In Part 1 of this report we present the two major bilateral treaties on river water in South Asia, i.e. the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan and the Ganges Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh, as well as the various... more
In Part 1 of this report we present the two major bilateral treaties on river water in South Asia, i.e. the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan and the Ganges Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh, as well as the various water cooperation agreements between India and Nepal, to illustrate the successes, failures and ongoing challenges of South
Asian transboundary river water management. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan was signed in 1960 and recognized as a landmark of cooperation between the two countries. The treaty resolved a 12-year dispute between the signatories regarding their respective rights over the waters of the Indus Basin, and has since survived three wars
between India and Pakistan. The key framework for water-sharing between India and Bangladesh is the Ganges treaty on riverine water-sharing, signed in 1996. This treaty was also
the outcome of a longstanding dispute over sharing of transboundary river water, especially following construction of the Farakka Barrage by India in West Bengal around 16 km upstream of the Bangladesh border. The Ganges Water Treaty assumes equitable sharing of river waters, subject to an impact review by either party. However, when it became evident
that the flow at Farakka was far less than anticipated in the treaty, further negotiations were required to enable a compromise beyond the treaty’s initial agreement. Despite agreements being reached by state representatives, civil society and political actors across South Asia continue to question why their government is allowing the waters of ‘their’ rivers to be used by a neighbouring state.
Part 2 presents findings from our case study of Bangladesh, starting with a review of patterns of rainfall and river flow as factors that exert a crucial influence on water availability
in Bangladesh. The focus of our study is on key transboundary rivers that are central to Bangladeshi debates on upstream dams and diversion schemes. While our research does not
indicate that there have been substantial declines or shifts in rainfall across Bangladesh over the past decades, more concerning is the long-term decline in the flow of the Ganges–Padma, which many assume to be exacerbated by the operation of the Farakka Barrage. Although the decline in river flow volumes began well before construction of the barrage, we suggest that its operation may be canceling out natural long-term cyclical patterns to create new average flows that are lower than those of the mid-20th century. Perhaps more importantly, our analysis has found no clear relationship between water scarcity and conflict in the past two decades,
although in the case of the Ganges–Padma river there are indications that more conflict events have occurred as flow volumes have decreased, supported by interview data on several instances where violent and non-violent conflicts have arisen over the issue of water availability. Given increasing uncertainties over water supply, domestic water-sharing policies
should therefore be considered as supporting not only livelihoods but also security. While it is essential to understand macro changes in South Asia’s climate and water ecosystems, good water management also requires an understanding of local dynamics in areas dependent on river water, including grassroots perceptions of water-related challenges and popular views about their causes. The stakeholder analysis made it clear that communication between water management policymakers and affected populations along the rivers is minimal, and that a very significant knowledge gap exists between policymakers and
affected populations. Those who are facing the consequences of water management policies and projects are largely ignorant about decisionmaking and are not invited into policymaking
processes, nor are their views sought by policymakers. As a result, policymakers do not have sufficient information about local challenges, views and interests. However, as a result of
developments in the media, local residents are now becoming more aware of water-related issues, while projects such as the Tipaimukh Dam have become a burning issue of civil society protests, especially in the Sylhet area downstream of the proposed dam. Our study revealed a further communication gap and gap in awareness between policymakers and
knowledge producers, and a lack of expert involvement in policymaking. Finally, there are also barriers to civil society contributions to decisionmaking. The danger is that policymaking outcomes are more influenced by political rivalry than by comprehensive scientific assessments of water-related challenges.
Although bilateral treaties still form the primary mode of cooperation on transboundary rivers in South Asia, multilateral frameworks and transboundary River Basin Organizations (RBOs) are attracting increasing attention in the region as potential avenues forward in dealing with water challenges, as described in Part 3 of this report. The term ‘transboundary river basin organization’ describes a wide range of organizational types performing various functions, generally including most (if not all) of the countries within a particular river basin. The legal frameworks and statutes of these institutions are often
determined by the basin’s context and history and the mandate given to the body established by the member states. This project looked specifically at the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), Mekong River Commission (MRC) and South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) in order to illustrate their relevance for the region of study and explore possibilities for extracting important lessons relevant across cases. Whereas NBI and MRC are among the organizations often used as examples of comparatively successful transboundary water cooperation, SAWI is a relatively new multilateral framework initiative, and, so far, is the only multilateral initiative on transboundary waters in South Asia. It is therefore important to investigate this initiative,
to inform the further development of multilateral river-basin cooperation on river water management in South Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular.
Asian transboundary river water management. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan was signed in 1960 and recognized as a landmark of cooperation between the two countries. The treaty resolved a 12-year dispute between the signatories regarding their respective rights over the waters of the Indus Basin, and has since survived three wars
between India and Pakistan. The key framework for water-sharing between India and Bangladesh is the Ganges treaty on riverine water-sharing, signed in 1996. This treaty was also
the outcome of a longstanding dispute over sharing of transboundary river water, especially following construction of the Farakka Barrage by India in West Bengal around 16 km upstream of the Bangladesh border. The Ganges Water Treaty assumes equitable sharing of river waters, subject to an impact review by either party. However, when it became evident
that the flow at Farakka was far less than anticipated in the treaty, further negotiations were required to enable a compromise beyond the treaty’s initial agreement. Despite agreements being reached by state representatives, civil society and political actors across South Asia continue to question why their government is allowing the waters of ‘their’ rivers to be used by a neighbouring state.
Part 2 presents findings from our case study of Bangladesh, starting with a review of patterns of rainfall and river flow as factors that exert a crucial influence on water availability
in Bangladesh. The focus of our study is on key transboundary rivers that are central to Bangladeshi debates on upstream dams and diversion schemes. While our research does not
indicate that there have been substantial declines or shifts in rainfall across Bangladesh over the past decades, more concerning is the long-term decline in the flow of the Ganges–Padma, which many assume to be exacerbated by the operation of the Farakka Barrage. Although the decline in river flow volumes began well before construction of the barrage, we suggest that its operation may be canceling out natural long-term cyclical patterns to create new average flows that are lower than those of the mid-20th century. Perhaps more importantly, our analysis has found no clear relationship between water scarcity and conflict in the past two decades,
although in the case of the Ganges–Padma river there are indications that more conflict events have occurred as flow volumes have decreased, supported by interview data on several instances where violent and non-violent conflicts have arisen over the issue of water availability. Given increasing uncertainties over water supply, domestic water-sharing policies
should therefore be considered as supporting not only livelihoods but also security. While it is essential to understand macro changes in South Asia’s climate and water ecosystems, good water management also requires an understanding of local dynamics in areas dependent on river water, including grassroots perceptions of water-related challenges and popular views about their causes. The stakeholder analysis made it clear that communication between water management policymakers and affected populations along the rivers is minimal, and that a very significant knowledge gap exists between policymakers and
affected populations. Those who are facing the consequences of water management policies and projects are largely ignorant about decisionmaking and are not invited into policymaking
processes, nor are their views sought by policymakers. As a result, policymakers do not have sufficient information about local challenges, views and interests. However, as a result of
developments in the media, local residents are now becoming more aware of water-related issues, while projects such as the Tipaimukh Dam have become a burning issue of civil society protests, especially in the Sylhet area downstream of the proposed dam. Our study revealed a further communication gap and gap in awareness between policymakers and
knowledge producers, and a lack of expert involvement in policymaking. Finally, there are also barriers to civil society contributions to decisionmaking. The danger is that policymaking outcomes are more influenced by political rivalry than by comprehensive scientific assessments of water-related challenges.
Although bilateral treaties still form the primary mode of cooperation on transboundary rivers in South Asia, multilateral frameworks and transboundary River Basin Organizations (RBOs) are attracting increasing attention in the region as potential avenues forward in dealing with water challenges, as described in Part 3 of this report. The term ‘transboundary river basin organization’ describes a wide range of organizational types performing various functions, generally including most (if not all) of the countries within a particular river basin. The legal frameworks and statutes of these institutions are often
determined by the basin’s context and history and the mandate given to the body established by the member states. This project looked specifically at the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), Mekong River Commission (MRC) and South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) in order to illustrate their relevance for the region of study and explore possibilities for extracting important lessons relevant across cases. Whereas NBI and MRC are among the organizations often used as examples of comparatively successful transboundary water cooperation, SAWI is a relatively new multilateral framework initiative, and, so far, is the only multilateral initiative on transboundary waters in South Asia. It is therefore important to investigate this initiative,
to inform the further development of multilateral river-basin cooperation on river water management in South Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular.
