enakshi mitra

There are several philosophical issues which are usually woven around the notion of actions. Apart from the dominant question as to how actions (as contrasted with involuntary happenings) are different from, and related with, cognition, wish and willóa question which boils down to the controversy whether actions are caused by these mental antecedents or justified (rationalized) atemporallyóthere arises the further dispute about which of the ontological categories like particulars, universals, events, substance, etc., will be suitable to house them. From the standpoint of philosophy of language, issues like analysis of the logical form and semantics of action-words and action-sentences demand special attention. A typically semantic problem regarding the difference between reference and description comes up with regard to actions, for the same action seems to be available to several descriptions. To take an instance cited by Davidson, the same action of flipping the switch may alternatively be described as ëdriving off a batí, ëchecking the degree of luminanceí, ëchecking the functionality of the power pointí, ëilluminating the roomí, ëdisturbing air moleculesí, ëalerting a prowlerí, etc. The strong suggestion that it is the very same action that is intentional under some of these descriptions and unintentional under other ones stirs up some prevalent philosophical anxietiesóthose regarding the extensional identity of the action, the ontology of its attributes and their mutual relationówith a fresh resurgence. In this paper, I seek to bring out the difference between the later Wittgensteinís 1 and Davidsonís view of actions with a special focus. This will be an attempt to compare and contrast their respective approaches to the correlative notions of wish, will (intention) and actions, an issue which has customarily been categorized as ëreasoní-approach of Wittgenstein as against the ëmental causationí theory endorsed by Davidson. I have sought to integrate this theme with the semantic issue of the distinction

There are several philosophical issues which are usually woven around the notion of actions. Apart from the dominant question as to how actions (as contrasted with involuntary happenings) are different from, and related with, cognition, wish and willóa question which boils down to the controversy whether actions are caused by these mental antecedents or justified (rationalized) atemporallyóthere arises the further dispute about which of the ontological categories like particulars, universals, events, substance, etc., will be suitable to house them. From the standpoint of philosophy of language, issues like analysis of the logical form and semantics of action-words and action-sentences demand special attention. A typically semantic problem regarding the difference between reference and description comes up with regard to actions, for the same action seems to be available to several descriptions. To take an instance cited by Davidson, the same action of flipping the switch may alternatively be described as ëdriving off a batí, ëchecking the degree of luminanceí, ëchecking the functionality of the power pointí, ëilluminating the roomí, ëdisturbing air moleculesí, ëalerting a prowlerí, etc. The strong suggestion that it is the very same action that is intentional under some of these descriptions and unintentional under other ones stirs up some prevalent philosophical anxietiesóthose regarding the extensional identity of the action, the ontology of its attributes and their mutual relationówith a fresh resurgence. In this paper, I seek to bring out the difference between the later Wittgensteinís 1 and Davidsonís view of actions with a special focus. This will be an attempt to compare and contrast their respective approaches to the correlative notions of wish, will (intention) and actions, an issue which has customarily been categorized as ëreasoní-approach of Wittgenstein as against the ëmental causationí theory endorsed by Davidson. I have sought to integrate this theme with the semantic issue of the distinction

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