SECURITY TRAINING

FOR
SEAFARERS WITH
DESIGNATED
SECURITY DUTIES
Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION
The ISPS code (International Ship & Port
Facility Security Code) makes it mandatory for
the companies and port facilities to implement
a number of security measures on board ships
and port facilities. These mandatory
requirements are laid down in part A and the
corresponding non-mandatory guidelines are
laid down in Part B. The individual responsible
for implementing these measures of the
company level is designed as the Company
Security Officer (CSO). The specific duties of
the Company Security officer are laid down in
Part A Para 11 and the guide lines laid down
in Part B Para 8, 9 and 13. Duties of Seafarers
Designated security duties are laid down
This course is designed to cover following
topics.

• Introduction to the Course

• Maritime :Security policies
• Security Responsibilities
• Ship Security Assessment
• Security Equipment
• Threats Identification, Recognition and
Response
• Ship Security Actions
• Emergency Preparedness, Drills & Exercises
• Security Administration
COMPETENCIES TO BE ACHIEVED
On successful completion of the course,
the trainee will be able to effectively carry
out the duties and responsibilities of
designated Security Duties. The
achievement of the competence will be
assessed through a written exam (in
English) at the course
Assessment:
The achievement of the competence will be
assessed through a written exam (in
English) at the course. Delegates should
secure % to pass.
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS & PATTERNS
Today the maritime industry is no longer considered
safe, non- political, global transportation system that
moves goods by sea, harmless from one place to another,
but rather, an entity that exposes all nations, maritime
and non- maritime alike, to the threat of terrorist
attack.
The Secretary General of IMO proposed to the Member
States that the organization should review all its
conventions and other instruments that have a
bearing on prevention and suppression of unlawful acts,
including terrorism that may affect the safety of
shipping and port facilities.
In 2002, IMO therefore launched a global
programme on maritime/ port security in order to
provide this assistance through the use of regional,
sub- regional and national seminars/ workshops.
Ship & Port Operations and Conditions
Peculiarities of the ship and port operations and
the conditions under which they perform
The Port-
•Disruption of port activity would hurt the
nation's economy but will also invite worldwide
media attention is the prime aim of any terrorist
organization. The ports are also very vulnerable
as they are spread over large areas with large in/
out flow of men, cargo and vehicles.
•Are also vulnerable to threats from sea
•The criminals/ terrorist using the ships/ cargo
as a conduit for their activities
The Ship-
a)From the point of view of security, two
main aspects need to be considered.
b)the non permanent multinational and the
floating nature of its crew and secondly the
operational area.
c)The Ships operate in different parts of the
world where the degree of threats as well
protection may considerably vary.
d)The ships today operate under tremendous
commercial pressures with very fast
turnaround time
e)security may conflict with the commercial
interests
Chapter 2:

MARITIME SECURITY
POLICY
 FAMILIARITY WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS,CODES & RECOMMENDATIONS
Birth of the ISPS Code
The 9/11 terrorist attack of 2001 have brought about a sea
change in the maritime legislation regarding security. On
December 13th 2002, the IMO agreed to nine amendments
to the international Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
1974 (SOLAS 74)
The conference agreed that all cargo ships over 500 tons
engaged in international voyage, all passenger vessels
and mobile offshore oil and gas rigs, and all port facilities
must meet the new requirements by 01 July 2004. The Code
consists of two parts- Part A which is mandatory and
Part B which gives guidelines
Listed in your handout
Mandatory Measures under ISPS
• requirement for ships to have a ship security
officer
• development for comprehensive security plans
for international port facilities, focusing on
areas that have direct contact with ships
FAMILIARITY WITH RELEVANT GOVERNMENT
LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
Implementation:-
The onus of implementing these new regulations
falls squarely on IMO member governments. Flag
states must improve ship security plans for their
registered vessels. They also have to verify the
compliance of ships with the mandatory section
Part A of the ISPS Code and the amendments of
SOLAS 74 (also mandatory). Governments of the
flag states are further charged with issuing to their
registered vessels “International Ship Security
Certificates" signifying that those vessels comply
with the new regulations
High cost of implementation: -
One major stumbling block is cost. Carrying out this package of
new security measures will cost the shipping industry along with
the flag and port states, "billions of dollars". Besides some
companies could be forced to shut down if too much of the cost is
passed on to them. IMO has taken note of the difficulties that may
that might be faced by some flag states in implementing the new
security package. It has created a $1.5 million fund to enable
maritime security experts to visit flag states that need assistance
in drawing up effective and internationally harmonized security
procedures. One problem is that this problem addresses the cost of
providing advice to the governments on administrative changes.
Countries and their shipping industry have to finance the operation
of new procedures, inspectorates, training, monitoring and checking
notes Hawkes. Despite the cost, implementation of the new
security standard is inevitable, experts agree Flags of
"convenience" countries will have to raise their certification
fees to fund compliance, says Hawkes, because the price of not
complying is likely to be a loss of trade. Hawkes explains that
U.S authorities may bar from American ports any ships deemed
not to have an effective IMO compliant ship security plan and
operations. This could include ships with adequate securities
that have called at ports that do not have the proper safeguard in
place, he says. As a result, ports with poor security standards
could be reduced to receiving local traffic
DEFINITIONS
The definitions of various terms used in the
ISPS Code are as follows:
• Convention means the international
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
197 4, as amended (SOLAS 74).
• Regulation means a regulation of the
convention.
• Chapter means a chapter of the convention
• Ship Security Plan means a plan developed
to ensure the applications of measures on
board the ship designed to protect the
persons on board, cargo, cargo transport
units, ship's stores or the ship from the risk
of a security incident.
• Port facility security plan means a plan developed to
ensure the applications of measures designed to protect
the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport
units and ship's stores within the port facility from the
risk of a security incident
• Ship Security Officer means the person on board
the ship, accountable to the master, designated by
the Company as responsible for the security of the
ship, including implementation and maintenance of the
ship security plan, for liaison with the company security
officer and port facility security officer
• Company Security Officer means the person
designated by the company for ensuring that a ship
security assessment is carried out that a ship security plan
is developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter
implemented and maintained, and for liaison with port
facility security officer and the ship security officer.
• Port facility security officer means the person designated as
responsible for the development, implementation, revision and
maintenance of the port security plan and for liaison with the
ship security officer and company security officer.
• Security level 1 means the level for which minimum
appropriate protective security measures shall be
maintained at all times.
• Security Level 2 means the level for which
appropriate additional protective security measures shall
be maintained for a period of times as a result of heightened
risk of a security incident.
• Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific
protective security measures shall be maintained for limited
period of time when a security incident is probable or
imminent, although it may nor be possible to identify the
specific target.
• The term "ship", when used in ISPS Code, includes mobile
offshore drilling units and high speed crafts as defined in
regulation Xl-2/1.
• The term "Contracting Government" in connection
with any reference to a port facility, when used in sections
14to 18, includes a reference to the Designated Authority
• Terms not otherwise defined in this part shall have the
same meaning as the meaning attributed to them in chapter
1 and chapter Xl-2 of ISPS Code.
Chapter 3:

SECURITY
RESPONSIBILITIES
CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Subject to the provisions of regulations 3 & 7
of chapter Xl-2 SOLAS74, Contracting
Governments shall set security levels and
provide guidance from protection from
security incidents. Higher security levels
indicate greater likelihood of occurrence of
a security indent. Factors to be considered
in setting the appropriate security level
include:
• The degree that the threat information is
credible.
• The degree that the threat information is
corroborated
• The degree that the threat information is
specific or imminent; and
• The potential consequences of such a
security incident
Contracting Governments, when they have set
security level 3, shall issue, as. Necessary,
appropriate instructions and shall provide
security- related information to the ships and port
facilities that may be affected
• Setting of the applicable security level.
• Approving a· port facility assessment and
subsequent amendments to an approving
assessment.
• Determining the port facility which will be
required to designate a port facility security
officer.
• Approving a port facility security plan and
subsequent amendments to an approved plan.
• Exercising control and compliance measures
pursuant to Regulation 9 of chapterXl-2 of SOLAS
7 4 and,
• Establishing the requirements for a Declaration of
Security
RECOGNIZED SECURITY ORGANISATIONS
Contracting Governments may authorize a
recognized security organization (RSO) to
undertake certain security-related activities,
including:
• Approval of a ship security plan, or
amendment thereto, on behalf of the
administration;
• Verification and certification of compliance or a
ship with the requirements of chapterXl-2 of
SOLAS 74 and Part A of ISPS Code on behalf
of the administration.
• Conducting port facility security assessment
required by the Contracting Government.
The Ship
Duties of Gangway Watch
• Stop and identify all persons wanting access. Allow no
unauthorized visitors unless approved by Master, SSO or
Watch Officer
• Verify individual’s purpose/ authority for boarding
• Log ail visitors names, organization represented, purpose of
visit, time in /out in visitor record sheet
• Ensure all visitors have departed ship by time stated by
Master, SSO or DO. Report all violations to DO
• Ensure all visitors receive the appropriate identification
badge and are briefed on circulating restrictions and
restricted areas. Escort if required
• Check all equipment and cargo leaving and entering the
ship for suspected contraband. Report all violations to the
Master, SSO or DO
• Deny entry to all personnel refusing
 Identification
 Satisfactory explanation for reason of visit
 Consent of search of personal belongings
 Consent of search of individual
 Consent to conform to ship regulations
SHIP SECURITY OFFICER (SSO)
Ship security officer means the person on
board the ship, accountable to the
master, designated by the Company as
responsible for the security of the ship,
including implementation and
maintenance of the ship security plan and
for liaison with the, company security
officer and port facility security officers.
The SSO is designated by the company
The duties and responsibilities of the SSO include, but are
not likely to:
• Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to
ensure that appropriate security measures are maintained: ·
• Maintaining and supervising, the implementation of the ship
security plan (SSP),including any amendments to the SSP.
• Co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and
ship stores with other shipboard. Personnel and with the
relevant port facility security officer.
• Proposing modifications to the SSP
• Reporting to the Company Security Officer any deficiencies
and non conformities identified during internal audits,
periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of.
compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
• Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board
• Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to
shipboard personnel, as appropriate;
• Reporting all security incidents
• Co-ordinating implementation of the SSP with the company
security officer and the relevant port facility security officer;
and
• Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested,
and maintained, if any.
The ship security officer is responsible
for liaising and communication with the
Port Facility Security Officer and Ship
Security Officer of other ships in case of
ship-to-ship operations
 COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
A Company Security Officer (CSO) is a
person designated by the shipping
company to be responsible for
developing, implementing, and
maintaining individual Ship Security
Plan for all or part of the company fleet
of ships. Depending on how the fleets of
ships are organized. A company may
designate more than, one CSO as long as
it is clear who the CSO for a particular
ship is.
Duties and Responsibilities.
The duties and responsibilities of the Company
Security Officer include, but are not limited to the
following:

• Advising the level of threats likely to be encountered

by the ship, using appropriate security assessments
and other relevant information.
• Supervising security assessment for each ship
• Ensuring the development, the submission for
approval, and thereafter the implementation and
maintenance of the ship security plan;
• Ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as
appropriate, to eliminate the deficiencies and the
security requirements of the individual ship;
• Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security
measures and activities
• Arranging for the initial and subsequent
verifications of the ship by the administration or
the recognized security organization (RSO)
Duties and Responsibilities (continued…)
• Ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities
are identified during internal audits, periodic
reviews, security inspections and verifications of
compliance are promptly addressed and dealt with;
• Enhancing security awareness and vigilance
• Ensuring adequate training for personnel
responsible for the security of the ship;
• Ensuring effective communication and co-operation
between the ship security officer and the relevant
port facility security officer;
• Ensuring consistency between security
requirements and safety requirements;
• Ensuring that, if a sister-ship or fleet security plans
are used, the plan for each ship reflects the ship-
specific information accurately; and
• Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent
arrangements approved for a particular ship or
group of ships are implemented and maintained
 Seafarers with designated Security duties
The specific security duties for each personnel will be
laid down in the Ship Security Plan.

• Duties and responsibilities of security watch- The

security watch must be aware of the security level
the ship is operating in. A sharp lookout shall be
maintained. Suspicious persons, objects and
activities and malfunctioning of security equipment
shall be reported to the duty officer.
• Communication- To summon assistance, the
security watch shall be provided with means of
communication to keep in touch with the duty officer.
• Briefings-All officers and crew members are to be
briefed about their duties and security level the
ship is in at every change of security level, on
possible threats, the procedures for reporting
suspicious persons, objects or activities and the
need for vigilance.
Chapter 4:

SHIP SECURITY
ASSESSMENT
Security Assessment is a risk-based
decision making tool. lt is a systematic
and analytical process to consider the
likelihood that a security breach will
endanger an asset, individual of function
and based on that, to identify actions
to reduce the vulnerability and mitigate
the consequences of a security breach.
Assessment Tools
1. The Ship Security Assessment shall include
at least the following:
• An on-scene security survey
• Identification of existing security measures,
procedures and operations
• Identification and evaluation of key
shipboard operations that is important to
prated
• Identification: of possible threats to the key
ship board operations and the likelihood
of their occurrence, in order to establish
and priorities security measures; and
• Identification of weaknesses, including
human factor in the infrastructure, policies
and procedures·
2. Each Ship Security Assessment (SSA)
must consider:
• Threats that may be unique for the port
facility at which the ship will call
• Threats of port facilities
• Port facility security measures
3. The Ship Security Assessment (SSA)
must address the following areas of the
ship that, if damaged used for illicit
purpose, could endanger people, or
operations on the ship or within the
port facility
• Physical Security
• Structural integrity of the ship and/ port
facilities
• Personnel protective systems
• Communication systems, including radios
and telecommunications
ON-SCENE SECURITY SURVEY

The "On-Scene" Security Survey should examine

and evaluate the existing shipboard security
protective measures, procedures, and operations for:
• Ensuring the performance of aII ship security duties
• Monitoring restricted areas to prevent unauthorized
access
• Controlling access to the ship
• Monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the ship

• Controlling the embarkation/disembarkation of person

.and their belongings.
• Supervising cargo handling and delivery of ship stores
• Ensuring the ready availability of ship security
equipment and communication systems.
• Handling of unaccompanied baggage
Chapter 5:

SECURITY EQUIPMENT
 SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS
It is no more possible to ensure security through
physical inspection alone. Physical inspection of one
single container may take up to a day. Needless to
say those commercial considerations cannot allow
such luxuries. In order to detect and nab today's
clever and technology savvy criminal, a
number of highly sophisticated equipments are in
use. The use of metal detectors and the arch is well
known to US. We have also come across luggage, X-
ray machines at the airports
• A Better Nose
• X-Rays
• Explosives Detection Systems (EDS)
• Explosives Trace Detection (ETD)
Equipment prescribed by SOLAS 74
• Ship security alert system- Each ship must
be fitted with a Ship Security Alert System, or
"silent alarm", which when activated will
transmit a ship-to-shore security alert that
identifies the ship, the ship's location, and
indicates that the ship in under threat or has had
a breach of a security. Transmissions from the
Ship Security Alert System must not alert any
other ship or sound any alarm on the ship.
Further it must continue until reset. The Ship
Security Alert System must be designed to be
activated from the navigational bridge and from
one other piace on the ship
Automatic identification system-(AIS) This
was equipment which was made mandatory
through a clause in SOLAS 74.
Other Security Equipment
During the Ship Security Assessment, the
Company Security Officer and Ship Security
Officer must evaluate the need for other
appropriate security equipment that may be
used to protect the security of the ship. For
example, closed-circuit cameras may be used
for surveillance (when personnel are available
to monitor the cameras) or metal detectors
and/or x-ray equipment may be
appropriate for screening passengers and
their belongings. The Ship Security Plan
must identify all the ship security equipment
and establish procedures for inspecting,
testing, and maintaining all security
equipment manufacturers' instructions
HAND HELD METAL DETECTORS HEND HELD METAL DETECTORS
MODEL-101A MODEL – 102B

HAND HELD METAL DETECTORS

DOOR FRAME METAL DETECTORS
MODEL -103C
(PORTABLE) 105E
LETTER BOMB UNDER VEHICLE
DETECTOR SEARCH

OPTICAL SEARCH DEVICES (Trolley

Mounted)
Chapter 6:

THREAT IDENTIFICATIONS,
RECOGNITION & RESPONSE
Recognition & detection of weapon,
dangerous substances and devices
In order to pre-empt and prevent a terrorist action
onboard, it is imperative that the terrorist is
prevented from bringing his instruments of
destruction onboard. Further, it is likely that
the terrorist will try to smuggle his weapons in
parts and these parts at first look would look like
machinery spare or tools for carrying out repairs
onboard. It is therefore important that
personnel onboard have at least a basic
knowledge of these instruments and how they
look like. Given below are some images of
weapons used by terrorists/pirates.
 REVOLVER ASSAULT RIFLE

SHOULDER FIRED
HAND GRENADE
ROCKET LAUNCHER
Explosives
Any explosive material has the following
characteristics:
•It is chemically or otherwise energetically
unstable.
•The initiation produces a sudden
expansion of the material accompanied
by large changes in pressure (and
typically also a flash or loud noise) which
is called the explosion
Classifications:
• Low Explosives (Burns through
deflagration rather than detonation wave.
Are a mixture, are initiated by heat and
require confinement to create an
explosion) and
• High Explosives (will explode without
confinement, are compounds, initiated
by shock or heat, supersonic reaction,
high brisance "Brisance“ means the
shattering effect of an explosion.
METHODS OF PHYSICAL SEARCHES AND NON -
INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS

GUIDE TO SEARCHING PROCEDURES IN PORTS AND ON

SHIPS
• Metal Detection
• Baggage Screening
 Metal Detectors
 Vapor Detection
 X-Ray Systems
 Physical Search
• Heavy Baggage
• Cars & Small vehicles
X-Ray Systems
However X-Ray examination can also be
defeated, for example X-Rays may not
detect explosives and plastic weapons not
will they allow identification of the actual
liquid in bottles or other containers.
Moreover it is possible to camouflage the
image of weapons and devices by the use of
other dense materials.
The use of X-Rays is a very effective method
of screening bags and other items provided
certain conditions are met. For example,
operator efficiency decreases significantly
after only a relative short time, particularly
at peak screening periods.
Physical Search
To be properly effective, physical
search of bags and belongings should
include a check for false
compartments, often used for the
smuggling of weapons and devices.
Particular attention should be paid to
electrical and electronic apparatus,
such as radios, which have often been
used as containers for devices to avoid
detection under X-Ray examination.
Passengers should be questioned on
the origins of the equipment and whether it
has been out of their possession for any
period of time. Equipment may be
examined for unusual characteristics,
signs of tampering, excessive weight,
loose aroused. Treat all new packaged
equipment in the same manner as used
models
• Heavy Baggage-
The screening of heavy baggage is
normally done by central X- Ray machine
supported by physical search. Air sampling
probes can be used in the checking of
heavy baggage and it is an area where the
use of digs trained to sniff out explosives may
well be beneficial. Like passenger
screening, once heavy baggage has been
screened it is essential it should be
marked and kept under surveillance until
onboard the ship. In the organization
and control of heavy baggage, the rules of
reconciling passengers to their baggage
must be strictly adhered to.
• Cars and small Vehicles- The screening
of cars boarding ferries has two aims
namely:
a) Preventing a car bomb being driven
on-board.

b) Intercepting weapons, explosive and

IED concealed in those cars
EXECUTION AND COORDINATING SEARCHING
Know what you are looking for
Personnel forming part of the search party
should be briefed on the likely physical
appearance of the object for which the search is
being carried out. As brought out earlier, the
threatening object may be an AK-47 rifle, a
time bomb or a plastic explosive. But these
items would he hidden under a disguise, As
brought out earlier, an AK-47 may have been
hidden as tools in spare parts. Similarly
plastic explosives can be moulded in various
shapes. Hence, a time bomb may be hidden
separately as timer, Detonator and the
explosive itself.
TECHNIQUES USED TO CIRCUMVENT
SECURITY MEASURES
a)Physical penetration of the security barrier
• Breaking an electric circuit (switches)
• Making an electric circuit (pressure pads
• Interrupting or disturbing a light beam
(photoelectric)
• Detecting sounds
• Detecting motion (ultrasonic motion
sensors)
• Electronic perimeter defense (RADAR)
• Duress alarms (Operated by personnel)
b) Deceit

• Change of physical identity

• Using forged identity documents
• Cyber crime
• Hiding contra band in genuine
products
• Using false bottoms
• Smuggling weapons and explosives
in parts
Chapter 7:

SHIP SECURITY ACTIONS

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY DIFFERENT SECURITY LEVELS
1. Recognizing that vigilance must increase as the threat of a
security incident increases; the ISPS Code establishes three
security levels that call for tighter protective measures when
there are more likely or specific threats.
• Security Level 1
It means the level for which minimum appropriate protective
security measures shall be maintained at all times. i.e. day to day
working of a ship.

• Security Level 2
Security Level 2 is used when there is a heightened threat
of an attack occurring in a specific area against a specific
class of targets. Thus, necessitating maintenance of
additional protective security measures for a period of time.

• Security Level 3
It means the level for which further specific protective security
measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when
a security incident is probable of imminent, although it may not
be possible to identify the specific target.
2. The Ship Security Plan must specify the security
protective measures to be taken on each ship at
each security level for the following activities
• Ordinary Security activities
• Controlling access to the ship
• Controlling the embarkation of persons and
their belongs
• Monitoring restricted areas to prevent
unauthorized access
• Monitoring deck areas and areas around the
ship
• Supervising cargo and stores handling
ACTION TO BE TAKEN AT VARIOUS SECURITY
LEVELS

Access to the Ship

Level 1
The guidelines for access related security measures are as
follows:

• Checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship

and confirming their reasons for doing so by checking, for
example, joining instructions, passenger tickets, boarding passes,
work orders, etc;
• Segregating embarking from disembarking passengers;
identification of access points that shall be secured or
attended to prevent unauthorized access; securing, by locking
or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas to
which passengers and visitors have access; and providing
security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats,
the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects of
activities and the need for vigilance
• At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship shall be
liable to search. The frequency of such searches, including
random searches, shall be specified in the approved SSP
and shall be specifically approved by the Administration.
Security Level 2
At security level 2, where there is heightened risk of a
security incident, establish the following additional
protective measures:-
• Assigning personnel to patrol deck areas during silent
hours to deter unauthorized access;
• Limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying
those to be closed and the means of adequately securing them,
• Deterring waterside access to the ship, including, for
example, in liaison with the port facility, provision of boat
patrols;
• Establishing a restricted area on the shore-side of the
ship, in close co-operation with the port facility;
• Increasing the frequency and detail of searches of people,
personal effects, and vehicles being embarked or loaded onto
the ship;
• Escorting visitors on the ship;
• Providing additional specific security briefings to all ship
personnel on any
• Identified threats, re-emphasizing the procedures for
reporting suspicious persons; objects, or activities and
stressing the. need for increased vigilance; and carrying out
a full or partial search of the ship.
Security Level 3
At security Level 3, the ship shall comply with the
instructions issued by those responding to the
security incident or threat thereof, i.e. the PFSO.
The SSP shall detail the security measures, which
could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation
with those responding and the port facility, which
may include:
• Limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;
• Granting access only to those responding to the
security incident or threat thereof;
• Directing of persons on board;
• Suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;
• suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries,
etc
• Evacuation of the ship;
• Movement of the ship; and
• Preparing for a full or partial search of the ship
Restricted Areas of the Ship
The Ship Security Plan must provide for monitoring the
restricted areas of the ship to prevent unauthorized access.
The purpose of restricted areas is to prevent unauthorized
access to protect the safety of the ship personnel and
passengers, and to protect cargo and ship stores from
tampering. Restricted areas may include:
• The Navigational bridge
• The engine Room
• Steering gear room
• Crew Accommodation areas
• Cargo tanks or holds
• Cargo pump rooms
• Storage lockers for ship stores
• Spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous
substances .
• Electrical equipment rooms
• Ventilation and air conditioning equipment rooms
• Portable water systems
• Emergency response equipment rooms
• Similar key areas essential to the security and safe
operation of the ship
Security Level 1
At security Level 1, establish some or
all of the following protective measures
for restricted areas of the ship:
• Lock or otherwise secure access points to
restricted areas
• Use surveillance equipment to monitor
activities in restricted areas
• Use guards of patrols in restricted areas
• Use automatic intrusion detection
devices to alert ship personnel of
unauthorized access.
Security Level 2
At Security Level 2, where there is a
heightened risk of a security incident,
establish the following additional
protective measures to prevent
unauthorized access to restricted areas
of the ship:
• Establish additional restricted areas
around access points
• Continuously monitor surveillance
equipment, If any
• Dedicate additional ship personnel to
guard and patrol restricted areas
Security Level 3
At Security Level 3, where local
authorities or port facility personnel
may be responding to a specific
security incident, cooperate with those
authorities and comply with their
instructions that may include:
• Establishing additional restricted areas
near or around the site of the security
incident and denying access to those
areas
• Carefully searching all restricted
areas of the ship
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP shall
establish the security measures to be
applied during cargo handling, which may
include:
• Routine checking of cargo, cargo transport
units and cargo spaces prior to, and during,
cargo handling operations:
• Checks to ensure that cargo being loaded
matches the cargo documentation;
• Ensuring, in liaison with the port facility,
that vehicles to be loaded on board car-
carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships are
subjected to search prior loading, in
accordance with the frequency required
the SSP; and
• Checking of seals of other methods used to
prevent tampering
MAINTAINING SECURITY OF THE SHIP/PORT
INTERFACE
It is critical that the ship security officer and the port
facility security officer maintained a good interface ad
work in harmony
At all times the master of a ship has the ultimate
responsibility for the safety and security of the ship.
Even at security level 3 a master may seek
clarification of amendment of instructions issued by
those responding to a security incident, or threat
thereof, if there are to believe that compliance with
any instruction may imperil the safety of the ship.
If a ship has a higher security level than the port
facility it intends to use, the CSO or SSO should
advise the PFSO without delay. The PFSO should
undertake an assessment of the particular situation
in consultation with the CSO or SSO and agree on
appropriate security measures with the ship,
which include completion and signing of a
Declaration of Security
Delivery- of Ship Stores
Ship Security Plan should specify
protective measures for ·the delivery of
ship Stores to:
• Check ship stores for evidence of
package damage. Or tampering
• Prevent the acceptance of ship stores
without prior inspection
• Prevent tampering
• Prevent acceptance and loading or stores
unless order
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP shall establish the security measures to
be applied during delivery of ship's stores, which may include
checking to ensure stores match the order prior to be loaded
on board and immediately stowing ship stores after Loaded on
board.

Security Level 2
At Security Level 2, where there is heightened risk of a security
incident establish additional protective measures regarding ship
stores, including detailed checking an increase inspection of ship
stores.

Security Level3
At security level 3, the ship shall comply with the instruction
issued by the responding to the security incident or threat
thereof. The SSP shall detail the security measures, which could
taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding
and the port facility, which may include:
• subjecting ship’s stores to more extensive checking;
• Preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of 'ship's
stores; and
• Refusal to accept ships stores on board the ship
Monitoring the Security of the Ship
The Ship Security Plan must provide the
capability to continually monitor the ship,
including the restricted areas of the ship
and areas surrounding the ship.

Monitoring aids may include:

• Lighting
• Watch-keepers, security guards, deck
watches and/or patrols
• Automatic intrusion detectors and
surveillance equipment
At Security Level 1, monitor the security of the ship
by
•Invalid certificate
•Serious deficiency in security equipment or
documentation
•Receipt of a complaint that the ship does not
comply with Xl-2 I Code Part A
•Ships personnel not familiar with essential ship
board security procedures or cannot carry out
security drills.
•Key security members of the ship are unable
to establish proper communication among
themselves.
•Ship has to embark persons for loading stores from
a port or a ship which are in violation of Xl-2/Part A.
of Code. Further the ship has not completed
DoS (declaration of security) nor has taken any
additional security measures.
• That the ship possesses a valid certificate and
the name of the issuing authority.
• The security level at which the ship is currently
operating.
• The security level at which the ship operated in
any previous port where it has conducted
ship/port interface within the time
frame .specified in para 2.3
• Any special or additional security measures that
were taken by the ship in any previous port
where it has conducted a ship/port interface
within the timeframe specified in para 2.3.
• The appropriate ship security procedures were
maintained during any ship-to-ship activity
within the timeframe specified in para 2.3.
• Other practical security - related
information (but not details of the ship security
plan), taking into account the guidance given
in Part B of the ISPS Code.
FAMILIARITY WITH THE DECLARATION OF SECURITY

1. What is the Declaration of Security?

2. The Declaration of Security specifies

3. When is a Declaration of security required?

• Flag and Port States have agreed to require Declarations of
Security for certain international voyages and I or specific ships
on those voyages
• There has been a security threat or security incident involving
the ship or the port facility
• The ship is at a port facility that is not required to prepare and
implement and approved Port Facility Security Plan.
• The Ship is conducting ship-to-ship activities with another ship
that is not required to prepare and implement an approved Ship
Security Plan.

4. At the higher security levels

5. Who may complete the Declaration of Security form?
REPORTING SECURITY INCIDENTS
Any breach of security should be immediately
reported to SSO/ Duty Officer Master/ Port Police
• Activate the Ship Security Alert System
• Call Emergency Stations
• Inform the Contracting Government of the Port
Facility
• Prepare to evacuate the ship
• Prepare to leave the port
• Act on Instructions given by the contracting
governments .
• Use the appropriate Contingency plan
• Suspicious package left unattended
• Suspicious vehicles in unauthorized areas
• Persons tampering with containers or other cargo
• Suspicious persons anywhere on the terminal
REPORTING SECURITY INCIDENTS (continued…)

• Persons initiating “small talk’’ geared towards obtaining

knowledge of security or terminal operation
• Suspicious persons coming off I boarding vessels. Be on
the lookout for their movements throughout the terminal.
• Suspicious odors that may appear to you as chemical
or hazardous in nature
• Leaking containers
• Damage to terminal perimeter security such as fencing,
walls, etc
• Evidence of obvious tampering with any port equipment.
Be sure to inspect equipment prior to operating
• Suspicious small boats or kayaks near or around terminal
berths
• Persons not wearing Port ID Cards
• Persons attempting to videotape or take photographs on
the terminals
• The Port Police have made a confidential telephone tip
line available so you may call to leave tips or information
that may lead to the reduction of crime, illegal activity or
safety violations.
Chapter 8:

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
DRILLS, AND EXERCISES
EXECUTION OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

The famous saying goes "Hope for the best and be

prepared for the worst". Contingency planning
relates to the second half of the saying i.e. be
prepared for the worst. In simple words contingency
planning means planning for an unseen event or an
emergency. Hence, depending upon the threat
scenario the ship must identify all the contingences
that can take place. Once the contingencies have
been identified, well thought out plans can be drawn
out to avoid, minimize and mitigate the adverse
effect of the contingency. Some of the contingencies
that a ship can expect to jeopardize its security are
• Bomb threat
• Hostage situation
• Sabotage
• Chemical weapon threat
• Detection of explosives on board
The contingency plan must include the
following:
a) The on board organization to handle the
contingency
b) Responsibility and duty of each personnel in
tackling in the contingency.
c) Detailed check off list prescribing the action to
be taken by each individual.
d) The communication arrangement within the
ship
e) Personnel authorized to communicate with
external authorities and the means of
communications.
f) Records to be maintained
Breaches of Security
When security is breached, the Master /
SSO shall consider doing the following:

• Activate the Ship Security Alert System

• Call Emergency Stations
• Inform the Contracting Government of
the Port Facility
• Prepare to evacuate the ship
• Prepare to leave the port
• Act on Instructions given by the
contracting governments.
• Use the appropriate Contingency Plans
SECURITY DRILLS AND EXERCISES
According to the ISPS-code part A 9.8.1 security drills
and exercises are confidential and cannot be witnessed
by third parties other than flag state authorities
To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of
the ship security plan, drills shall be conducted at least
once every three months.
Various types of exercises which may include participation
of company security officers, port facility security
officers, relevant authorities of Contracting
Governments as well assist ship security officers, if
available, shall be carried out at least once each calendar
year with no more than 18 months between the exercises.
These exercises shall test communications,
coordination, resource availability, and response.
These exercises may be:
• Full scale or live
• Tabletop simulation or seminar; or
• Combined .with other exercises held, such as search and
rescue or emergency
• Response exercises.
Company participation in an exercise
with another Contracting Government
shall recognized by the Administration
To ensure. effective coordination and
implementation between the ship,
Company shore based personnel, and
port facilities, different types of larger-
scale exercises that include the
participation of the Company Security
Officer, Port Facility Security
Officers, and other appropriate
participants should be conducted at
least once a year
Assessment of Security Drills and
Exercises

Preparation-
As part of the preparation for the
exercises, all personnel who are required
to participate in the exercise must
be thoroughly briefed on the aim of the
exercise, how it will be conducted and
what each individual is expected to do.
USE OF CITADEL WHERE PROVIDED ONBOARD
A Citadel is designated pre-planned area
purpose built into the, ship where, in the
event of imminent boarding by pirates,
all crew will seek protection. A Citadel
is designed and constructed to resist a
determined .pirate trying to gain entry.
Such a space would probably have, but
not be limited to, its own self-contained
air-conditioning emergency rations, water
supply good external communications
emergency shut-down capability for the
main and auxiliary engines, and remotely
operated CCTV cameras.
A Citadel is to provide longer term
protection of the crew
The ability to communicate is very
important as the crew needs to be able to
confirm that they are all in a secured
place and that anyone a potential
boarding party encounters can safety be
assumed to be hostile
CITADEL EQUIPMENT
• Communications
• Contact List
• CCTV
• Navigational Aids
• Food and water
• Crew List
• Grab Bag
• Toilet
• Bedding Material
Chapter 9:

SECURTY ADMINISTRATION
DOCUMENTATION & RECORDS

The SSP has a plan of the ship

annotated with:
• All the potential access points to ship
• All restricted areas and vulnerable
points
• The citadel plan
• Access points to ship
Gangway Log/ ID Badges
Gangway log:
Uncontrolled or unescorted movement must
not be permitted; therefore gangway/ visitors
log is mandatory at all times.

The company policy is that at all times and all

security level, all repairmen and visitors
must carry ID and be entered in the
gangway visitors log, and maintained at all
times for informational and historical
purposes
The format and information is to be
documented:
• All entries are to be made in ink
• Mistakes will be corrected by drawing a
line through the incorrect entry and initials
of corrector placed next to it
Visitors log:
• Name of repairman or visitor
• Name of person being visited
• The time in and out
• The allocated badge number

ID badges should be color-coded and issued

to escorted or non-escorted repairmen or
visitors. They should only be issued on
the production of photographic identity
documents. At security level three, only
pre-cleared visitors should be allowed
access to the ship.
Badges will be serialized and color-coded as
follows:
• Blue: visitor is on approves access list and
escort is not required
• Orange: for personal visits. Sponsor will be
required to escort visitor at all times
• Red: for contract I other escort required visitors
• Green: for passengers. With passenger
identification, photograph and signature,
duration of the pass and issue control

Personnel issued badges will be told:

• How to wear I display the badge
• What to do if badge is lost
• To return badge upon leaving the ship
Crew log:
All crew leaving the ship, away from the
immediate berth or facility, must sign in and
out of the crew log.
The log should include the following
information:
• Name of crewman signed out
• Time out
• Who authorized
• Where Going
• What task
• When due back
• Contact number (if available)
• Time in
• Signature
Chapter 10:

PIRACY AWARENESS - PRIOR

TO ENTERING AREAS OF RISK
APPRAISE THE STRENGTHS AND
VULNERABILITIES OF CRUISE AND SHIP

Information gathering, risk assessment

through available information
Understand the role of the Company Security
Officer in assimilating the information
and trends of piracy attacks as well as
information on Group convoys/escorts which
is passed to the ship. The various sources
used by the Company Security Officer could
be identified. In addition, the ship also
receives navigational warnings with Piracy
information
ANTIPIRACY MEASURES (CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY)
Passage planning and reporting, including
planning for convoys/group transit

MSCHOA as well as various administrations

routeing guidelines and reporting could be
shown as examples. Also, examples of
application and use of escort vessel
provided by various countries could be shown
UNDERSTAND THE COTENTS OF THE BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE
PURPOSE
•The purpose of this document is to provide Best
Management Practices (BMP) to assist companies
and ships in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring
attacks and delaying successful attacks in the
Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Coast of Somalia.
The organizations consulted on this document
represent the vast majority-of ship owners and
operators transiting the region.
TYPICAL ATTACK PROFILES AND LESSONS LEARNT

Analysis of successful attacks indicates the following

common vulnerabilities are exploited by the pirates:
a. Low speed
b. Low free board
c. Inadequate planning and procedures
d. Visibly low state of alert and/or lack of evident self-
protective measures.
e. Where a slow response by the ship is evident

Commonly two or more small high-speed (up to 25 knots)

open boats/"skiffs" are used in attacks often approaching
from the port quarter and/or stern

The use of a pirate "mother ship", which is a larger ship

carrying personnel, equipment, supplies and smaller
attack craft, has enabled attacks to be successfully
undertaken at a greater range from the shore
TYPICAL ATTACK PROFILES AND
LESSONS LEARNT (continued….)
• The majority of attempted hijacks have
been repelled by ship's crew who have
planned and trained in advance of the
passage and employed passive counter
measures to good effect.
• Prevailing weather and sea state
conditions also greatly influence
attackers' ability to operate. Wind
strengths in excess of 18 knots and wave
heights above 2 meters are considered
sufficient to provide protection for all
but the most vulnerable vessels,
particularly where masters are taking full
account of Best Management Practices.
RECOMMENDED BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Introduction
Whilst recognizing the absolute
discretion of the master at all times to
adopt appropriate measures to avoid,
deter of delay piracy attacks in this
region, this document of best practices
is provided for ship owners and ship
operators, masters and their crews.
Prior to transit-general planning
a.General
• UKMTO Dubai is the first point of contact for
ships in the region. The day-to-day interface
between masters and the military is provided
by UKMTO Dubai, who talk to the ships and
liaise directly with MSC HOA and the naval
commanders at sea. UKMTO Dubai require
regular updates on the position and intended
movements of ships. They use this information
to help the naval units maintain an accurate
picture of shipping. (See Glossary at Annex A for
further detail.
• The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
(MSCHOA), is the planning and coordination
authority for EU forces (EU NAVFOR) in the Gulf
of Aden and the area off the Coast of Somalia.
(See Glossary at Annex A)
• Advanced notion of a vessel’s intended
passage is required by the naval authority
so that they can identify vulnerabilities and
plan suitable protection.
Initial report to UKMTO Dubai, (e-mail or
fax)
Initial report to MARLO (e-mail or fax)
Additionally, if planning to transit the Gulf
of Aden, or navigate within the area bound
by 12ºN, 58 ºE & 10º S: Register the
Vessel Movement with MSCHOA (either,
online or by e-mail or fax)
• Whilst measures should be taken to
prevent pirates boarding the Safety of
crew and passengers is paramount.
b. Company planning

The use of additional private security

guards is at the discretion of the
company but the use of armed guards
is not recommended
C. Ship's master planning
i. Communication of “ Initial Report “to
UKMTO Dubai and MARLO (e-mail or
fax) when entering the reporting area
between Suez, and 78 degrees East 10
degrees South, see Anti-Piracy Planning
chart Q6099
ii. “Vessel Movement Registration”
submission has been logged with their
companies that their details are
correctly registered with MSCHOA.
This can be done by either the ship or
the company
Ship's master planning (Continued…)
• Prior to transit of the region it is recommended
that the crew should be thoroughly briefed.
• The anti-piracy contingency plan has been
shown to be most effective when implemented
in advance. A drill is conducted prior to arrival
in the area, the plan reviewer and all
personnel briefed on their duties, including
familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a
piracy attack.
• Masters are advised to also prepare an
emergency communication plan, to include all
essential emergency contact numbers and
pre*prepared messages, which should be
ready at hand or permanently displayed near
the communications panel (e.g. telephone
numbers of MSCHOA, IMB PRC, CSO, etc -see
Contact List at Annex B)
Ship's master planning (continued…)
• Define the ship’s AIS policy:
SOLAS permit the master the discretion to
switch off AIS if he believes that its use
increase the ship’s vulnerability. However.
in order to provide naval forces with
tracking information within the GoA it is
recommended that AIS transmission is
continued but restricted to ship’s identity,
position, course, speed, navigational status
and safety-related information. Off the
coast of Somalia the decision is again left
to the master’s discretion, but current
Naval advice is to turn it off completely. If
in doubt this can be verified with MSCHOA
3. Prior to transit voyage planning
a.Vessels are encouraged to report their
noon position, course, speed, estimated
and, actual arrival ,times to UKMTO
Dubai and MARLO whilst operating in the
region.
b.Vessels are also encouraged to increase
the frequency of such reports when
navigating, in known high risk/piracy
areas and further report upon passing
Point A or B in the GoA, as shown on
Anti-Piracy Chart Q6099.
Inside the GoA
i. EUNAVFOR strongly recommends that ships
conduct their passage within the IRTC.
Westbound ships should bias themselves to
the northern portion of the corridor, and
eastbound ships to the southern portion.
Group Transit (GT) guidance within the GoA
for times and, speeds are on the MSCHOA
website if a GT is contemplated.
ii. Ships should avoid entering Yemeni
Territorial Waters (YTWs)customary
international law, as it is not possible for
international military forces (non- Yemeni) to
protect ships that are attacked inside Yemeni
TTW.
iii. Ships may be asked to, make adjustments to
passage plans to conform MSCHOA routeing
advice.
Inside the GoA (continued….)

iv. During GTs ships should not expect to be

permanently in the company of a warship.
But all warships-in-the GoA, whether part
of EUNAVFOR; or coordination with them,
will be aware of the GoA GTs and will have
access to the full details of vulnerable
SHIPPING.
v. MSCHOA strongly recommends masters
make every effort to plan transit periods of
highest risk areas of the GoA for night
passage. (MSCHOA will advise ships) Very
few successful attacks have occurred at
night.
d. Outside the GoA
• Ship navigating off the east coast of
Somalia should consult with MSCHOA
website or UKMTO Dubai in order to
obtain the most recent routeing advice
• Masters should still update UKMTO Dubai
in the usual manner with their ship’s
course and details
Prior transit- Defensive measures
• Increase lookouts/bridge manning
• Man the engine-room
• Secure and control access to the bridge, engine-
room, steering gear room, and all
accommodation/internal spaces. All potential
access points (doors, portholes, vents, etc.)
should be risk-assessed and adequately secured,
especially where the potential access point is
considered large enough for an attacker to gain
entry. Access to and from the accommodation
and internal work spaces should be reduced to a
single point of entry when transiting the high
risk areas. Any measures employed should not
obstruct an emergency EXIT from within the
internal space, whilst remaining secure
from access by pirates outside.
Prior transit- Defensive measures (Contd…)
• In case of emergency, warships can be
contacted on VHF Ch. 16 (Backup
Ch.08).
• It is recommended that a piracy attack
muster point or "citadel" be designated and
lock-down procedures rehearsed in order
to delay access to control of the ship and buy
time. Ideally this should be away from
external bulkheads and portholes. Due to
the ongoing debate on the use of citadels
and their method of employment, masters are
recommended to check regularly with
MSCHOA
In Transit-Operations
a. Ship's crew should not be exposed to
undue risk when employing Self-Protective
Measures (SPM).
b. All ships inside the GoA are strongly urged
to use the IRTC and follow MSC HOA GT advice
and timings as promulgated on the MSCHOA
web site.
c. Attention of Mariners is also drawn to IMO
circular SN. 1/Circ.281 dated 4 August 2009,
"Information on Internationally Recognized
Transit Corridor (IRTC) for Ships Transiting the
Gulf Aden" where advice is provided that the
IRTC is subject to change by military
authorities according to prevailing
circumstances. Mariners are therefore urged to
obtain up-to-date information from the
"MSCHOA" website http://www.mschoa.org or
NAV-warnings promulgated for that area.
In Transit-Operations (continued…)
• Ships should comply with the International
Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all
times. Masters should endeavour not to
impede the safe navigation of other vessels
when joining and leaving the IRTC. Navigation
lights should not be turned off at night. Follow
the guidance given b Flag State Authority.
• Provide deck lighting only as required for
safety. Lighting in the shadow zones around the
ship's hull may extend the area of visibility
for lookouts, but only where consistent with
safe navigation. Where fitted, and deemed
suitable, consider the immediate use of
"remotely operated" ship search lights, if
suspicious activity around the vessel is
observed, the use of search lights may startle
and deter a potential attack. (Current Naval
advice is to transit with navigation lights only
If attacked by pirates
a. Follow the ship's pre-prepared contingency plan.
b. Activate the Emergency Communication Plan,
and report the attack immediately to the single
primary point of contact in the event of an attack,
which is UKMTO Dubai. (MSCHOA)
c. Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS),
which will alert your Company Security Officer and flag
state.
d. If the master has exercised his right to turn off the
Automatic Identification System (AIS) during transit of
the piracy area, this should be turned on once the ship
comes under pirate attack.
e. Sound the emergency alarm and make a 'pirate
attack' (PA) announcement in accordance with the
ship's emergency plan. .
f. Make a "Mayday" call on VHF Ch. 16 (and backup
Ch. 08, which is monitored by naval units). Send a
distress message via the DSC (Digital Selective
Calling) system and lnmarsat-C, as applicable.
Establish telephone communication with UKMTO
Dubai.
If attacked by pirates (continued….)
g. Prevent skiffs closing on the ship by altering course
and increasing speed where possible. Pirates have
great difficulty boarding a ship that is:
 Making way at over 15 knots.
 Manoeuvring - it is suggested that as early as possible
masters undertake continuous small zigzag manoeuvres
to further deter boarding whilst maintaining speed.
Consider increasing the pirates' exposure to wind/waves
and using bow wave and stern wash to restrict pirate
craft coming alongside. Masters and the Officer of the
Watch (OOW) should be aware of the handling and
manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel. Particular
attention should be given to the effects of varying helm
orders and the impact these can have on the ship's
speed.
h. Activate fire pump defensive measures
i. Consider turning on forward facing deck lights to draw
attention to your vessel and aid positive identification
by arriving military forces as a vessel under attack
j. Muster all remaining crew in accordance with the
ship's contingency plan
If boarded by pirates
a. Before pirates gain access to the bridge,
inform UKMTO Dubai and, if time permits, the
Company.
b. Offer no resistance; this could lead to
unnecessary violence and harm to the crew.
c. If the bridge/engine-room is to be evacuated,
then the main engine should be stopped; all way
taken off the vessel if possible and the ship
navigated clear of other ships.
d. Remain calm and cooperate fully with the
pirates.
e. Ensure all crew, other than the bridge
team, stay together in one location.
f. If in a locked down "citadel" ensure internal
protection/cover is available in case the pirates
attempt to force entry. Keep clear of entry
point/door and portholes/windows - do not resist
entry. Use citadel emergency communication
methods to communicate with authorities
In the event of military action
a. Crew should be advised NOT to use cameras
with flash at any time when any military action
in underway.
b. In the event that military personnel take
action on board the ship, all personnel should
keep low to the deck, cover their head with both
hands, with hands visible and empty.
c. Be prepared to answer questions on identity
and status on board.
d. Be aware that English is not the working
language of all naval units in the region.
e. Military Forces- may initially secure all persons
encountered. This is standard practice. Brief and
prepare ship's personnel to expect this and to
cooperate fully during the initial stages of military
action on board
Post incident reporting (Reference Annex
C)
a. Following any piracy attack or suspicious
activity, it is vital that a detailed report of
the event is reported to MSCHOA, UKMTO
DUBAI and the IMB.
b. This will ensure full analysis and trends in
piracy activity are established as well as
enabling assessment of piracy techniques
or changes in tactics, in addition to
ensuring appropriate warnings can be
issued to other Merchant Shipping in the
vicinity.
c. Masters are therefore requested to
complete the standardized piracy report
form contained in Annex C
Updating best management practices
1. It is anticipated that these BMP will
be periodically updated based upon
operational experience and lessons
learned. The parties to this document will
endeavor to meet regularly to update these
BMP and to circulate revisions to their
respective members and other interested
organizations.
2. If in doubt, consult the MSCHOA
website where additional relevant
information will always be posted (noting
that this may not be endorsed by all the
above-listed organizations)
Chapter 11:

PIRATE ATTACK
 EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF A PIRACY ATTACK
Piracy and armed robbery against ships
Before embarking on any set of measures or
recommendations, it is imperative for governmental or
other agencies concerned to gather accurate statistics of
the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships,
to collate these statistics under both type and area and to
assess the nature of the attacks with special emphasis on
types of attack, accurate geographical location and modus
operandi of the wrongdoers and to disseminate or publish
these statistics to all interested parties in a format that is
understandable and usable. Advanced intelligence could
also prove useful in obtaining information to Governments
in order to be able to act in a coordinated manner even
before an attack occurs. Based on the statistics of the
incidents and any intelligence of piracy and armed robbery
against ships Governments should issue to ships entitled to
fly their flag, as necessary, advice and guidance on any
appropriate additional precautionary measures ships may
need to put in place to protect themselves from attack.
Governments should. involve representatives of ship
owners and seafarers in developing these measures
to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against
ships
ASSESS HOW TO DEFEND THE CREW AND THE SHIP
Self protection
Ships can and should take measures to protect
themselves from pirates and armed robbers. These
measures are recommended in
MSC.1/Circ.1334. While security forces can often
advise on these measures, and flag States are
required to take such measures as are necessary
to ensure that owners and masters accept their
responsibility, ultimately it is the responsibility of
owners, companies, ship operators and masters to
take seamanlike precautions when their ships
navigate in areas where the threat of piracy and
armed robbery exists. Flag States should make
ship owners/companies aware of any UN Security
Council, IMO, or any other UN resolutions
on piracy and any recommendations therein
relevant for the ship owner, ship operator the
master and crew when operating in areas where
piracy or armed robbery against ships occur.
With respect to the carriage of firearms on
board, the flag State should be aware that
merchant ships and fishing vessels
entering the territorial sea and/or ports of
another-State are subject to that State's
legislation. It should be borne in mind that
importation of firearms is subject to port
and coastal State regulations. It should be
borne in mind that importation of firearms is
subject to port and coastal State regulations.
It should also be borne in mind that
carrying firearms may pose an even greater
danger if the ship is carrying flammable
cargo or similar types of dangerous goods
Non-arming of seafarers

For legal and safety reasons, flag States should

strongly discourage the carrying and use of
firearms by seafarers for personal protection or
for the protection of a ship. Seafarers are civilians
and the use of firearms requires special training
and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with
firearms carried on board ship is great. Carriage of
arms on board ships may encourage attackers to
carry firearms or even more dangerous weapons,
thereby escalating an already dangerous
situation. Any firearm on board may itself
become an attractive target for an attacker.
Use of unarmed security personnel
The use of unarmed security personnel is a matter
for individual ship owners, companies, and ship
operators to decide. It should be fully
acceptable to provide an enhanced lookout
capability this way.
Use of privately contracted armed security
personnel
The use of privately contracted armed security
personnel on board ships may lead to an
escalation of violence. The carriage of such
personnel and their weapons is subject to flag
State legislation and policies and is a matter for
flag States to determine in consultation with
ship owners, companies, and ship operators, if
and· under which conditions this will be
allowed. Flag States should take into account the
possible escalation of violence which could
result from carriage of armed personnel on
board merchant ships, when deciding on its
policy
COPING IN A HOSTAGE SITUATION

Survival considerations
These techniques have been successfully
employed by others who have been taken
hostage:
• No one can tell an individual whether he
or she should resist or not if taken
hostage/kidnapped. This decision must
be made by each person's own assessment
of the circumstances. Resisting the attempt
may be extremely risky. You may be injured
if you attempt to resist armed individuals.
It is possible that you will immediately
be blindfolded and drugged
Chapter 12:

THE RELEASE PROCESS

ADDITIONAL DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH
RELEASE PROCESS (12.1)
THE RELEASE PROCESS
• Reassure the pirates that you will not be a cause of
concern against them.
• Seek to maintain the best possible living conditions on
board - negotiate this if necessary with the pirates.
Remember as many as fifty or more pirates may live on
board during your period of captivity
• They will take living spaces, however by being
reasonable; you can maintain good conditions for
yourself and your crewmates
• Formulate a positive physical and mental exercise
routine. This will help you cope with captivity;
maintain your wellbeing and help pass the time
productively. Try to maintain a regular sleep pattern
Chapter 13:

SEAFARER'S FAMILY
ENABLE SEAFARERS TO CONSIDER WHAT THEY MAY
WISH TO SHARE WITH THEIR FAMILY CONCERNING THE
RISK OF PIRACY

Alert your family and relatives at home to the possible dangers

that exist.

By discussing these matters openly before you transit the

area/ joining ship, you will help them deal with your captivity if
your ship is pirated.

By discussing such matters in advance, the impact on your

loved ones at home will be less then if they are unprepared and
do not understand what is happening.