Roman Hloch

The concept of sense perception constitutes considerable part of Aristotle’s De anima. As such, this concept is abundant source of his philosophical thoughts. In this paper, I shall focus on two Aristotle’s propositions about sense perception: 1) a sense organ is potentially as such, as his sense object is actually; 2) a sense is a capacity to receive sensible form without the matter. By analyzing this propositions, I shall expose their mutual connection. I shall also expose important and indispensable role of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle’s concept of sense perception. I shall sketch the modern debate between materialist and spiritualist interpretations and possible solution of this disputation, which may answer the question about the character of change during the act of sense perception, and also the question about the role and relation between physiological sense organ and formal sense. By this I shall clarify both propositions 1) and 2) their relation.

Practical wisdom (phronesis) is a key term in Aristotle’s ethics, especially when it comes to explain and to understand the right way to act. In this article, I aim at the character of practical wisdom (phronesis) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I try to point out that practical wisdom consists of few subordinate abilities. In my interpretation, I try to explain the relation between these abilities and their specific role inside the practical wisdom (phronesis). In this article, I present plausible interpretation of character of practical wisdom and subordinate abilities.

The Aristotelian Ergon Argument and the Contemporary Theory of Virtues Contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics engage in great detail with the concept of human nature. This is also the case with Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, who, in their argumentation, use the so-called ergon argument that can be unambiguously found already in Aristotle, who is a direct inspiration for the proponents of this branch of the contemporary theories of virtue. This article focuses on the comparison of the concept of the "ergon argument" and its related theses in Aristotle, Foot and Hursthouse. The goal is to ascertain the extent to which the current neo-Aristotelian concept is truly and originally Aristotelian. The comparison shows that, for Foot and Hursthouse, Aristotle serves more in the mode of a free inspiration, as some of their key elements are substantially different than the original Aristotelian concept, or are even completely absent. It is shown at the same time that Aristotle's original concept is the philosophically richer and more sophisticated theory. This is, in part, the result of the efforts by Foot and Hursthouse to plausibly adapt their concepts to contemporary ethical discussions.

Nauka o středu představuje jeden ze stěžejních pilířů Aristotelovy etiky a je úzce provázána s jeho pojetím etických zdatností. Ty jsou podle Aristotela flexibilní s ohledem na kontext praktické situace. Pojetí statečnosti se však od ostatních etických zdatností liší. Předně je zde problém dvou emocí, které Aristotelés přisuzuje zdatnosti statečnosti. Dále omezuje její oblast výhradně na válečnictví. Toto paradigma válečnictví má pak za následek, že statečnost postrádá flexibilitu etických zdatností a stává se rigidní. Tyto klíčové prvky ohrožují plausibilitu a koherenci Aristotelovy nauky o středu. Chyba ovšem není v nauce o středu jako takové, ale chyby se dopouští sám Aristotelés nesprávnou aplikací nauky o středu na statečnost.