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Dem Finanzvorstand wird in praxisnahen Publikationen eine herausgehobene Stellung im Vorstand zugesprochen; empirische Befunde zu seiner Bedeutung in der Unternehmensführung sind jedoch rar. So bleibt bisher unbeantwortet, ob... more
Dem Finanzvorstand wird in praxisnahen Publikationen eine herausgehobene Stellung im Vorstand zugesprochen; empirische Befunde zu seiner Bedeutung in der Unternehmensführung sind jedoch rar. So bleibt bisher unbeantwortet, ob Finanzvorstände wie Vorstandsvorsitzende bei geringem Unternehmenserfolg häufiger entlassen werden und inwiefern auch erzwungene Wechsel des Vorstandsvorsitzenden disziplinierend auf Finanzvorstände wirken. Wir untersuchen daher die Disziplinierung von Finanzvorständen in den größten deutschen Aktiengesellschaften zwischen 1999 und 2006. Ausgehend von Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehungen zwischen Aufsichtsrat, Vorstandsvorsitzendem und Finanzvorstand erwarten wir, dass im Disziplinierungskalkül der Prinzipale auch team- und firmenspezifisches Humankapital eine Rolle spielt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein geringer Unternehmenserfolg und ein erzwungener Wechsel im Vorstandsvorsitz unabhängig voneinander die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Disziplinierung des Finanzvorstandes erhöhen. Zudem finden wir Anhaltspunkte für eine enge Teambeziehung zwischen Finanzvorstand und Vorstandsvorsitzendem. Im Vergleich zu früheren Befunden wird die herausgehobene Stellung des Finanzvorstandes gegenüber einfachen Vorstandsmitgliedern deutlich, die eine intensivere Betrachtung des Finanzvorstandes bei zukünftiger Forschung zu Erfolgswirkungen von Führungswechseln nahe legt. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is often referred to as a company’s No. 2 on contemporary management boards; yet corresponding empirical evidence is scarce. As a result, academic literature has not yet investigated whether CFOs—like CEOs—are dismissed more frequently if corporate performance is poor and to what extent forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover also influences disciplinary action towards CFOs. Therefore, in this paper we examine the antecedents of forced CFO departures in the largest German corporations between 1999 and 2006. Building on principal-agent theory, we expect respective relationships between the board of directors, the CEO, and the CFO. Moreover, we propose that principals also take team-specific and firm-specific human capital into consideration when disciplining agents. We find that poor corporate performance and forced CEO turnover both independently increase the likelihood of CFO dismissal. In addition, we find indications for a close team relationship between CFOs and CEOs. In summary, our results support the prominent role of CFOs alongside CEOs on contemporary management boards and suggest a more detailed consideration of CFOs in future research on performance consequences of managerial successions.
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In this article, the authors introduce 3 different course formats for teaching management consulting at the university. On the basis of data from self-evaluation questionnaires from 159 students, the authors analyze effectiveness of these... more
In this article, the authors introduce 3 different course formats for teaching management consulting at the university. On the basis of data from self-evaluation questionnaires from 159 students, the authors analyze effectiveness of these course designs in raising the self-confidence of participants to cope with the kind of tasks typically faced by entry-level management consultants. Despite differences in their design
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The paper provides an overview of qualifications in the German construction workforce and draws comparisons with the situation in the British construction industry. The German system of general education and vocational training is... more
The paper provides an overview of qualifications in the German construction workforce and draws comparisons with the situation in the British construction industry. The German system of general education and vocational training is outlined. Data from a variety of sources are used to describe both the stocks and the flows of qualifications in the German construction workforce. Particular attention is paid to vocational qualifications, such as apprenticeships and the Meister qualification. Key findings are that the majority of German construction workers are qualified up to apprenticeship level, and that most of these employees have achieved a general schooling certificate from at least a lower secondary school prior to their vocational training. These factors are taken as signs of strength of the German construction workforce. Comparisons between the stocks of qualifications in the construction industry in the two countries suggest that intermediate qualifications of the apprenticeship type are far less prevalent in the British construction workforce.