Richard Fitch

The first chapter introduces the reader to the specifics of the French educational system, the agrégation (accreditation) system with its focus on the training of elite philosophy high school teachers. The fact that this training took place at a select number of preparatory schools, where the ...

The discourse that calls itself philosophy has long had problems with both women and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. This article explores how both Pyrrhonism and Michèle Le Dœuff's feminist philosophizing threaten this discourse by revealing its lack of philosophical rigour, to the extent that it should be relabelled philosophism. This exploration will also reveal how anti-feminism relates to anti-scepticism in the masculinist and philosophist imaginaries. Using Pascal as an initial point of contact, the article then suggests how feminist philosophy and Pyrrhonism might develop a rational solidarity in the practice of philosophizing and in undoing, and keeping undone, oppressive relationships.

When the questions of 'Philosophy and…' or 'Philosophy of….' arise, the practice of philosophy itself can often end up adopting either a position with pretensions to imperial dominance, or one of craven, near irrelevant, servility: either obnoxious conceptual policeman, or passive ...

Mark C. Taylor is Cluett Professor of Humanities and director of the Center for Technology in the Arts and Humanities at Williams College. He is also director of the Critical Issues Forum at the Guggenheim Museum in New York. His booksinclude Erring: A Postmodern ...

The discourse that calls itself philosophy has long had problems with both women and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. This article explores how both Pyrrhonism and Michèle Le Dœuff’s feminist philosophizing threaten this discourse by revealing its lack of philosophical rigour, to the extent that it should be relabelled philosophism. This exploration will also reveal how anti-feminism relates to anti-scepticism in the masculinist and philosophist imaginaries. Using Pascal as an initial point of contact, the article then suggests how feminist philosophy and Pyrrhonism might develop a rational solidarity in the practice of philosophizing and in undoing, and keeping undone, oppressive relationships.

The aim of this paper is to use an engagement with possible sceptical elements in the thought of Nicholas of Autrecourt, and with the reception of Nicholas’s thought by Étienne Gilson and Hans Blumenberg, to explore the philosophical problem of the relationship of reason and mastery in the context of Christian thought. This engagement is Neo-Pyrrhonian in intent. First it seeks to reposition scepticism concerning epistemic justification so that it appears as not anti-rational or irrational, but as the most rigorous example of rationality, expressing the mastery of reasoning over reason. The next move is to address the question as to whether a scepticism figured as the mastery of reasoning can be expressed coherently in a Christian context. It concludes that it can such that the mastery of reasoning can be paradoxically figured as a path to humility. This path was not taken by Nicholas much as he did not take the path towards scepticism. However, this does not mean he was wrong about the epistemic failings of Aristotle’s philosophy and the peril they pose to any form of Christian thought that does not seek to dispense with reason.

This essay explores the philosophical reasons why successful attempts to overturn domination and dogmatism only seem to result in the emergence of new forms of domination and dogmatism, and thus in political disappointment.  It is argued that the epistemic key to this problem is to be found in Pyrrhonian scepticism.  To begin, the way dialectic developed so as to be understood, in Hegel, as a response to this problem, is examined.  How this was then forgotten in Marx is explored through Lucio Colletti’s flawed critique of Hegelian Marxism.  The essay concludes that political thought, if it truly aspires to overturn domination and dogmatism, should address itself directly to the sceptical problem by adopting a Left Pyrrhonian dialectical strategy.

Pelagianism is known, if at all, as an early fifth century Christian heresy. Politically radical forms of Christianity, and their secularised kin, are sometimes accused of being Pelagian in spirit and therefore heretical. Being Pelagian is taken to mean having a naïvely optimistic understanding of human nature. Following from this understanding, forms of political life are invented that are themselves wildly optimistic and thus politically unrealistic. Furthermore it is alleged that these political forms, based on a false concept of human nature, act to oppress the flourishing of real human nature. Such a line of attack has often been used against radical political theologies, anarchism, and socialism. Theologically the supposed naivety that lies at the root of these radical political theologies and philosophies is held not to be innocent, but to be an example of unchristian hubris tainted with satanic pride. However, this understanding of the Pelagian is rooted in Augustine of Hippo’s polemical misrepresentation of the teaching of Pelagius. As numerous Pelagian texts have survived there is no scholarly reason to accept prima facie Augustine’s misrepresentation. Indeed, when those texts are examined a far more complex, and far less heretical, Pelagianism emerges. Here the most politically radical Pelagian text, the Epistula de divitiis or On Riches, is examined. Beginning with the sin of avarice a striking political theology is unfolded. With an incipient class analysis, an awareness of the slippery logic of desire, and a sensitivity to the political problem of philosophical method, themes are raised that would not be tackled again with such sophistication until at least the late eighteenth century. In this text, and others, the Pelagian mentality reveals itself to be, within theological parameters, both realistic and radical, and as such, worthy of note by all concerned with political radicalism.

In Gary Gutting’s recent survey of French philosophy since the 1960s, he argues that Derrida is an absolute sceptic regarding philosophy’s powers of conceivability (185). This is a position which Gutting is not in sympathy with, and he tries to show that Derrida’s arguments do not successfully justify the absolute status of this scepticism because he fails to establish the logical connections between the insights his close readings bring to light. He fails to be absolute and thus falls back into the other position Gutting outlines, which is that of relative scepticism, associated chiefly with Foucault, Deleuze and Badiou. For these thinkers ‘there are conceptual impossibilities for any given set of concepts…but… it is always possible to develop new concepts that will allow us to think such impossibilities’ (185). However, these developments remain within a traditional understanding of the powers of philosophy. If even the putatively radical forms of recent French philosophy slip back into the relative scepticism of traditional philosophising, what remains of the promise of a radically different thinking that has been sought, in various ways, by the likes of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and, indeed, by Derrida? Is a position of absolute scepticism regarding the principalities and powers of traditional philosophy even possible? Or does it always retain the power to predestine to failure any attempt to think otherwise? This paper argues absolutely against these powers, but by questioning the hurry to decide upon decision in Derrida’s later writings and in the current literature inspired by this decision.

Reference: Gary Gutting, 2011, Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Recent scholarship has stripped Nicholas of Autrecourt (c.1298-1369) of his sobriquet of the ‘Mediaeval Hume’ and of his reputation as an Ockhamist extremist. In fact he employs fallibilism and probabilism against scepticism, and there is little if no evidence of his acquaintance with Ockham’s works. What does survive scrutiny is his infamous disdain for Aristotle and the claim that only the principle of non-contradiction can endure the sceptical challenge. This paper examines how these might impact on the enduring philosophical problem of the purported power of will and decision to ground normativity. Any such decision must be of the void in order to avoid falling into infinite regress or circularity. But if asserted without reason, as a truly pure act, then there would appear to be no reason not to also assert its contrary, leaving social normativity in a state of equipollent indifference indistinguishable from nihilism. But does this objection to the efficacy of decision require the functioning of the principle of non-contradiction? And if so, how does this avoid begging the question of the grounding of principles? The paper begins with a consideration of the aspects of Autrecourt’s arguments that Christophe Grellard has recently suggested appear suspiciously Pyrrhonian.

Bowie once stated that ‘an artist should remain apolitical’, and that if they do dissent then it should be expressed as caricature. Playing knowingly with social as well as artistic convention seems of the essence of his best work, even if this playing seems to fall short of traditional political dissent. Indeed, in his early work Bowie repeatedly showed a theatrical disdain for all ‘that revolution stuff’. This paper speculates as to the performative intent, and incidental social and political effects, of Bowie’s manipulation of social norms, whether in his songs, performances, or in public declarations such as his representations of his sexuality. Dissent in popular music usually proceeds by attacking existing social and political norms in the name of a more authentic normativity expressive of higher values or of a subculture. But Bowie situates many of his songs outside any conventional world, in spaces where norms no longer bind people or performers: dystopic futures, outer space, alien life, alternative presents. It offers theatrical suspension of, and thus relief from, social norms, rather than an alternative form of belonging which is always in danger of becoming as oppressive as the forms it replaces (e.g. Cygnet Committee). From this perspective the usual connection, made between the value of Bowie’s persistent reinvention of self and the politics of personal identity, may be less significant than a more general scepticism regarding all social norms, of world as well as self – comedian and caricature as well as chameleon. The paper concludes by re-examining some of Bowie’s supposedly political moments, such as the purported fascist flirtation of the mid 1970s, in light of this cutting-up of convention.

This paper first explores what would be required for a phenomenological practice to be non-dogmatic, and then asks if the categorical imperative could have a place in such a practice. Although modern phenomenology often professes noble anti-dogmatic intentions, in practice these soon seem to fall by the wayside. The turn, from vulgar metaphysical or positivist dogma, towards ‘the things themselves’, soon turns full circle to return to dogma, as appears to be the case with recent phenomenological returns to religion or to the philosophy of mind. Dogmatism renders reasoning arbitrary and rationally indistinct. So a dogmatic phenomenology renders the careful description of ‘what appears’, arbitrary and indistinct. Instead of bringing phenomenological light, a thick dogmatic fog obscures. To succeed philosophically, phenomenology must remain non-dogmatic. A properly non-dogmatic phenomenological practice would suspend judgement on matters beyond what appears to appear. This practice, given the focus on suspension, might be described as an ephectic phenomenology. Essential to such a practice would be the discipline to resist the siren calls of the more seductive styles of dogmatising, such as, for example, transcendental thought. But what of the categorical imperative? Even thinkers such as Derrida and Nancy, more sensitive than most to the perils of dogmatism in phenomenology, have remained wedded to imperatives. Do imperative forms of thought elude dogmatism, and thus have a place in an ephectic phenomenology? The paper explores this question by examining the place of the imperative in the work of Alphonso Lingis, as well as Kant’s original formulation. Lingis is examined because of his sensitivity to the libidinal. In conclusion, a concept of a pathological imperative is articulated. Not so much in the sense of a diseased imperative, but more in the wake of the archaic sense of pathē as describing what we must undergo regardless of our desire; an imperative torn between the pathological and the passionate.

Etymologically anarchism is usually understood to mean ‘without government’, from an-archia. However, it could also be taken to mean ‘without first principle’, and thus ‘without dogma’, from an-archē. Suspicion of political forms might be supplemented, even nourished, by a reasoned scepticism about the presumed power of reason to ground itself. When it comes to justifying authority there may be as much of a problem with justification as with authority. And dogmatism can be understood as the epistemic equivalent of political domination. This type of logical scepticism has provoked religious responses in the past. Examples include Christian Pyrrhonism (Pascal), and some strands of Buddhist philosophy. But its political implications have rarely been explored. Rather than reacting to scepticism, this paper examines, more directly, how anarchism and religion might find common ground in a reasoned scepticism towards reason. This might initially seem counter-intuitive, as today scepticism is often reduced to the rejection of religion and religious claims. But this rejection, such as can be found in the ‘New Atheism’, can be shown to not really be sceptical at all, but rather to be a form of negative dogmatism. There is a lesson here for anarchism, which might imperil itself if it is reduced to nothing more than a negative dogmatism regarding the state, or to a form of political thought that simply takes freedom and equality as archē. The paper concludes that engagement with anti-dogmatic scepticism can not only allow compatibility between anarchism and religion, but enriches all parties. The paper begins by glancing at Proudhon’s remarks on religion in his 1846 rebuff of Marx.

This paper begins by taking issue with Quentin Meillassoux’s description, in his After Finitude, of the relationship between critical thought, fideism, and scepticism. He collapses the three into an entity he calls ‘sceptico-fideism’. The paper argues that this entity has little if no historical or philosophical substance. Correlationism and fideism are not sceptical. They are failed responses to the threat posed by justificatory, or Pyrrhonian, scepticism. As such they both have the character of a negative dogmatism concerning reasoning. Meillassoux misses this as he confuses external world scepticism and justificatory scepticism, and eventually his own philosophy becomes just another variety of negative dogmatism. The crucial problem for thinking comes not from an isolated mind failing to grasp objects in the world or beyond the world, or from being confounded by the ancestral. It concerns sustaining the practice of giving and taking reasons when the very sociality of reason seems to render such a practice impossible. True speculative thought is concerned with the absolute only as a possible device to domesticate the movement of reasons as grasped in Pyrrhonian scepticism. Thus thinking the absolute does not, in itself, mean thinking about grounds, necessity, or contingency, whether they are figured in a religious way or not. It means thinking together in a manner that can sustain social life amid the threats of epistemic implosion, nihilism, and pure violence. The paper concludes by indicating how moving beyond negative dogmatism concerning reasoning can allow reason-giving thought to move beyond negative dogmatism regarding religion. This opens up new vistas for the philosophy of religion.

When the questions of ‘Philosophy and…’ or ‘Philosophy of….’ arise, the practice of philosophy itself can often end up adopting either a position with pretensions to imperial dominance, or one of craven, near irrelevant, servility: either obnoxious conceptual policeman, or passive foot-servant to theoretical dogmatisms. These enervating fates might be described as, at best, philosophisms rather than philosophy. In her work Michèle Le Doeuff has sought to elude philosophism in projects that unfold under names such as: critical epistemology; critical feminism; a migrant rationality of impulse and movement; non-hegemonic rationalism. On one side, there is reasoned recognition of the impossibility of the self-grounding or autonomy of philosophy. Reason is not pure and always emerges from an epistemic imaginary. On the other side, there is the acknowledgement that “If the city itself gives up knowledge in favour of belief, if the concept of knowledge dissolves into nothing but the interiorizing of beliefs, both women and men are deprived of an intellectual life.” Somewhere, between the, frankly ridiculous, posturing of self-glorification and the obsequiousness of the disappointed self-love of self-criticism, there might be philosophy: “that tiny seed of opposition obtained with a maximum of intellectual effort”. A philosophy rooted in reason as nothing more or less than the giving and taking of reasons between people exposed as equal in that very practice; a practice that is nourished by, and nourishes, epistemic imaginaries that revel in the penumbra of un-knowledge, rather than in positive or negative dogmas. This paper takes up these themes, possibilities, and challenges, by beginning with a consideration of Le Doeuff’s occasional references to Pascal.

Domination is to social life what dogmatism is to thinking. In theory, emancipation is to social life what philosophy is to thinking. They are supposed to remove domination and dogmatism. But in practice emancipation and philosophy only seem to produce new forms of domination and dogmatism. Why is this the case and how might this be otherwise? What domination and dogmatism share is the desire that what is arbitrarily given should not be otherwise. The effect of this is that all are forced to submit to the desire of the dominator or dogmatist. Promises of something otherwise can be traced to Marx with regard to domination, and to Hegel with regard to dogmatism. Both these promises carry the name ‘dialectic’. In dialectic there is recognition that domination and dogmatism are intertwined, and that dealing with one entails dealing with the other. Good philosophy and radical politics are thus mutually reinforcing so that, for the Marx of the mid 40s, “The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat” such that “philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy.” But what are these weapons and how can they bring about both the dissolution of the existing order and the ‘total redemption of humanity’? In the absence of the proletariat one should look to philosophy and, in particular, to the negativity of reason. This negativity undoes all the claims that make domination more than violence. But pure negativity, contra the likes of Marcuse and the post-moderns, is insufficient. Domination stripped of reason only leaves violence and an abyssal nihilism fertile for capital. In the dialectic Hegel tries to harness negativity, to make it labour towards reconciliation. But, after Adorno and others, the failure of this domestication is evident. A way forward is to go back beyond Hegel. He was responding to the potential for the radical undoing of social forms that can be found in late Pyrrhonian forms of Hellenistic scepticism; only very rarely (e.g. Colletti) has this been appreciated, and even then with little result. But from a proper appreciation can follow an understanding of how the eternal recurrence of the cycle of domination, through emancipation, to domination, is formed and can be broken. And why new dogmatisms, such of those of a Badiou or a Zizek, offer not dialectic, but only more of the same.