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Atomic weapons are useful because of the stories people tell about them, the fears those stories inspire, and the actions by which people respond to those fears"-John Canaday 1 This book investigates how it is possible that a state... more
Atomic weapons are useful because of the stories people tell about them, the fears those stories inspire, and the actions by which people respond to those fears"-John Canaday 1 This book investigates how it is possible that a state maintains nuclear weapons. 2 This is unusual. The conventional nuclear research agenda does not consider the maintenance of nuclear weapons much of a puzzle. In short, nuclear weapons are seen as so obviously useful for a state engaged in "self-help", that no right-minded government would ever willingly give them up (Chapter 2). Nuclear weapon possession has thus prompted a great deal of investigation into how best to manage these weapons, but far less on how states maintain them. Indeed, Security Studies, informed by Realism (e.g. Waltz, 1979), was traditionally concerned with
As the number of international rankings has risen dramatically since the 1990s, a large body of scholarship has emerged to examine and understand them. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of this body of work and to chart... more
As the number of international rankings has risen dramatically since the 1990s, a large body of scholarship has emerged to examine and understand them. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of this body of work and to chart out fruitful directions for future research. In short, prior scholarship has been surprisingly quiet on the relations among multiple actors and their economic dimensions at the core of country performance indicator (CPI) activities. To foreground crucial socioeconomic relations, we develop a relational heuristic based upon a sports analogy: the actors involved in the creation and maintenance of CPIs can fruitfully be approached as a complex of players, referees, coaches, and audiences. Such an account helps us better understand how CPIs emerge and are sustained, even when they rely on dodgy data and their effects are perverse. We use nation brand rankings—overlooked in international relations research—as empirical illustration.
Drawing upon emerging trends across Europe, this essay argues that the painful learning Britain undergoes via Brexit, looks set to become a useful lesson for the rest of the EU. The article suggests the EU requires a new narrative of... more
Drawing upon emerging trends across Europe, this essay argues that the painful learning Britain undergoes via Brexit, looks set to become a useful lesson for the rest of the EU. The article suggests the EU requires a new narrative of legitimation because collective memories of Europe's bloody past are fading, while as Brexit shows, conventional cost-benefit analysis may not cut through to EU citizens. However, Britain - and the very public humiliation Brexiting has entailed - has provided budding Eurosceptics with a public demonstration of the folly of exiting. As such, Britain may end up becoming an "unwittingly martyr" for the EU cause: performing a morality tale that embodies the dangers of nationalist hubris and putting faith in Eurosceptic fantasies. The function of this martyrdom lies not in the utility of the sacrifice itself - remaining EU members will be economically worse off - but in its narrative potential to become a "usable past" that can be harnessed for some purpose in the present. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom then, a no-deal Brexit may be the optimum outcome for the EU because it would best illuminate the folly of leaving and therefore publicly crystalise the benefits of membership.
An impressive portfolio of case-study research has now demonstrated how and through what means the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have sought higher social status. However, this field of research lacks... more
An impressive portfolio of case-study research has now demonstrated how and through what means the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have sought higher social status. However, this field of research lacks systematic means of evaluating this status-seeking. This article fills this lacuna by developing a mixed-methods framework enabling scholars to zoom in and compare individual states’ relative status performance. Using diplomatic representation as a proxy for status recognition and comparing it to a country’s status resources (wealth), the framework indicates how successfully countries have generated recognition from the international society. The findings show that China’s economic ascent has been matched by increased recognition, and that South Africa enjoyed an almost immediate ‘status bounce’ following apartheid, turning it from a pariah to a significant overperformer. Russia should be understood as an ‘overperforming status-dissatisfied power’ while India’s status performance has been around ‘par’ for a country of its economic resources. Lastly, Brazil underperforms more than any of the other BRICS, especially since its democratic transition. The findings highlight considerable variance in the type and duration of gaps between status resource and recognition and suggests that rather than treating these as ‘inconsistencies’ awaiting correction, they can and should be accounted for by case study analyses. Keywords: BRICS and rising powers, foreign policy, regionalism, diplomacy, hierarchy, status
Brexit shocked liberal elites across Europe, instigating a burgeoning new field of research. Brexit scholarship tends to puzzle over two questions: what happened? What will happen now? This article addresses the latter and builds upon... more
Brexit shocked liberal elites across Europe, instigating a burgeoning new field of research. Brexit scholarship tends to puzzle over two questions: what happened? What will happen now? This article addresses the latter and builds upon scholarship that suggests that “identity” mattered as much as economics. Digging deeper into British identity, this essay borrows from social-psychology to analyse how temporal status comparisons contributed to Brexit. It argues how the peculiar qualities of British identity narrative make Eurosceptic complaints about sovereignty, Brussels and “control”, particularly salient to nationalists. In short, negative temporal status comparisons with Britain’s former self underpins its longterm Euroscepticism: When Brits learn they once “ruled the world”, the European Union’s practices of compromise compare poorly: Cooperation is easily presented as subordination. Brexit can thus be understood as a radical attempt to arrest Britain’s decline by setting sail for a future based on a nostalgic vision of the past.
Recent domestic crises have put a dampener on Brazil’s great power aspirations. We suggest that this period of pessimism is an apt moment to take long-lens perspective on Brazil’s historical quest for status. To be sure, the “rise of... more
Recent domestic crises have put a dampener on Brazil’s great power aspirations. We suggest that this period of pessimism is an apt moment to take long-lens perspective on Brazil’s historical quest for status. To be sure, the “rise of Brazil narrative” was certainly ubiquitous, but prior research has lacked a means of assessing the extent to which international recognition for Brazil’s rise was forthcoming. Therefore, to complement existing research into Brazil’s status seeking, we provide a systematic evaluation and analysis of Brazil’s status performance between 1970 and 2010. To what extent was Brazil able to translate its economic resources into international status across the period? Compared to its BRICS peers, did Brazils status seeking bring about relative improvement in international recognition? To this end, we put to work a recently developed mixed-methods framework for systematically assessing and comparing countries’ status performance across time. Our results will be chastening to Brazilians but not entirely surprising. In short, our findings suggest that not only does Brazil underperform compared to its status resources, but also that it performs worse than any of its BRICS peers. While Brazilian politicians have tended to blame the P5 for excluding them from the high status “in group”, our findings show that Brazil has also struggled with recognition from smaller powers for a prolonged period stretching from the 1970s and into the twenty-first century.
This policy paper provides a critical overview of the major points of contention in the British nuclear policy debate, before examining the decision to renew Trident in 2007 in more detail, and evaluating the prospects for reversal. The... more
This policy paper provides a critical overview of the major points of contention in the British nuclear policy debate, before examining the decision to renew Trident in 2007 in more detail, and evaluating the prospects for reversal. The paper concludes with reflections on where the current policy trajectory will likely lead the UK and the potential difficulties associated with this strategy.
Brexit has habit of rendering research redundant rapidly. Since I wrote "Brexit and EU Legitimation: Martyr for the EU Cause?", Boris Johnson has won a large majority on the back of his promise to "Get Brexit Done" and his ability to pass... more
Brexit has habit of rendering research redundant rapidly. Since I wrote "Brexit and EU Legitimation: Martyr for the EU Cause?", Boris Johnson has won a large majority on the back of his promise to "Get Brexit Done" and his ability to pass a withdrawal agreement. i As such the chances of a no-deal Brexit have receded (for now ii). This has not rendered my analysis obsolete, but reflecting upon Johnson's slogan has led me to realise that my analysis was unnecessarily narrow. In this addendum, I flesh out what is left ambiguous in the article and develop a more holistic framework for analysing the discursive effects of Brexit. In so doing, I make the argument that for the EU, Brexit will never be "done", at least for the EU
Kor onakrisen er ikke begynnelsen på apokalypsen, men et symptom. Vi har vaert i apokalypsen en god stund nå. Slik den industrielle revolusjonen skjedde over en mye lengre periode enn vi vanligvis forbinder med «revolusjoner», kommer... more
Kor onakrisen er ikke begynnelsen på apokalypsen, men et symptom. Vi har vaert i apokalypsen en god stund nå. Slik den industrielle revolusjonen skjedde over en mye lengre periode enn vi vanligvis forbinder med «revolusjoner», kommer heller ikke apokalypser vanligvis over natten. Slik sett har menneskene systematisk feiltolket det paradigmatiske apokalypse-scenarioet, nemlig asteroiden. Snarere enn å utslette menneskeheten i et eneste «big bang», slik katastrofefilmen Deep Impact viser, utfoldet masseutslettelsene seg over tiår. Det er på samme måte med covid-19. Om pandemien skulle føre til massedød og/eller samfunnskollaps, vil historikerne-om det fortsatt er noen igjen til å krangle om opprinnelsen til utslettelsen-neppe legge mye vekt på koronautbruddet i seg selv. I stedet tror jeg de vil gruble over et paradoks som ikke rammet dinosaurene. Hvordan klarte menneskene å skape et samfunn så teknologisk avansert at de kunne forutsi apokalypser, utvikle teknologi til å stanse dem og likevel ubøyelig og sta nekte å gjøre det?
The corona crisis is not the beginning of the apocalypse but a symptom; we have been in the apocalypse for a while now. Akin to how the industrial revolution occurred over a far longer period than we normally associate with "revolutions",... more
The corona crisis is not the beginning of the apocalypse but a symptom; we have been in the apocalypse for a while now. Akin to how the industrial revolution occurred over a far longer period than we normally associate with "revolutions", apocalypses seldom occur overnight either. In this regard, humans have systematically misread the paradigmatic apocalypse scenario: the asteroid. Rather than wiping out humanity in one big bang, as Deep Impact would have it, it took decades for the mass extinctions to unfold. Similarly, even if COVID 19 does prompt mass deaths and/or societal collapse, if there are any historians still around to argue over the origins of our demise, they will be unlikely to pay much heed to the Corona outbreak itself. Instead, I expect they will puzzle over a paradox that did not befall the dinosaurs. How did humans manage to create a society so technologically advanced that they could predict the apocalypse(s), develop the technology to stop it (them), yet adamantly and proudly refuse to do so?
In an important sense, Brexit will never be “done”. These last three years of omnishambles have had the side-effect of producing a genuinely collective memory, not only for the UK, but for Europe too. In this respect, Brexit is unusual,... more
In an important sense, Brexit will never be “done”. These last three years of omnishambles have had the side-effect of producing a genuinely collective memory, not only for the UK, but for Europe too. In this respect, Brexit is unusual, because it has generated the sort of continuous international attention usually reserved for major wars. While Brits must endure it all first hand, the drumbeat of political calamity emanating from the UK frequently makes it into continental news bulletins too. Other EU members have been watching the Brexit soap opera unfold with a mixture of concern, irritation and amusement. In short, Britain's Brexit experience has become that rarest of things: a narrative resource for politicians across Europe, one that lessons will be drawn from indefinitely. The question this essay discusses is, what lessons might Brexit be used to teach?
Hvorfor Norge bør trekke seg ut av PISA.
The election of Boris Johnson once again highlights the salience of nostalgia to the Brexit debate. This is more than a throwaway attack line, writes Paul David Beaumont (Norwegian University of Life Sciences). Drawing upon social... more
The election of Boris Johnson once again highlights the salience of nostalgia to the Brexit debate. This is more than a throwaway attack line, writes Paul David Beaumont (Norwegian University of Life Sciences). Drawing upon social psychology can provide the theoretical basis for why and how Johnson's "retrotopian" rhetoric appeals to old, wealthy, and nationalist Brexiteers.
This short article analyses how the Labour leadership has dealt with the divides within the parliamentary party and over Brexit. It suggests that rather than succumbing to a "magic grandpa" effect, Labour members have reasonable reasons... more
This short article analyses how the Labour leadership has dealt with the divides within the parliamentary party and over Brexit. It suggests that rather than succumbing to a  "magic grandpa" effect, Labour members have reasonable reasons for why they "love Corbyn and hate Brexit". However, the paper argues that as the business end of Brexit approaches, this support will come under increasing stress unless Corbyn backs a second referendum
An optimistic take on Jeremy Corbyn's chances of winning a general election.
I artikkelen hevder vi at eventuelle kutt i midlene til diverse utenrikspolitiske sivilsamfunnsorganisasjoner vil føre Norge et skritt nærmere en nihilistisk dystopi bestående av reality-tv, selfies og kaker på Instagram.
Det norske valgresultatet er slutten på sosialdemokratiske prinsipper, og begynnelsen på en ny «egoismens tidsalder». Det er over to uker siden Norge stemte ut Jens og hans rødgrønne, sosialdemokratiske regjering, og stemte fram de... more
Det norske valgresultatet er slutten på sosialdemokratiske prinsipper, og begynnelsen på en ny «egoismens tidsalder». Det er over to uker siden Norge stemte ut Jens og hans rødgrønne, sosialdemokratiske regjering, og stemte fram de konservative, blå partiene. For den som har vaert i koma, kan jeg fortelle at den uhellige blå alliansen mellom «Den snille bjørnen» Erna og «Den slemme bjørnen» Siv, forårsaket ganske stor ståhei i mediene. Til Norges kollektive ergrelse, gikk den internasjonale pressen berserk. Nasjonale katastrofer og nasjonale valgkatastrofer er stort sett det eneste som fører til at Norge dukker opp på den internasjonale radaren. Da den internasjonale pressen denne gangen tok en titt i det kollektive tomrommet i bevisstheten kalt «Norge», googlet de raskt Frp og Breivik, og endte opp med å servere nonsens. Guardian skrev blant annet at «anti-innvandringspartiets suksess viser at landet ikke har tatt tak i årsakene bak Anders Breiviks kriminelle handlinger.» I Norge, hvor valgresultatet ikke var saerlig overraskende, har vise, gamle kommentatorer, når de først har blitt presset, mumlet om historisk presedens og om velgere som har gått lei. Samtidig har flere av venstresidens framstående talsmenn skyldt på de språklige ferdighetene på «Den gode bjørnens» lag. Man får imidlertid inntrykk av at mange tror dette bare er et naturlig, midlertidig regjeringsskifte, og man vil komme tilbake igjen i vanlig sosialdemokratisk spor ved første korsvei. The Guardians synsing er åpenbart pjatt, men det ser også ut til at norske forklaringer, kanskje med vilje, bommer på det bredere og mer alarmerende mønsteret. Premisset bak Guardians synspunkt holder ikke mål. Frp er mye mer enn et anti-innvandringsparti. De har en bred populistisk plattform, og lover lavere skatter og avgifter, billigere drikkevarer, mer veier, mer penger til politiet, «valgfrihet» (les privatisering), i tillegg til anti-innvandringspolitikk. Det eneste vi kan si er at deres
Op-ed on why the Socialist Left party in Norway should be doing better in the polls and an analysis of why they are not
Research Interests:
Available upon request. Defended Oct 2020; passed without corrections.