Moral judgments of piling-on behavior - Study 4 Group membership
Preregistration for moral judgments of piling-on behavior (Study 2)
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Blame is a moral judgment that has a cognitive and a social nature. We first focus on the cognitive side and introduce a theoretical model of blame that integrates insights and evidence from extant research. Within this model, we... more
Blame is a moral judgment that has a cognitive and a social nature. We first focus on the cognitive side and introduce a theoretical model of blame that integrates insights and evidence from extant research. Within this model, we demonstrate the critical role of such concepts as agent, intentionality, and obligation—all of which are grounded in people’s theory of mind. We then contrast two views on the ordering of blame and theory of mind based inferences: blame-late models, which claim that blame follows mental state inferences; and blame-early models, which claim that the opposite order holds. After integrating these two views within our model, we turn to two eminently social topics of moral judgment: blaming as a social act; and blaming of group agents. We suggest that our model of cognitive blame provides a fruitful framework for both of these topics, thus highlighting the intimate connection between blame as a cognitive phenomenon and blame as a social phenomenon. Humans blame,...
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Not so bad after all? The role of explanation features in blame mitigation Joanna Korman Brown University Corey J. Cusimano Brown University Jessica E. Smith Brown University Andrew E. Monroe Florida State University Bertram F. Malle... more
Not so bad after all? The role of explanation features in blame mitigation Joanna Korman Brown University Corey J. Cusimano Brown University Jessica E. Smith Brown University Andrew E. Monroe Florida State University Bertram F. Malle Brown University Abstract: Previous work on the role of explanations in blame mitigation used an outdated distinction between “person” and “situation” causes and examined which causes better excuse a negative behavior. This approach fails with intentional behaviors, which are explained by reasons, not causes. A recent model of blame (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe 2012) suggests that reason explanations function as justifications for negative intentional behaviors—reducing blame by citing socially acceptable beliefs or desires. But which reason types—beliefs or desires—are most effective in reducing blame? Participants recounted an offense they had committed, provided a blame rating, explained the behavior, and provided a second blame rating. Offenders’ exp...
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Original data for Studies 1-5 in "Norms, Minds, and Morality: Moral Judgment is about More than Outcomes"
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According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no... more
According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will beliefs but found strong effects when manipulating the perceived choice capacity of the judged agent. Study 4 used pretested narratives that varied agents’ apparent free will and found that perceived choice capacity mediated the relationship between free will and blame. These results suggest that people’s general beliefs about whether free will exists have no impact on moral judgments but specific judgments about the agent’s choice capacity do.
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Free will is often appraised as a necessary input to for holding others morally or legally responsible for misdeeds. Recently, however, Clark and colleagues (2014), argued for the opposite causal relationship. They assert that moral... more
Free will is often appraised as a necessary input to for holding others morally or legally responsible for misdeeds. Recently, however, Clark and colleagues (2014), argued for the opposite causal relationship. They assert that moral judgments and the desire to punish motivate people’s belief in free will. In three experiments—two exact replications (Studies 1…
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In 2017, Colin Kaepernick drew global attention by kneeling during the national anthem before a football game. The protest divided the country into two groups: those who supported Kaepernick’s stand against inequality, and those who... more
In 2017, Colin Kaepernick drew global attention by kneeling during the national anthem before a football game. The protest divided the country into two groups: those who supported Kaepernick’s stand against inequality, and those who believed it was disrespectful. The current study investigates whether differences in moral values (i.e., fairness vs. respect for authority) predict an individual’s opinion of the protestors, and whether priming one of those values influences opinions on social justice protests more broadly. Our data support the moral tradeoff hypothesis by demonstrating that when values are in conflict, the degree to which individuals value fairness versus authority predicts their opinions of the protesters. These differences in fairness vs. authority also extended to judgments of other kinds of social justice protests. These findings support the Moral Foundations Theory as a useful tool for investigating the influence of moral values on perceptions of social issues and...
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Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially-regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for... more
Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially-regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other’s behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for “warrant”— evidence that one’s moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and even-handed in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test two sets of predictions derived from the socially-regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across...
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There is broad consensus that features such as causality, mental states, and preventability are key inputs to moral judgments of blame. What is not clear is exactly how people process these inputs to arrive at such judgments. Three... more
There is broad consensus that features such as causality, mental states, and preventability are key inputs to moral judgments of blame. What is not clear is exactly how people process these inputs to arrive at such judgments. Three studies provide evidence that early judgments of whether or not a norm violation is intentional direct information processing along 1 of 2 tracks: if the violation is deemed intentional, blame processing relies on information about the agent's reasons for committing the violation; if the violation is deemed unintentional, blame processing relies on information about how preventable the violation was. Owing to these processing commitments, when new information requires perceivers to switch tracks, they must reconfigure their judgments, which results in measurable processing costs indicated by reaction time (RT) delays. These findings offer support for a new theory of moral judgment (the Path Model of Blame) and advance the study of moral cognition as hierarchical information processing. (PsycINFO Database Record
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Culture, Causality, Intention, and 10 moreExecutive Function, Humans, Judgment, Female, Male, Reaction Time, Guilt, Social Values, Adult, and Morals
ABSTRACT How does the general public understand the behavior of Milgram's teachers—those participants who ostensibly tortured an innocent stranger? In our social perception analysis, we contrast two research traditions that... more
ABSTRACT How does the general public understand the behavior of Milgram's teachers—those participants who ostensibly tortured an innocent stranger? In our social perception analysis, we contrast two research traditions that attempt to answer this question. On one hand, lay dispositionism argues that people make harsh, person-focused judgments of Milgram's teachers. On the other hand, a mental state account suggests that perceivers integrate information about social situations and agents’ behavior to infer the mental states of others. Mental state inferences then, in turn, drive social judgments of others. We review the theory of lay dispositionism, its application to the Milgram experiments, and several limitations of the theory. We then offer an alternative mental state account and support this view with recent studies on the Milgram experiments, and extensions to everyday behavior explanation. A final section considers the research and policy implications of our analysis.
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Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection... more
Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will-a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused "first mover," and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people's judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will.
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Research Interests: Behavior, Social Perception, Adolescent, Multidisciplinary, Intention, and 9 moreThinking, Humans, Judgment, Female, Male, Goals, PLoS one, Coercion, and Adult
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In this chapter we present a program of research focused on developing an empirically grounded model of the folk concept of free will. Specifically, we address three questions underlying the question of free will: What is people’s concept... more
In this chapter we present a program of research focused on developing an empirically grounded model of the folk concept of free will. Specifically, we address three questions underlying the question of free will: What is people’s concept of free will? How are free will and moral judgment related? Does threatening people’s belief in free will affect social perception and moral judgment?