CN109068325B - Key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a method for key management and identity authentication based on a wireless sensor network. , if so, turn to S3, otherwise turn to S5; S3, determine whether the quintuple information of the requesting node is valid, if so, turn to S4, otherwise refuse to communicate; S4, the requested node and the requesting node are authenticated by the key distribution center, generating pairing key; S5, find the relay node according to the respective communication areas of the requesting node and the requested node, and then repeat S3 to S4 for the relay node and the requesting node respectively, and repeat S3 for the relay node and the requested node. and S4. The invention can achieve the purpose of reducing the node resource storage consumption, improving the forward and backward security between nodes, and resisting replay attacks.

Description

A wireless sensor network-based key management and identity authentication method

technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and in particular relates to a key management and identity authentication method based on a wireless sensor network.

Background technique

A wireless sensor network is composed of a large number of resource-constrained sensor nodes, which cooperate with each other in the form of an ad hoc network through a wireless communication network, and have been widely used in many fields. The wireless sensor network integrates a number of technologies including sensor technology and wireless communication technology, and can collaboratively realize real-time perception, collection, aggregation, and processing of various monitoring information in the distribution area, and send it to users who need this information. Enables users to achieve dynamic intellisense of the physical environment.

In wireless sensor networks, the physical particularity of wireless communication requires communication security, while resource-constrained sensor nodes require lightweight, efficient and secure implementations. At present, the vast majority of encryption schemes rely on the security of the key, and the disclosure of the key often leads to the disclosure of the plaintext content. Therefore, the effective management of keys is an important content of wireless sensor network security.

The key management scheme of wireless sensor network is closely related to the nature of the network and the distribution method of keys. According to different network structures, it can be divided into distributed key management mechanism and hierarchical key management mechanism. The distributed key management mechanism has no specific requirements for the network, and each node implements key management between nodes through the key pre-distribution mechanism. The key management mechanism of the hierarchical structure realizes the distribution and management of keys based on the clustered network topology. In addition, according to different network environments, it can be divided into static network key management mechanism and dynamic network structure key management mechanism. The static network key management mechanism considers the special case that the network or node remains unchanged; the dynamic network key management mechanism considers the situation that the network and the node are updated. Different key distribution schemes also produce two different distribution mechanisms, random keys and deterministic keys. The random key distribution mechanism means that the key is randomly generated by some sub-keys in the key pool, while the deterministic key distribution mechanism means that some specific nodes directly generate the key.

At present, there are two research ideas in the research on wireless sensor network key pre-distribution and key management at home and abroad: the key pre-distribution scheme based on random probability and the key pre-distribution scheme based on geographic location information and identity information. The key pre-distribution scheme based on random probability needs to store a large number of invalid keys, and the resource storage consumption is large; the key pre-distribution scheme based on location identity information requires a lot of computational consumption and lacks the authentication mechanism of nodes.

The existing wireless sensor-based key management scheme still needs to consume a lot of storage space to store useless keys in the key pre-distribution stage, and the overlapping of shared keys reduces the scalability of the network; When generating keys, the authentication mechanism is not considered in time. The premise of generating paired keys between nodes is the legitimacy of the nodes; most key management schemes are based on static networks, and dynamic networks are less efficient.

To sum up, in view of the defects of the prior art, a key management and identity authentication scheme based on a wireless sensor network is particularly required to solve the above-mentioned problems.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art and provide a key management and identity authentication method based on a wireless sensor network, which can achieve the purpose of reducing node resource storage consumption, improving forward and backward security between nodes, and resisting replay attacks. .

In order to solve the problems of the prior art, the present invention discloses a method for key management and identity authentication based on a wireless sensor network, comprising the following steps:

S1, establish a matrix M containing multiple adjacent node quintuple information;

S2, determine whether the request node is included in the matrix M, if so, go to S3, otherwise go to S5;

S3, determine whether the quintuple information of the requesting node is valid, if so, turn to S4, otherwise refuse communication;

S4, the requested node and the requesting node perform identity verification through the key distribution center to generate a pairing key;

S5. Find the relay node according to the respective communication areas of the requesting node and the requested node, and then repeat S3 to S4 for the relay node and the requesting node respectively, and repeat S3 and S4 for the relay node and the requested node.

As a preferred option,

In S1, the establishment method of matrix M is as follows:

S11. Dynamically generate the communication threshold of the requested node and the adjacent node threshold;

S12, generate a matrix M according to the communication threshold and the adjacent node threshold;

其中q表示被请求节点的邻近节点阈值；Loc表示该节点的位置信息；AT表示该节点的存活标志，其值为0表示存活，为1表示新增，为-1表示休眠，为其它负值表示被撤销；CT表示该节点最近与被请求节点的通信认证次数；TT表示该节点有效时间的时间戳；RT表示属于通信阈值范围内，但未被纳入节点矩阵M的邻近节点的合法通信请求次数。The matrix M is expressed as

Among them, q represents the adjacent node threshold of the requested node; Loc represents the location information of the node; AT represents the survival flag of the node, its value is 0 means alive, 1 means new, -1 means dormant, and other negative values means revoked; CT means the number of recent communication authentications between the node and the requested node; TT means the timestamp of the valid time of the node; RT means legal communication requests from neighboring nodes that are within the communication threshold range but not included in the node matrix M frequency.

As a preferred option,

In S2, the method for judging whether the request node is included in the matrix M is as follows:

S21, the requested node establishes a threshold function according to the matrix M, and generates a threshold value according to the request information of the adjacent nodes;

S22 , judging whether the threshold value meets the requirements, and if so, it is determined that the requesting node has been included in the matrix M; otherwise, it is determined that it has not been included in the matrix M.

As a preferred option,

In S3, if the timestamp of the requesting node is valid and there is no other invalid state, the node is deemed valid, otherwise it is deemed invalid.

As a preferred option,

In S4, the requested node and the requesting node perform identity verification through the key distribution center, and the method for generating the pairing key is as follows:

S41, the requesting node sends the encrypted information of the authentication request to the requested node;

S42, the requesting node requests the key distribution center to distribute the session key, and sends the relevant information of the current round of communication;

S43, the requested node requests the key distribution center to distribute the session key, and sends the relevant information of this round of communication;

S44, the key distribution center sends encrypted information for verification to the requesting node respectively, and sends encrypted information including the session key to the requested node;

S45, the requested node decrypts to learn the session key, and sends the encrypted verification information of the session key to the requesting node;

S46. Both nodes generate a pairing key according to the intermediate value in the authentication process.

As a preferred option,

In S41, the requesting node sends its own location information encryption request information to the requested node;

In S42, the requesting node sends two encrypted messages to the key distribution center, one is a random value encrypted with its own identity information; the other is data information encrypted with the master key shared by the requesting node and the key distribution center, the The data information includes its own identity information, the validity period of the communication, and the temporary session random value of the current round of communication; the temporary session random value of the requesting node is generated by the requesting node selecting the two random numbers of this round of communication, as well as its identity information and timestamp. ;

In S43, the requested node sends two encrypted messages to the key distribution center, one is a random value encrypted with its own identity information; the other is data information encrypted with the master key shared by the requested node and the key distribution center , the data information includes its own identity information and the temporary session random value of the current round of communication; the temporary session random value of the requested node is generated by the requested node selecting two random numbers of this round of communication and its identity information;

In S44, after receiving the session request from the requested node and the requesting node, the key distribution center first decrypts and obtains the identity information of the two nodes, compares it with the pre-stored identity information, and then decrypts the random values of the two nodes for blinding The identity information of the two nodes; and the encrypted data of the master key shared by the key distribution center and the requesting node is sent to the requesting node to indirectly inform the identity information of the requested node; in this process, the key distribution center has been informed of the request The random value of the temporary session of the node in this round and the timestamp of the requested node;

The key distribution center sends the temporary random value of the requesting node and the data information encrypted with the master key shared by the key distribution center and the requesting node to the requested node, which is used as a security credential for the authentication of the requested node and the generation of two At the same time, the key distribution center also sends the data information encrypted by the master key shared by the key distribution center and the requested node, this part includes the identity information of the requesting node, a message that is not replayed and timely, Also provide the requested node with a session key and the timestamp of the requesting node;

In S45, the requested node sends the encrypted data information and the temporary session random value of the requesting node to the requesting node, and the temporary session random value of the requesting node is encrypted with the session key; the encrypted data information is provided to the requesting node decryption key to Restore the temporary random value; the temporary random value of the requesting node is encrypted with the session key to ensure that the message is not replayed;

In S46, the pairing key of the current round of the two nodes is obtained by taking the hash value of the encrypted information of the security credential and the random value of the temporary session of the requested node.

As a preferred option,

In S5, the method for finding a relay node according to the respective communication areas of the requesting node and the requested node is as follows:

Determine the communication area of the two nodes. If there is an overlapping area or an overlapping candidate node, the relay node is selected according to the Euclidean distance single-hop minimum standard deviation path principle; otherwise, the node at the boundary of the two areas is selected to continue to determine the communication area. Then, according to the node matrix M, the coincidence area or the coincidence candidate node is searched, and the process is repeated until the relay node is found.

As a preferred option,

In S5, the number of times of skip table communication is at most three times.

As a preferred option,

After the identity authentication is completed, the requested node will modify the threshold value of the requesting node, and check whether any node is invalid or the timestamp has expired; if there is, delete the node, and select the node with the highest number of requests to join the communication node matrix M, and at the same time Modify the values of the corresponding matrix.

As a preferred option,

Every time the timestamp of the system expires, a new round of timestamp, random number and new hash function will be re-broadcasted; the requested node only needs to modify the value accordingly; the new node will obtain the current time period and the previous time Periodic valid information to participate in a new round of identity authentication.

The invention has the beneficial effects: by adopting the form of a node matrix, there is no need to build a key pool to store a large number of useless keys, and each node stores the information of a single-hop node directly. It is updated, and the method of hash function and time stamp is used to ensure the timeliness of the system, which improves the ability of anti-monitoring, anti-node capture attack and anti-replay attack. In addition, the authentication process does not need to know the specific identity information of each node, ensuring the privacy of the node.

Description of drawings

1 is a schematic diagram of a node network model in the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication process between nodes in the present invention.

Detailed ways

The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and cannot be used to limit the protection scope of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 1 , the authentication process between the two nodes is specifically described by taking the node A as the requested node and the node B as the requesting node as an example.

S1. Establish a matrix M containing quintuple information of multiple adjacent nodes, and the specific steps are as follows:

S11. The system dynamically sets the communication threshold of node A, where the communication threshold is a communication range set based on the power energy and communication capability of node A, to ensure that the communication radius between nodes is r. Set the neighbor node threshold q of node A, which means that each node can communicate with at most q neighbor nodes.

According to the threshold limit, all nodes within the communication threshold range can be determined, and their location information can be obtained through the positioning algorithm. These information are all public information in the deployment area, and these nodes can directly communicate with node A in a single hop, and nodes outside the deployment area cannot directly communicate in a single hop.

S12, generate the communication node matrix M of node A according to the communication threshold and the adjacent node threshold, and its expression is:

其中q表示被请求节点的邻近节点阈值；Loc表示邻近节点的位置信息；AT表示该节点的存活标志，其值为0表示存活，为1表示新增，为-1表示休眠，为其它负值表示被撤销；CT表示该节点最近与被请求节点的通信认证次数；TT表示该节点有效时间的时间戳；RT表示属于通信阈值范围内，但未被纳入节点矩阵M的邻近节点的合法通信请求次数。当有节点被节点矩阵删除时，合法请求次数最高的邻近节点将优先递补进节点矩阵M，其他节点则继续按照请求次数排队，而通信节点矩阵内的节点通信次数值始终为0。系统首次部署时，通信节点矩阵M为空。

Where q represents the adjacent node threshold of the requested node; Loc represents the location information of the adjacent node; AT represents the survival flag of the node, its value is 0 means alive, 1 means new, -1 means dormant, and other negative values means revoked; CT means the number of recent communication authentications between the node and the requested node; TT means the timestamp of the valid time of the node; RT means legal communication requests from neighboring nodes that are within the communication threshold range but not included in the node matrix M frequency. When a node is deleted by the node matrix, the adjacent node with the highest number of legal requests will be preferentially replenished to the node matrix M, and other nodes will continue to queue up according to the number of requests, and the value of the communication times of the nodes in the communication node matrix is always 0. When the system is first deployed, the communication node matrix M is empty.

S2, determine whether the request node is included in the matrix M, the specific steps are as follows:

S21. Construct a threshold function of node A and generate a threshold value according to the request information of adjacent nodes. The expression of the threshold function is:

θ＝h(λ,T_BS),ζ＝h(x_AID_A)，

T_BS∈BS，x_A∈A，λ表示BS基站周期性地分布到每个节点的随机数，无效的节点不会接收到这个值；T_BS表示BS的有效时间戳；θ表示BS系统信息的机密值；x_A表示节点A选取的随机数，ζ表示节点A盲化的身份信息；

表示系统BS时间戳有效期间，有效邻近节点的盲化的位置信息，ξ表示该节点是否属于矩阵M，其值为1表示属于，为0表示不属于；

用来计算邻近节点是否可以和节点A直接进行单跳通信。in,

θ=h(λ, T _BS ), ζ=h(x _A ID _A ),

T _BS ∈ BS, x _A ∈ A, λ represents the random number periodically distributed to each node by the BS base station, invalid nodes will not receive this value; T _BS represents the valid timestamp of the BS; θ represents the BS system information The confidential value of ; x _A represents the random number selected by node A, and ζ represents the blinded identity information of node A;

Represents the blinded position information of the valid adjacent nodes during the valid period of the system BS timestamp, ξ represents whether the node belongs to the matrix M, and its value is 1 means it belongs, and 0 means it does not belong;

It is used to calculate whether adjacent nodes can directly communicate with node A in a single hop.

S22. Determine whether the threshold value satisfies h((h(λ, T _BS ), Loc _x ), h(x _A ID _A ))=0, if so, it means that node B is within the communication range and can directly communicate with node A Hop communication, otherwise it means that node B is not within the communication range, it cannot directly communicate with node A in a single hop, and must communicate indirectly through other nodes.

S3. Determine whether the quintuple information of node B is valid, and the specific steps are as follows:

If the timestamp of node B is valid, and node B is not in other invalid states, then node B can communicate with node A directly for identity authentication, otherwise, the communication is refused.

S4. Node A and Node B perform identity verification through the KDC (Key Distribution Center) to generate a pairing key. The specific steps are as follows:

In S41, node B sends its own location information encryption request information to node A.

In S42, node B sends two encrypted information to KDC, one is a random value encrypted with its own identity information, which is used by KDC to blind its own identity information to node A; the other is the master secret shared by node B and KDC. The data information encrypted by the key K _B , the data information includes its own identity information, the validity period of the communication and the temporary session random value of the current round of communication; the temporary session random value of the node B is selected by the node B. The two random numbers of this round of communication , along with its identity information and timestamp generation. The session key and timestamp are finally returned to Node B in the form of encrypted information to ensure the validity of Node B.

In S43, node A sends two encrypted information to KDC, one is a random value encrypted with its own identity information, which is used by KDC to blind its own identity information to node B; the other is the master secret shared by node A and KDC. The data information encrypted by the key K _A is used to indicate that the KDC needs to send the relevant information of the node A to the node B. The data information includes its own identity information and the temporary session random value of the current round of communication; the temporary session random value of the node A is determined by the node B. A selects two random numbers for this round of communication and generates their identity information. Node A's temporary session random value and session key are also returned to node A in the form of encrypted information to ensure node A's effectiveness.

In S44, after receiving the session request from node A and node B, the KDC first decrypts and obtains the identity information of the two nodes, compares it with the pre-stored identity information, and then decrypts the random values of the two nodes to blind the two nodes. identity information; and send the encrypted data of the master key shared by KDC and node B to node B, which is used to indirectly inform node A of the identity information; in this process, KDC has already learned the temporary session random value of node B and node A of this round. timestamp.

The KDC sends the hash value of node B's temporary random value and the data information encrypted with the master key KB shared by KDC and node _B to node A. This part is used as a security credential for node A's authentication and generation of two-node communication. At the same time, KDC also sends the data information encrypted by the master key K _A shared by KDC and node A, this part includes the identity information of node B, a message that is not replayed and timely, and also provides node A with a session The key and the timestamp of Node B.

In S45, node A sends the encrypted data information and node B's temporary session random value to node B, and node B's temporary session random value is encrypted with the session key; the encrypted data information is provided to node B's decryption key to recover Temporary random value; Node B's temporary random value is encrypted with the session key to ensure that the message is not replayed.

In S46, the pairing key of the current round of the two nodes is obtained by taking the hash value of the encrypted information of the security credential and the random value of the temporary session of the node A.

S5. Find the relay node according to the respective communication areas of node B and node A, and then repeat S3 to S4 between the relay node and node B respectively, and repeat S3 and S4 between the relay node and node A, the specific steps are as follows :

Determine the communication area of the two nodes. If there is an overlapping area or an overlapping candidate node, the relay node is selected according to the Euclidean distance single-hop minimum standard deviation path principle; otherwise, the node at the boundary of the two areas is selected to continue to determine the communication area. Then, according to the node matrix M, the coincidence area or the coincidence candidate node is searched, and the process is repeated until the relay node is found. In S5, the number of times of skip table communication in the wireless sensor network is at most three times.

After identity authentication, node A will modify the threshold value of node B, and check whether any node is invalid or the timestamp has expired; if it exists, it will delete the node, and select the node with the highest number of requests to join the communication node matrix M, and modify it at the same time. the value of the corresponding matrix.

Every time the timestamp of the system expires, a new round of timestamp, random number and new hash function will be re-broadcasted; node A only needs to modify the corresponding value; the new node will obtain the current time period and the previous time period valid information to participate in a new round of identity authentication.

The above are only the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for those skilled in the art, without departing from the technical principles of the present invention, several improvements and modifications can be made. These improvements and modifications It should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (9)

1. a wireless sensor network-based key management and identity authentication method, is characterized in that: comprise the steps: S1, establish a matrix M containing multiple adjacent node quintuple information; The establishment method of matrix M is as follows: S11. Dynamically generate the communication threshold of the requested node and the adjacent node threshold; S12, generate a matrix M according to the communication threshold and the adjacent node threshold; The matrix M is expressed as

Where q represents the adjacent node threshold of the requested node; Loc represents the location information of the adjacent node; AT represents the survival flag of the node, its value is 0 means alive, 1 means new, -1 means dormant, and other negative values means revoked; CT means the number of recent communication authentications between the node and the requested node; TT means the timestamp of the valid time of the node; RT means legal communication requests from neighboring nodes that are within the communication threshold range but not included in the node matrix M frequency; S2, determine whether the request node is included in the matrix M, if so, go to S3, otherwise go to S5; S3, determine whether the quintuple information of the requesting node is valid, if so, turn to S4, otherwise refuse communication; S4, the requested node and the requesting node perform identity verification through the key distribution center to generate a pairing key; S5. Find the relay node according to the respective communication areas of the requesting node and the requested node, and then repeat S3 to S4 for the relay node and the requesting node respectively, and repeat S3 and S4 for the relay node and the requested node. 2. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 1, is characterized in that: In S2, the method for judging whether the request node is included in the matrix M is as follows: S21, the requested node establishes a threshold function according to the matrix M, and generates a threshold value according to the request information of the adjacent nodes; S22 , judging whether the threshold value meets the requirements, and if so, it is determined that the requesting node has been included in the matrix M; otherwise, it is determined that it has not been included in the matrix M. 3. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 1, is characterized in that: In S3, if the timestamp of the requesting node is valid and there is no other invalid state, the node is deemed valid, otherwise it is deemed invalid. 4. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 2, is characterized in that: In S4, the requested node and the requesting node perform identity verification through the key distribution center, and the method for generating a pairing key is as follows: S41, the requesting node sends the encrypted information of the authentication request to the requested node; S42, the requesting node requests the key distribution center to distribute the session key, and sends the relevant information of the current round of communication; S43, the requested node requests the key distribution center to distribute the session key, and sends the relevant information of this round of communication; S44, the key distribution center sends encrypted information for verification to the requesting node respectively, and sends encrypted information including the session key to the requested node; S45, the requested node decrypts to learn the session key, and sends the encrypted verification information of the session key to the requesting node; S46. Both nodes generate a pairing key according to the intermediate value in the authentication process. 5. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 4, is characterized in that: In S41, the requesting node sends its own location information encryption request information to the requested node; In S42, the requesting node sends two encrypted messages to the key distribution center, one is a random value encrypted with its own identity information; the other is data information encrypted with the master key shared by the requesting node and the key distribution center, the The data information includes its own identity information, the validity period of the communication and the temporary random value of the current round of communication; the temporary random value of the requesting node is generated by the requesting node selecting the two random numbers of the current round of communication, as well as its identity information and timestamp; In S43, the requested node sends two encrypted messages to the key distribution center, one is a random value encrypted with its own identity information; the other is data information encrypted with the master key shared by the requested node and the key distribution center , the data information includes its own identity information and the temporary random value of this round of communication; the temporary random value of the requested node is generated by the requested node selecting two random numbers of this round of communication and its identity information; In S44, after receiving the session request from the requested node and the requesting node, the key distribution center first decrypts to obtain the identity information of the two nodes, compares it with the pre-stored identity information, and then decrypts the random values of the two nodes for blinding The identity information of the two nodes; and the encrypted data of the master key shared by the key distribution center and the requesting node is sent to the requesting node to indirectly inform the identity information of the requested node; in this process, the key distribution center has been informed of the request The temporary random value of the node in this round and the timestamp of the requested node; The key distribution center sends the temporary random value of the requesting node and the data information encrypted with the master key shared by the key distribution center and the requesting node to the requested node. The temporary random value and the data information encrypted by the master key are used as security credentials for At the same time, the key distribution center also sends the data information encrypted by the master key shared by the key distribution center and the requested node, and the data information encrypted by the master key includes the request Identity information of the node, a message that is not replayed and timely, a session key provided to the requested node, and the timestamp of the requesting node; In S45, the requested node sends the encrypted data information together with the temporary random value of the requesting node to the requesting node, and the temporary random value of the requesting node is encrypted with the session key; the encrypted data information is provided to the requesting node to decrypt the key to restore the temporary random value of the requesting node. Random value; the temporary random value of the requesting node is encrypted with the session key to ensure that the message is not replayed; In S46, the pairing key of the current round of the two nodes is obtained by taking the hash value of the encrypted information of the security credential and the temporary random value of the requested node. 6. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 1, is characterized in that: In S5, the method for finding a relay node according to the respective communication areas of the requesting node and the requested node is as follows: Determine the communication area of the two nodes. If there is an overlapping area or an overlapping candidate node, the relay node is selected according to the Euclidean distance single-hop minimum standard deviation path principle; otherwise, the node at the boundary of the two areas is selected to continue to determine the communication area. Then, according to the node matrix M, the coincidence area or the coincidence candidate node is searched, and the process is repeated until the relay node is found. 7. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 6, is characterized in that: In S5, the number of times of skip table communication is at most three times. 8. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 1, is characterized in that: After the identity authentication is completed, the requested node will modify the threshold value of the requesting node, and check whether any node is invalid or the timestamp has expired; if it exists, it will delete the node, and select the node with the highest number of requests to join the communication node matrix M, and at the same time Modify the values of the corresponding matrix. 9. a kind of key management and identity authentication method based on wireless sensor network according to claim 1, is characterized in that: Every time the timestamp of the system expires, a new round of timestamp, random number and new hash function will be re-broadcasted; the requested node only needs to modify the value accordingly; the new node will obtain the current time period and the previous time Periodic valid information to participate in a new round of identity authentication.

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