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The Arab Spring’s influence on the Maghreb has been piecemeal and partial. In Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime was overthrown in a fortnight enabling the country to redraft its constitution and hold multi-party elections. While in Algeria,... more
The Arab Spring’s influence on the Maghreb has been piecemeal and partial. In Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime was overthrown in a fortnight enabling the country to redraft its constitution and hold multi-party elections. While in Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika recently won an unprecedented fourth term in office despite being too ill to stand or campaign. What explains these varied experiences? Why did Ben Ali’s regime fall and Bouteflika’s survive? Why has Morocco not gone the same way as Tunisia? And what of Mauritania, the oft forgotten and frequently ignored other Maghreb country? This book addresses these and other questions by using Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s (2010) celebrated model for explaining democratisation to analyse and compare Morocco’s, Algeria’s, Tunisia’s and Mauritania’s political development over the past 10 years.
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With the ongoing protests in Algeria and Lebanon, and violence in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, scholarly and policy attention remains firmly fixed on regime development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While debate still rages over... more
With the ongoing protests in Algeria and Lebanon, and violence in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, scholarly and policy attention remains firmly fixed on regime development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While debate still rages over the applicability of the term “Arab Spring,” few specialists and scholars question the enduring legacies this unprecedented wave of unrest has had on specific countries and the region more broadly. Indeed, the tenth anniversary of the ousting of Tunisia’s President Ben Ali recommends a fresh look at what has happened in the region in the intervening years.
This article draws on the Algerian regimes of Chadli Benjedid and Abdelaziz Bouteflika to critically evaluate Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s dimension of linkage. The paper shows that, despite the intensification of the country’s ties to... more
This article draws on the Algerian regimes of Chadli Benjedid and Abdelaziz Bouteflika to critically evaluate Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s dimension of linkage. The paper shows that, despite the intensification of the country’s ties to the European Union (EU) from one regime to the other, the willingness and ability of Brussels to put democratizing pressure on Algiers decreased rather than increased. This development challenges Levitsky and Way’s thesis and the importance they place on linkage in relation to their other dimensions of leverage and organizational power. The article concludes that: strengthening linkage does not always result in greater EU or Western democratizing pressure; the balance of importance Levitsky and Way strike between their dimensions is open to question; and, the EU has grown less willing to press for political change in Algeria.
The Arab uprisings’ failure to bring about either the scale or type of political change in the Maghreb that it initially seemed to promise belies the significance of its impact on the region. While Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco continue... more
The Arab uprisings’ failure to bring about either the scale or type of political change in the Maghreb that it initially seemed to promise belies the significance of its impact on the region. While Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco continue to be ruled by the same competitive authoritarian regimes that held power when the protests began, they, and the new governments in Tunisia and Libya, must now negotiate an altered and more dangerous security environment than before. The unsettling of Tunisia’s security apparatus and the outbreak of full-blown civil war in Libya have created new opportunities for terror and criminal groups to thrive and expand. The primary aim of this special issue is to chart and explain many of the critical changes in the Maghreb’s security environment that have occurred as a result of the Arab Spring. Each of the articles collected here identifies and analyses at least one important security issue in one or more Maghreb country as well as explain how that issue has emerged in response to or been affected by the Arab Spring.
This article argues that Morocco’s competitive authoritarian regime is more resilient today in certain key respects than it was when the Arab Spring began. Drawing on Levitsky and Way’s dimension of organisational power, the paper... more
This article argues that Morocco’s competitive authoritarian regime is more resilient today in certain key respects than it was when the Arab Spring began. Drawing on Levitsky and Way’s dimension of organisational power, the paper contends the regime was sufficiently unnerved by the unrest to resort to the use of high intensity coercion as part of its response to 20 February Movement. The article maintains that, in employing this force successfully, the regime has turned the protests into an important source of non-material cohesion for its security apparatus and thereby enhanced its ability to defend itself from similar challenges in the future.
In reviewing the books of Mathilde von Bülow (2016), Liat Kozma (2017), and Odile Moreau and Stuart Schaar (2016), this paper makes a series of important observations on trans—Mediterranean relations. Along with the longevity of Europe’s... more
In reviewing the books of Mathilde von Bülow (2016), Liat Kozma (2017), and Odile Moreau and Stuart Schaar (2016), this paper makes a series of important observations on trans—Mediterranean relations. Along with the longevity of Europe’s concerns over migration and migrants from North Africa and the wider Middle East, and the parallels between France and Britain’s treatment of their colonised populations and domestic minorities, it notes the opportunities for anti-colonial resistance generated by the imperial powers’ classification of individuals, groups and organisations operating in and out of their respective Mediterranean territories.
This article contributes to the Global International Relations project by critically evaluating the roles ascribed to Europe and the EU by Levitsky and Way in their model for explaining regime transitions. Focusing primarily on their... more
This article contributes to the Global International Relations project by critically evaluating the roles ascribed to Europe and the EU by Levitsky and Way in their model for explaining regime transitions. Focusing primarily on their international dimensions of linkage and leverage, it assesses both the normative geopolitical underpinnings and explanatory power of their thesis, drawing on the North African cases of Tunisia and Mauritania at the start of the Arab Spring to illustrate and substantiate its observations and arguments. It concludes that the EU’s failure to discipline either country’s competitive authoritarian regime raises important questions about the validity of the privileged role in which they cast Europe.
The aim of this article is to critically assess Joseph Nye’s claims about student exchange programmes by examining the impact of Morocco’s educational relationship with the EU on the kingdom’s political development during and since the... more
The aim of this article is to critically assess Joseph Nye’s claims about student exchange programmes by examining the impact of Morocco’s educational relationship with the EU on the kingdom’s political development during and since the Arab Spring. Nye maintains that such schemes are important sources of soft power which Western countries can use to promote their values – including that of democracy – in the societies of the visiting students. Despite tens of thousands of its citizens enrolling in European universities each year, however, Morocco is scarcely any more democratic today than it was when the Arab Spring began. The article considers what the country’s non-democratisation means for the EU’s soft power and this facet of Nye’s thesis.
As Abdelaziz Bouteflika begins his fourth term as Algeria’s president, questions persist over his regime’s survival. Why has it endured while those of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Libya’s Qaddafi have not? What has Bouteflika done differently?... more
As Abdelaziz Bouteflika begins his fourth term as Algeria’s president, questions persist over his regime’s survival. Why has it endured while those of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Libya’s Qaddafi have not? What has Bouteflika done differently? What sets Algeria apart? The aim of this paper is to address these questions by using Steven Levitsky’s and Lucan Way’s (2010) celebrated model for explaining democratisation to chart and examine Algeria’s links to European and North American countries, the amount of leverage Western governments have over Algiers, and the Bouteflika regime’s organisational strength. The paper concludes that Europe and North America have little appetite and only limited means to press Algeria to democratise and that the regime possesses strong coercive capabilities. Together, these factors have helped ensure Bouteflika’s survival.
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The book offers fresh insight into the recent political development and contrasting experiences of four Maghreb countries: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. The Arab Spring affected them in different ways. Tunisia underwent... more
The book offers fresh insight into the recent political development and contrasting experiences of four Maghreb countries: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. The Arab Spring affected them in different ways. Tunisia underwent profound change as Ben Ali was overthrown in a fortnight. Yet in Algeria, President Bouteflika won an unprecedented fourth term in office despite being too ill to campaign. What explains these variations? Why did Ben Ali’s regime fall and Bouteflika’s survive? Why has Morocco not gone the same way as Tunisia? And what of Mauritania, the often forgotten other Maghreb country? This book addresses these and other questions by using Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s celebrated model for examining political transitions to analyse and compare the political development of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania over the last ten years.
... Frustrated Hopes: Democracy and its Alternatives in North Africa and the Middle East. View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/13629390903347085 JNC Hill a * pages 443-453. ... Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel... more
... Frustrated Hopes: Democracy and its Alternatives in North Africa and the Middle East. View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/13629390903347085 JNC Hill a * pages 443-453. ... Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (eds). ...
... 37 The State's crackdown on the tribes of the Khenifra region in 1973 followed an attempted uprising in Moulay Bouaza by the ... Its future course, permutations, and points of emphasis will depend... more
... 37 The State's crackdown on the tribes of the Khenifra region in 1973 followed an attempted uprising in Moulay Bouaza by the ... Its future course, permutations, and points of emphasis will depend in no small measure on the policies of the Algerian and ... 22 Ghallab, Abd al-Karim. ...
Abstract In reviewing the books of Mathilde von Bülow (2016), Liat Kozma (2017), and Odile Moreau and Stuart Schaar (2016), this review article makes a series of important observations on trans—Mediterranean relations. Along with the... more
Abstract In reviewing the books of Mathilde von Bülow (2016), Liat Kozma (2017), and Odile Moreau and Stuart Schaar (2016), this review article makes a series of important observations on trans—Mediterranean relations. Along with the longevity of Europe's concerns over migration and migrants from North Africa and the wider Middle East, and the parallels between France and Britain's treatment of their colonised populations and domestic minorities, it notes the opportunities for anti-colonial resistance generated by the imperial powers' classification of individuals, groups and organisations operating in and out of their respective Mediterranean territories.
Abstract This paper has three main objectives. The first is to contribute to the process, which is being pursued by an increasing number of scholars with ever greater urgency, of mapping Boko Haram. The second is to make the point that,... more
Abstract This paper has three main objectives. The first is to contribute to the process, which is being pursued by an increasing number of scholars with ever greater urgency, of mapping Boko Haram. The second is to make the point that, while Boko Haram might be unique, it is not the first Islamic group to spring from or operate in northern Nigeria, to the alarm of either the country’s government or the international community. The third is to highlight a historical paradox: the Tijaniyya’s shift from suspect to ally. To achieve these ambitions, the paper compares Boko Haram with what the British authorities in Nigeria in the 1920s described as the pseudo-Tijanis. More specifically, it points to: their complicated organisational structures; their links to other groups and bodies elsewhere in the Islamic world; and the difficult and delicate positions in which their actions placed the North’s traditional leaders.
Two thousand and ten was a momentous year for Africa. During its course Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,... more
Two thousand and ten was a momentous year for Africa. During its course Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Somalia and Togo all celebrated their half centenaries. Nearly 400 million men, women and children,1 or around two-fifths of all Africans, in seventeen countries spread across four of the continent’s five main sub-regions, marked 50 years of independence and self-rule.2 Seldom have so many people in so many places been brought together in remembrance of an historical moment that is at once both common and unique. All continue to live with colonialism’s legacies. All continue to experience them in different ways.
Oil is contributing to Nigeria’s failure in six main ways. First, its extraction undermines the quality of life and standards of living of tens of thousands of Niger Delta residents. The unsightly pipes, noisy pumping stations, frequent... more
Oil is contributing to Nigeria’s failure in six main ways. First, its extraction undermines the quality of life and standards of living of tens of thousands of Niger Delta residents. The unsightly pipes, noisy pumping stations, frequent oil spills and constant gas flaring create an unpleasant and unhealthy environment to live in. Many of the streams and springs that provide drinking water are polluted. Much of the food produced locally is contaminated. The number of cases of certain types of cancer and respiratory illness are higher than the national averages. And the traditional industries of farming and fishing are in decline due to the damage caused to agricultural land and fish stocks leading to the impoverishment of those who work in them.
There are two parts to Nigeria’s failure. First, the Federal Government does not exercise total control over the whole of the country’s sovereign territory. There are places in the Niger Delta and the north-eastern state of Borno in which... more
There are two parts to Nigeria’s failure. First, the Federal Government does not exercise total control over the whole of the country’s sovereign territory. There are places in the Niger Delta and the north-eastern state of Borno in which Abuja’s writ does not run. Second, the Federal Government does not provide all of its citizens with the security, basic health care, primary education and other public goods that it should. It is failing to protect and promote the flourishing of all Nigerians.
On 7 February 2011 Nigeria’s Supreme Court overturned former Rear Admiral Francis Agbiti’s conviction for negligence and disobedience. The five judges unanimously declared his sentence unsafe on the grounds that his original trial had not... more
On 7 February 2011 Nigeria’s Supreme Court overturned former Rear Admiral Francis Agbiti’s conviction for negligence and disobedience. The five judges unanimously declared his sentence unsafe on the grounds that his original trial had not been fair. In summing up on the court’s behalf, Justice Olufunlola Adekeye paid particular attention to Agbiti’s opening argument that the members of the panel that tried him were either unqualified to do so, known to be prejudiced against him before the trial started, or acted inappropriately during its course. Two of its members, Major General Akpa and Air-Vice Marshal Odesola, were too junior to have sat upon it. Its president, Rear Admiral Ajayi, was known to have disliked Agbiti from old while its other senior member, Rear Admiral Oni, sponsored the publication of an article critical of Agbiti while the trial was still taking place.1
Federalism is contributing to Nigeria’s failure in four main ways. First, it is fuelling the ethnic tensions and religious hatreds that are undermining the quality of life of tens of thousands of Nigerians. The cities of Kano, Kaduna,... more
Federalism is contributing to Nigeria’s failure in four main ways. First, it is fuelling the ethnic tensions and religious hatreds that are undermining the quality of life of tens of thousands of Nigerians. The cities of Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri and Jos are regularly plunged into sectarian violence resulting in considerable loss of life and damage to property. At least some of this death and destruction is caused by the federal and state authorities who permit and instruct the police and army to respond with extreme force. The widespread anger and resentment this causes continue to drive some Nigerians into the arms of insurgent groups and others to support secession. By fuelling these tensions the Federal Government is not only failing to promote the flourishing of all its citizens, but it is also assisting groups and organisations which are either preventing it from exercising total control over its territory or seeking to break Nigeria up.
Abstract The Arab uprisings’ failure to bring about either the scale or type of political change in the Maghreb that it initially seemed to promise belies the significance of its impact on the region. While Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco... more
Abstract The Arab uprisings’ failure to bring about either the scale or type of political change in the Maghreb that it initially seemed to promise belies the significance of its impact on the region. While Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco continue to be ruled by the same competitive authoritarian regimes that held power when the protests began, they, and the new governments in Tunisia and Libya, must now negotiate an altered and more dangerous security environment than before. The unsettling of Tunisia’s security apparatus and the outbreak of full-blown civil war in Libya have created new opportunities for terror and criminal groups to thrive and expand. The primary aim of this special issue is to chart and explain many of the critical changes in the Maghreb’s security environment that have occurred as a result of the Arab Spring. Each of the articles collected here identifies and analyses at least one important security issue in one or more Maghreb country as well as explain how that issue has emerged in response to or been affected by the Arab Spring.