Skip to main content
Simona Tiribelli
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the field of telemedicine has grown exponentially over the past decade, along with the adoption of AI-based telemedicine to support public health systems. Although AI-based telemedicine can open... more
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the field of telemedicine has grown exponentially over the past decade, along with the adoption of AI-based telemedicine to support public health systems. Although AI-based telemedicine can open up novel opportunities for the delivery of clinical health and care and become a strong aid to public health systems worldwide, it also comes with ethical risks that should be detected, prevented, or mitigated for the responsible use of AI-based telemedicine in and for public health. However, despite the current proliferation of AI ethics frameworks, thus far, none have been developed for the design of AI-based telemedicine, especially for the adoption of AI-based telemedicine in and for public health. We aimed to fill this gap by mapping the most relevant AI ethics principles for AI-based telemedicine for public health and by showing the need to revise them via major ethical themes emerging from bioethics, medical ethics, and public health ethics t...
The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML... more
The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society.
Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely... more
Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely acknowledged, the very concept of fairness has not been sufficiently explored so far. Our paper aims to fill this gap and claims that an ethi- cally informed re-definition of fairness is needed to adequately investigate fairness in ADM. To achieve our goal, after an introductory section aimed at clarifying the aim and structure of the paper, in section “Fairness in algorithmic decision- making” we provide an overview of the state of the art of the discussion on fairness in ADM and show its shortcomings; in section “Fairness as an ethical value”, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness, drawing insights from accounts of fairness developed in moral philosophy, and define fairness as an ethical value. In particular, we argue that fairness is articulated in a distributive and socio-relational dimension; it comprises three main components: fair equality of opportunity, equal right to justification, and fair equality of relationship; these components are grounded in the need to respect persons both as persons and as particular individuals. In section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making revised”, we analyze the implications of our redefinition of fairness as an ethical value on the discussion of fairness in ADM and show that each component of fairness has profound effects on the criteria that ADM ought to meet. Finally, in section “Concluding remarks”, we sketch some broader implications and conclude.
Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely... more
Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely acknowledged, the very concept of fairness has not been sufficiently explored so far. Our paper aims to fill this gap and claims that an ethically informed re-definition of fairness is needed to adequately investigate fairness in ADM. To achieve our goal, after an introductory section aimed at clarifying the aim and structure of the paper, in section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making” we provide an overview of the state of the art of the discussion on fairness in ADM and show its shortcomings; in section “Fairness as an ethical value”, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness, drawing insights from accounts of fairness developed in moral philosophy, and define fairness as an ethical value. In particular, we argue that fairness is articulated in a distributive and socio-relational dimension; it comprises three main components: fair equality of opportunity, equal right to justification, and fair equality of relationship; these components are grounded in the need to respect persons both as persons and as particular individuals. In section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making revised”, we analyze the implications of our redefinition of fairness as an ethical value on the discussion of fairness in ADM and show that each component of fairness has profound effects on the criteria that ADM ought to meet. Finally, in section “Concluding remarks”, we sketch some broader implications and conclude.
In Our Moral Fate: Evolution and Escape from Tribalism, Buchanan’s challenging attempt to account for morality through an evolutionary lens has, as its turning point, the introduction of the key roles of the human capacity for critical,... more
In Our Moral Fate: Evolution and Escape from Tribalism, Buchanan’s challenging attempt to account for morality through an evolutionary lens has, as its turning point, the introduction of the key roles of the human capacity for critical, open-ended moral reasoning and the powerful motivating force of moral identity to exercise it, in order to explain the shift from “shallowly inclusive” to “deeply inclusive moralities” and therefore to account for the possibility of the Two Great Expansions of the moral regard. Nevertheless, these two crucial human traits seem to produce those large-scale social-political effects required by these two momentous moral shifts only under certain necessary conditions, specifically because—according to the author—the widespread and relatively unconstrained exercise of the capacity for critical, open-ended moral reasoning is something of a luxury good, namely, something that requires a considerable surplus reproductive success. This contribution aims at highlighting why a real (or morally meaningful) exercise of human moral reasoning (REHMR) cannot be a luxury good, by raising three fundamental points to ground Buchanan’s novel pathway from a moral standpoint. The first section argues for the introduction of a moral justification for the necessary conditions underlying the REHMR. The second section claims the need for an evolutionary or moral foundation of the moral reasons and principles which inform and prompt the affirmation of an authentic moral identity. Finally, the third section motivates the demand for an elucidation on what deep normative source of morality is specifically at stake in Buchanan’s theory.

Cite this article:

Tiribelli, S. Debating Buchanan’s Our Moral Fate: Why Exercising Moral Reasoning Cannot Be a Luxury Good. Jus Cogens 3, 59–71 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-021-00039-0
Bermejo, F., Reggi, L., Tiribelli, S., & Zuckerman, E. "Coverage of COVID-19 and Political Partisanship — comparing across nations", Medium, April 3rd, 2020
Research Interests:
Tiribelli, S. (2020), Predeterminazione algoritmica e libertà di scelta in Etica nel Futuro (a cura di L. Alici e F. Miano), Napoli, Orthotes, pp. 431-441 (ISBN: 978-88-9314-247-2). Il contributo concettualizza una sfida etica dalla... more
Tiribelli, S. (2020), Predeterminazione algoritmica e libertà di scelta in Etica nel Futuro (a cura di L. Alici e F. Miano), Napoli, Orthotes, pp. 431-441 (ISBN: 978-88-9314-247-2).

Il contributo concettualizza una sfida etica dalla fisionomia antica ma dal portato totalmente inedito, la cui analisi diviene oggi ineludibile e critica all’evolversi della relazione tra Umanità e Tecnologia.
Indagando se – e, nel caso, come – i sistemi d’intelligenza artificiale e, nello specifico, gli algoritmi che governano il funzionamento delle nostre sempre più ubique e pervasive ICT digitali – dal vasto mondo dell’Internet of things (IoT) agli online service providers (OSP), i motori di ricerca Internet e le diffuse piattaforme di social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, solo per citarne alcune) – stiano influenzando (costringendo) le condizioni essenziali della nostra libertà di scelta e azione, il presente lavoro vaglia l’incombere di una nuova possibile forma di [pre]determinismo sull’agire umano.
A tal fine, il saggio prende le mosse da una disamina della nozione e della pratica di libertà di scelta, ripensandone congiuntamente le condizioni sine qua non al suo esercizio: a) la disponibilità di opzioni alternative e b) l’autonomia (autodeterminazione). Proponendo una teoria originale sull’impatto degli algoritmi sulle condizioni evidenziate, il lavoro argomenta e definisce, nella seconda e terza sezione, un’azione su due livelli – epistemologico e ontologico – dell’autonomia umana, e ne esplora, infine, alcune delle implicazioni etiche, formulando due distinte tipologie di vincoli o costrizioni (soft e hard constraints) esercitabili dagli algoritmi sul nostro “spazio” di libertà di scelta e azione online e offline; uno spazio ripensato, dunque, alla luce di un mondo iper-connesso e, soprattutto, sempre più permeato – se non governato – da sistemi autonomi algoritmici.
Research Interests:
Nel porre in luce alcune delle sfide contemporanee più pressanti che emergono a seguito della “quarta rivoluzione”, questo saggio si propone di indagare una questione che interpella, in modo urgente, la riflessione pratica sui nuovi... more
Nel porre in luce alcune delle sfide contemporanee più pressanti che emergono a seguito della “quarta rivoluzione”, questo saggio si propone di indagare una questione che interpella, in modo urgente, la riflessione pratica sui nuovi media: se – e, nel caso, come e con quali conseguenze prospettabili – le ICT e i SNS incidano nel processo di formazione dell’identità individuale.
Sebbene la risposta a un primo quesito possa sembrare ovvia, la via euristica qui proposta tenta, nella prima sezione, di chiarire la rinnovata condizione – nell’“infosfera” – del riconoscimento intersoggettivo e, rispetto a esso, di porre in evidenza la funzione dei SNS quali opzioni qualitative di narrazione individuale. È all’analisi di una di queste opzioni digitali (Instagram) e, in modo particolare, di una delle sue categorie più influenti, quella del Bello, che sarà dedicato il secondo paragrafo. Un’operazione con il fine specifico di esemplificare il modus operandi dei “nuovi” media sulla narrazione virtuale del sé online (nel medium prescelto: sulla narrazione estetica del sé) e, nella sezione conclusiva, di delinearne alcune delle conseguenze, reali o potenziali, per lo sviluppo di un’identità, non più (solo) off-line e non (almeno ancora) esclusivamente online: un’identità onlife.