Morris Silver
City College of New York, Economics, Emeritus
- Ancient economies (Archaeology), State Formation, Roman Law, Greek Law, Papyrology, Roman Economy, and 51 moreRoman social history, Roman Epigraphy, Ancient Greek History, Late Roman Empire, Ancient History, Late Antiquity, Ancient Religion, Roman Archaeology, Roman Empire, Roman History, Roman Religion, Latin Epigraphy, Ancient Greek Law, Classical Archaeology, Roman Spain, Greek Epigraphy, Ancient Greek Religion, Roman Republic, Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor, Economic History, Roman Egypt, Roman Dacia, Graeco-Roman Egypt, Archaeology of Mediterranean Trade, Roman Army, Imperial Rome, Ancient Trade & Commerce (Archaeology), Ancient economy, Manumission of Slaves in Antiquity; Paramone-Clause, Ancient Greek Colonies of the Northern Black Sea Shore, Minoan iconography, Minoan art and archaeology, Aegean Archaeology, Aegean Bronze Age (Bronze Age Archaeology), Aegean Prehistory (Archaeology), Minoan Archaeology, Mycenaean era archaeology, Aegean Prehistory, Minoan Religion, Archaeology of Crete, Late Bronze Age archaeology, Mediterranean prehistory, Minoan and Mycenaean economy and administration, Mycenaean, Linear B, Aegean Late Bronze Age, Anatolian Archaeology, Prehistoric Archaeology, Mediterranean archaeology, New Kingdom (Archaeology), and AMAIC, Australian Marian Academy of the Immaculate Conception, revision ancient history era King Hezekiah Judahedit
CORRECTION in The Purpled World: In Figure 18 on page 211, the image shown is the wrong one. The image correctly discussed in the text is actually CMS II.7, No. 17 = Arachne 160376. The correct image is available for download at... more
CORRECTION in The Purpled World:
In Figure 18 on page 211, the image shown is the wrong one. The image correctly discussed in the text is actually CMS II.7, No. 17 = Arachne 160376. The correct image is available for download at https://arachne.dainst.org/search?q=160376
SUPPLEMENT TO BOOK AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM AUTHOR (see below)
During the Aegean Bronze Age (ca. 3,000-1,050 BCE), the spread of woolen textiles triggered an increased demand for color. The dyes included those made from the labor-intensive processing of crocus stamens (saffron dye), and even more costly dyes made from certain sea snails (the muricidae / Murex). Minoan and Mycenaean textile producers (the palaces) mainly operated in the Black Sea region, rich in gold. "Purpled world" is Morris Silver's term for this emergent ideology. In Part I of The Purpled World, Silver demonstrates how the palaces embedded commercial motivation into traditional rituals, played out in purpose-built textile exhibition spaces, including labyrinths. In Part II, he mines textual, archaeological, and iconographic evidence to reveal the international textile trade. In Parts III and IV, Homer's Trojan War is seen as a trade war, and Homeric heroes have roles as traders and/or agents for Poseidon. In Part V, Silver considers the before-and-after of this "purpled world": Jason and the Argonauts, and the so-called collapse of the Mycenaean Palaces as a manifestation of vertical disintegration in the Aegean textile industry. The Purpled World integrates all these forms of evidence with interpretative insights from Maslovian psychology, as well as the disciplines of fashion studies, marketing, and economics.
Book available online at: https://chs.harvard.edu/read/the-purpled-world-marketing-haute-couture-in-the-aegean-bronze-age/
A "Supplement" (September 24) concerned with a number of issues raised in the book is available to scholars who email the author (msilver12@nyc.rr.com) and include a brief reference to their research interest.
In Figure 18 on page 211, the image shown is the wrong one. The image correctly discussed in the text is actually CMS II.7, No. 17 = Arachne 160376. The correct image is available for download at https://arachne.dainst.org/search?q=160376
SUPPLEMENT TO BOOK AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM AUTHOR (see below)
During the Aegean Bronze Age (ca. 3,000-1,050 BCE), the spread of woolen textiles triggered an increased demand for color. The dyes included those made from the labor-intensive processing of crocus stamens (saffron dye), and even more costly dyes made from certain sea snails (the muricidae / Murex). Minoan and Mycenaean textile producers (the palaces) mainly operated in the Black Sea region, rich in gold. "Purpled world" is Morris Silver's term for this emergent ideology. In Part I of The Purpled World, Silver demonstrates how the palaces embedded commercial motivation into traditional rituals, played out in purpose-built textile exhibition spaces, including labyrinths. In Part II, he mines textual, archaeological, and iconographic evidence to reveal the international textile trade. In Parts III and IV, Homer's Trojan War is seen as a trade war, and Homeric heroes have roles as traders and/or agents for Poseidon. In Part V, Silver considers the before-and-after of this "purpled world": Jason and the Argonauts, and the so-called collapse of the Mycenaean Palaces as a manifestation of vertical disintegration in the Aegean textile industry. The Purpled World integrates all these forms of evidence with interpretative insights from Maslovian psychology, as well as the disciplines of fashion studies, marketing, and economics.
Book available online at: https://chs.harvard.edu/read/the-purpled-world-marketing-haute-couture-in-the-aegean-bronze-age/
A "Supplement" (September 24) concerned with a number of issues raised in the book is available to scholars who email the author (msilver12@nyc.rr.com) and include a brief reference to their research interest.
Research Interests: Entrepreneurship, Marketing, Homer, Iconography, Gift Exchange, and 10 moreAncient economies (Archaeology), Fashion History, Kingship and systems of rule, Textile Dyeing, Hittite History, Ancient Greek Economy, Natural and Agricultural Sciences, Social and economic history of the ancient world, Economics of arts and culture, and Jason and the Golden Fleece
Research Interests:
Greek scholars have produced a vast body of evidence bearing on nuptial practices that has yet to be mined by a professional economist. By standing on their shoulders, the author proposes and tests radically new interpretations of three... more
Greek scholars have produced a vast body of evidence bearing on nuptial practices that has yet to be mined by a professional economist. By standing on their shoulders, the author proposes and tests radically new interpretations of three important status groups in Greek history: the pallakē, the hetaira, and the nothos. It is argued that legitimate marriage—that is, “marriage by loan of the bride to the groom”—was not the only form of legal marriage in classical Athens and the ancient Greek world generally. Pallakia—that is, “marriage by sale of the bride to the groom”— also was legally recognized. The pallakē-wifeship transaction is a sale into slavery with a restrictive covenant mandating the employment of the sold woman as a wife. The book proposes and tests the hypothesis that the likelihood of bride sale rises with increases in the distance between the ancestral residence of the groom and the father’s household. The “bastard” (nothoi) children of pallakai lacked the legal right to inherit from their fathers but were routinely eligible for Athenian citizenship.. It is argued that the basic social meaning of hetaira (“companion”) is not “prostitute”/”courtesan” but “single woman”—that is, woman legally recognized as being under her own authority (kuria). The defensive adaptation of single women is reflected in Greek myth and social practice by their grouping into packs, most famously the Daniads and Amazons.
Research Interests: Greek Comedy, Intellectual and cultural history, Ancient Greek Religion, Greek Law, Greek Papyrology, and 24 moreAncient Greek Iconography, Cross-cultural interaction (Archaeology), Rape and Sexual Assault Law, Ancient Greek Epigraphy, Marriage, Greek mythology, Greek Art, Euripides Electra, Ancient Greek Women, Suppliants, Greeks in Egypt, Ancient Greek Marriage, Ancient Greek Economy, Brauron, Roman Family Law, ancient Greek society, Homeric epic, Ancient Greek Onomastics, Greek and Roman Social History, Greek Textiles, Abduction of Europa, Greek Drama (Tragedy and Comedy), Marriage In Greek Literature, and Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite
Legal codes and other documents of the late Roman Empire reveal a system, the colonate or sometimes (redundantly) the bound colonate in which farmers (coloni) had their (head and land) taxes paid by estate owners in whose census rolls... more
Legal codes and other documents of the late Roman Empire reveal a system, the colonate or sometimes (redundantly)
the bound colonate in which farmers (coloni) had their (head and land) taxes paid by estate owners
in whose census rolls they were registered. If the land changed ownership coloni were entitled to stay
and were registered in the tax roll of the new owner. However, coloni and their offspring lacked the right to
migrate. Developing some previously advanced ideas about patrocinium “patronage,” this article argues that
the pristine or original form of the colonate is a voluntary contractual arrangement among free farmers, estate
owners, and the imperial Fiscus which acquired a public law dimension because it required a change in
the personal status of the farmer. By means of this bondage contract the contractors expected to share in the
aggregate gains from reducing tax-collection costs and from stabilizing tax revenues. The paper goes on to
consider the implications of the colonate for economic efficiency and concludes with some observations on
the reasons for changes over time in its importance.
This article was ejected from a forthcoming volume on Roman Law by an editor for Oxford University Press. Here the reader has the opportunity to judge its merits for himself.
the bound colonate in which farmers (coloni) had their (head and land) taxes paid by estate owners
in whose census rolls they were registered. If the land changed ownership coloni were entitled to stay
and were registered in the tax roll of the new owner. However, coloni and their offspring lacked the right to
migrate. Developing some previously advanced ideas about patrocinium “patronage,” this article argues that
the pristine or original form of the colonate is a voluntary contractual arrangement among free farmers, estate
owners, and the imperial Fiscus which acquired a public law dimension because it required a change in
the personal status of the farmer. By means of this bondage contract the contractors expected to share in the
aggregate gains from reducing tax-collection costs and from stabilizing tax revenues. The paper goes on to
consider the implications of the colonate for economic efficiency and concludes with some observations on
the reasons for changes over time in its importance.
This article was ejected from a forthcoming volume on Roman Law by an editor for Oxford University Press. Here the reader has the opportunity to judge its merits for himself.
Research Interests:
Fundamina Abstract. Why did Roman slaves have a peculium or purse? It has been suggested that the grant of a peculium was a clever arrangement, a trick actually, by means of which owners incentivized slaves to perform unsupervised labor.... more
Fundamina Abstract. Why did Roman slaves have a peculium or purse? It has been suggested that the grant of a peculium was a clever arrangement, a trick actually, by means of which owners incentivized slaves to perform unsupervised labor. Upon this incentive base stands Rome’s “peculium economy” in which diverse and far-flung business and other activities are performed by unsupervised slaves. However, forcibly taken slaves, the kind still taken for granted in the scholarly literature, would not be incentivized by peculia. The “peculium economy” stands, however, because the slaves forming its base are slaves by contract/self-sellers. The paper explores and develops the implications of this finding.
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This paper begins with a brief review of evidence for migration to the relatively affluent city of Rome during the earlier Empire. Then it is suggested that most slaves coming to Rome at this time originated in the Greek East and that... more
This paper begins with a brief review of evidence for migration to the relatively affluent city of Rome during the earlier Empire. Then it is suggested that most slaves coming to Rome at this time originated in the Greek East and that these slaves were volunteers not forcible captives. Slavery by contract made it possible for individuals to overcome credit constraints limiting their ability to borrow to finance training and migration. This view is tested by examining literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence to decide whether slave markets in the Greek East (at Acmonia, Ephesus, Magnesia on Meander, Thyatira and Delos) and in Rome itself were suitable for processing “dangerous merchandise” (= forcible captives). The totality of the evidence suggests they were not. Near Easterners conveyed through local and Roman slave markets were probably willing self-sellers seeking economic advancement. A new, positive, light is cast on the role of slave dealers who profited from reallocating labor power from less to more productive uses.
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The puzzle of Demosthenes’ khōris oikountes “living apart” Athenian navy inductees and their possible relationship to apeleutheroi (slaves? freedmen?) has been revisited in a number of recent articles. This long-debated theme has... more
The puzzle of Demosthenes’ khōris oikountes “living apart” Athenian navy inductees and their possible relationship to apeleutheroi (slaves? freedmen?) has been revisited in a number of recent articles. This long-debated theme has implications for whether privileged slaves—those granted lifestyle autonomy—constituted a distinct and significant category among slaves in classical Athens. Most recently, Canevaro and Lewis have argued that apeleutheroi were freedmen divided into two sub-groups: one sub-group “lived apart” from their former owners and the other “lived with” them. The present article concludes that C&L are mistaken: the technical term apeleutheros refers only to privileged slaves who lived apart from owners and who should be identified with Demosthenes’ “living apart.” More generally, the discussion contributes new understanding of the nature of Greek slavery, including of the long-debated paramonē-clause in slave sale contracts and of the roles of pais, therapōn and “Plataean.”
Readers should note the following "Correction"
In footnote 27 on page 151, I state: “My view is that Phormion is a freeborn Greek (perhaps even an Athenian) who sold himself into slavery to advance his career prospects.” I based this view on Phormion having a patronymic and a demotic. I should have explained that this argument runs directly counter to Apollodoros’ statement that Phormion was a barbarian, not a Greek (Demosthenes 45.73, 81). I continue to believe that Phormion sold himself into slavery.
Readers should note the following "Correction"
In footnote 27 on page 151, I state: “My view is that Phormion is a freeborn Greek (perhaps even an Athenian) who sold himself into slavery to advance his career prospects.” I based this view on Phormion having a patronymic and a demotic. I should have explained that this argument runs directly counter to Apollodoros’ statement that Phormion was a barbarian, not a Greek (Demosthenes 45.73, 81). I continue to believe that Phormion sold himself into slavery.
Research Interests:
Literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence demonstrates that wealth-seeking Italians (and other foreigners) migrated to Transalpine Gaul taking capital with them. It is demonstrated below that this “colonialism” was a component of a... more
Literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence demonstrates that wealth-seeking
Italians (and other foreigners) migrated to Transalpine Gaul taking capital
with them. It is demonstrated below that this “colonialism” was a component of a
process that is well-organized by the “Imperialism of Free Trade” framework put
forward many years ago by Gallagher and Robinson (1953) to explain nineteenth
century British imperial history. More specifi cally, Rome’s forcible seizure of political
control in Northern Gaul is best explained by the aim to establish security
for a profi table and mutually benefi cial trade, most notably in Italian wine. By
accomplishing this goal Roman policymakers succeeded in integrating all of Gaul
into an expanding international economy and completed its transformation into an
economically advanced nation. The transformation was aided by wealth-seeking
Gallic collaborators and came at the expense of those Gallic elites who fought to
preserve their way of life and privileges.
Italians (and other foreigners) migrated to Transalpine Gaul taking capital
with them. It is demonstrated below that this “colonialism” was a component of a
process that is well-organized by the “Imperialism of Free Trade” framework put
forward many years ago by Gallagher and Robinson (1953) to explain nineteenth
century British imperial history. More specifi cally, Rome’s forcible seizure of political
control in Northern Gaul is best explained by the aim to establish security
for a profi table and mutually benefi cial trade, most notably in Italian wine. By
accomplishing this goal Roman policymakers succeeded in integrating all of Gaul
into an expanding international economy and completed its transformation into an
economically advanced nation. The transformation was aided by wealth-seeking
Gallic collaborators and came at the expense of those Gallic elites who fought to
preserve their way of life and privileges.
Research Interests:
This paper reviews and analyzes materials mainly from Herculaneum concerning individuals bearing the tria nomina but lacking filiation. Two explanations are put forward and evaluated: (1) they are freeborn citizens who had sold themselves... more
This paper reviews and analyzes
materials mainly from Herculaneum
concerning individuals bearing the tria
nomina but lacking filiation. Two explanations
are put forward and evaluated: (1)
they are freeborn citizens who had sold
themselves into slavery and later were manumitted
with the result that they had dual
filiation – both ›F‹ and ›L‹; and (2) they are
promoted Junian Latins
materials mainly from Herculaneum
concerning individuals bearing the tria
nomina but lacking filiation. Two explanations
are put forward and evaluated: (1)
they are freeborn citizens who had sold
themselves into slavery and later were manumitted
with the result that they had dual
filiation – both ›F‹ and ›L‹; and (2) they are
promoted Junian Latins
Research Interests:
Freed Roman slaves were stained by their former status but not uniformly. It is argued that free men who had been forcible captives and their forcibly detained children (vernae) were not detested by the elite. On the other hand, scorn was... more
Freed Roman slaves were
stained by their former status but not uniformly.
It is argued that free men who had
been forcible captives and their forcibly detained
children (vernae) were not detested
by the elite. On the other hand, scorn was
poured on the heads of upwardly mobile
former slaves who, it is argued, were typically
self-sellers. The former ›slaves by contract‹
were a ›distinct category‹ in a way
that made them posters of ›servility‹ and
hence perfect targets for invective hurled by
envious ingenui and by literary flatterers of
snobs. The macula servitutis becomes almost
an index of the importance of self-sale
in the Roman economy.
stained by their former status but not uniformly.
It is argued that free men who had
been forcible captives and their forcibly detained
children (vernae) were not detested
by the elite. On the other hand, scorn was
poured on the heads of upwardly mobile
former slaves who, it is argued, were typically
self-sellers. The former ›slaves by contract‹
were a ›distinct category‹ in a way
that made them posters of ›servility‹ and
hence perfect targets for invective hurled by
envious ingenui and by literary flatterers of
snobs. The macula servitutis becomes almost
an index of the importance of self-sale
in the Roman economy.
Research Interests:
Economic theory suggests that the colonate would have enjoyed a surge in growth during late antiquity in response to the Roman state’s interventions in credit markets which included restrictions on the real security that might legally be... more
Economic theory suggests that the colonate would have enjoyed a surge in growth during late antiquity in response to the Roman state’s interventions in credit markets which included restrictions on the real security that might legally be offered by loan-seeking farmers and limitations on the interest rate they might be charged by lenders. As a result of these interventions, estate owners were placed in a better legal position to profit from providing loans to enrolled small farmers than were ordinary lenders to profit from providing loans to independent small farmers. The predictions of economic theory are supported by letters written by contemporary farmers (Anoup and Pieous) and “waterwheel receipts” as well by discussions offered by Caesarius of Arles and Salvian.
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Legal and other texts insist that slaves (servi) are not permitted to join the Roman army. The evidence suggests, however, that slaves might serve if they were owned by the army itself. After demonstrating the presence of public slaves... more
Legal and other texts insist that slaves (servi) are not permitted to join the Roman army. The evidence suggests, however, that slaves might serve if they were owned by the army itself. After demonstrating the presence of public slaves (servitia castris) in Rome’s armed forces (I-II) this paper examines the nature of the duties of calones and lixae (III). Next, it is considered whether soldiers belonging to collegia were public slaves with special attention being paid to capsarii “medical orderlies” (IV). Then the status of the augusti vernae in Legion III Augusta is analyzed (V). Next, the one-namedness of legionary soldiers in inscriptions is employed to identify public slaves (VI). Finally, findings are summarized and questions raised for future research.
Research Interests:
The Roman Christian Church was able to take-off into self-sustained growth during the relatively affluent early Empire period. The growth-precipitating factor was the creation and organizational embodiment of an innovative business model... more
The Roman Christian Church was able to take-off into self-sustained growth during the relatively affluent early Empire period. The growth-precipitating factor was the creation and organizational embodiment of an
innovative business model having a special appeal to the well-to-do. This model, permeated with familiar commercial terminology and analogies, permitted the well-to-do literally to purchase redemption and salvation by giving money to the Church for distribution to the poor. At the same time
the model permitted well-to-do altruists to fulfill an unselfish desire to render assistance to the neediest in Roman society. Despite its advantages in attracting rich donors the new Christian business model in which applicants for the Church’s aid received only superfi cial screening and, hence, were virtually guaranteed to be classified as eligible (i.e., as “poor”) proved to be extremely vulnerable to the kind of risk-shifting behavior referred to as “moral hazard.” The outcome was an increase in the relative number of “voluntarily poor” individuals who curtailed or terminated their participation
in the labor force. Poverty increased because it was rewarded. This explanation of the upsurge in poverty is sufficient and there is no reason to appeal to other, much less visible, causes. The trend retarded economic growth and strained the resources of the Church and then of the State which
came to its assistance. Ultimately, the welfare system had to be revised and sharply curtailed to the detriment of the involuntary poor.
innovative business model having a special appeal to the well-to-do. This model, permeated with familiar commercial terminology and analogies, permitted the well-to-do literally to purchase redemption and salvation by giving money to the Church for distribution to the poor. At the same time
the model permitted well-to-do altruists to fulfill an unselfish desire to render assistance to the neediest in Roman society. Despite its advantages in attracting rich donors the new Christian business model in which applicants for the Church’s aid received only superfi cial screening and, hence, were virtually guaranteed to be classified as eligible (i.e., as “poor”) proved to be extremely vulnerable to the kind of risk-shifting behavior referred to as “moral hazard.” The outcome was an increase in the relative number of “voluntarily poor” individuals who curtailed or terminated their participation
in the labor force. Poverty increased because it was rewarded. This explanation of the upsurge in poverty is sufficient and there is no reason to appeal to other, much less visible, causes. The trend retarded economic growth and strained the resources of the Church and then of the State which
came to its assistance. Ultimately, the welfare system had to be revised and sharply curtailed to the detriment of the involuntary poor.
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Scholars have argued that Athens was stateless. Specifically, it is has been asserted that residents in classical Athens relied predominantly on themselves and neighbors in resisting criminals who sought to forcefully take their property.... more
Scholars have argued that Athens was stateless. Specifically, it is has been asserted that residents in classical Athens relied predominantly on themselves and neighbors in resisting criminals who sought to forcefully take their property. This is rather a surprising proposition since Athens was a rather large and diverse city with a well articulated division of labor and occupational specialization. The present paper begins by advancing a functional definition of ‘state’ as an organization (firm) specializing in the production of protection from and punishment of criminals. Then the paper theorizes about the origin, division, and demise of states and applies this reasoning to Athens. This is followed by an examination of
evidence, mainly speeches delivered by Attic orators for various public occasions, political meetings, and law-courts. These texts preserve many details concerning how Athens actually dealt with property crime. The main finding is that if, as been suggested by some scholars, Athens was a ‘remarkably
peaceful and well-ordered society’ then the explanation lies not in an unusually peaceful outlook of its residents or in their reliance on self-help and social pressures to deter criminal activity, but in reliance on harsh penalties and the provision of enforcement resources by the Athenian state.
Key words: Athens; monopoly; protection/punishment; public good; public slaves (dēmosioi); state/stateles
evidence, mainly speeches delivered by Attic orators for various public occasions, political meetings, and law-courts. These texts preserve many details concerning how Athens actually dealt with property crime. The main finding is that if, as been suggested by some scholars, Athens was a ‘remarkably
peaceful and well-ordered society’ then the explanation lies not in an unusually peaceful outlook of its residents or in their reliance on self-help and social pressures to deter criminal activity, but in reliance on harsh penalties and the provision of enforcement resources by the Athenian state.
Key words: Athens; monopoly; protection/punishment; public good; public slaves (dēmosioi); state/stateles
