Benjamin Habib

This study is concerned with motivations driving North Korea’s interaction with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, drawing on information from treaty-reporting documents, along with project reports compiled by international agencies and official statements released by the North Korean government. The article draws on causal inference to explore the hypothesis that the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government represent the most likely explanation for North Korea’s interaction with the international climate change regime. It finds a strong probability that North Korea is utilizing the UNFCCC as a capacity-building vehicle across its agricultural and energy sectors, a weak possibility that North Korea’s climate change vulnerability is a compelling incentive for greenhouse gas mitigation, and a weak possibility that North Korea is using the Clean Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC as a means for generating foreign currency revenue. The paper argues that the balance of incentives underpinning these motivations can be linked to the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government.

Climate change is a new variable that may weaken the Kim Jong-il regime by disrupting North Korea's agricultural sector, leading to greater food insecurity and erosion of the state's institutions. North Korea has limited capacity to adapt to climate hazards, which could exacerbate existing stresses and push the regime into terminal decay.

This article aims to introduce the concept of parallel economies to explain the transformation of North Korea’s command economy during the 1990s. The article summarises North Korea’s pre-1991 command economy, before identifying the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great famine (1994–1998) as causes for the splintering of the old command system into parallel economiesdthe official, military, illicit, court and entrepreneurial economies—separated from the central planning matrix. It concludes that the existence of parallel economies makes system-wide economic reform unlikely and increases the importance of foreign aid in maintaining the viability of the regime’s political architecture.

We are privileged to be alive at a pivotal moment in human history when all the settled assumptions of the last two centuries are up for renegotiation. New economic, political and social paradigms are evolving right now in response to the converging crises of climate change, energy insecurity and global economic instability. While undoubtedly alarming, the realities of our historic moment also present a window of opportunity to lay the foundation for a new set of social and ecological relations, rooted not just in sustainability but in regeneration. As educators, we can play an important role in preparing our students to play a constructive part in this regenerative project.

North Korea is an outlier on the periphery of the East Asian economic miracle and simultaneously a key strategic actor amid the dance of regional great power competition. This article investigates the factors constraining North Korea’s further integration into the Northeast Asian region and the implications of the maturation of its nuclear weapons program for regional security. These findings suggest that North Korea’s doctrine of simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development heralds the end of regional denuclearisation politics, which in turn is shaping the nature and extent of North Korea’s integration into Northeast Asia. North Korea’s nuclear gambit and the failure of regional states to adjust to North Korea as a nuclear weapons power may increase the danger of conflict escalation and expanded regional horizontal nuclear proliferation.

To the casual observer, North Korea seems like an irrational beast ruled by a confrontational nuclear armed regime that is constantly engaged in crises with neighbouring states and the international community Indeed, every time diplomacy heralds a new dawn for cooperation on the Korean peninsula, the regime of Kim Jong-il unleashes some new provocation that plunges the region back into uncertainty. But is this image entirely accurate? Why Confucius, Communism and the Bomb. For so many reasons. North Korea lends itself to provocative titles. In interrogating these three concepts I will make the case that the North Korean leadership is in fact pursuing a calculated strategy to maintain its power and preserve its unique political system intact.

Conference paper presented at International Social Innovation Research Conference 2020 (ISIRC) at the University of Sheffield, 1-3 September 2020, co-authored by Dr Philipp Grunewald (Kings College London), Dr Naomi van der Velden (Permaculture UK), and Dr Benjamin Habib (La Trobe University).

Knowledge is central to the work and currency of universities. Through teaching and research, the project of the university incorporates both the generation of new knowledge and the transfer of knowledge to students and the public. However, contemporary universities, like other information-provision industries, are grappling with the near-zero marginal cost of the production of information that has arisen through digitisation, modularisation and other online technologies. In effect, information is now infinitely replicable, an outcome which has significant implications for knowledge transmission and the provision of online education. Online learning practices frequently demonstrate a misunderstanding of the possibilities and limitations posed by the infinite replicability of information. Often they are employed by university managers as labour productivity tools to de-skill lecturing work and save money on labour costs by breaking the lecturing role into component tasks, some of which can be automated. As an outgrowth of this productivity agenda, automated assessment tasks are also often promoted by teaching and learning departments as a time-saving teaching short cut to increase the “efficiency” of assessment. This leads to two questions, one commercial and the other pedagogical. Firstly, if information is infinitely replicable online, what is the value-added component of online learning that makes it worth paying for? Secondly, what online learning models and assessment tasks maximise the value-added component of online education when information is infinitely replicable? Our article presents a discussion of these questions, structured in four parts: First, the article reflects on the evolution of teaching delivery in higher education in response to constraints on funding of the higher education sector. Second, it introduces the concept of the infinite replicability of digitised information and evaluates the implications of this phenomenon for higher education delivery. Third, it argues for a pedagogical approach to online and blended learning that incorporates an understanding of the challenges of infinitely replicable information in the online environment. Finally, the article posits teaching interventions trialled by the authors in the disciplines of international relations, education and business, based on models of online learning with a constructivist and andragogical focus. These interventions have been designed to help create deep learning experiences that extend beyond knowledge transmission which provide a tangible value-added educational component to online learning.

Previous predictions of regime collapse in North Korea proved wrong because they over- emphasised economic weakness without considering the strength of other dimensions of the state. Rapid internal change is more likely to be detected by monitoring key leverage points in the North's political economy. This paper identifies four leverage points that merit close observation: (1) an increase in the annual food shortage may lead to similar institutional failures as those experienced during the famine period. This may be caused by another series of natural disasters, or, less, likely, by a withdrawal of international aid. (2) A relaxation of informational controls would give the population a basis to compare their political system with those of other countries, which could lead to the wholesale rejection of the ruling ideology and the growth of alternative leadership options. (3) Endemic corruption may lead to the erosion of social control mechanisms if citizens are able to circumvent restrictions or get out of trouble by buying off officials. (4) The next leadership transition may see a power struggle develop if the designated successor has not built a patronage network and power base that is powerful enough to enable him to decisively grasp the reins of power. Kim Jong-Il maintains power in spite of these problems by coopting regime elites and by employing the threat or use of force to preserve control. Change at any one of the key leverage points could compromise the coercive apparatus and elite patronage networks, sparking wider systemic change.

Knowledge is central to the work and currency of universities. Through teaching and research, the project of the university incorporates both the generation of new knowledge and the transfer of knowledge to students and the public. However, contemporary universities, like other information-provision industries, are grappling with the nearzero marginal cost of the production of information that has arisen through digitisation, modularisation and other online technologies. In effect, information is now infinitely replicable, an outcome which has significant implications for knowledge transmission and the provision of online education. Online learning practices frequently demonstrate a misunderstanding of the possibilities and limitations posed by the infinite replicability of information. Often they are employed by university managers as labour productivity tools to de-skill lecturing work and save money on labour costs by breaking the lecturing role into component tasks, some of whic...

Rapid internal transformation in North Korea is likely to occur through the confluence of change—a perfect storm—at key leverage points in the physical, ideational and institutional dimensions of the state. This article identifies four leverage points that merit close observation: (1) A reduction in the resource and income base of the regime elite. (2) A relaxation of informational controls would give the population a basis to compare their political system with those of other countries. (3) Endemic corruption which undermines key institutions of the state. (4) A power struggle resulting from an abrupt leadership transition.

Permaculture design seeks to create sustainable communities, and over time has established itself as a transnational community of practice. Based on original interviews with permaculture practitioners from around the world, and drawing on the three core elements of communities of practice – shared domain, communality and shared practices – as our analytical framework, this paper makes three arguments. First, the shared domain of permaculture as a body of knowledge, a system of ethics and set of practical design principles creates an overarching teleological regime that anchors the globally dispersed collective activities of permaculture practitioners. Second, communality in the international permaculture community is centred around the permaculture design course, national and international permaculture convergences, and organisations and demonstration sites that act as hubs for practitioner interaction, linked across national borders by social media networks. Third, shared practices...

Knowledge is central to the work and currency of universities. Through teaching and research, the project of the university incorporates both the generation of new knowledge and the transfer of knowledge to students and the public. However, contemporary universities, like other information-provision industries, are grappling with the near-zero marginal cost of the production of information that has arisen through digitisation, modularisation and other online technologies. In effect, information is now infinitely replicable, an outcome which has significant implications for knowledge transmission and the provision of online education.

Online learning practices frequently demonstrate a misunderstanding of the possibilities and limitations posed by the infinite replicability of information. Often they are employed by university managers as labour productivity tools to de-skill lecturing work and save money on labour costs by breaking the lecturing role into component tasks, some of which can be automated. As an outgrowth of this productivity agenda, automated assessment tasks are also often promoted by teaching and learning departments as a time-saving teaching short cut to increase the “efficiency” of assessment. This leads to two questions, one commercial and the other pedagogical. Firstly, if information is infinitely replicable online, what is the value-added component of online learning that makes it worth paying for? Secondly, what online learning models and assessment tasks maximise the value-added component of online education when information is infinitely replicable?

Our article presents a discussion of these questions, structured in four parts: First, the article reflects on the evolution of teaching delivery in higher education in response to constraints on funding of the higher education sector. Second, it introduces the concept of the infinite replicability of digitised information and evaluates the implications of this phenomenon for higher education delivery. Third, it argues for a pedagogical approach to online and blended learning that incorporates an understanding of the challenges of infinitely replicable information in the online environment. Finally, the article posits teaching interventions trialled by the authors in the disciplines of international relations, education and business, based on models of online learning with a constructivist and andragogical focus. These interventions have been designed to help create deep learning experiences that extend beyond knowledge transmission which provide a tangible value-added educational component to online learning.

This article deconstructs United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 2094 through the preambulatory statements, objectives, obligations, and implementation and enforcement provisions of UNSC Resolution 2094. The article proceeds in three parts. First, it reviews the academic literature on UNSC sanctions and their application in the North Korean case. Second, it deconstructs UNSC Resolution 2094 according to the common structural components of international legal instruments to assess the level of congruence between the objectives of UNSC Resolution 2094, its enforcement
mechanisms and outcomes. Third, it explores the weaknesses of UNSC Resolution 2094, focusing on the gap between the
objectives and enforcement mechanisms found in the resolution. The inability of the UNSC sanctions regime to prevent North Korea reaching the cusp of becoming a nuclear weapons power is evidence of the international community’s weak leverage over Pyongyang, a situation arising from the vulnerability of South Korea to a North Korean attack and the cross-cutting strategic priorities of China; the absence of economic linkages between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the primary sanctions sender state in the USA; and North Korea’s commitment to a nuclear weapons capability as the foundation of its medium-term economic development strategy, its institutional governance
structure and associated ideological commitments.

We are privileged to be alive at a pivotal moment in human history when all the settled assumptions of the last two centuries are up for renegotiation. New economic, political and social paradigms are evolving right now in response to the converging crises of climate change, energy insecurity and global economic instability. While undoubtedly alarming, the realities of our historic moment also present a window of opportunity to lay the foundation for a new set of social and ecological relations, rooted not just in sustainability but in regeneration. As educators, we can play an important role in preparing our students to play a constructive part in this regenerative project.

This study is concerned with motivations driving North Korea’s interaction with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, drawing on information from treaty-reporting documents, along with project reports compiled by international agencies and official statements released
by the North Korean government. The article draws on causal inference to explore the hypothesis that the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government represent the most likely explanation for North Korea’s interaction with the international climate
change regime. It finds a strong probability that North Korea is utilizing the UNFCCC as a capacity-building vehicle across its agricultural and energy sectors, a weak possibility that North Korea’s climate change vulnerability is a compelling incentive for greenhouse gas mitigation, and a weak possibility that North Korea is using the Clean Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC as a means for generating foreign currency revenue. The paper argues that the balance of incentives underpinning these motivations can be linked to the leadership perpetuation and state survival imperatives of the North Korean government.

North Korea is a willing participant in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, despite its reputation as a belligerent actor in nuclear diplomacy. This article is the first study to document North Korea’s compliance with its commitments under Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC, finding that the objectives of the treaty coalesce with core legitimacy and survival interests of the Kim government and the DPRK state.

North Korea is an outlier on the periphery of the East Asian
economic miracle and simultaneously a key strategic actor amid the dance of regional great power competition. This article investigates the factors constraining North Korea’s further integration into the Northeast Asian region and the implications of the maturation of its nuclear weapons program for regional security. These findings suggest that North Korea’s doctrine of simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development heralds the end of regional denuclearisation
politics, which in turn is shaping the nature and extent of North Korea’s integration into Northeast Asia. North Korea’s nuclear gambit and the failure of regional states to adjust to North Korea as a nuclear weapons power may increase the danger of conflict escalation and expanded regional horizontal nuclear proliferation.

This article aims to introduce the concept of parallel economies to explain the transformation of North Korea's command economy during the 1990s. The article summarises North Korea's pre-1991 command economy, before identifying the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great famine (1994–1998) as causes for the splintering of the old command system into parallel economiesdthe official, military, illicit, court and entrepreneurial economiesdseparated from the central planning matrix. It concludes that the existence of parallel economies makes system-wide economic reform unlikely and increases the importance of foreign aid in maintaining the viability of the regime's political architecture. Introduction In the years leading up to 1991, North Korea's moribund command system, was extremely vulnerable to disruptions in its input flow, increasingly reliant on imported energy supplies, agricultural inputs and manufactured goods from the Soviet Union and the wider communist bloc. When the Soviet Union collapsed, this vulnerability was exposed and the weakened economy plunged into precipitous decline, splintering into a number of parallel economies through the 1990s, including the huge military economy, the entrepreneurial economy, the court economy, and the illicit economy, along with the remains of the old command system. The military has become the backbone of regime perpetuation under this economic order. In the absence of systemic economic reform, inputs of foreign aid have become crucial to the maintenance of the military-centred system. The paper begins by summarising the development of the North Korean command economy between 1945 and 1991, documenting trends of increasing inefficiency and bottlenecks throughout the economy over time. Next, the paper describes the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great famine (1994–1998) on North Korea's economic system, resulting in the splintering of the old command system into a series of five parallel economies. It then identifies these five parallel economiesdthe official, military, illicit, court and entrepreneurial economiesdbefore outlining their impact on the likelihood of system-wide economic reforms, and the necessity of foreign aid as an input to keep the totalitarian political architecture viable in spite of the fracturing of the economic system. By understanding the nature of the economic transformation that has occurred in North Korea, it then becomes possible to more accurately gauge the political changes that have, and continue to, taken place. With regard to economic reforms, the centres of power within the underlying economic architecturedthe parallel economiesdwill largely dictate the type of reforms that may be politically feasible. These insights are also important as a leadership transition looms within the Kim regime. The distribution of economic power within the North Korean state will provide a useful indication of the constituencies that Kim Jong-il's successor will have to court to maintain power, and may provide a signpost as to the likelihood that the successor's power can be maintained at all.

North Korea is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear programme because of its importance to the political economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) state and the perpetuation of the Kim regime. Two observations give rise to this conclusion: firstly, the development of North Korea’s nuclear programme has been a long-term project spanning several decades. At no stage has Pyongyang shown a commitment to its dismantlement. Secondly, denuclearisation negotiations have followed a cyclical pattern in which the North has provoked crises to make new demands and gain leverage in negotiations. By inference, it is clear that the nuclear
programme has great intrinsic value to Pyongyang. This paper argues that the nuclear programme has value as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy to extract economic inputs for its moribund economy, in domestic politics as vehicle for
bureaucratic interests and as a rallying symbol of the country’s hyper-nationalist ideology, as well as its role as a defensive deterrent and important cog in Pyongyang’s offensive asymmetric war strategy. For these reasons, the Kim regime is unlikely to seriously entertain nuclear disarmament.

Climate change is a new variable that may weaken the Kim Jong-il regime by disrupting North Korea’s agricultural sector, leading to greater food insecurity and erosion of the state’s institutions. North Korea has limited capacity to adapt to climate hazards, which could exacerbate existing stresses and push the regime into terminal
decay.

This paper is inspired by observational data obtained on field trips to North Korea (visiting Pyongyang, Kaesong, Wonsan and Hamhung) in July 2012 and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (visiting Yanji, Hunchun and Fangchuan) in Jilin Province, China, in December 2011. There is no substitute for in-country experience in coming to terms with North Korea and contextualising primary source data and secondary source accounts. One cannot fully understand the relentless psychological assault of the regime’s personality cult without experiencing it directly, or fully appreciate the scale of the country’s land management problems without seeing the scale of mountainside erosion with one’s own eyes.

This playlist contains select lecture material from Dr Benjamin Habib’s undergraduate subject “Contemporary Politics of Northeast Asia” (POL2CPA) at La Trobe University. This subject examines key issues in the international politics of Northeast Asia, focusing on the Korean Peninsula as case study.

Political Economy of Contemporary North Korea Lecture Series:

    1. Introduction: Korea’s Place in Northeast Asia
    2. The Role of Ideology in the Governance of North Korea
    3. The Kim Il Sung-era Command Economy
    4. Proposals for Economic Reform in North Korea
    5. North Korea’s Energy Sovereignty Strategy
    6. Environmental Degradation and Food Security in the DPRK
    7. Evaluating Regime Transformation Scenarios for the DPRK

This lecture series also represents the capstone of my research into North Korea, as I announced at my presentation at the Australian Institute for International Affairs last month in Melbourne.  After ten years researching the DPRK it is time to embark on a new research project examining the relationship between grassroots agroecological projects, environmental movements and international climate politics.  I would like to extend my deepest thanks to all the wonderful people I have met and everyone who has assisted me with my work on North Korea over the past decade, both in Australia, Korea and China.

On 8th February 2016 I suffered a panic attack on national television, which led me to start writing publicly about my personal experiences with anxiety and depression.  This page catalogues my writings on mental health and provides links to helpful resources.