This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical
structure of Michael Williams's response ... more This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical
structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical
skepticism. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy
he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the
skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical
strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses.
According to the account developed here, this claim is
misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not
outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its
essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given
his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The
paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that
response.
In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne's thoug... more In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne's thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel's progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne's thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hartle's claim that Montaigne is not a skeptic at all, let alone a Pyrrhonian skeptic. In this paper, I argue that Hartle's circular-dialectical interpretation of Montaigne is not only compatible with Pyrrhonism, but is in fact an ideal model for understanding Sextus Empiricus's philosophical therapy.
Thompson Clarke's seminal paper "The Legacy of Skepticism" (1972) is notoriously difficult in bot... more Thompson Clarke's seminal paper "The Legacy of Skepticism" (1972) is notoriously difficult in both substance and presentation. Despite the paper's importance to skepticism studies in the nearly half-century since its publication, no attempt has been made in the secondary literature to provide an account, based on a close reading of the text, of just what Clarke's argument is. Furthermore, much of the existing literature betrays (or so it seems to me) fundamental misunderstandings of Clarke's thought. In this essay, I attempt to explain-concisely but comprehensively-Clarke's overall argument in "The Legacy of Skepticism."
I argue in this paper that, like the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to n... more I argue in this paper that, like the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to negative–dogmatic skepticism in On Certainty turns on the attempt to free us from the demands of traditional philosophy and is therefore not a philosophical position, strictly speaking. Rather, it is a therapeutic metaphilosophy designed to bring into view (i.e., to illumine) the relationship between our everyday epistemic practices and those of philosophy such that we simultaneously come to recognize (a) what I call the pragmatic–transcendental self–standingness of the everyday and (b) its philosophical–rational groundlessness. The Pyrrhonian illumination of the everyday is therapeutic in that it aims to purify our metadoxastic attitudes of dogmatism.
This paper pursues two tasks: first, to criticize a number of prominent contemporary interpretati... more This paper pursues two tasks: first, to criticize a number of prominent contemporary interpretations of the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, especially Jonathan Barnes’s; and second, to outline an alternative interpretation of Sextus that (a) reconciles the opposing sides of the long-standing dispute over the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment, and (b) suggests a sympathetic alternative to some of the most influential accounts of the Pyrrhonian way of life.
This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical
structure of Michael Williams's response ... more This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical
structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical
skepticism. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy
he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the
skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical
strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses.
According to the account developed here, this claim is
misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not
outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its
essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given
his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The
paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that
response.
In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne's thoug... more In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne's thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel's progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne's thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hartle's claim that Montaigne is not a skeptic at all, let alone a Pyrrhonian skeptic. In this paper, I argue that Hartle's circular-dialectical interpretation of Montaigne is not only compatible with Pyrrhonism, but is in fact an ideal model for understanding Sextus Empiricus's philosophical therapy.
Thompson Clarke's seminal paper "The Legacy of Skepticism" (1972) is notoriously difficult in bot... more Thompson Clarke's seminal paper "The Legacy of Skepticism" (1972) is notoriously difficult in both substance and presentation. Despite the paper's importance to skepticism studies in the nearly half-century since its publication, no attempt has been made in the secondary literature to provide an account, based on a close reading of the text, of just what Clarke's argument is. Furthermore, much of the existing literature betrays (or so it seems to me) fundamental misunderstandings of Clarke's thought. In this essay, I attempt to explain-concisely but comprehensively-Clarke's overall argument in "The Legacy of Skepticism."
I argue in this paper that, like the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to n... more I argue in this paper that, like the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to negative–dogmatic skepticism in On Certainty turns on the attempt to free us from the demands of traditional philosophy and is therefore not a philosophical position, strictly speaking. Rather, it is a therapeutic metaphilosophy designed to bring into view (i.e., to illumine) the relationship between our everyday epistemic practices and those of philosophy such that we simultaneously come to recognize (a) what I call the pragmatic–transcendental self–standingness of the everyday and (b) its philosophical–rational groundlessness. The Pyrrhonian illumination of the everyday is therapeutic in that it aims to purify our metadoxastic attitudes of dogmatism.
This paper pursues two tasks: first, to criticize a number of prominent contemporary interpretati... more This paper pursues two tasks: first, to criticize a number of prominent contemporary interpretations of the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, especially Jonathan Barnes’s; and second, to outline an alternative interpretation of Sextus that (a) reconciles the opposing sides of the long-standing dispute over the scope of Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment, and (b) suggests a sympathetic alternative to some of the most influential accounts of the Pyrrhonian way of life.
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structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical
skepticism. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy
he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the
skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical
strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses.
According to the account developed here, this claim is
misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not
outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its
essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given
his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The
paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that
response.
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structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical
skepticism. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy
he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the
skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical
strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses.
According to the account developed here, this claim is
misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not
outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its
essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given
his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The
paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that
response.