ILARIA ANNA COLUSSI

The paper aims at delineating a proper ethical and legal response to the ‘dual-use dilemma’ of nuclear science and technologies.
After assessing the different models of governance proposed so far in nuclear field for addressing the ‘dual-use’ feature of nuclear technologies, and based on precautionary, proactionary or cost/benefit approaches, it suggests the adoption of a framework based on the notion of ‘responsible stewardship’.
This model entails the analysis – through the involvement and cooperation, as much as possible, of all the stakeholders in the field - of both the advantages and risks of nuclear area in a comprehensive manner, which considers social, ethical, legal, environmental and political values. The policies then adopted are periodically and constantly revised (according to a ‘step by step’ principle) and based on the proportional balance of interests, values and rights at stake. A multilevel framework of sources and actors is involved in such a responsible process. A specific attention is devoted to the balance between the freedom to research and the security needs at the individual and at the State level, in particular focusing on Article IV of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Further, the concrete ways for applying such model are explained, in particular with regards to the issue of control of materials, education of people, and control of information.
Finally, the historical steps in the governance of nuclear technologies addressing the issue have been explored, in order to provide some examples of the suggested approach.

Trade sanctions consist of export restrictions and embargoes, or import or customs restrictions, and boycotts. Such measures, which can be adopted at the international, regional or national level, are economic tools for achieving foreign policy objectives. The effects that they produce are several, and they cover the political, economic and social spheres. This article analyzes the possible consequences of trade sanctions, in particular embargoes addressing targeted states, in order to evaluate their effectiveness. Two case studies of sanctions, the Iranian and the Russian case, are presented.

One of the basic rules in trade law is the freedom of trade. However, such rule encounters some limitations when the object of trade is constituted by strategic items, such as dual-use items, which may have peaceful (civilian/commercial) or non peaceful/military applications. Trade of these categories of goods needs to be controlled, as they can provoke security concerns. Such control is pursued through control lists, licenses, authorizations to stakeholders of the supply chain, information-sharing and cooperation mechanisms, reports, records, declarations, screenings and sanctions as well. The paper aims at focusing on the issue of sanctions, in particular the ones established at the international level: these measures are provided for the violation of trade rules in reference to dual-use items, and/or sanctions have as an object this type of goods. The legal provisions established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and at the United Nations level are analysed thereafter. Brief observations are offered as regards the EU framework of restrictive measures too.

The notion of 'nuclear non-proliferation' is twofold. It refers to: (a) reduction of the number of existing arsenals (disarm or vertical non-proliferation), and (b) containment of the number of States that possess nuclear weapons or the control of non-state actors who can use such weapons (horizontal non-proliferation). Different sources of the law exist at the international and regional level for addressing the issue. At the international law level, the main legal text for addressing the issue, both on the side of vertical and horizontal non-proliferation, is the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For the implementation of the principles contained in the NPT, a 'nuclear safeguards' system has been created, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been assigned the role of the nuclear 'watchdog' for the NPT. At the regional level, with respect to horizontal non-proliferation, there are bilateral or multilateral agreements that ban weapons of mass destruction in certain areas (Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, NWFZ, treaties), and denuclearization treaties. They contain norms about verification and compliance, and some of them institute a specific agency that complements the IAEA. Along with IAEA system of safeguards and NWFZ bodies, there are regional safeguards bodies: (a) the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) model is the cornerstone of no-proliferation of nuclear material in the EU, while (b) the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) has the function to control nuclear activities developed in Brazil and Argentina. Therefore, this study aims at critically and comparatively analysing the different safeguards systems adopted at the international and regional level.

Science and technology require an intervention by the law, and law is called upon to intervene in front of their evolution, and to look for proper solutions of governance and rational responses to their risks. One of the main issues to be investigated from the legal viewpoint is represented by the 'dual-use dilemma' that arises both in 'traditional' and new areas of techno-sciences. Indeed, any kind of research has the potential to be used both for bad as well as for good purposes. Therefore, it is important to reflect upon the ways to control possibly dangerous research without preventing the progress from going further. Such 'dual-use dilemma', then, entails the study of one of the fundamental freedoms in the biolaw area: the freedom of scientific research, its limits, and relationship with other rights/needs/freedoms (such the need of security). This work focuses on two areas of the techno-scientific world. One is more 'traditional', i.e. nuclear science, in whose context the reflections on 'dual-use' were born and developed, and the other one is a new emerging technology, which is synthetic biology. The aim is to understand how the freedom of scientific research could be shaped in relationship with other rights/needs/interests for dealing with 'dual-use' issues in the aforementioned areas of science and technology.

Freedom of trade encounters some limits when the object of trade is constituted by dual-use goods and technologies, which are materials and items normally used for civilian/peaceful purposes that also have military applications. One form of controlling their trade is represented by the imposition of sanctions for the cases of violation of trade rules. International and European Union (EU) sanctions in this area may address the whole States (‘comprehensive’ sanctions, such as embargoes and financial measures), or specific individuals or groups involved in legal activities (‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans). This paper aims to develop a comparative analysis between measures imposed at the level of the United Nations (UN) and within the EU framework.

The issue of sanctions is a relevant part of the strategic trade law. The trade of strategic items needs to be controlled through trade control rules,  and in case of violation of those rules, penalties should be established.
The purpose of this contribution is to define what sanctions in strategic trade mean and to systematize them accordingly, by considering the international law level, the EU one and the national experiences.