of the ID transmitter is selected according to the frequency pattern. The second message contains coded second data. The receiving device is controlled by the control device in dependence on the first Data matched to the respective carrier frequencies according to the frequency pattern. Depending on the second data, the legitimacy for access to the motor vehicle is then determined. The receiving device of the control device is therefore able to tune to the respectively correct carrier frequency of the frequency pattern, because the controller knows both the first data and the algorithm, with the aid of the frequency pattern is calculated from the first data.

Erfindungsgemäß wird für die Überprüfung der Legitimation nicht ausschließlich der Inhalt einer Kommunikation zwischen dem ID-Geber und der Steuereinrichtung im Kraftfahrzeug ausgewertet. Die Kommunikation wird zusätzlich gesichert, indem die Kommunikations-Trägerfrequenzen gemäß einem Frequenzmuster gewählt werden. Dieses Frequenzmuster wird in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten bestimmt, die von der Steuereinrichtung an den ID-Geber gesendet werden. Nur die Steuereinrichtung und der ID-Geber sind in der Lage, das Frequenzmuster zu bestimmen und die Kommunikation auszuführen, da nur ihnen die ersten Daten bekannt sind. Sollten die ersten Daten jedoch von unberechtigten aus der anfänglichen Kommunikation ermittelt werden, ist dem Unberechtigten zumindest die Bestimmungsvorschrift für das Frequenzmuster unbekannt. Daher kann eine böswillig verlängerte Funkstrecke mit Sendeempfängern der Kommunikation gemäß dem Frequenzmuster nicht folgen. Selbst wenn also zunächst die ersten Daten erfolgreich über die böswillig verlängerte Funkstrecke an den ID-Geber übermittelt werden, weil die Verlängerungsstrecke auf die entsprechende Sendefrequenz der Sendeeinrichtung der Steuereinrichtung eingestellt ist, antwortet der ID-Geber mit einer Übertragung gemäß einem Frequenzmuster, auf das die Verlängerungsstrecke nicht eingestellt ist. Wenn aber die Empfangseinrichtung der "Verlängerung" nicht dem Frequenzmuster des ID-Gebers folgen kann, so ist keine Weitergabe an das Kraftfahrzeug möglich. Selbst dann, wenn die "Verlängerung" einen breitbandigen Empfänger auf der ID-Geber-Seite verwendet und somit die Abstrahlung des ID-Gebers empfangen kann, ist es extrem aufwendig, auf der Kraftfahrzeugseite einen Sender zu implementieren, der dem Frequenzmuster verzögerungsfrei folgen kann. Wenn aber die Kommunikation in Folge einer böswilligen Verlängerung nicht gemäß dem Frequenzmuster erfolgt, kommt eine Datenübertragung nicht zustande, und eine Legitimation wird fahrzeugseitig immer abgewiesen.According to the invention, the content of a communication between the ID transmitter and the control device in the motor vehicle is not evaluated exclusively for checking the legitimacy. The communication is additionally secured by selecting the communication carrier frequencies according to a frequency pattern. This frequency pattern is determined in response to the first data sent from the controller to the ID transmitter. Only the controller and the ID transmitter are able to determine the frequency pattern and to carry out the communication since only the first data is known to them. If, however, the first data are determined by unauthorized persons from the initial communication, the unauthorized person is at least not aware of the specification for the frequency pattern. Therefore, a maliciously prolonged radio link with transceivers can not follow the communication according to the frequency pattern. Thus, even if initially the first data is successfully transmitted to the ID transmitter via the maliciously extended radio link because the extension link is set to the corresponding transmission frequency of the transmitting device of the control device, the ID transmitter responds with a transmission according to a frequency pattern to which the Extension distance is not set. However, if the receiving device of the "extension" can not follow the frequency pattern of the ID transmitter, then no transfer to the motor vehicle is possible. Even if the "extension" uses a broadband receiver on the ID transmitter side and thus can receive the radiation of the ID transmitter, it is extremely costly on the Motor vehicle side to implement a transmitter that can follow the frequency pattern delay. However, if communication due to a malicious extension does not occur according to the frequency pattern, data transmission will not be established and legitimation will always be denied on the vehicle side.

Bei dem erfindungsgemässen Verfahren wird beim Ausführen der Funk-Kommunikation von der mit der Empfangseinrichtung gekoppelten Steuereinrichtung überprüft, ob von dem Frequenzmuster abweichende weitere Trägerfrequenzen (d.h. mehrere Trägerfrequenzen parallel) abgestrahlt werden. Wird erfasst, dass auf verschiedenen Trägerfrequenzen, die von dem bestimmten Frequenzmuster abweichen, Abstrahlung stattfindet, deutet dies auf den Versuch einer breitbandigen oder zumindest Mehrfrequenz-Verlängerung der Funkstrecke hin. Der ID-Geber sendet nämlich mit seiner Sendeeinrichtung auf der nach dem Frequenzmuster bestimmten Frequenz.In the method according to the invention, when radio communication is carried out, the control device coupled to the receiving device checks whether further carrier frequencies deviating from the frequency pattern (i.e., several carrier frequencies in parallel) are emitted. If it is detected that radiation is taking place on different carrier frequencies which deviate from the specific frequency pattern, this indicates the attempt of a broadband or at least multi-frequency extension of the radio link. The ID transmitter transmits namely with its transmitting device on the frequency determined by the frequency pattern.

Eine entsprechende Erfassung kann in der Steuereinrichtung zusätzlich derart ausgewertet werden, dass böswillige Verlängerungsversuche von üblichen Störungen, die beispielsweise durch in der Nähe gleichzeitig stattfindende Zugriffsversuche auf andere Kraftfahrzeuge verursacht werden, unterschieden werden. Es kann z.B. vorgesehen werden, dass wenigstens eine Mindestzahl oder Mindestdauer von Abstrahlungen auf von dem Frequenzmuster abweichenden Frequenzen vorliegen muss, bevor dies als Versuch einer "Verlängerung" gewertet wird. Wenn dies festgestellt wird, wird die Funk-Kommunikation ohne weitere Prüfung der Legitimation abgebrochen.A corresponding detection can additionally be evaluated in the control device in such a way that malicious extension attempts are distinguished from usual disturbances which are caused, for example, by simultaneous access attempts to other motor vehicles taking place nearby. It can e.g. provision must be made for at least a minimum number or minimum duration of emissions to be present at frequencies deviating from the frequency pattern, before this is considered an attempt at "extension". If this is detected, the radio communication is aborted without further verification of the legitimacy.

Es wird demnach der Inhalt einer Kommunikation mit der Art der Kommunikation verknüpft. Die Sicherheit der Kommunikation und des Zugriffs auf das Kraftfahrzeug wird daher bei dem erfindungsgemäßen Verfahren erhöht.Accordingly, the content of a communication is linked to the type of communication. The security of communication and access to the motor vehicle is therefore increased in the method according to the invention.

Eine anfängliche Anforderung der Überprüfung der Legitimation kann mit Hilfe bekannter Mittel erreicht werden, wie zum Beispiel Sensoren, Schaltern oder durch Senden von Anforderungssignalen an die Steuereinrichtung.An initial legitimacy verification request may be accomplished by known means, such as sensors, switches, or by sending request signals to the controller.

Die Steuereinrichtung codiert die ersten Daten mit einem ersten Algorithmus und sendet diese Daten in einer ersten Nachricht auf einer ersten Frequenz. Die Art der Codierung und die Frequenz können bei jeder Überprüfung anfänglich fest vorgegeben sein, jedoch auch veränderlich sein, z.B. uhrzeitabhängig variiert werden. Jedenfalls muß der ID-Geber Kenntnis von der verwendeten Frequenz und der Art der Codierung haben. Dem ID-Geber muß insbesondere der Decodierungs-Algorithmus bekannt sein.The controller encodes the first data with a first algorithm and sends that data in a first message on a first frequency. The type of coding and the frequency may be initially fixed at each check, but may be variable, e.g. can be varied depending on the time. In any case, the ID transmitter must have knowledge of the frequency used and the type of coding. In particular, the ID transmitter must be aware of the decoding algorithm.

Die ersten Daten können zum Beispiel auch in Abhängigkeit von einer Kennung des angesprochenen ID-Gebers codiert sein. Die erste Frequenz kann im Niederfrequenzbereich, zum Beispiel bei 125 KHz, liegen. Sofern sich der ID-Geber bereits in einem sende- beziehungsweise empfangsbereiten Zustand befindet, kann auch eine höhere Frequenz, von zum Beispiel 433 MHz verwendet werden.The first data may for example also be coded as a function of an identifier of the addressed ID transmitter. The first frequency may be in the low frequency range, for example at 125 KHz. If the ID transmitter is already in a ready-to-transmit or receive-ready state, a higher frequency of, for example, 433 MHz can also be used.

Die Nachricht mit den codierten ersten Daten wird von dem ID-Geber empfangen und decodiert. Sofern die ersten Daten in Abhängigkeit von einer Kennung des ID-Gebers codiert wurden, decodiert der ID-Geber unter Verwendung seiner eigenen ID-Geber-Kennung die Daten.The message with the coded first data is received and decoded by the ID transmitter. If the first data were coded in dependence on an identifier of the ID transmitter, the ID transmitter decodes the data using its own ID transmitter identifier.

Wenn die ersten Daten decodiert vorliegen, wird von dem ID-Geber ein Frequenzmuster in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten bestimmt. Es ist eine eindeutige Zuordnung von den ersten Daten zu einem Frequenzmuster sicher zu stellen, da sonst die Steuereinrichtung gegebenenfalls nicht das identische Frequenzmuster ermittelt und eine nachfolgende Kommunikation nicht möglich ist. Dann müßte die Legitimation erneut überprüft werden. Für die Bestimmung des Frequenzmusters kann beispielsweise eine Rechenvorschrift oder eine fest eingespeicherte Verweistabelle verwendet werden, die eine Zuordnung von Daten zu Frequenzmustern gespeichert hat. Auch die Steuereinrichtung bestimmt in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten ein identisches Frequenzmuster. ID-Geber und Steuereinrichtung sind danach auf die Kommunikation vorbereitet und auf eine zu verwendende anfängliche Frequenz abgestimmt. Dann wird die Funk-Kommunikation zwischen einer Funksendeeinrichtung des ID-Gebers und einer Empfangseinrichtung der Steuereinrichtung gestartet. Während der gemäß dem Frequenzmuster erfolgenden Kommunikation wird eine zweite Nachricht mit codierten zweiten Daten übertragen. Das Frequenzmuster kann zum Beispiel zeitlich bestimmte Frequenzwechsel und/oder Sendepausen enthalten. Ein Paar von Sendeempfängern zur böswilligen Verlängerung der Funkstrecke kann diese Kommunikation nicht verlängern, da sie auf das Frequenzmuster nicht eingestellt sind.When the first data is decoded, the ID transmitter becomes a frequency pattern depending on the first data certainly. It is an unambiguous assignment of the first data to ensure a frequency pattern, otherwise the controller may not determine the identical frequency pattern and subsequent communication is not possible. Then the legitimacy would have to be checked again. For the determination of the frequency pattern, for example, a calculation rule or a permanently stored reference table can be used, which has stored an assignment of data to frequency patterns. The control device also determines an identical frequency pattern as a function of the first data. ID encoders and controllers are then prepared for communication and tuned to an initial frequency to be used. Then, the radio communication between a radio transmitting device of the ID transmitter and a receiving device of the control device is started. During the communication according to the frequency pattern, a second message is transmitted with coded second data. The frequency pattern may include, for example, time-specific frequency changes and / or transmission pauses. A pair of transceivers for maliciously extending the radio link can not extend this communication because they are not tuned to the frequency pattern.

Ferner kann das Frequenzmuster auch eine Variation der Sendeamplitude vorsehen. In einer Funk-Verlängerungsstrecke kann dann nicht unterschieden werden, ob diese Amplitudenverstärkung beziehungsweise dieser Amplitudenabfall vorgesehen, also Teil des Frequenzmusters ist, oder ob diese Änderung z.B. auf eine Störung der Verlängerungsstrecke zurückzuführen ist.Furthermore, the frequency pattern can also provide a variation of the transmission amplitude. In a radio extension path it is then not possible to distinguish whether this amplitude amplification or this amplitude drop is provided, ie is part of the frequency pattern, or whether this change is e.g. is due to a disturbance of the extension route.

Sofern die Kommunikation nicht erfolgreich beendet wird, weil beispielsweise eine Verlängerungsstrecke zwischengeschaltet ist, die der Kommunikation nicht folgen kann, gibt das Steuergerät den Zugriff auf das Fahrzeug nicht frei. Nach erfolgreicher Kommunikation gemäß dem bestimmten Frequenzmuster werden die zweiten Daten in der Steuereinrichtung geprüft und in Abhängigkeit von den zweiten Daten wird der Zugriff auf das Fahrzeug freigeben beziehungsweise nicht freigeben.Unless the communication is terminated successfully because, for example, an extension link is interposed that can not follow the communication, the controller does not release the access to the vehicle. After successful communication according to the particular frequency pattern, the second data is checked in the control device and, depending on the second data, the access to the vehicle is released or not released.

ID-Geber befinden sich üblicherweise nicht ununterbrochen in einem energieintensiven Sende/Empfangszustand. Es ist daher bei dem erfindungsgemäßen Verfahren vorteilhaft, wenn nach dem Anfordern der Überprüfung der Legitimation zunächst ein Wecksignal mit Hilfe der Funksendeeinrichtung der Steuereinrichtung gesendet wird, und wenigstens ein ID-Geber auf das Wecksignal hin ein Antwortsignal an die Steuereinrichtung sendet, bevor die codierten ersten Daten gesendet werden.ID encoders are usually not continuously in an energy-intensive send / receive state. It is therefore advantageous in the inventive method, when after requesting the verification of legitimacy first a wake-up signal using the radio transmitter of the controller is sent, and at least one ID transmitter sends the wake-up signal to a response signal to the controller before the coded first Data is sent.

Das Funk-Wecksignal kann in einem Frequenzbereich abgestrahlt werden, in dem ein Transponder in einem ID-Geber, der sich in einem passiven Zustand befindet, aufgeweckt wird. Zum Beispiel kann eine Frequenz von 125 KHz verwendet werden. Jeder durch das Signal aufgeweckte ID-Geber im Umkreis sendet ein Antwortsignal an die Steuereinrichtung.The radio wake-up signal may be radiated in a frequency range in which a transponder in an ID transmitter in a passive state is woken up. For example, a frequency of 125 KHz can be used. Each ID transmitter awakened by the signal sends a response signal to the controller.

Senden mehrere ID-Geber ein Antwortsignal an die Steuereinrichtung, wird vorzugsweise einer der ID-Geber von der Steuereinrichtung als der dem Kraftfahrzeug zugeordnete ID-Geber ausgewählt.If several ID transmitters send a response signal to the control device, preferably one of the ID transmitters is selected by the control device as the ID transmitter assigned to the motor vehicle.

Sofern sich mehrere ID-Geber im Umkreis des Kraftfahrzeugs befinden, muß sichergestellt werden, daß die nachfolgende Kommunikation beziehungsweise Überprüfung der Legitimation nur mit einem der ID-Geber durchgeführt wird. Dazu kann zum Beispiel vorgesehen sein, daß in Beantwortung des Wecksignals die ID-Geber eine ID-Geber-Kennung als Antwortsignal an die Steuereinrichtung senden. Die Steuereinrichtung prüft zunächst, ob die antwortenden ID-Geber überhaupt zu dem Kraftfahrzeug gehören. Wenn mehrere ID-Geber vorhanden sind, die zu dem Kraftfahrzeug gehören (zum Beispiel bei Fahrer und Beifahrer) wird einer der ID-Geber für die Kommunikation ausgewählt und für das nachfolgende Verfahren als der dem Kraftfahrzeug zugeordnete ID-Geber angesehen. In dem Wecksignal kann auch eine Fahrzeugkennung enthalten sein, die in den ID-Gebern ausgewertet wird. In diesem Fall antworten nur diejenigen ID-Geber auf das Signal, die sich als zu der Fahrzeugkennung gehörend erkennen.If several ID encoders are located in the vicinity of the motor vehicle, it must be ensured that the subsequent communication or verification of the legitimacy is performed only with one of the ID encoders. For this purpose, it may be provided, for example, that in response to the wake-up signal the ID transmitter sends an ID transmitter identifier as a response signal to the control device. The control device first checks whether the answering ID encoders belong to the motor vehicle at all. If there are a plurality of ID encoders that belong to the motor vehicle (for example, the driver and front passenger), one of the ID encoders for the communication is selected and regarded as the ID encoders associated with the motor vehicle for the subsequent method. In the wake-up signal can also be included a vehicle identifier, which is evaluated in the ID donors. In this case, only those ID transmitters respond to the signal that identify themselves as belonging to the vehicle identifier.

Vorzugsweise werden vor oder mit dem Senden der codierten ersten Daten Identifikationsdaten für den ausgewählten ID-Geber von der mit der Steuereinrichtung gekoppelten Funksendeeinrichtung gesendet werden.Preferably, before or with the transmission of the coded first data, identification data for the selected ID transmitter be sent from the coupled to the controller radio transmitter.

Auf diese Weise wird der als zugeordneter ID-Geber ausgewählte ID-Geber über seine Auswahl informiert und steht für die weitere Kommunikation zur Verfügung. Die ID-Geber die nicht ausgewählt wurden, können dementsprechend in den ursprünglichen passiven Zustand schalten, in dem sie die nachfolgende Kommunikation nicht stören.In this way, the ID transmitter selected as assigned ID transmitter is informed of its selection and is available for further communication. The ID donors that have not been selected can accordingly switch to the original passive state, in which they do not disturb the subsequent communication.

Vorzugsweise enthalten die zweiten Daten einen den ID-Geber eindeutig identifizierenden Code.The second data preferably contains a code that uniquely identifies the ID transmitter.

Obwohl die Funk-Kommunikation und die Übermittlung der zweiten Nachricht gemäß dem bestimmten Frequenzmuster durchgeführt wird, wird auf diese Weise eine zusätzliche Sicherung der Kommunikation erreicht. Der den ID-Geber eindeutig identifizierende Code ist dabei vorzugsweise nicht mit den Identifikationsdaten identisch, die während des Weckvorgangs übermittelt wurden. Es handelt sich um Daten, die in der Steuereinrichtung in dem Kraftfahrzeug gespeichert sind und die solche ID-Geber identifizieren, die für den Zugriff auf das Kraftfahrzeug vorgesehen sind. Diese Daten können von dem ID-Geber wiederum in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten verschlüsselt sein.Although the radio communication and the transmission of the second message is performed according to the particular frequency pattern, an additional securing of the communication is achieved in this way. The code uniquely identifying the ID transmitter is preferably not identical to the identification data transmitted during the wake-up process. It is data that are stored in the control device in the motor vehicle and identify those ID encoders that are provided for access to the motor vehicle. This data can in turn be encrypted by the ID transmitter depending on the first data.

Bei einer bevorzugten Ausführungsform wird der den ID-Geber eindeutig identifizierende Code in dem ID-Geber mit einem für den ID-Geber charakteristischen Algorithmus erzeugt.In a preferred embodiment, the code uniquely identifying the ID transmitter is generated in the ID transmitter with an algorithm characteristic of the ID transmitter.

Es ist in diesem Fall möglich, in dem Steuergerät einen entsprechenden Algorithmus zur Decodierung zu verwenden, der als zu dem identifizierten ID-Geber gehörig abgelegt ist. So wird nicht nur der Inhalt der codierten Daten, der in der Funk-Kommunikation gemäß dem Frequenzmuster übertragen wird, zur Sicherung verwendet, sondern auch die Art beziehungsweise der Algorithmus der Sicherung selbst.It is possible in this case to use in the controller a corresponding algorithm for decoding, which is filed as belonging to the identified ID transmitter. Thus, not only the content of the encoded data transmitted in the radio communication according to the frequency pattern is used for the backup, but also the kind or the algorithm of the backup itself.

Vorzugsweise enthalten die ersten Daten wenigstens eine Zufallszahl.Preferably, the first data contains at least one random number.

Die vom Steuergerät gesendeten ersten Daten gewährleisten auf diese Weise eine weitere Sicherung der Kommunikation, da sowohl die Inhalte der Kommunikation, als auch das bestimmte Frequenzmuster bei jeder angeforderten Überprüfung variiert werden.The first data sent by the control unit thus ensure further security of the communication, since both the contents of the communication, as well as the particular Frequency patterns are varied with each requested verification.

Es ist vorteilhaft, wenn das Frequenzmuster wenigstens eine in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten bestimmte Frequenz enthält.It is advantageous if the frequency pattern contains at least one frequency determined as a function of the first data.

Das Frequenzmuster kann Änderungen der Frequenzen, der Sendeamplituden beziehungsweise auch zum Beispiel Informationen über Sendepausen enthalten. Es ist eine Sicherung gegenüber einer Verlängerungsstrecke jedoch insbesondere dann gegeben, wenn wenigstens eine Frequenz in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten bestimmt wird. Dies kann zum Beispiel bedeuten, daß die gesamte Kommunikation auf einer konstanten Frequenz ausgeführt wird, die in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten gewählt wurde. Jedoch ist auch eine Kombination mit Frequenzwechseln an zeitlich bestimmten Positionen oder zeitlichen Frequenzpausen möglich, wobei nicht jede der gewechselten Frequenzen in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten bestimmt sein muß. Zum Beispiel kann ein erster Kommunikationsabschnitt auf einer Frequenz stattfinden, die in Abhängigkeit von den ersten Daten bestimmt wurde, während ein nachfolgender zweiter Kommunikationsabschnitt gemäß einem vorgegebenen und bei jeder Kommunikation gleichbleibenden Frequenzmuster durchgeführt wird.The frequency pattern may include changes in the frequencies, the transmit amplitudes or, for example, information about transmission pauses. However, there is a fuse with respect to an extension path, in particular if at least one frequency is determined as a function of the first data. This may mean, for example, that all communication is carried out at a constant frequency chosen in dependence on the first data. However, a combination with frequency changes at timed positions or temporal frequency pauses is possible, wherein not each of the changed frequencies must be determined in dependence on the first data. For example, a first communication section may take place at a frequency determined in response to the first data while a subsequent second communication section is performed according to a predetermined frequency pattern consistent with each communication.

Weitere vorteilhafte Ausführungen des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens sind in den Ansprüchen gekennzeichnet.Further advantageous embodiments of the method according to the invention are characterized in the claims.

Das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren wird im folgenden anhand der beiliegenden Zeichnung, die eine bevorzugte Ausführungsform zeigt, näher erläutert.

  • Fig. 1 zeigt einen ersten Teil eines Ablaufdiagramms einer bevorzugten Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens;
  • Fig. 2 zeigt einen zweiten Teil eines Ablaufdiagram einer bevorzugten Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens.
The method according to the invention will be explained in more detail below with reference to the attached drawing which shows a preferred embodiment.
  • Fig. 1 shows a first part of a flowchart of a preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention;
  • Fig. 2 shows a second part of a flow chart of a preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention.

In einem Kraftfahrzeug ist eine Steuereinrichtung eingebaut. In der Umgebung außerhalb des Kraftfahrzeug befinden sich mehrere ID-Geber, die jeweils zum Zugriff auf ein Kraftfahrzeug berechtigen.In a motor vehicle, a control device is installed. In the environment outside the motor vehicle there are several ID encoders, each entitling to access a motor vehicle.

In Fig. 1 nähert sich bei 100 eine Person dem Kraftfahrzeug und bewegt ihre Hand zu einem der Türgriffe des Kraftfahrzeug. Ein Näherungssensor im Bereich des Türgriffs registriert diese Annäherung und übermittelt über eine Signalleitung ein Anforderungssignal an die zentrale Steuereinrichtung des Kraftfahrzeugs. Die Steuereinrichtung verfügt über Sende/Empfangsmittel oder ist mit solchen gekoppelt und sendet bei 110 auf einer Frequenz von 125 KHz ein Wecksignal für die ID-Geber in den Umgebungsbereich des Kraftfahrzeugs. Das Wecksignal enthält auch eine Kraftfahrzeug-Kennung. Die ID-Geber im Umkreis verfügen über einen Transponder und werden durch das Wecksignal bei 120 aus einem Ruhezustand geweckt und aktivieren jeweils eine interne Stromversorgung über eine Batterie. Jeder ID-Geber prüft anhand der Kraftfahrzeug-Kennung, ob das Wecksignal grundsätzlich für ihn bestimmt sein könnte. Sofern ein ID-Geber bestimmt, daß sich das Wecksignal nicht an ihn richtet, schaltet der betreffende ID-Geber wieder in den vorherigen Ruhezustand.In Fig. 1 At 100, a person approaches the motor vehicle and moves his hand to one of the door handles of the motor vehicle. A proximity sensor in the region of the door handle registers this approach and transmits a request signal via a signal line to the central control device of the motor vehicle. The control device has transmitting / receiving means or is coupled to such and transmits at 110 at a frequency of 125 KHz a wake-up signal for the ID transmitter in the surrounding area of the motor vehicle. The wake-up signal also includes a motor vehicle identifier. The ID encoders in the vicinity have a transponder and are awakened by the wake-up signal at 120 from a hibernation and each activate an internal power supply via a battery. Each ID transmitter checks on the basis of the motor vehicle identifier whether the wake-up signal could in principle be intended for it. If an ID transmitter determines that the wake-up signal does not turn on turns it on, the relevant ID transmitter switches back to the previous idle state.

Bei 130 senden diejenigen ID-Geber, deren interne Überprüfung ergeben hat, daß sie durch das Wecksignal angesprochen werden sollten, ein Antwortsignal an die Steuereinrichtung. Es kann sich um mehrere antwortende ID-Geber handeln, z.B. wenn die zugreifende Person mehrere ID-Geber bei sich trägt, oder ggf. eine weitere Person (z.B. Beifahrer) ebenfalls einen ID-Geber bei sich trägt. Das Antwortsignal wird von den nun intern mit Strom versorgten ID-Gebern auf einer Frequenz im MHz-oder GHz-Bereich gesendet. In dem Antwortsignal jedes ID-Gebers ist eine ID-Geber-Kennung codiert, die es der Steuereinrichtung ermöglicht, die antwortenden ID-Geber zu unterscheiden.At 130, those ID transmitters whose internal verification has revealed that they should be addressed by the wake-up signal send a response signal to the controller. It can be several responding ID transmitters, e.g. if the accessing person carries several ID-donors with him, or possibly another person (for example, a passenger) also carries an ID-donor with him. The response signal is transmitted by the now internally powered ID encoders on a frequency in the MHz or GHz range. In the response signal of each ID transmitter, an ID transmitter identifier is coded, which enables the controller to distinguish the answering ID transmitter.

Bei 140 prüft die Steuereinrichtung, ob Antwortsignale von mehreren ID-Gebern eingehen. Sofern dies der Fall ist, wird bei 150 von der Steuereinrichtung einer der ID-Geber ausgewählt und für das weitere Verfahren als der dem Kraftfahrzeug zugeordnete ID-Geber angesehen. Die Auswahl in der Steuereinrichtung kann zufällig geschehen, oder gemäß bestimmter Kriterien wie z.B. der Antwortzeit der ID-Geber oder der Signalstärke.At 140, the controller checks for response signals from multiple ID encoders. If this is the case, one of the ID transmitters is selected by the control device at 150 and regarded as the ID transmitter assigned to the motor vehicle for the further method. The selection in the controller may be random, or according to certain criteria such as e.g. the response time of the ID transmitter or the signal strength.

Bei 160 sendet die Steuereinrichtung ein Signal, daß die Auswahl des zugeordneten ID-Gebers den ID-Gebern im Umkreis mitteilt. Die nicht ausgewählten ID-Geber schalten nach Empfang des Signals wieder in den anfänglichen Ruhezustand. Die Auswahl wird auch einem einzelnen antwortenden ID-Geber mitgeteilt, da dem ID-Geber selbst nicht bekannt ist, ob mehrere ID-Geber geantwortet haben.At 160, the controller sends a signal that the selection of the associated ID transmitter communicates to the ID donors in the vicinity. The non-selected ID encoders switch back to the initial idle state after receiving the signal. The selection is also communicated to a single answering ID transmitter, since the ID transmitter itself is not aware of whether several ID encoders have responded.

Fig. 2 zeigt die weiteren Schritte des Verfahrens, nachdem die Auswahl des zugeordneten ID-Gebers durch die Steuereinrichtung erfolgt ist. Fig. 2 shows the further steps of the method after the selection of the associated ID transmitter has been carried out by the control device.

Die Steuereinrichtung erzeugt mit einer zugehörigen Recheneinheit eine Zufallszahl. Diese Zufallszahl wird mit einem zum Steuergerät gehörenden Schlüssel codiert bzw. verschlüsselt und bei 170, ggf. mit weiteren Daten, in einer ersten Nachricht im MHz- oder GHz-Bereich an den ausgewählten ID-Geber gesendet.The control device generates a random number with an associated arithmetic unit. This random number is encoded or encrypted with a key belonging to the control unit and at 170, possibly with further data, in a first Message sent in the MHz or GHz range to the selected ID transmitter.

In Abhängigkeit von der Zufallszahl bestimmt die Steuereinrichtung unter Anwendung einer eindeutigen Rechenvorschrift bei 180 ein Frequenzmuster. Zum Beispiel können in Abhängigkeit von der Zufallszahl zwei Frequenzen bestimmt werden, zwischen gewechselt wird. Der Zeitpunkt des Wechsels wird ebenfalls durch die Zufallszahl bestimmt.Depending on the random number, the controller determines a frequency pattern using a unique calculation rule at 180. For example, depending on the random number, two frequencies can be determined, between being switched. The time of the change is also determined by the random number.

Der ID-Geber empfängt bei 190 die Nachricht und decodiert die codierten ersten Daten, die die Zufallszahl enthalten. Die Decodierung ist möglich, da jeder zum Kraftfahrzeug gehörende ID-Geber über gespeicherte Informationen zur Entschlüsselung von Nachrichten seiner zugeordneten Steuereinrichtung verfügt. Unabhängig von der Steuereinrichtung bestimmt auch der ID-Geber in Kenntnis der Zufallszahl bei 200 das Frequenzmuster. Da eine eindeutige Zuordnung zwischen Zufallszahl und Frequenzmuster vorliegt, werden im ID-Geber und in der Steuereinrichtung immer identische Frequenzmuster erzeugt.The ID transmitter receives the message at 190 and decodes the encoded first data containing the random number. The decoding is possible because each belonging to the motor vehicle ID transmitter has stored information for decrypting messages of its associated control device. Regardless of the controller determines the ID transmitter in knowledge of the random number at 200, the frequency pattern. Since there is an unambiguous assignment between random number and frequency pattern, identical frequency patterns are always generated in the ID transmitter and in the control device.

Der ID-Geber bestimmt bei 210 außerdem einen Code, der ihn eindeutig identifiziert. Dazu wird eine intern gespeicherte eindeutige ID-Geber-Kennung mit der Zufallszahl verschlüsselt, wobei ein dem ID-Geber zugeordneter Algorithmus angewendet wird.The ID transmitter also determines at 210 a code that uniquely identifies it. For this purpose, an internally stored unique ID-donor identifier is encrypted with the random number, whereby an algorithm associated with the ID donor is applied.

Nachdem der Code bestimmt ist, nehmen die Steuereinrichtung und der ID-Geber bei 220 die Kommunikation miteinander auf, wobei die Kommunikation auf Trägerfrequenzen ausgeführt wird, die gemäß dem bestimmten Frequenzmuster gewählt werden. Die Steuereinrichtung erwartet auf einer ersten Frequenz, auf die sie gemäß dem bestimmten Frequenzmuster abgestimmt ist, den Start der Kommunikation durch den ID-Geber. In der nachfolgenden Kommunikation schalten die Steuereinrichtung und der ID-Geber die Kommunikationsfrequenz nach Übermittlung einer bestimmten Datenmenge oder nach Ablauf einer bestimmten Kommunikationsdauer um, wobei die jeweilige Datenmenge bzw. die bestimmte Dauer für einen Frequenzwechsel gemäß dem Frequenzmuster festgelegt sind. Während der Kommunikation sendet der ID-Geber bei 230 den bei 210 bestimmten Code als zweite Daten in einer zweiten Nachricht an die Steuereinrichtung.After the code is determined, the controller and the ID transmitter, at 220, communicate with each other, wherein the communication is performed on carrier frequencies selected according to the particular frequency pattern. The controller expects, on a first frequency to which it is tuned according to the determined frequency pattern, the start of the communication by the ID transmitter. In the subsequent communication, the control device and the ID transmitter switch the communication frequency after transmission of a specific amount of data or after a certain communication time, wherein the respective amount of data or the specific duration are set for a frequency change according to the frequency pattern. During communication, the ID transmitter sends at 230 the code determined at 210 as second data in a second message to the controller.

Bei 240 prüft die Steuereinrichtung, ob die Kommunikation abgeschlossen ist und die vollständige Nachricht übermittelt wurde. Sofern dies nicht der Fall ist, wird die Kommunikation fortgesetzt oder nach Kommunikationsproblemen mindestens einmal erneut gestartet, wobei wieder das bestimmte Frequenzmuster verwendet wird. Sofern die Kommunikation nicht erfolgreich abgeschlossen werden kann, weil dem vorgegebenen Frequenzmuster nicht korrekt gefolgt wird, wird vermutet, daß ein Versuch unternommen wird, die Funkstrecke zwischen ID-Geber und Steuereinrichtung zu verlängern. In diesem Fall wird aufgrund der fehlerhaften Kommunikation der Zugriff auf das Kraftfahrzeug verweigert. Bei solchen Störungen, die nicht durch eine böswillige Verlängerung hervorgerufen werden, kann dann der Zugangsberechtigte die Überprüfung erneut anfordern oder das Kraftfahrzeug manuell mit einem Schlüssel öffnen.At 240, the controller checks if the communication is complete and the complete message has been transmitted. If this is not the case, the communication is continued or restarted at least once after communication problems, again using the particular frequency pattern. If the communication can not be completed successfully because the given frequency pattern is not correctly followed, it is presumed that an attempt is made to extend the radio link between the ID transmitter and the controller. In this case, access to the motor vehicle is denied due to the faulty communication. For such disturbances, which are not caused by a malicious extension, then the authorized user can request the inspection again or open the motor vehicle manually with a key.

Sofern die Kommunikation erfolgreich abgeschlossen wird, decodiert die Steuereinheit bei 250 in Kenntnis der Zufallszahl und des für den ID-Geber charakteristischen Algorithmus die zweiten Daten aus der zweiten Nachricht, die die ID-Geber-Kennung enthalten. Sofern die ID-Geber-Kennung den ID-Geber als zugangsberechtigt ausweist, veranlaßt die Steuereinrichtung die Freigabe des Kraftfahrzeugs durch z.B. Ansteuern der Zentralverriegelung oder gezielte Freigabe der Tür, an der ein Näherungssensor die Berührung erfaßt hat. Falls der ID-Geber nicht als legitimiert erkannt wird, erfolgt keine Freigabe.If the communication is successfully completed, the control unit at 250, knowing the random number and the algorithm characteristic of the ID transmitter, decodes the second data from the second message containing the ID transmitter identifier. If the ID transmitter identifier identifies the ID transmitter as authorized, the control unit causes the release of the motor vehicle by e.g. Activation of the central locking or targeted release of the door on which a proximity sensor has detected the touch. If the ID transmitter is not recognized as legitimate, no release takes place.

Gemäß dieser Ausführungform wird einerseits sichergestellt, daß grundsätzlich nur dann Zugriff gewährt wird, wenn die Kommunikation zwischen der Steuereinrichtung und einem berechtigten ID-Geber erfolgt. Dies wird durch die Überprüfung der ID-Geber-Kennung erreicht. Zusätzlich wird aber auch gewährleistet, daß nur eine Freigabe erfolgt, wenn sich der ID-Geber tatsächlich in der Nähe des Kraftfahrzeugs befindet. Eine böswillig installierte Funk-Verlängerungsstrecke ist nämlich nicht in der Lage, dem im ID-Geber und der Steuereinrichtung unabhängig voneinander bestimmten Frequenzmuster bei der Kommunikation zu folgen.According to this embodiment, on the one hand it is ensured that, in principle, access is only granted if the communication takes place between the control device and an authorized ID transmitter. This is achieved by checking the ID transmitter identifier. In addition, however, it is also ensured that only a release takes place when the ID transmitter is actually in the vicinity of the motor vehicle. A maliciously installed wireless extension line is not capable of that in the ID transmitter and the control device to independently follow specific frequency patterns in the communication.

Im Rahmen der Erfindung sind Abwandlungen möglich. Insbesondere kann das Frequenzmuster in beliebiger Weise in Abhängigkeit von den Daten bestimmt werden, die die Steuereinrichtung an den ID-Geber sendet. Es kann dafür z.B. eine fest gespeicherte Zuordnung verwendet werden oder eine mathematische Funktion. Ferner kann das Frequenzmuster auch lediglich eine Folge von Frequenzen enthalten, die in Reaktion auf ein fest vorgegebnes Wechsel-Signal zyklisch gewechselt werden. In diesem Fall kann die Steuereinrichtung beispielsweise in zufälligen Zeitabständen einen Frequenzwechsel bei dem ID-Geber anfordern, der jeweils gemäß dem Frequenzmuster erfolgt und dem eine Verlängerungsstrecke nicht folgen kann. Auch die ersten Daten, in deren Abhängigkeit das Frequenzmuster bestimmt wird, können statt oder außer einer Zufallszahl beliebige andere Daten enthalten, die z.B. abhängig von Datum oder Uhrzeit oder Umgebungsparametern sind. Wesentlich ist, daß die Funk-Kommunikation selbst und nicht nur deren Inhalt durch die ersten Daten beeinflußt wird.Variations are possible within the scope of the invention. In particular, the frequency pattern may be arbitrarily determined in dependence on the data that the controller sends to the ID transmitter. It can be used e.g. a permanently stored assignment can be used or a mathematical function. Furthermore, the frequency pattern may also contain only a series of frequencies which are cyclically changed in response to a fixed predetermined change signal. In this case, the control device may, for example, request a frequency change at the ID transmitter at random time intervals, which takes place in each case according to the frequency pattern and to which an extension route can not follow. Also, the first data in dependence of which the frequency pattern is determined may, instead of or in addition to a random number, contain any other data, e.g. depending on date or time or environment parameters. It is essential that the radio communication itself and not only its content is affected by the first data.

Claims (11)

  1. Method of checking a legitimation for access to a motor vehicle, with the steps:
    - requesting checking of the legitimation,
    - encoding of first data with a first algorithm by a control device disposed in the motor vehicle,
    - transmitting the encoded first data in a first message with the aid of a radio transmitting device coupled to the control device,
    - receiving the first message in an ID transmitter assigned to the motor vehicle,
    - decoding the first data in the ID transmitter,
    - determining a frequency pattern as a function of the first data,
    - carrying out a radio communication between a radio transmitting device of the ID transmitter and a receiving device of the control device, wherein - at least during the transmission of a second message - the carrier frequency of the transmitting device of the ID transmitter is chosen according to the frequency pattern, the second message containing encoded second data, wherein the receiving device of the control device is adapted as a function of the first data to the respective carrier frequencies according to the frequency pattern,
    determining the legitimation for access to the motor vehicle as a function of the second data,
    characterised in that during the radio communication the control device coupled to the receiving device checks whether further carrier frequencies are emitted which deviate from the frequency pattern, and when this is established the communication without legitimation is terminated.
  2. Method as claimed in Claim 1, in which after the requesting of the checking of the legitimation first of all an alarm signal is transmitted with the aid of the radio transmitting device of the control device, and in response to the alarm signal at least one ID transmitter transmits a response signal to the control device before the encoded first data are transmitted.
  3. Method as claimed in Claim 2, wherein when a plurality of ID transmitters transmit a response signal to the control device one of the ID transmitters of the control device is selected as the ID transmitter assigned to the motor vehicle.
  4. Method as claimed in Claim 3, wherein before or with the transmission of the encoded first data identification data for the selected ID transmitter are transmitted by the radio transmitting device coupled to the control device.
  5. Method as claimed in any one of Claims 1 to 4, wherein the second data contain a code which unambiguously identifies the ID transmitter.
  6. Method as claimed in Claim 5, characterised in that the code which unambiguously identifies the ID transmitter is generated in the ID transmitter with the aid of an algorithm which is characteristic for the ID transmitter.
  7. Method as claimed in Claim 5 or 6, wherein the code which unambiguously identifies the ID transmitter is generated as a function of the first data.
  8. Method as claimed in any one of Claims 1 to 7, wherein the first data contain at least one random number.
  9. Method as claimed in any one of Claims 1 to 8, wherein the frequency pattern contains at least one frequency determined as a function of the first data.
  10. Method as claimed in any one of Claims 1 to 9, wherein the frequency pattern contains at least one frequency change, the chronological position of which is determined as a function of the first data.
  11. Method as claimed in any one of Claims 1 to 10, wherein the checking of the legitimation is requested on the basis of a proximity signal transmitted by a proximity sensor on a door handle of the motor vehicle.
EP06117688A 2005-07-25 2006-07-21 Verification method for a vehicle access legitimation Active EP1747955B1 (en)

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