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CN115767527A - Improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing safety and efficiency - Google Patents

Improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing safety and efficiency Download PDF

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Publication number
CN115767527A
CN115767527A CN202211277108.6A CN202211277108A CN115767527A CN 115767527 A CN115767527 A CN 115767527A CN 202211277108 A CN202211277108 A CN 202211277108A CN 115767527 A CN115767527 A CN 115767527A
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Prior art keywords
cscf
authentication
key
hss
msg
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Inventor
吴作顺
刘梓淇
吴芷静
吴抒恒
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China Telecom Digital Intelligence Technology Co Ltd
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China Telecom Digital Intelligence Technology Co Ltd
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Priority to CN202211277108.6A priority Critical patent/CN115767527A/en
Publication of CN115767527A publication Critical patent/CN115767527A/en
Priority to PCT/CN2023/123172 priority patent/WO2024082963A1/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses an improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing safety and efficiency, wherein in the mechanism, UE and HSS share a secret key generation function f 3 、f 4 And f 5 And a message authentication function H 1 (ii) a UE and S-CSCF shared key generation function f 3 ’、f 4 ' and message authentication function H 2 (ii) a HSS and S-CSCF shared secret key K HS (ii) a UE and HSS generate random numbers respectively; synchronizing a system clock; the UE trusts the HSS to which the UE belongs; and realizing UE registration authentication and key agreement and service authentication and key agreement based on the content. The method can avoid the attack of false base stations, the network access of false users, the replay attack, the man-in-the-middle attack, the leakage of shared keys and the enjoying of encrypted communication of the false users, and save the cost of a network end.

Description

Improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing safety and efficiency
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of emerging information, and particularly relates to an improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing safety and efficiency.
Background
The access security mechanism of the IMS in the 5G message service undertakes two major tasks: firstly, authentication of access users; and secondly, after the authentication is finished, establishing IPSec security association (IPSecSA) between the UE and the P-CSCF, and providing security protection for the interaction of subsequent SIP signaling.
The IMS-AKA mechanism is mainly used for the authentication of users and the distribution of session keys, in the registration process of the IMS, SIP signaling carrying AKA parameters is interacted between UE and an IMS network authentication entity, and the AKA parameters are transmitted and negotiated according to the AKA mechanism, thereby realizing the processes of access authentication and key negotiation.
In practical application, the security vulnerabilities exposed by the IMS-AKA mechanism are as follows:
(1) Although the SIP signaling can be encrypted and integrity protected by the security key negotiated by the AKA mechanism between the UE and the P-CSCF, the initial registration request message is sent when the security key has not been negotiated, and an attacker can easily obtain the registration information of the user, thereby causing the privacy disclosure of the user.
(2) When registering to the IMS network, at least two registration requests need to be sent, SIP interaction between a user and the network is too complicated, and an authentication header field carried by an SIP message has a plurality of AKA parameters, so that the length of the SIP message is greatly increased. Due to the limitation of network bandwidth, transmission delay will be obvious, and time consumption for a user to access a network through registration will be long, which affects the user experience.
(3) In the AKA-based access authentication process, the UE does not perform identity authentication on an access point P-CSCF of an IMS core network, and the opportunity of impersonating a man-in-the-middle to attack is provided for an attacker.
In order to solve the problems, an improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism which balances security and efficiency needs to be researched.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism with balanced security and efficiency based on the architecture of the international standard 5G message terminal access authentication system, aiming at the defects of the prior art.
In order to achieve the technical purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
an improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism balancing security and efficiency is provided, in which,
(1) UE and HSS share key generation function f 3 、f 4 And f 5 And a message authentication function H 1 (ii) a UE and S-CSCF shared key generation function f 3 ’、f 4 ' and message authentication function H 2 (ii) a HSS and S-CSCF shared secret key K HS ；
(2) UE and HSS generate random numbers respectively;
(3) Synchronizing a system clock;
(4) The UE trusts the HSS to which the UE belongs;
wherein, f 3 A key generation function for calculating an encryption key CK; f. of 4 A key generation function for calculating an integrity protection key IK; f. of 5 A key generation function for calculating an anonymous key AK;
H 1 an authentication function for the registration message for the UE; h 2 An authentication function for the S-CSCF to the response message;
f 3 ' is a generating function of the iterative encryption key CK; f. of 4 ' is a generating function of an iterative integrity protection key IK;
and (4) realizing UE registration authentication and key agreement and service authentication and key agreement based on the steps (1) to (4).
In order to optimize the technical scheme, the specific measures adopted further comprise:
the UE registration authentication and key agreement realizes the registration authentication and key agreement by applying a Hash function chain and a timestamp.
The UE registration authentication and key agreement process includes:
(1) UE initiates registration, ME sends registration message MSG U And message authentication code MAC U ；
MSG U ＝E(K i-l ,R U )||TMPI i-1 ||f n (R U )||A1{A1,A2,...,Ar}
MAC U ＝H l (K i-l ,IMPI||MSG U )
Wherein E is a single-key encryption function;
R U for old shared secret key K i-l An encrypted random number;
TMPI i-1 an old temporary user identity;
f n (R U ) The Hash function is performed for n times, wherein n is the maximum number of times of service application after one registration is successful;
{ A1, A2,. And Ar } and A1 are r alternative sets of encryption algorithms and user-selected algorithms, respectively.
(2) S-CSCF receives registration information of UE and leaves f n (R U ) According to TMPI i-l Mixing MSG U End time-stamped timesampv 1 and MAC U Forwarded to the home network HSS of the UE together;
(3) HSS receives MSG U And MAC U According to TMPI i-l Obtaining stored IMPI, decrypting to obtain R U ；
Calculating XMAC U Checking XMAC U And MAC U If the two are consistent, verifying whether the timestamp V1 is legal or not, authenticating the UE successfully by the HSS in a legal way, re-synchronizing the system clock if the UE is illegal, and re-initiating registration;
HSS selects random number R after successful registration H Deciding whether to agree with the ciphering algorithm A1 selected by the UE, if not, selecting one of the given alternative ciphering algorithms as the ciphering algorithm A used for the current registration i (ii) a Generation of a novel TMPI i Generating a new key K i ＝E(K i-1 ,R U R H ) And use of R in combination H And K i Generating CK, IK and AK; shared secret key K with HSS and S-CSCF HS Encryption of E (Ki, R) U ) (ii) a Then register the response information MSG H The message is sent back to the S-CSCF;
MSG H ＝R H ||AK||TMPI i ||A i ||E(K HS ,E(K i ,R U ))||CK||IK||E(K i ,R H ))
(4) The S-CSCF receives the response information returned by the HSS, decrypts to obtain E (K) i ,R U )、E(K i ,R H ) Leave AK, E (K) i ,R H )、TMPI i Generating a random number R S Calculating f n (R S ) (ii) a MSG (minimum shift group) S 、MAC S Sending the information to the UE;
MSG S ＝R H ||TMPI i ||A i ||f n (R S )||E(K i ,R U )||CK||IK||timestampV2
MAC S ＝H 2 (AK,MSG S )
(5) S-CSCF will MSG S 、MAC S The SIP response is sent to the I-CSCF, and the I-CSCF forwards the SIP response to the P-CSCF;
after receiving the SIP response, the P-CSCF stores the CK and the IK and forwards the rest parts to the UE;
MSG P ＝R H ||TMPI i ||A i ||f n (R S )||E(K i ,R U )timestampV2
MAC P ＝H 2 (AK,MSG P )
(6) UE receives MSG P 、MAC P With R H And K i CK, IK, and AK are generated, and XMAC is calculated S And E (K) i ,R H )；
Inspection and MAC S Whether the two are consistent; by K i Decryption E (K) i ,R H ) Checking R U Whether the random number is the initially selected random number or not; and checking the validity of the timestamp, if the time stamp passes all the time, the UE successfully authenticates the S-CSCF, and the UE leaves the TMPI i Algorithm a, accepting HSS selection, as the temporary subscriber identity for this registration i The encryption algorithm is used for transmitting service data;
simultaneously sending RES to S-CSCF;
RES＝E(K i ,R H )
(7) Test XRES = E (K) i ,R H ) And if the identity is consistent with the RES, the S-CSCF successfully authenticates the UE.
The above-mentioned service authentication and key negotiation process is:
after the registration authentication is successful, when the UE needs to perform service communication for the ith time,S-CSCF sends f to ME n-i (R S ) ME check f (f) n-i (R S ) Whether or not to f last time stored before n-(i-1) (R S ) If the identity is the same, the identity of the S-CSCF is confirmed, the S-CSCF is legal, and f is sent to the S-CSCF n-i (R U )；
S-CSCF checks UE validity, if legal, it achieves two-way authentication, sends success mark to UE, starts to generate cipher and integrity key CK needed by this service communication i 、IK i ；
The UE also starts to generate CK after receiving the success mark i 、IK i And preparing for service communication.
CK i ＝f 3 ’(CK,f n-i (R U ))；
IK i ＝f 4 ’(IK,f n-i (R U ))。
When the service frequency reaches the upper limit n of the Hash function chain, the user needs to register authentication with the S-CSCF and the HSS again when applying for the service, and updates the key shared with the HSS.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
(1) The authentication of the HSS to the UE and the bidirectional authentication of the UE and the S-CSCF are realized, and the attack of a false base station and the network access of a fake user are avoided. A Hash function chain and a timestamp are applied in the authentication process, so that replay attack is avoided; plain text-free delivery of IMPI and random number R used to generate encryption keys U And man-in-the-middle attack is avoided.
(2) The shared key of the UE and the HSS is updated every time the user registers, so that the leakage of the shared key is avoided; the free negotiation determines the encryption algorithm, and covers the encryption algorithm selection function.
(3) And no clear text is transmitted for CK and IK, so that a fake user is prevented from enjoying encrypted communication.
(4) After the user successfully accesses the network, the HSS does not need to be involved in the service authentication, and the network end expense is saved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the registration and authentication of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a flow chart of service authentication and key agreement according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
Embodiments of the present invention are described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The invention relates to an improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism with balanced safety and efficiency, and the precondition comprises the following steps:
(1) UE and HSS share key generation function f 3 、f 4 And f 5 And a message authentication function H 1 ；
UE and S-CSCF shared key generation function f 3 ’、f 4 ' and message authentication function H 2 ；
HSS and S-CSCF shared secret key K HS 。
(2) The UE and the HSS each generate a random number.
(3) Synchronizing a system clock;
(4) The UE trusts its home HSS.
Wherein, f 3 A key generation function for calculating an encryption key CK; f. of 4 A key generation function for calculating an integrity protection key IK; f. of 5 A key generation function for calculating an anonymous key AK;
H 1 an authentication function for the registration message for the UE; h 2 An authentication function for the S-CSCF to the response message;
f 3 ' is a generating function of the iterative encryption key CK; f. of 4 ' is a generating function of an iterative integrity protection key IK;
based on the above (1) - (4), UE registration authentication and key agreement and service authentication and key agreement can be realized.
UE registration authentication and key agreement:
f is introduced as a Hash function which can be iterated, and the maximum iteration number is n; e is a one-key encryption function.
The specific flow is shown in figure 1:
(1) UE initiates registration to generate registration message MSG U ，
MSG U The method comprises the following steps:
old shared secret key K i-l Encrypted random numberR U Old temporary subscriber identity TMPI i-1 ；
Hash function f of degree n n (R U ) Wherein n is the maximum number of times that the service can be applied after one registration is successful, and can be determined according to the specific condition of the system;
r alternative sets of encryption algorithms { A1, A2., ar } and a user selected algorithm A1.
Specifically, the method comprises the following steps:
ME sending MSG U And message authentication code MAC U 。
Wherein, MSG U ＝E(K i-l ,R U )||TMPI i-1 ||f n (R U )||A1{A1,A2,...,Ar}
MAC U ＝H l (K i-l ,IMPI||MSG U )
(2) S-CSCF receives registration information of UE and leaves f n (R U ) According to TMPI i-l Mixing MSG U End time-stamped timesampv 1 and MAC U Forwarded together to its home network HSS;
(3) HSS receives MSG U And MAC U According to TMPI i-l Obtaining the stored IMPI, decrypting to obtain R U ；
Calculating XMAC U Checking XMAC U And MAC U And if the two are consistent, checking whether the timestamp V1 is legal, authenticating the UE successfully by the legal HSS, and if not, re-synchronizing the system clock and re-initiating registration.
HSS selects random number R after successful registration H Deciding whether to agree with the ciphering algorithm A1 selected by the UE, if not, selecting one of the given alternative ciphering algorithms as the ciphering algorithm A used for the registration i (ii) a Generation of novel TMPI i Generating a new key K i ＝E(K i-1 ,R U R H ) And use of R in combination H And K i Generating CK, IK and AK; shared secret key K with HSS and S-CSCF HS Encryption of E (Ki, R) U ) (ii) a Then register the response information MSG H The message is sent back to the S-CSCF;
MSG H ＝R H ||AK||TMPI i ||A i ||E(K HS ,E(K i ,R U ))||CK||IK||E(K i ,R H ))
(4) S-CSCF receives the response information returned from HSS, and decrypts to obtain E (K) i ,R U )、E(K i ,R H ) Leave AK, E (K) i ,R H )、TMPI i Generating a random number R S Calculating f n (R S ) (ii) a MSG (minimum shift group) S 、MAC S Sending the information to the UE;
MSG S ＝R H ||TMPI i ||A i ||f n (R S )||E(K i ,R U )||CK||IK||timestampV2
MAC S ＝H 2 (AK,MSG S )
(5) S-CSCF will MSG S 、MAC S The SIP response is sent to the I-CSCF, and the I-CSCF forwards the SIP response to the P-CSCF;
after receiving the SIP response, the P-CSCF stores CK and IK and forwards the rest parts to the UE;
MSG P ＝R H ||TMPI i ||A i ||f n (R S )||E(K i ,R U )timestampV2
MAC P ＝H 2 (AK,MSG P )
(6) UE receives MSG P 、MAC P With R H And K i CK, IK, and AK are generated, and XMAC is calculated S And E (K) i ,R H )；
Inspection and MAC S Whether the two are consistent; by K i Decryption E (K) i ,R H ) Checking for R U Whether the random number is the initially selected random number or not; and checking the validity of the timestamp, if the time stamp passes all the time, the UE successfully authenticates the S-CSCF, and the UE leaves the TMPI i Algorithm A for accepting HSS selection as a temporary subscriber identity for this registration i And the service data is transmitted as an encryption algorithm.
And simultaneously sends RES to S-CSCF.
RES＝E(K i ,R H )
(7) Test XRES = E (K) i ,R H ) If the identity is consistent with RES, the authentication of S-CSCF is carried out if the identity is consistent with RESThe UE was successful.
Service authentication and key negotiation:
after successful registration and authentication, when UE needs to perform ith service communication, S-CSCF shall send f to ME n-i (R S ) (ii) a ME needs to check f (f) n-i (R S ) Whether or not to compare with the last f previously stored n-(i-1) (R S ) If the same, confirming the identity of the S-CSCF and sending f to the S-CSCF n-i (R U )。
S-CSCF checks UE validity, if legal, it achieves two-way authentication, sends success mark to UE, starts to generate cipher and integrity key CK needed by this service communication i 、IK i ；
The UE also starts to generate CK after receiving the success mark i 、IK i And preparing for service communication. As shown in fig. 2.
CK i ＝f 3 ’(CK,f n-i (R U ))；
IK i ＝f 4 ’(IK,f n-i (R U ))。
When the service frequency reaches the upper limit n of the Hash function chain, the user needs to register authentication with the S-CSCF and the HSS again when applying for the service, and updates the key shared with the HSS.
Some of the abbreviations in the present invention are as follows:
UE: a user;
and the P-CSCF: a unified entry point to the IMS visited network;
I-CSCF: an entry point to the IMS home network;
and S-CSCF: IMS signaling plane core node location;
HSS: home Subscriber Server, belonging to Subscriber Server;
ME: a mobile device.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned embodiments, and all technical solutions belonging to the idea of the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention. It should be noted that modifications and embellishments within the scope of the invention may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the principle of the invention.

Claims (6)

1. An improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism with balanced security and efficiency is characterized in that in the mechanism,
(1) UE and HSS share key generation function f 3 、f 4 And f 5 And a message authentication function H 1 (ii) a UE and S-CSCF shared key generation function f 3 ’、f 4 ' and message authentication function H 2 (ii) a HSS and S-CSCF shared secret key K HS ；
(2) UE and HSS respectively generate random numbers;
(3) Synchronizing a system clock;
(4) The UE trusts the HSS to which the UE belongs;
wherein f is 3 A key generation function for calculating an encryption key CK; f. of 4 A key generation function for calculating an integrity protection key IK; f. of 5 A key generation function for calculating an anonymous key AK;
H 1 an authentication function for the UE for the registration message; h 2 An authentication function for the S-CSCF to the response message;
f 3 ' is a generating function of the iterative encryption key CK; f. of 4 ' is a generating function of the iterative integrity protection key IK;
and (4) realizing UE registration authentication and key agreement and service authentication and key agreement based on the steps (1) to (4).
2. The improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing security and efficiency as claimed in claim 1, wherein said UE registration authentication and key agreement uses a Hash function chain and a timestamp to implement the registration authentication and key agreement.
3. The mechanism of claim 2, wherein the UE registration authentication and key agreement procedure comprises:
(1) UE initiates registration, ME sendsRegistration message MSG U And message authentication code MAC U ；
MSG U ＝E(K i-l ,R U )||TMPI i-1 ||f n (R U )||A1{A1,A2,...,Ar}
MAC U ＝H l (K i-l ,IMPI||MSG U )
Wherein E is a single-key encryption function;
R U for old shared secret key K i-l An encrypted random number;
TMPI i-1 identifying the old temporary user;
f n (R U ) The Hash function is performed for n times, wherein n is the maximum number of times of applying for service after one registration is successful;
{ A1, A2,. And Ar } and A1 are r alternative sets of encryption algorithms and user-selected algorithms, respectively.
(2) S-CSCF receives registration information of UE and leaves f n (R U ) According to TMPI i-l Mixing MSG U End-time stamped timestampV1 and MAC U Forwarded to the home network HSS of the UE together;
(3) HSS receives MSG U And MAC U According to TMPI i-l Obtaining the stored IMPI, decrypting to obtain R U ；
Calculating XMAC U Checking XMAC U And MAC U If the two are consistent, verifying whether the timesampV 1 is legal or not, authenticating the UE successfully by the HSS in a legal manner, and re-synchronizing the system clock in an illegal manner to re-initiate registration;
HSS selects random number R after successful registration H Deciding whether to agree with the ciphering algorithm A1 selected by the UE, if not, selecting one of the given alternative ciphering algorithms as the ciphering algorithm A used for the registration i (ii) a Generation of a novel TMPI i Generating a new key K i ＝E(K i-1 ,R U R H ) In combination with R H And K i CK, IK and AK are generated; shared secret key K with HSS and S-CSCF HS Encryption of E (Ki, R) U ) (ii) a Then registration response information MSG H The message is sent back to the S-CSCF;
MSG H ＝R H ||AK||TMPI i ||A i ||E(K HS ,E(K i ,R U ))||CK||IK||E(K i ,R H ))
(4) The S-CSCF receives the response information returned by the HSS, decrypts to obtain E (K) i ,R U )、E(K i ,R H ) Leave AK, E (K) i ,R H )、TMPI i Generating a random number R S Calculating f n (R S ) (ii) a MSG (minimum shift group) S 、MAC S Sending the information to the UE;
MSG S ＝R H ||TMPI i ||A i ||f n (R S )||E(K i ,R U )||CK||IK||timestampV2
MAC S ＝H 2 (AK,MSG S )
(5) S-CSCF will MSG S 、MAC S The SIP response is sent to the I-CSCF, and the I-CSCF forwards the SIP response to the P-CSCF;
after receiving the SIP response, the P-CSCF stores the CK and the IK and forwards the rest parts to the UE;
MSG P ＝R H ||TMPI i ||A i ||f n (R S )||E(K i ,R U )timestampV2
MAC P ＝H 2 (AK,MSG P )
(6) UE receives MSG P 、MAC P With R H And K i CK, IK, and AK are generated, and XMAC is calculated S And E (K) i ,R H )；
Inspection and MAC S Whether the two are consistent; by K i Decryption E (K) i ,R H ) Checking for R U Whether the random number is the initially selected random number or not; and checking the validity of the timestamp, if the timestamp passes all the authentication, the UE successfully authenticates the S-CSCF, and the UE leaves the TMPI i Algorithm A for accepting HSS selection as a temporary subscriber identity for this registration i The encryption algorithm is used for transmitting service data;
simultaneously sending RES to S-CSCF;
RES＝E(K i ,R H )
(7) Test XRES = E (K) i ,R H ) And if the identity is consistent with the RES, the S-CSCF successfully authenticates the UE.
4. The mechanism of claim 1 for improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA according to which the security and efficiency are balanced, wherein the service authentication and key agreement procedure is:
after the registration authentication is successful, when the UE needs to carry out the ith service communication, the S-CSCF sends f to the ME n-i (R S ) ME check f (f) n-i (R S ) Whether or not to compare with the last f previously stored n-(i-1) (R S ) If the identity is the same, the identity of the S-CSCF is confirmed, the S-CSCF is legal, and f is sent to the S-CSCF n-i (R U )；
S-CSCF checks UE legality, if legal, it achieves two-way authentication, sends success mark to UE, starts to generate cipher and integrity key CK needed by this service communication i 、IK i ；
The UE also starts to generate CK after receiving the success mark i 、IK i And preparing for service communication.
5. The RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for 5G messages to balance security and efficiency as recited in claim 4, wherein CK is configured to perform i ＝f 3 ’(CK,f n-i (R U ))；
IK i ＝f 4 ’(IK,f n-i (R U ))。
6. The improved mechanism of 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA for balancing security and efficiency as claimed in claim 1, wherein when the number of services reaches the upper limit n of the Hash function chain, the user needs to re-register authentication with S-CSCF and HSS and update the key shared with HSS when applying for services.
CN202211277108.6A 2022-10-19 2022-10-19 Improved 5G message RCS access authentication IMS-AKA mechanism for balancing safety and efficiency Pending CN115767527A (en)

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