Chen Kane

With the effective conclusion of U.S.-Israeli negotiations for the military aid package, the next U.S. administration should take note of the need to restore trust with Israel and find ways to foster a more collective security mindset in the Middle East.

: Since 2012, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has sponsored the Project onAdvanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) at the Naval PostgraduateSchool (NPS) in Monterey, California. PASCCs mission is to support DTRA by selecting a portfolio of strategic dialogues and studies to provide over-the-horizon analysis aimed at reducing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and emerging weapons of mass effect (WME). PASCC is also interested in new means of supporting strategic stability and regional security in regard to WMD/WME, as well as mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of both deterrence and nonproliferation/arms control efforts. The dialogues and studies PASCC supports are of direct value to the U.S. government and the broader public. PASCC reports are widely available through its website as well as the NPS sponsored Homeland Security Digital Library (www.hsdl.org). PASCC also facilitates briefings by project performers at events it or...

Introduction - Chen Kane & Egle Murauskaite Part I: The Helsinki Process 1 Cautious Optimism - Lynn M. Hansen 2 A Zone in the Middle East - Rolf Ekeus Part II: Perspectives from the Region and Outside 3 The Helsinki Process and the Middle East - Nabil Fahmy & Karim Haggag 4 The Helsinki Process and its Relevance in a Changing Middle East - Ehud Eiran 5 Nuclear-Weapon- Free Zone in the Middle East: a Political View - Turki Al Faisal & Awadh Al-Bad 6 Domestic Politics in Iran and a Future Regional Process - Ariane M. Tabatabai 7 Lessons learned - Nilsu Goren Part III: The Middle East Today 8 The Helsinki process in the Middle East -Gershon Baskin & Hanna Siniora 9 The Future of Arms Control in the Middle East - Bilal Saab 10 The Middle East and the Helsinki Process - Mike Yaffe 11 Civil Society Dialogues and Middle East Regional Security - Peter Jones Part IV: Possible Futures 12 A Helsinki Process for the Middle East - Patricia Lewis & Karim Kamel Conclusion - Chen Kane

The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges.

With the effective conclusion of U.S.-Israeli negotiations for the military aid package, the next U.S. administration should take note of the need to restore trust with Israel and find ways to foster a more collective security mindset in the Middle East.

This special issue of the Nonproliferation Review results from a project funded by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, aiming to identify lessons learned from efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) around the world. It contains edited versions of papers presented at a November 2015 workshop at the Washington, DC, offices of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. One section covers cross-cutting themes, including the strategic, diplomatic, legal, technical, and inter- and intra-agency dimensions of elimination. The second section discusses lessons learned from work in the former Soviet states, Iraq in the 1990s, Iraq in 2003–04, South Africa, Libya, and Syria. Major observations include that the field lacks institutionalization. There are few standing bodies with funding and responsibility for WMD elimination; each case usually emerges by surprise and has ad hoc character. Different combinations of states and international agencies may be involved, bringing varied authorities and competencies to different operational environments. A generic “checklist” approach accordingly may be best suited to applying past lessons to new missions. Among the few constants are a need for extensive coordination between partners and, where applicable, the WMD possessor, and the importance of cultivating high-level support for the mission, both nationally and internationally. Persistent gaps can be seen in both institutions and capabilities. These include the lack of any standing pre-crisis planning body or forum; a lack of sufficient capabilities for identifying and characterizing WMD, especially biological weapons; a lack of understanding of how to approach the dismantlement of foreign nuclear weapons, if necessary. Without continued investment in destruction technologies and organizations, new gaps are likely to emerge as today's parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention complete the destruction of their chemical-weapons stockpiles. Elimination is comparable to other areas of countering WMD. It would benefit from corresponding levels of attention and resources.

The report offers a number of constructive suggestions that could engender significant progress on the issue, even while the current political impasse precludes states’ ability to make political commitments or convene the WMDFZ Conference prior to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. For instance, states can create a Group of Experts to discuss legal, technical, and organizational issues essential to negotiating and implementing the Zone. Many of the issues identified in this report should be discussed first within regional states in a comprehensive interagency process, not just to formulate national positions on the issues, but also to clarify their declared, undeclared, known, or unknown WMD capabilitie

At this time of considerable political turmoil in the Middle East, there is a pressing need to explore alternative frameworks for regional security. The book discusses the Helsinki Process as one potentially relevant historical model to learn from.

The Helsinki Process began in a divided Europe in the early 1970s and, over 40 years, achieved major successes in promoting cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on social, human rights, security, and political issues. In this volume, established Middle East experts, former diplomats, and emerging scholars assess the regional realities from a broad range of perspectives and, with the current momentum for reform across the Middle East, chart a path towards a comprehensive mechanism that could promote long-term regional security.

Providing a gamut of views on regional threat perception and suggesting ways forward for regional peace, this book is essential reading for students and scholars with an interest in Politics, the Middle East and Conflict Studies.

This special issue of the Nonproliferation Review results from a project funded by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, aiming to identify lessons learned from efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) around the world. It contains edited versions of papers presented at a November 2015 workshop at the Washington, DC, offices of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. One section covers cross-cutting themes, including the strategic, diplomatic, legal, technical, and inter- and intra-agency dimensions of elimination. The second section discusses lessons learned from work in the former Soviet states, Iraq in the 1990s, Iraq in 2003–04, South Africa, Libya, and Syria. Major observations include that the field lacks institutionalization. There are few standing bodies with funding and responsibility for WMD elimination; each case usually emerges by surprise and has ad hoc character. Different combinations of states and international agencies may be involved, bringing varied authorities and competencies to different operational environments. A generic “checklist” approach accordingly may be best suited to applying past lessons to new missions. Among the few constants are a need for extensive coordination between partners and, where applicable, the WMD possessor, and the importance of cultivating high-level support for the mission, both nationally and internationally. Persistent gaps can be seen in both institutions and capabilities. These include the lack of any standing pre-crisis planning body or forum; a lack of sufficient capabilities for identifying and characterizing WMD, especially biological weapons; a lack of understanding of how to approach the dismantlement of foreign nuclear weapons, if necessary. Without continued investment in destruction technologies and organizations, new gaps are likely to emerge as today's parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention complete the destruction of their chemical-weapons stockpiles. Elimination is comparable to other areas of countering WMD. It would benefit from corresponding levels of attention and resources.