Patrice CHARLIER
EM Strasbourg, LaRGE EA2364, Faculty Member
While research about family firms impressively developed over the last decades, both empirical results and recommendations strongly depend on underlying theoretic frameworks. Disregarding the explanatory plurality, only few scholars deal... more
While research about family firms impressively developed over the last decades, both empirical results and recommendations strongly depend on underlying theoretic frameworks. Disregarding the explanatory plurality, only few scholars deal with a specific form of family business in Continental Europe: the Rhine firm. Being shaped by Germanic capitalism, the Rhine firm characterizes by particular long-term orientation, a strong anchor in its environment, prudent investment policy and social balancing between stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is therefore twofold. In a first step, we analyze both the role of family firms and its Rhineland branch within major disciplinary and socio-strategic governance frameworks. As these models focus unilaterally on either interest conflicts or power while omitting cognitive contributions of stakeholders, we propose in a second step an enlarged perspective of family governance that reconciles classic arguments and knowledge-based elements in a dy...
L'ordre des Dominicains est une organisation se caractérisant par sa longévité, sa création de connaissances et sa gouvernance démocratique. La lecture croisée des textes de l'ordre des frères prêcheurs, d'un entretien... more
L'ordre des Dominicains est une organisation se caractérisant par sa longévité, sa création de connaissances et sa gouvernance démocratique. La lecture croisée des textes de l'ordre des frères prêcheurs, d'un entretien exploratoire avec un frère et de la littérature récente en gouvernance permet d'énoncer trois propositions pour comprendre le lien entre gouvernance et création de la connaissance: - Dans le fonctionnement des instances de gouvernance dominicaines, davantage de temps est consacré à la discussion et à l'élaboration des stratégies de création et de diffusion des connaissances théologiques qu'au contrôle d'éventuels conflits d'intérêts. - Le fonctionnement des instances de gouvernance d'un couvent dominicain assure le maintien d'une expression très large, parfois contradictoire mais respectueuse, des différents points de vue (maintien d'un niveau sain de conflit cognitif). - Le débat contradictoire au sein des instances de gouv...
The recent developments of the theory of the family firms bring to distinguish firms with family control - member of the majority party or member of a minority party - and in family or not family management. In this new frame of analysis,... more
The recent developments of the theory of the family firms bring to distinguish firms with family control - member of the majority party or member of a minority party - and in family or not family management. In this new frame of analysis, the family firms present two constituents of the conflict of agency: the conflict classic shareholder-leader - conflict of type I - and the conflict between majority and minority shareholders - conflict of type II-. The object of this communication is to test these new approaches for the first time on a sample of private French family firms where the legal rules covering protection of shareholders, disclosure practices, or proportion of independent members in the board of directors differ. Even if the separation between control and management is source of conflict of agency, our results show that the most successful firms are the ones which have the most weakest conflict of agency.
La performance des entreprises familiales est analysée en fonction de leurs modes de gouvernance, envisagés comme des réponses aux différentes hypothèses d'enracinement familial. L'hypothèse traditionnelle de «... more
La performance des entreprises familiales est analysée en fonction de leurs modes de gouvernance, envisagés comme des réponses aux différentes hypothèses d'enracinement familial. L'hypothèse traditionnelle de « l'enracinement illégitime » est testée en différenciant deux modes de gouvernance susceptibles d'en réduire les effets négatifs : celui des entreprises contrôlées par une famille avec un dirigeant extérieur d'une part, et celui des entreprises dirigées par une famille qui n'est plus l'actionnaire principal d'autre part. L'hypothèse de l'enracinement « positif » ou « légitime » est également testée lorsque l'entreprise est contrôlée et dirigée par la famille. Les résultats des tests effectués sur un échantillon d'entreprises moyennes européennes semblent confirmer l'hypothèse d'un enracinement familial négatif.
The recent developments of the theory of the family firms bring to distinguish firms with family control - member of the majority party or member of a minority party - and in family or not family management. In this new frame of analysis,... more
The recent developments of the theory of the family firms bring to distinguish firms with family control - member of the majority party or member of a minority party - and in family or not family management. In this new frame of analysis, the family firms present two constituents of the conflict of agency: the conflict classic shareholder-leader - conflict of type I - and the conflict between majority and minority shareholders - conflict of type II-. The object of this communication is to test these new approaches for the first time on a sample of private French family firms where the legal rules covering protection of shareholders, disclosure
practices, or proportion of independent members in the board of directors differ. Even if the separation between control and management is source of conflict of agency, our results show
that the most successful firms are the ones which have the most weakest conflict of agency.
practices, or proportion of independent members in the board of directors differ. Even if the separation between control and management is source of conflict of agency, our results show
that the most successful firms are the ones which have the most weakest conflict of agency.