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CN1767429A - Mobile communication user certification and key negotiation method - Google Patents

Mobile communication user certification and key negotiation method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN1767429A
CN1767429A CN200410088407.0A CN200410088407A CN1767429A CN 1767429 A CN1767429 A CN 1767429A CN 200410088407 A CN200410088407 A CN 200410088407A CN 1767429 A CN1767429 A CN 1767429A
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authentication
mobile subscriber
network
key
message
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CN200410088407.0A
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CN100544249C (en
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单广玉
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China Academy of Telecommunications Technology CATT
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Datang Mobile Communications Equipment Co Ltd
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Abstract

This invention relates to a method for mobile communication user certification and cryptographic key negotiation including: carrying out a first Hass operation to random numbers generated by mobile users at the registration stage, utilizing the final Hass value and user ciphered code to generate an information certification code to be sent to the access network, which confirms the reality of the information with the help of attribute network of the user and keeps the Hass value when it is true, carrying out a second Hass operation to the random numbers generated by the access networks to generate an information certification code by the final Hass value to be sent to the user, which confirms the identity of the access network and keeps the Hass value. At the certification and the key negotiation stage, the user and the access network utilize the stored Hass value to certificate to generate a session cryptographic key.

Description

Mobile communication user certification and cryptographic key negotiation method
Technical field
The present invention relates to the mobile communication authentication techniques, relate to user and internetwork authentication and session cipher negotiating method in the mobile communication system or rather.
Background technology
Authentification of user in the global system for mobile communications (GSM) and key agreement adopt one way system, promptly have only network authentication user's process, do not have the process of user's authenticating network, network authentication user's one-way process as shown in Figure 1:
Step 11, travelling carriage sends the user and inserts request, comprises the User Identity (IMSI) of travelling carriage in this request;
Step 12, base station sub-system/mobile switching center (BSS/MSC/VLR) receives request, and sends authentication data request to the authentication center (AuC) of home network, comprises the User Identity (IMSI) of travelling carriage in this request;
Step 13, the authentication center of home network (AuC) inquires corresponding key K and produces a random number RA ND according to the User Identity (IMSI) of travelling carriage, and according to key K, random number RA ND, utilizes response generating function A 3() generates the response SRES of expectation and according to key K, random number RA ND, utilizes session key generating function A 8() generates session key K C, to BSS/MSC/VLR return authentication response message, with triple combination RAND, SRES, K CSend to the BSS/MSC/VLR storage;
Step 14, BSS/MSC/VLR takes out random number RA ND and sends to mobile station MS as challenging value;
Step 15, travelling carriage (MS) basis and AuC cipher key shared K, response generating function A 3() and session key generating function A 8(), session key K CWith response XSRES, and response XSRES sent to BSS/MSC/VLR, BSS/MSC/VLR is the SRES of XSRES and storage relatively, if when consistent by authenticating, just can utilize the session key K of negotiation then between travelling carriage (MS) and BSS/MSC/VLR CCarry out session communication.
The problem that network authentication user's one-way process is brought is to prevent go-between's false base station attack, and can't guarantee session key K CFreshness.Because as long as in network, intercepted and captured triple combination RAND, SRES, K C, then this triple combination just can be used down always, K CJust not having freshness can say.
The false base station of go-between is attacked and the freshness problem of session key in order to solve, 3GPP improves the gsm system verification process, increased the authentication of user by message authentication code to network, realize two-way authentication, with prevent old session key by sequence number mechanism and reuse, guarantee the freshness of session key, and increased the generation of Integrity Key.The verification process of 3GPP as shown in Figure 2.Mainly comprise: authentication request; The distribution of Ciphering Key AV and authentication and key agreement three big processes.
Authentication request is finished by step 201, sends service request by user authentication module/mobile device (USIM/ME) to VLR Visitor Location Register (VLR), has comprised User Identity IMSI in this request.
The distribution of Ciphering Key AV from HE/HLR (HE) to VLR (SN) finished to 205 by step 202.
Step 202, VLR sends authentication data request to Home Environment/attaching position register (HE/HLR), has comprised User Identity IMSI in this request;
Step 203, HE/HLR inquires corresponding key K according to User Identity IMSI, produces random number RA ND respectively and produces sequence number SQN; Utilize message authentication function f 1 () to generate message authentication code MAC, MAC=f1K (SQN ‖ RAND ‖ AMF), ‖ wherein is a simple cascade symbol, and AMF is the authentication management territory, is used for the service time of regulation key or is used to specify wherein a cover when using many cover f1 to f5 algorithms; Utilize message authentication function f 2 (), Key generation functions f3 (), f4 (), f5 () to generate XRES value, session key CK, Integrity Key IK and the Anonymity Key AK that supplies the network authentication terminal respectively again, XRES=f2K (RAND), CK=f3K (RAND), IK=f4K (RAND), AK=f5K (RAND); Generate AUTN value (authentication token), AUTN=SQN AK ‖ AMF ‖ MAC for the terminal authentication network; The five-tuple of this RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, IK closes and constitutes Ciphering Key AV, AV=RAND ‖ XRES ‖ CK ‖ IK ‖ AUTN.For each user, key K has only one, but HLR can produce a plurality of random number RA ND, closes thereby generate a plurality of five-tuples;
Step 204, HE/HLR closes XRES, CK, IK, AUTN and RAND by the verify data response message with a plurality of five-tuples and sends to VLR;
Step 205, VLR stores a plurality of Ciphering Key AV.
Authentication is finished to 213 by step 206 with key agreement.
Step 206, VLR selects one from a plurality of Ciphering Key of storage, the Ciphering Key AV (i) that promptly selects a kind of (being expressed as i) five-tuple to close;
Step 207, VLR sends authentication request to USIM/ME, comprises selected Ciphering Key AV (i) in this authentication request, RAND (i) ‖ AUTN (i);
Step 208, USIM/ME verifies that at first AUTN (i) embodies the terminal authentication network, specific practice is at first to calculate SQN, whether checking SQN in correct scope, calculates XMAC=f1K (SQN ‖ RAND ‖ AMF) then, and the MAC that comprises among XMAC and the AUTN (i) is compared, if it is different, USIM/ME returns user authentication failure to VLR/SGSN, and VLR sends the authentification failure report to HE/HLR, determines to start a new verification process again by VLR.Pass through authentication when consistent.Begin to carry out the operation of network authentication terminal then, use and HE/HLR cipher key shared K and function f 2 (), calculate RES (i) with the RAND (i) that receives;
Step 209, USIM/ME sends authentication response message to VLR, in this response message the RES (i) that calculates is sent to VLR;
Step 210, VLR receives RES (i), and compares with the XRES (i) that stores, and passes through authentication when relatively more consistent;
Step 211, VLR sends to USIM/ME with authentication result;
Step 212, VLR utilizes function f 3 (), f4 (), according to key K, RAND (i) computation key CK (i) and IK (i);
Step 213, USIM/ME utilizes function f 3 (), f4 (), according to key K, RAND (i) computation key CK (i) and IK (i).
In the said process, in order to realize the authentification of user network, 3GPP generates message authentication code MAC according to information such as sequence number SQN, random challenge RAND in HE/HLR, realize authentication by USIM/ME by verifying message authentication code MAC to network, this sequence number SQN is that this integer is every will to be increased progressively once according to certain rules through once authenticating by user and the common integer of safeguarding of network.By sequence number mechanism, prevent the playback of authentication information, thereby guarantee the freshness of the session key of generation.When the sequence number the authentication information that sends to terminal from network is not in terminal acceptable scope, terminal need be initiated the sequence number synchronization process, make that the sequence number of this terminal is reset among the HE/HLR, in order to prevent that sequence number from exposing user's identity and positional information, also needs to generate Anonymity Key sequence number is hidden.
In GSM and 3GPP system, produce verify data and send to the VLR/SGSN of visited network by the AuC of authentication center of home network, by the VLR/SGSN authenticated user, promptly VLR depends on random challenge and the response that AuC produces and comes authenticated user.
In sum, the authentication of gsm system is a unilateral authentication, lacks the authentication of user to network, makes system be subjected to man-in-the-middle attack easily.The 3GPP authentication is complicated sequence number administrative mechanism and verification process with the subject matter of key agreement, makes agreement and system realize going up more complicated.
In addition, when occurring the dispute of using about network between user and the VLR, AuC can't solve this dispute.VLR can't provide the evidence that the user uses network, because when the user does not have accesses network, VLR also can pass through MAP signaling access authentication vector, and these Ciphering Key are the evidences that can not use network as the user.
Along with the development of 3G business, may need the communications status between user and the VLR is authenticated in commercial the application, do not allow to deny.Be similar in the ecommerce, need to guarantee the authentication of transaction each side and the non repudiation of transaction.Therefore, should find a kind of method can not only realize mobile subscriber and internetwork bidirectional identity authentication and key agreement, and can prove the communications status between user and the network, make communicating pair have non repudiation.
Summary of the invention
The objective of the invention is to design a kind of mobile communication user certification and cryptographic key negotiation method, solve in the mobile communication system user and internetwork two-way, unilateral authentication and session key agreement, can prove the communications status of communicating pair, have non repudiation.
The technical scheme that realizes the object of the invention is such: two-way authentification of user of a kind of mobile communication and cryptographic key negotiation method are applied to it is characterized in that between mobile subscriber, visited network and home network:
A. at registration phase,
A1. the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m;
A2. visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n;
B. authenticating and the key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=m, 1＜=i＜=n,
B1. the mobile subscriber is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage N-i+1(Rv), the verify data f that visited network is sended over N-iVerify that (Rv) determine the authenticity of visited network, the mobile subscriber preserves f behind authentication success N-i(Rv), finish the authentication to network based on the user of hash chain;
B2. visited network is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage M-i+1(Ru), the verify data f that the user is sended over N-i(Ru) verify, determine the authenticity of mobile subscriber identifier, network is preserved f behind authentication success M-i(Ru), finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain the user;
B3. mobile subscriber and visited network behind authentication success, utilize f respectively M-i(Ru) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
The technical scheme that realizes the object of the invention still is such, and unidirectional authentification of user of a kind of mobile communication and cryptographic key negotiation method are applied to it is characterized in that between mobile subscriber, visited network and home network:
A '. at registration phase,
A1 '. the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m;
A2 '. visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n;
B '. in authentication and key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=m, visited network is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage M-i+1(Ru), the verify data f that the mobile subscriber is sended over M-i(Ru) verify, determine the authenticity of mobile subscriber identifier, visited network is preserved f behind authentication success M-i(Ru), finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain the user; Behind authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network utilize f M-i(Ru) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
The technical scheme that realizes the object of the invention can also be such: unidirectional authentification of user of a kind of mobile communication and cryptographic key negotiation method are applied to it is characterized in that between mobile subscriber, visited network and home network:
A ". at registration phase,
A1 ". the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m;
A2 ". visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n;
B ". in authentication and key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=n, the mobile subscriber is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage N-i+1(Rv), the verify data f that visited network is sended over N-iVerify that (Rv) determine the authenticity of visited network, the mobile subscriber preserves f behind authentication success N-i(Rv), finish the authentication to network based on the user of hash chain; Behind authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network utilize f N-i(Rv) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
Mutual authentication method of the present invention comprises based on the network of Hash (Hash) chain to user's authentication with based on the user of the hash chain authentication to network.
Unilateral authentication method of the present invention comprises based on the network of Hash (Hash) chain to user's authentication or based on the user of the hash chain authentication to network.
Wherein based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the user, specifically refer to: in registration process, the user carries out identity registration by the VLR Visitor Location Register VLR of visited network to the AuC of authentication center of home network, and AuC judges user identity by message authentication function (H ()); In authentication and cipher key agreement process, VLR authenticates the user by Hash chain independently.
Based on the user of the hash chain authentication to network, specifically refer to: in registration process, the user carries out identity according to message authentication function (H ()) to VLR and judges; In authentication and cipher key agreement process, the user is undertaken comparing with being stored in local information (through the cryptographic Hash after upgrading) after the Hash operation by the authentication information to VLR, and visited network is carried out authentication.
In the authentication and cipher key agreement process based on hash chain of the inventive method, the generation of session key (encryption key and Integrity Key) is accompanied by verification process, and each session key that generates all the authentication information with this is relevant.
The message source authentication based on message authentication code of the inventive method, user, AuC, VLR three parts share the message authentication function, the user is by the authenticity of message authentication code MACu to the authentication information of AuC proof submission, and whether AuC is genuine in the user who is claimed the message from the authentication information that VLR forwards according to the message authentication code judgement; VLR proves the authenticity of the authentication information that sends by message authentication code MACv to the user, and the user judges the authenticity of the information that VLR submits to according to message authentication code.
Message authentication function (H ()) needs authenticator and certified person to share key.The user is produced by AuC the authentication information of network among the 3GPP, and based on user and AuC cipher key shared, VLR oneself does not produce message authentication code.And in the inventive method, message authentication between user and the AuC is based on the shared key K between user and the network, message authentication between user and the VLR is based on shared Anonymity Key AK (AK ' of user side is produced according to RAND and K by the user, and the AK of VLR side sends to VLR by AuC).
The inventive method also has the beneficial effect of following several respects except two-way, the unidirectional authentication that can realize user and network:
Obtain the assurance of key freshness by the cryptographic Hash of the random number that produces by the user, guarantee that by sequence number mechanism the key freshness compares, not have the complex process brought because of the management of sequence number, thereby consult to realize simply with 3GPP;
When dispute appears in visited network and user, the evidence (f that the user produces that visited network can provide the user to use network to user's home network M-i(Ru) and MACu), because this evidence is based on random number R u that the user produces and user and home network cipher key shared K and encrypts generation, home network can be verified, and visited network can't oneself produce, so can prove the use of user to network, thus have to a certain degree prevent to deny function;
Because network is finished by two first, second separate hash chains respectively the authentication of network user's authentication and user, carry out easily flexibly two-way authentication to be become unilateral authentication under the situation of two-way authentication not needing.If the user does not need authenticating network, then network side just need not produce hash chain, when authentication only by Network Check user's authentication information, and the user needn't check the authentication information of network.Otherwise if network does not need authenticated user, then user side just need not produce hash chain, when authentication only by the authentication information of customer inspection network, and network needn't be checked user's authentication information.
In a word, the inventive method adopted be different from the prior art scheme, user and network bi-directional, unidirectional authentication and key agreement mechanism, agreement realizes simple and flexible, and have to a certain degree prevent to deny function.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the one-way process block diagram of network authentication user in the gsm system;
Fig. 2 is 3GPP network and user's two-way authentication and a key agreement FB(flow block);
Fig. 3 is the register flow path block diagram of user when roaming into a new accesses network of the inventive method;
Fig. 4 is that the user that works as of the inventive method initiates service request, authentication and key agreement FB(flow block) when visited network requires authenticated user.
Fig. 5 be the inventive method based on the network of Hash (Hash) chain unilateral authentication FB(flow block) to the user;
Fig. 6 be the inventive method based on the user of Hash (Hash) chain unilateral authentication FB(flow block) to network.
Embodiment
The precondition of carrying out certificate scheme of the present invention comprises:
Master key K, Key generation functions f share in mobile subscriber and home network authentication center (AuC) 3(), f 4(), f 5(), message authentication function H ();
The VLR Visitor Location Register of mobile subscriber and visited network (VLR) is shared hash function f (), message authentication function H (), Key generation functions f 3' (), f 4' ();
The mobile subscriber, VLR and AuC can produce random number separately, and the table of random numbers that the user is produced is shown Ru, and the table of random numbers that VLR is produced is shown Rv and the table of random numbers that AuC is produced is shown RAND.
Above-mentioned condition also can be expressed as: in mobile subscriber's side master key K is arranged, Key generation functions f 3(), f 4(), f 5(), f 3' (), f 4' (), message authentication function H () and hash function f () produce random number R u; In visited network (VLR) side hash function f (), message authentication function H () and Key generation functions f are arranged 3' (), f 4' (), produce random number R v; Home network (AuC) side has master key K, Key generation functions f 3(), f 4(), f 5(), message authentication function H () produces random number RA ND.
Master key K that shares between mobile subscriber and the AuC and message authentication function H () are used for the message authentication between mobile subscriber and the AuC; Cipher key shared produces function f between mobile subscriber and the AuC 3() is used to generate encryption key seed CK; Cipher key shared produces function f between user and the AuC 4() is used to generate Integrity Key seed IK; Cipher key shared produces function f between user and the AuC 5() is used to generate Anonymity Key AK.
Cipher key shared produces function f between user and the VLR 3' () be used to generate the air-interface encryption ciphering key Ki of corresponding the i time authentication request; Cipher key shared produces function f between user and the VLR 4' () be used to generate the air interface Integrity Key IKi of corresponding the i time authentication request.
The mutual authentication of user of the inventive method and network and key agreement are divided into two stages execution; Registration phase and authentication phase.
When the user roams into a new accesses network, at first need to register, registration process is as shown in Figure 3; After finishing registration, when the user initiated service request, visited network required authenticated user, and identifying procedure as shown in Figure 4.
Referring to Fig. 3, the user roams into a new visited network (perhaps when all cryptographic Hash of the hash chain that produces are all finished using) beginning registration process, finishes the registration of mobile subscriber at home network.
Step 31, the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and producing length is the hash chain of m, calculates f M(Ru) (M=1,2,3 ..., m), promptly calculate f 1(Ru), f 2(Ru) ..., f mAnd produce a time stamp T imeStamp that the mobile subscriber is current (Ru); Then, according to international mobile subscriber identifier (IMSI), f n(Ru) and TimeStamp, generate MSGu and user's message authentication code MACu, MSGu=IMSI ‖ f n(Ru) ‖ TimeStamp, (K MSGu), and sends to MSGu and MACu the VLR of visited network to MACu=H;
Step 32, the VLR of visited network sends to MSGu and MACu the AuG of home network.In the registration process, VLR does not authenticate the mobile subscriber, just authentication information is issued mobile subscriber's home network, by after the home network authentication result being returned.
Step 33 after the AuC of home network receives MSGu and MACu message, at first according to the MSGu that receives, is calculated XMACu, and XMACu=H (K, MSGu); Whether checking MACu that receives and the XMACu that calculates equates then, if equate, in allowed limits whether the time stamp T imeStamp that reexamines among the MSGu that receives (stab relatively with the AuC current time, judge between the two in allowed limits) every whether, if then mobile subscriber's identity is legal, by the authentication of network to the user.
As seen, judge whether mobile subscriber identifier is legal, still control by home network AuG.
The AuC of home network produces a random number RA ND, according to random number RA ND and shared master key K, utilizes Key generation functions f 3, f 4, f 5Generate encryption key seed CK, Integrity Key seed IK and Anonymity Key AK respectively:
CK＝f 3(K，RAND)；
IK＝f 4(K，RAND)；
AK＝f 5(K，RAND)。
The AuC of home network is with MSGh=IMSI ‖ f m(Ru) ‖ RAND ‖ CK ‖ IK ‖ AK sends to the VLR of visited network by confirming response message.Why will send RAND, be that the mobile subscriber could generate this several keys after having known RAND because the mobile subscriber need be according to the RAND of AuC generation when producing CK, IK and AK.
Step 34, after the VLR of visited network received the affirmation response message MSGh of AuC, VLR incited somebody to action IMSI, f wherein m(Ru), CK, IK and AK preserve, selecting random number R v to produce own length is the 2nd Hash chain of n, calculating f N(Rv) (N=1,2,3 ..., n), promptly calculate f 1(Rv), f 2(Rv) ..., f n(Rv), obtain to confirm response message, comprise MSGv and message authentication code MACv:
MSGv＝RAND‖f n(Rv)‖TimeStamp；
MACv＝H(AK，MSGv)。
The VLR of visited network will confirm response message MSGv and MACv, send to the mobile subscriber, and the TimeStamp among the MSGv is the current timestamp of VLR.
After the mobile subscriber receives and confirms response message MSGv and MACv, at first produce AK '=f5 (K according to the RAND in the MSGv message, RAND), calculate then XMACv=H (AK ', MSGv), whether the MACv in the response message that checking is received equates with the XMACv that calculates, if equate, in allowed limits in allowed limits more whether the TimeStamp that reexamines reception (stab with mobile subscriber's current time), if think that then this affirmation response message is from real VLR, by the authentication of user, with the f among the MSG v to network n(Rv) storage.According to RAND and master key K, produce encryption key seed CK and Integrity Key seed IK then:
CK＝f 3(K，RAND)；
IK＝f 4(K，RAND)。
So far, the mobile subscriber finishes in the AuG of home network registration.
In registration process, by AuC the mobile subscriber is carried out authentication, the mobile subscriber then carries out authentication to VLR.Through the mobile subscriber of AuC authentication, VLR no longer carries out authentication to it, directly confirms as validated user.The mutual authentication process that this three party is realized shows that in the registration process, VLR does not authenticate the user, but authentication information is directly issued the AuC of mobile subscriber's home network, after the AuC authentication by home network the result is returned VLR.If the authentification of user that home network returns is correct, then the mobile subscriber is at authentication and key agreement during the stage, the f in the authentication information that authentication for the first time and key agreement begin to submit to m(Ru) just can be used as after Service Ticket during customer access network, just participate in having authenticated without AuC.
After registration, the VLR side of visited network has been stored the final hash value f of a hash chain computing m(Ru), mobile subscriber's side has been stored the final hash chain f of the 2nd hash chain computing n(Rv).
Referring to Fig. 4, authentication and cipher key agreement process.After registration was finished, when the user initiated service request, the VLR of visited network required authenticated user, began authentication and cipher key agreement process.Suppose that this authentication request is the i time (1＜=i＜=n, 1＜=i＜=m).
Step 41, for the i time authentication request, the VLR of visited network produces authentication request message, comprises the verify data MSGvi=f of network in this request message N-i(Rv), send it to the user.
Step 42 after the mobile subscriber receives the authentication request message of visited network VLR, obtains the verify data f of VLR from this message N-i(Rv), utilize the hash function f () that shares to calculate f (f N-i(Rv)), and checking whether with the f of storage N-i+1(Rv) equate,, think that then VLR is legal, f if equate N-i(Rv) preserve, and with the user authentication data that produces as authentication response message MSGui=f M-i(Ru) issue the VLR of visited network.
Step 43, the VLR of visited network receives MSGui=f M-i(Ru) after, utilize the hash function f () that shares to calculate f (f M-i(Ru)), and checking whether with the f of its storage M-i+1Equate that (Ru) if equate that then authentification of user passes through, VLR will preserve f M-iAnd send the result of authentication success to the user (Ru).
Step 44,45, behind the authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network VLR calculate encryption key seed CK, Integrity Key seed IK and the above-mentioned f of storage according to when registration M-i(Ru) generate air-interface encryption ciphering key Ki and the air interface Integrity Key Iki that this session needs:
CKi＝f 3’(CK，f m-i(Ru))；
IKi＝f 4’(IK，f m-i(Ru))。
Therefore, in authentication phase, only judge by Hash chain independently: the local resource that can use VLR through the mobile subscriber of AuC authentication by the VLR of visited network., be two-way authentication and the key agreement between VLR and mobile subscriber also promptly in authentication and key agreement stage.
Referring to Fig. 5, be the inventive method based on the network of Hash (Hash) chain unilateral authentication FB(flow block) to the user, but omitted to mobile subscriber's authenticating step and based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain the authenticating step of network (being need to prove: no matter be two-way authentication or unilateral authentication that registration phase is finished based on the network of hash chain, the inventive method all must be done two-way authentication at registration phase, and the step 31 in the promptly necessary execution graph 3 is to 34).
For based on the network of Hash (Hash) chain unilateral authentication process to the user, registration phase also need finish based on the network of hash chain to mobile subscriber's authenticating step (step 31 among Fig. 3,32,33) with based on the network of hash chain authenticating step (step 34 among Fig. 3) to the mobile subscriber.But general description is: the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m; Visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n.
In authentication and key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=m.
Step 51, visited network VLR sends user authentication request message to the mobile subscriber;
Step 52 receives the mobile subscriber of user authentication request message, produces user authentication data MSGui=f M-i(Ru) issue the VLR of visited network.
Step 53, the VLR of visited network receives MSGui=f M-1(Ru) after, utilize the hash function f () that shares to calculate f (f M-i(Ru)), and checking whether with the f of its storage M-i+1Equate that (Ru) if equate that then authentification of user passes through, VLR will preserve f M-iAnd send the result of authentication success to the user (Ru).
Step 54,55, behind the authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network VLR calculate encryption key seed CK, Integrity Key seed IK and the above-mentioned f of storage according to when registration M-i(Ru) generate air-interface encryption ciphering key Ki and the air interface Integrity Key Iki that this session needs:
CKi＝f 3’(CK，f m-i(Ru))；
IKi＝f 4’(IK，f m-i(Ru))。
But step 51 to 55 general description are: visited network is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage M-i+1(Ru), the verify data f that the mobile subscriber is sended over M-i(Ru) verify, determine the authenticity of mobile subscriber identifier, visited network is preserved f behind authentication success M-i(Ru), finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain the user; Behind authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network utilize f M-i(Ru) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
Referring to Fig. 6, be the inventive method based on the user of Hash (Hash) chain unilateral authentication FB(flow block) to network.But omitted to mobile subscriber's authenticating step and based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain the authenticating step of network (being need to prove: no matter be two-way authentication or unilateral authentication that registration phase is finished based on the network of hash chain, the inventive method all must be done two-way authentication at registration phase, and the step 31 in the promptly necessary execution graph 3 is to 34).
For based on the user of Hash (Hash) chain unilateral authentication process to network, registration phase also need finish based on the network of hash chain to mobile subscriber's authenticating step (step 31 among Fig. 3,32,33) with based on the network of hash chain authenticating step (step 34 among Fig. 3) to the mobile subscriber.
In authentication and key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=n.
Step 61, the mobile subscriber sends the network authentication request message to visited network VLR;
Step 62 receives the visited network VLR of network authentication request message, produces user authentication data MSGvi=f N-i(Rv) issue the mobile subscriber;
Step 63 after the mobile subscriber receives the authentication request message of visited network VLR, obtains the verify data f of VLR from this message N-i(Rv), utilize the hash function f () that shares to calculate f (f N-i(Rv)), and checking whether with the f of storage N-j+1(Rv) equate,, think that then VLR is legal, f if equate N-i(Rv) preserve, and send the result of authentication success to visited network.
Step 64,65, behind the authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network VLR calculate encryption key seed CK, Integrity Key seed IK and the above-mentioned f of storage according to when registration N-i(Rv) generate air-interface encryption ciphering key Ki and the air interface Integrity Key Iki that this session needs:
CKi＝f 3’(CK，f n-i(Rv))；
IKi＝f 4’(IK，f n-i(Rv))。
But step 61 to 65 general description are: the mobile subscriber is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage N-i+1(Rv), the verify data f that visited network is sended over N-iVerify that (Rv) determine the authenticity of visited network, the mobile subscriber preserves f behind authentication success N-i(Rv), finish the authentication to network based on the user of hash chain; Behind authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network utilize f N-i(Rv) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
In the practical application, the recurrent unilateral authentication that is two-way authentication or network to the user, the user does not generally use the unilateral authentication of network.
Two-way authentication of the present invention at registration phase, is carried out authentication by the AuC of home network to the mobile subscriber, by the mobile subscriber VLR of visited network is carried out authentication, and on the VLR of mobile subscriber and visited network storage hash chain separately; In authentication phase and key agreement stage, be the VLR and the mobile subscriber's of visited network two-way authentication, the network that is based on the hash chain is to mobile subscriber's authentication with based on the mobile subscriber of the hash chain authentication to network.
Unilateral authentication of the present invention, at registration phase, by the AuC of home network the mobile subscriber is carried out authentication, and on the VLR of visited network storage hash chain, with by the mobile subscriber VLR of visited network is carried out authentication, and on the mobile subscriber storage hash chain; In authentication phase and key agreement stage, be the unilateral authentication of the VLR of visited network to the mobile subscriber, be based on of the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber.
Unilateral authentication of the present invention, at registration phase, by the AuC of home network the mobile subscriber is carried out authentication, and on the VLR of visited network storage hash chain, with by the mobile subscriber VLR of visited network is carried out authentication, and on the mobile subscriber storage hash chain; In authentication phase and key agreement stage, be the VLR of visited network and mobile subscriber's unilateral authentication, be based on the authentication of the mobile subscriber of hash chain to network.

Claims (13)

1. mobile communication subscriber two-way authentication and cryptographic key negotiation method are applied to it is characterized in that between mobile subscriber, visited network and home network:
A. at registration phase,
A1. the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m;
A2. visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n;
B. authenticating and the key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=m, 1＜=i＜=n,
B1. the mobile subscriber is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage N-i+1(Rv), the verify data f that visited network is sended over N-1Verify that (Rv) determine the authenticity of visited network, the mobile subscriber preserves f behind authentication success N-1(Rv), finish the authentication to network based on the user of hash chain;
B2. visited network is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage M-i+1(Ru), the verify data f that the user is sended over M-i(Ru) verify, determine the authenticity of mobile subscriber identifier, network is preserved f behind authentication success M-i(Ru), finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain the user;
B3. mobile subscriber and visited network behind authentication success, utilize f respectively M-i(Ru) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
2. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that in the described steps A 1, produces message authentication code MACu and comprises: utilize IMSI, f m(Ru), the TimeStamp cascade generates MSGu, MSGu=IMSI ‖ f m(Ru) ‖ TimeStamp; Utilize the message authentication function to generate message authentication code MACu, and MACu=H (K, MSGu), IMSI is the international mobile subscriber identifier, TimeStamp is the current timestamp of mobile subscriber.
3. method according to claim 2 is characterized in that in the described steps A 1, and home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, comprising:
Home network utilizes message authentication function calculation message authentication code XMACu, and XMACu=H (K, MSGu);
Relatively whether the XMACu of Ji Suaning is consistent with the MACu of reception, continues to carry out following step when consistent;
In allowed limits whether the TimeStamp that inspection receives be to confirm that then authentication request message is true.
4. method according to claim 2, it is characterized in that: described authentication request message is carried out identity registration by visited network to home network, be described MSGu and MACu to be sent to visited network, by visited network this MSGu and MACu sent to home network again by the mobile subscriber.
5. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that home network is with final hash value f in the described steps A 1 m(Ru) be kept at visited network, comprise:
Home network produces a random number RA ND;
Generate and confirm response message MSG h, MSG h=IMSI ‖ f m(Ru) ‖ RAND ‖ CK ‖ IK ‖ AK, IMSI is the international mobile subscriber identifier, CK, IK, AK are respectively encryption key seed, Integrity Key seed, Anonymity Key;
Home network is with MSG hSending to visited network preserves.
6. method according to claim 5 is characterized in that: described encryption key seed CK, Integrity Key seed IK and Anonymity Key AK, utilize Key generation functions separately to generate CK=f respectively 3(K, RAND), IK=f 4(K, RAND), AK=f 5(K, RAND).
7. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that in the described steps A 2, produces message authentication code MACv and comprises: utilize RAND, f n(Rv), the TimeStamp cascade generates MSGv, MSGv=RAND ‖ f nRv) ‖ TimeStamp; Utilize the message authentication function to generate message authentication code MACv, and MACv=H (AK, MSGv), RAND, AK are random number and the Anonymity Key that comes from home network, TimeStamp stabs the current time of visited network.
8. method according to claim 7 is characterized in that the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of response message, comprising in the described steps A 2:
The mobile subscriber takes out RAND from described MSGv, utilize the Anonymity Key generating function to produce Anonymity Key AK ', and AK '=f5 (K, RAND);
The mobile subscriber utilizes message authentication function calculation XMACv, and XMACv=H (AK ', MSGv);
Relatively whether the XMACv of Ji Suaning is consistent with the MACv of reception, continues to carry out following step when consistent;
In allowed limits whether the TimeStamp that inspection receives be the authenticity of then confirming response message, and utilize encryption key seed generating function, Integrity Key seed generating function to generate encryption key seed CK and Integrity Key seed IK, CK=f respectively 3(K, RAND), IK=f 4(K, RAND).
9. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that among the described step B1, the mobile subscriber comprises the authentication of visited network:
Visited network produces authentication request message and also sends to the mobile subscriber, and what comprise the network authentication user in this request message recognizes correction data MSGvi=f N-i(Rv);
The mobile subscriber utilizes shared hash function to calculate f (f N-i(Rv));
Compare f (f N-i(Rv)) with the f that stores N-i+1(Rv) whether consistent, f N-i+1(Rv) be meant the mobile subscriber according to the Rv in the registration process, the cryptographic Hash of preserving through i-1 authentication back is sent to mobile subscriber's data by visited network when being i-1 success identity, and upgrading described cryptographic Hash during unanimity is f N-i(Rv).
10. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that among the described step B2, visited network comprises mobile subscriber's authentication:
The mobile subscriber is with verify data MSGui=f M-i(Ru) send to visited network;
The hash function that the visited network utilization is shared calculates f (f M-i(Ru));
F (the f of Ji Suaning relatively M-i(Ru)) with the f that stores M-i+1(Ru) whether consistent, f M-i+1(Ru) be meant visited network according to the Ru in the registration process, the cryptographic Hash of preserving through i-1 authentication back is sent to the data of visited network by the mobile subscriber when being i-1 success identity, and upgrading described cryptographic Hash during unanimity is f M-i(Ru).
11. method according to claim 10, it is characterized in that among the described step B3, air-interface encryption key generating function and air interface Integrity Key generating function that mobile subscriber and visited network utilization are shared generate session key CKi and Integrity Key IKi, CKi=f respectively 3' (CK, f M-i(Ru)), IKi=f 4' (IK, f M-i(Ru)), CK, IK are kept at encryption key seed, Integrity Key seed on mobile subscriber and the visited network simultaneously at registration phase.
12. unidirectional authentification of user of mobile communication and cryptographic key negotiation method are applied to it is characterized in that between mobile subscriber, visited network and home network:
A '. at registration phase,
A1 '. the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m;
A2 '. visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n;
B '. in authentication and key agreement stage, to the i time authentication and key agreement, 1＜=i＜=m, visited network is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage M-i+1(Ru), the verify data f that the mobile subscriber is sended over M-i(Ru) verify, determine the authenticity of mobile subscriber identifier, visited network is preserved f behind authentication success M-i(Ru), finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain the user; Behind authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network utilize f M-i(Ru) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
13. unidirectional authentification of user of mobile communication and cryptographic key negotiation method are applied to it is characterized in that between mobile subscriber, visited network and home network:
A ". at registration phase,
A1 ". the mobile subscriber produces random number R u, and this random number R u is carried out the first Hash operation f MAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Ru), m(Ru) and shared master key K produce message authentication code MACu, will comprise final hash value f m(Ru) carry out identity registration by visited network to home network with the authentication request message of message authentication code MACu, home network is confirmed the authenticity of authentication request message, when message is true, with this final hash value f m(Ru) be kept at visited network, finish based on the authentication of the network of hash chain to the mobile subscriber, M=1,2,3 ..., m;
A2 ". visited network produces random number R v, and this random number R v is carried out the second Hash operation f NAnd utilize final cryptographic Hash f (Rv), n(Rv) produce message authentication code MACv, will comprise final hash value f n(Rv) the affirmation response message with message authentication code MACv sends to the mobile subscriber, and the mobile subscriber confirms the authenticity of this response message, when message is true, with this final hash value f n(Rv) be kept at the mobile subscriber, finish the authentication to network based on the mobile subscriber of hash chain, N=1,2,3 ..., n;
B ". in authentication and key association, merchant's stage, to the i time authentication and key association, merchant, 1＜=i＜=n, the mobile subscriber is according to the cryptographic Hash f of storage N-i+1(Rv), the verify data f that visited network is sended over N-iVerify that (Rv) determine the authenticity of visited network, the mobile subscriber preserves f behind authentication success N-i(Rv), finish the authentication to network based on the user of hash chain; Behind authentication success, mobile subscriber and visited network utilize f N-i(Rv) the session key CKi and the Integrity Key IKi of the i time authentication of generation and key agreement.
CNB2004100884070A 2004-10-29 2004-10-29 Mobile communication user certification and cryptographic key negotiation method Expired - Fee Related CN100544249C (en)

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