Chapter Topics Transfer prices, corporate objectives, national tax laws. Cost minimization and performance evaluation. National tax guidelines. Five specific methods to determine arm’s-length prices. Advance pricing agreements (APAs). Enforcement of transfer pricing regulations.
11-2 International Transfer Pricing
Learning Objectives 1. Describe the importance of transfer pricing in achieving goal congruence in decentralized organizations. 2. Explain how the objectives of performance evaluation and cost minimization can conflict in determining international transfer prices. 3. Show how discretionary transfer pricing can be used to achieve specific cost minimization objectives. 4. Describe governments’ reaction to the use of discretionary transfer pricing by multinational companies.
11-3 International Transfer Pricing
Learning Objectives 5. Discuss transfer pricing methods used in the sales of tangible property. 6. Explain how advance pricing agreements can be used to create certainty in transfer pricing. 7. Describe worldwide efforts to enforce transfer pricing regulations.
11-4 Transfer Pricing Background
Transfer pricing is the determination of price on the
exchange of goods or services between related parties. These transfers are also referred to as intercompany transactions. Upstream transfers go from subsidiary to parent, downstream transfers are from parent to subsidiary. Transfers also occurs between different subsidiaries of the same parent. A significant proportion of international transactions are intercompany transfers.
11-5 Decentralization and Goal Congruence
Decentralization and agency problems
Decentralized companies are organized by division and division managers have significant authority. This structure decomposes problems into smaller pieces. It also permits local decision making which provides more responsibility for division managers. An agency problem can occur since division managers make decisions in their self-interest. The manager’s self-interest can vary with the best interests of the company.
Learning Objective 1 11-6
Decentralization and Goal Congruence
An effective accounting system can alleviate this agency
problem by providing incentives to division managers to act in the interests of the organization. This is referred to as goal congruence. These concepts are relevant to both multinational and purely domestic companies.
Learning Objective 1 11-7
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Performance evaluation systems Transfer prices directly affect the profits of the divisions involved in an intercompany transaction. Some performance evaluation systems are based on divisional profits. The effectiveness of these performance evaluation systems is influenced by the fairness of transfer prices. The effectiveness of performance evaluation systems affects the satisfaction of managers.
Learning Objective 2 11-8
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Cost minimization Profit maximization and, by extension, cost minimization are important corporate objectives. Manipulating transfer prices between countries is one way for multinational enterprises to achieve cost minimization. This is referred to as discretionary transfer pricing. The most common approach is to minimize costs by shifting profits to lower tax rate jurisdictions.
Learning Objective 2 11-9
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Cost minimization -- Example Padre Inc., a U.S. company, has two subsidiaries, Hijo and Hija. Hijo is located in Chile and Hija in the U.S. The tax rate is 17 percent in Chile and 35 percent in the U.S. Hijo transfers 100 units of cosa to Hija at a negotiated transfer price of $10 per unit. The cost per unit is $5 for Hijo and Hija sells the units in the U.S. at $15 per unit. Padre intervenes to set the transfer price at $13 per unit.
Learning Objectives 2 and 3 11-10
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Cost minimization -- Example Divisional profits under the negotiated transfer price:
Hijo Hija Padre
Sales $1,000 $1,500 $1,500 Cost of goods sold 500 1,000 500 Gross profit 500 500 1,000 Income tax effect 85 175 260 After-tax profit 415 325 740
Learning Objectives 2 and 3 11-11
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Cost minimization -- Example Divisional profits under the discretionary transfer price:
Hijo Hija Padre
Sales $1,300 $1,500 $1,500 Cost of goods sold 500 1,300 500 Gross profit 800 200 1,000 Income tax effect 136 70 206 After-tax profit 664 130 794
Learning Objectives 2 and 3 11-12
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Cost minimization -- Example Corporate profits under the discretionary transfer price are $54 greater relative to the negotiated price. This results from shifting $300 of pre-tax profits from the U.S. to Chile. The overall tax rate decreases from 26 to 20.6 percent. The performance evaluation objective is better served by the negotiated transfer price. The cost minimization objective is better served by the discretionary price.
Learning Objectives 2 and 3 11-13
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Conflicting objectives and a solution The previous example illustrates how cost minimization and performance evaluation can conflict. Dual pricing is one solution to this conflict. Under dual pricing, the official transfer price used for tax purposes is the discretionary transfer price. A separate set of records used for performance evaluation use the negotiated transfer price.
Learning Objective 2 11-14
Performance Evaluation, Cost Minimization, and Transfer Pricing Other cost minimization objectives Withholding taxes, on dividends, can be effectively avoided via setting favorable transfer prices. The same can be done to avoid profit repatriation restrictions. This essentially changes cash flows from dividends to intercompany revenues and expenses. Reduction of import duties. Increase cash flows out of a devaluing currency. Enhance the competitive position of a foreign operation.
Learning Objective 3 11-15
Government Reactions
Governments are aware of risk that multinationals will
use transfer pricing to avoid paying income and other taxes. Most governments publish guidelines regarding acceptable transfer pricing. The guidelines typically use the notion of an arm’s-length price. Arm’s-length price is the price that would be agreed upon by unrelated parties.
Learning Objective 4 11-16
Government Reactions
Section 482 – U.S. Internal Revenue Code
This rule allows the Internal Revenue Service to audit international transfer prices. Penalties of up to 40% of the underpayment of taxes can be imposed on violators. It applies to both upstream and downstream transactions, and transactions between two subsidiaries of the same parent.
Learning Objective 4 11-17
Government Reactions
Section 482 – U.S. Internal Revenue Code
A best methods rule requires the use of arm’s-length concept. Primary factors to consider are the degree of comparability to uncontrolled transactions and the quality of the underlying analysis. The IRS provides for correlative relief to help in situations where the IRS agrees with a company’s transfer pricing but a foreign government does not.
Widely considered the most reliable measure when a comparable uncontrolled transaction exists. Transfer price is determined based on reference to the company’s sales of the same product to an unrelated buyer. Reference to transactions between two unrelated parties for the same product are acceptable. If an uncontrolled transaction is not exactly comparable, an adjustment is allowable.
Learning Objective 5 11-20
Sale of Tangible Property
Resale price method
Generally used when the affiliate is a sales subsidiary and simply distributes finished goods. Transfer price is determined by deducting gross profit from the price charged by the sales subsidiary. Gross profit is determined by reference to uncontrolled parties. The most important factor in choosing this method is the similarity in function of the affiliated sales subsidiary and the uncontrolled reference company.
Learning Objective 5 11-21
Sale of Tangible Property
Cost-plus method Most appropriate when comparable uncontrolled transactions don’t exist and sales subsidiary does more than simply distribute finished goods. Transfer price is determined buy adding gross profit to the cost of production. Gross profit is determined by reference to uncontrolled parties. Factors influencing the comparability of uncontrolled transactions include: complexity of manufacturing process, procurement activities, and testing functions.
Learning Objective 5 11-22
Sale of Tangible Property
Comparable profits method
Underlying principle is that similar companies should earn similar returns over a period of time. One of the two related parties in the transactions is chosen for examination. Transfer price is determined via reference to an objective measure of profit of an uncontrolled company involved in comparable transactions. Typical measures of profit include: ratio of operating income to operating assets, and operating income to sales.
Learning Objective 5 11-23
Sale of Tangible Property
Profit split method
Treats the two related parties as one economic unit. Profit from the eventual sale to an uncontrolled party is allocated between the related parties. Allocation is based on relative contribution of each party. Contribution is determined by functions performed, risk assumed, and resources employed. There are actually two versions: comparable profit split method and residual profit split method.
Learning Objective 5 11-24
Sale of Tangible Property
Summary Any particular transfer pricing method used can result in a range of transfer prices. Companies can use discretion to set prices within the range in order to achieve cost minimization objectives. Companies can also use discretion in determining the “best” method. Section 482 does provide detailed guidance on factors to consider in determining comparability to uncontrolled transactions.
Learning Objective 5 11-25
Other Transfer Pricing Situations
Licenses of intangible property
Section 482 lists six categories of intangibles, including: patents, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, and methods and procedures. Four methods are available for setting transfer prices: Comparable uncontrolled transaction method. Comparable profits method. Profit split method. A group of unspecified methods. Pricing of Intercompany loans and intercompany services are also transfer pricing situations.
Learning Objective 5 11-26
Advance Pricing Agreements (APA)
Background An APA is an agreement between a company and a taxing authority regarding an acceptable transfer pricing method. A unilateral agreement is between a taxpayer and one government, a bilateral agreement involves a taxpayer and two governments. The primary advantage is assurance that their approach will not be challenged. The primary disadvantage is the time and cost involved in arriving at the agreement.
Learning Objective 6 11-27
Advance Pricing Agreements (APA)
Some specifics of national APAs
The U.S. began its APA program in 1991. An increasing number of other countries have subsequently established programs. In the U.S. of a total of 434 agreements, approximately 60 percent involve foreign parent companies. The electronics manufacturing industry is the leading user of APAs.
Learning Objective 6 11-28
Worldwide Enforcement
There are a number of documented cases of companies,
both U.S. and foreign, deemed to have underpaid taxes in the U.S. Some of these cases reflect obvious attempts by companies to evade U.S. taxes by manipulating transfer prices. In one case, a U.S. subsidiary sold bulldozers to its foreign parent for $551 each. From 1996-2000, over 60 percent of U.S. and foreign multinationals paid no U.S. income tax. There is a worldwide trend toward strengthening transfer pricing rules.
