UPDATES OF CASES ON

PERSONS AND FAMILY

RELATIONS 2010-2017
(JULY)

Prof. AMPARITA STA. MARIA, LL.B., LL.M.

GRADUATE LEGAL STUDIES INSTITUTE
ATENEO SCHOOL OF LAW
 Publication  Conjugal Partnership of Gains Arts.
 Abuse of Right/Right to Privacy 116,117, 121, 122, 124, 129 &
130,
 Family Code:
 Co-ownership with Impediment Art.
 Abuse of Right Art. 19
148
 Privacy Art. 26
 Family Home Arts. 152, 155, 160
 Absence of Essential Elements of
 Proof of Filiation Arts. 172 &175
Marriage Art. 4
 Illegitimate Children (and Surnames)
 Marriage with Foreigners Art. 26
Art. 176
 Void ab initio Marriages Arts. 34, 35,
 Support Arts. 194 & 198
38, 39 & 40
 Demand and Payment of Support
 Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 FC
Art. 203
 Absence or Disappearance of Spouse
 Designation of Parental Authority
Arts. 41 & 42
Art. 213
 Improvements on Paraphernal Property
 Interlocutory Orders on Support
Art. 92
pendente lite
 Sale of ACP without consent Art. 96
 RA 7610
Art. 2 PUBLICATION
NMSMI v. Military Shrine (G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013)

FACTS:
 In 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476,
amending Proclamation No. 423 by excluding certain
barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from forming part of the military reservation.
 At the bottom of Proclamation President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum: “P.S.—This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos.”
 That same year, Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette without the addendum.
HELD: The “Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.”
Citing Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, the SC also reiterated that
requirement of publication is indispensable in order to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to
a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days
following the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette.
It is important to note that publication “must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws”
 Article 19: Abuse of Right

CCI v. Quiñones (G.R. No. 175822, October 13, 2013)

 FACTS: Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu
Pacific in Lapu-Lapu went inside the Guess Boutique at the
second floor of Robinsons’ Department Store. She purchased
a black jeans worth P2,098 and paid the cashier duly
evidenced by a receipt.
 While walking through the skywalk, a Guess employee
approached and informed her that she failed to pay the
item she got. She insisted that she paid showing the
employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested
to talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office where she
worked.
 When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess
employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of
the clients of Cebu Pacific;
 Repeatedly demanded payment and even searched her
wallet to check how much money she had, followed by
another argument. Afterwards, Quinones went home.
 Guess employees gave a letter to the director of Cebu
Pacific narrating the incident. The Human Resource
Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter
and the latter conducted an investigation for purposes of
canceling Quiñones’ Robinson’s credit card.
 Quiñones claimed she was not given a copy of the damaging
letter.
 Quiñones filed a case for Damages.
 Petitioners claim good faith in trying to find out whether
Quiñones paid for the merchandise and argued that it
was within their right to verify from respondent whether
she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did
not.

 RULING: It is evident that petitioners went overboard and

tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were
demanding. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough
evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and
good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. In this
case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
BDO v. GOMEZ, (G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015)
 FACTS:
)
 Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the PCIB when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account in January 1985.
The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts
dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New Zealand. On two
(2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as
Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. PCIB
discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an
impostor, so they had to pay Harrington P50,600.00.
 The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for having accepted
the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a new
teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the
job. On November 14, 1985, the PCIB had started to deduct
amounts from Josephine’s salary while the investigation was pending.
 Eventually, PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. The PCIB did
not any give basis to this memorandum. Josephine filed a complaint for
damages claiming that PCIB had abused its right by gradually
deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
 HELD:
 PCIB’s actions were contrary to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
While it had a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the
right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. PCIB made deductions
on Josephine’s salary even if the investigation was still pending.
Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and requiring her to pay the amount. When Josephine asked
for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, PCIB refused
to give any such basis. PCIB continued to make deductions on
Josephine’s salary, allowances, and bonuses. Josephine was penalized
while other employees of the bank involved in the subject transactions
were not.
 Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. SPS. Bernardo (G.R. No
190667, November 7, 2016)
FACTS
 Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the large-scale manufacture, sale,
and distribution of beverages around the country. Respondents are doing business
under the name “Jolly Beverage Enterprises” as wholesalers of soft drinks in
Quezon City.
 The business relationship between the parties commenced in 1987, when petitioner
designated respondents as its distributor.
 On 22 March 1994, the parties formally entered into an exclusive dealership
contract for three years. Petitioner would extend developmental assistance and
trade discount incentives. Respondents undertook to sell petitioner’s products
exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in
its marketing efforts.
 For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and harmonious business partnership.
Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired, petitioner required
respondents to submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it would formulate
a policy defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City. It assured respondents that
their contract would be renewed for a longer period, provided that they would submit
the list. However, despite their compliance, the promise did not materialize.
 Respondents discovered that in February 1999, petitioner started to reach out to
the persons whose names were on the list. Respondents also received reports that
their delivery trucks were being trailed by petitioner's agents; and that as soon as
the trucks left, the latter would approach the former's customers. Further,
respondents found out that petitioner had employed a different pricing scheme,
such that the price given to distributors was significantly higher than that given to
supermarkets
 Towards the end of the partnership, petitioner employed a different marketing
scheme purportedly to obviate the poor dealership management from wholesalers
in major areas. But as may be shown by the incidents leading to the filing of this
case, this method was designed strategically to overrun respondent’s business and
takeover the customers of its wholesalers.
 Respondents filed a Complaint for damages, alleging that the acts of petitioner
constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in
commercial enterprise.
ISSUES
 Whether or not CA erred in affirming the finding petitioner violated Articles 19, 20,
21, or 28; hence, the award of damages and attorney’s fees was improper.
RULING
 No, the CA did not err in affirming that petitioner was liable for temperate, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for abuse of rights and unfair competition.
 Both the RTC and the CA found that the petitioner had employed oppressive and high-handed
schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment returns of respondents.
 It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the
products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by
respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like
respondents, who had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with
fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but to fold.
 Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal
provision; or an act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless
violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. The use of unjust, oppressive, or high-
handed business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of action to the injured
party.
 Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair
competition also gives a right of action to the injured party. Article 28 provides that:
 Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby settlers damage.
 Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of
profit, but regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a competitor out of business, in
order to take advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of a wanton
wrong.
 PETITION DENIED.
Art. 26: PRIVACY Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.
(G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
FACTS: Respondents are the owners of the lot adjacent to the
petitioners. ALDO (owned by Respondents) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO
on the ground that petitioners were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and that said construction was going to destroy the
wall of ALDO. The court denied Aldo’s application for
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations.
Thus, in order to get evidence, respondents set-up and installed
on the building of Aldo two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners’ property. Respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction. Petitioners filed an action for
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO claiming that the
acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.
Petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove
the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surveillance.

HELD: Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, xxx, protects an

individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy
against abuses that may be committed against him by other
individuals. It states:
The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence,"
however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled
to privacy.
This provision includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without
the consent of the latter."
 Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places
where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase "prying into the
privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy.
Art. 30 Gloria Dy v. People of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016)
FACTS
 Dy, as the General Manager of Mandy Commodities Company, Inc. (MCCI)
proposed to William Mandy (President of MCCI) to purchase a property for
the company. To facilitate the purchase, the president obtained a loan from
International China Bank of Commerce (bank), which was granted to the
company in the amount of P20 million.
 As security, MCCI executed a chattel mortgage over their warehouses. The
president entrusted Dy to manage the payment of the loan. Later on, MCCI
received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to its
default in paying.
 In order to prevent the foreclosure, the president delivered to Dy,
P21,706,281 worth of checks issued by MCCI, with the instruction that Dy
shall use the checks to pay the loan. However, the president later discovered
that the checks weren’t paid to the bank when the bank foreclosed the
mortgaged property. MCCI, represented by the president, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit for Estafa before Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and an
Information was filed against Dy before the Manila RTC.
 The RTC acquitted Dy (because the prosecution failed to establish
misappropriation or conversion which is an important element of the crime of
estafa) but it still found Dy to be civilly liable for the amount of
P21,706,281.00. Dy filed an appeal of the civil aspect of the decision with the
CA.
 The CA held that Dy’s acquittal does not necessarily absolve her of civil
liability. The CA said that it is settled that when an accused is acquitted on
the basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or her civilly liable if
the evidence so warrant. The evidence on record proves that Dy received the
checks from MCCI and preventing the company from recovering the amount
of the checks would constitute unjust enrichment.
 Dy appealed further to the SC, arguing that since she was acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged,
there was therefore no crime committed and therefore, any civil liability ex
delicto (civil liability from the criminal action) cannot be awarded.

ISSUE
 Whether or not Dy should be civilly liable in the criminal case for estafa
although she was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the
elements of the crime charged.
RULING
 Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between criminal and civil liabilities. A
crime is a liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and for the state. Acts
considered criminal are penalized by law as a means to protect the society from
dangerous transgressions. As criminal liability involves a penalty affecting a
person's liberty, acts are only treated criminal when the law clearly says so. On
the other hand, civil liabilities take a less public and more private nature. Civil
liabilities are claimed through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a
right or prevent or redress a wrong.
 Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil
component. Thus, while an act considered criminal is a breach of law against the
State, our legal system allows for the recovery of civil damages where there is a
private person injured by a criminal act. It is in recognition of this dual nature of a
criminal act that our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable. This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
 This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it recognizes acts or omissions
punished by law as a separate source of obligation in Art. 1157 and by Art. 30.
 Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
 A criminal action requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt while a civil
action requires a lesser quantum of proof, that of preponderance of evidence.
This distinction also agrees with the essential principle in our legal system that
while a criminal liability carries with it a corresponding civil liability, they are
nevertheless separate and distinct. In other words, these two liabilities may co-
exist but their existence is not dependent on each other.
 In estafa, whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the
delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil
liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is
because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto,
which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability
ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted
with the criminal case.
 The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil liability ex
contractu where the civil liability arises from an entirely different source of
obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal case, and consequently must be filed separately. This is necessarily so
because whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not
exist, it effectively says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that
constitutes criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot
be sourced from something that does not exist.
 When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a
contract of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence of
estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money because of abuse of
confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to
give something or to render some service. In estafa, the accused's failure to
account for the property of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding,
in turn, means thatreceived amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's
failure to comply with his obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any
finding that the source there is no civil liability ex delicto. The rulings in the
foregoing cases are consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal
actions, and the different sources of obligations under our laws.
 Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC because of the absence of the element of
misappropriation or conversion. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found that
Mandy delivered the checks to Dy pursuant to a loan agreement. Clearly, there
is no crime of estafa. There is no proof of the presence of any act or omission
constituting criminal fraud. Thus, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded
because there is no act or omission punished by law which can serve as the
source of obligation. Any civil liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a
civil liability ex contractu (civil liability arising from a contract). It does not
pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
 The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation
arising from a contract of loan in the same criminal case where she was
acquitted on the ground that there was no crime. Any contractual obligation
she may have must be litigated in a separate civil action involving the
contract of loan.
 PETITION GRANTED.
 WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY CIVIL ACTION WHICH MAY BE FILED TO CLAIM CIVIL
LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE CONTRACT.
 ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
ART. 2(2) Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc., (G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016)
 FACTS:
 Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital
and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from
employment in 2006. Cadiz was suspended for Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. Cadiz became
pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such
time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law. Cadiz then
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with
prayer for Reinstatement.
 ISSUE:
 W/N the condition requiring Cadiz to first enter into marriage before
she can be admitted back to employment
 HELD:
 Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.
It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and
deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is
a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and
inalienable right. Brent must prove two factors
necessitating its imposition: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job. Brent has not
shown the presence of neither of these factors. Perforce,
the Court cannot uphold the validity of said condition.
ART. 4, 35 (3)
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 18396, January 30, 2013)
FACTS:
The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony
between Syed and Gloria on January 9, 1993. The
marriage contract stated that the couple was issued a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8,
1993.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar
to secure a copy of the marriage license in relation to a
bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification declaring that the office has
not issued a marriage license to Syed and Gloria. It further
verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and
Gloria’s marriage contract was issued to a different couple.
The RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was
a valid marriage license because the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.
HELD:
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013)
HELD:
The purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid
marriage license because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that
the Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the
Marriage License series issued for the month of February 1982.
The Civil Registrar also said that it did not issue Marriage License
No. N-07568 to the couple.

Such certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to

prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, xxx "shall be void from the beginning."
Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica
B. Kho, (G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016)

Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the

Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G.
Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972. Based on the
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was, in fact, issued.
Vitangcol v. People, (G.R. No. 207406, Jan. 13, 2016)

Not sufficient proof that there was no marriage license.

Ruling: In this case the Supreme Court ruled that the
Certification of the Local Civil Registrar was not sufficient
proof of absence of marriage license.
“[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book
on Application for Marriage License and License
Issuance available in this office, no record could be
found on the alleged issuance of this office of
Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.”
• This Certification does not prove petitioner’s first marriage
was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519
does not exist.
• To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.
• The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that
it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming
that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was
no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar.
ART. 26 David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras
(20 August 2014, G.R. No. 188289)
FACTS:
David and Leticia Noveras were married in the year
1988 in QC. They resided in California, USA and
eventually acquired US citizenship. They had 2 children.
In 2003, Leticia claims that David abandoned his family
and lived with one Estrellita Martinez in Aurora. Upon
learning that David had an affair Leticia divorced him in
California. The Superior Court of California granted
Leticia custody of both children and all the US properties.
With respect to the properties in the Philippines, Leticia
filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal
properties.
The trial court ruling adopted the California Court’s ruling.

The CA modified the decision on appeal by directing the

equal division of the Philippine properties between the
spouses. With respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both
spouses to each pay their children the amount of
P520,000.

W/N the spouses divorce is valid in our jurisdiction.

W/N the petition for separation of absolute community
of property should be granted.
W/N the distribution of the properties ordered by the
CA correct?
HELD:
NO, the divorce is not valid and the trial court should not
have acknowledged the divorce decree.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Based on the Records only the divorce decree was
presented. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the California law on divorce
were not presented. Even if we apply the doctrine of
processual presumption as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a
valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that
the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The petition for separation of absolute community of
property should be granted. The records are replete
with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation
is highly improbable. More significantly they filed for
Divorce in California. These facts show that
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation
shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee (G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012)
Under the principle of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce must first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Norma A. Del Socorro, for and in behalf of her minor child, Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem v. Ernst Johan Brinkham Van Wilsem
(10 December 2014, G.R. No. 193707)
FACTS:
Norma and Ernst, a Dutch national, married in 1990. In 1994, they
had a son, Rodrigo. Then the marriage ended and a Divorce
Decree was issued by the Court of Holland. Norma and Rodrigo
returned to the Philippines. According to the petitioner, respondent
pledged monthly support to their son, but this never happened.
Ernst eventually came to the Philippines again and remarried in
Cebu. He received a demand letter for support, but refused to
answer it. Hence, the petitioner filed a complaint affidavit for
violation of Sec. 5 para. E(2) of R.A. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with the petitioner.
The lower court ruled that since respondent is a foreign national,
the law on support and R.A. 9262 have no application.
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code,
contending that notwithstanding the divorce decree,
respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation
to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis for financial support. Respondent
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated to petitioner for any financial support.

ISSUE:
W/N a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and
W/N a foreign national can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his failure to support his minor child.
HELD:
Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. Thus, the law in the Netherlands is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary
to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.

R.A. 9262 also applies to the petitioner. Since the

respondent is living in the Philippines, there is basis for the
claim of the petitioner that the territoriality principle in
criminal law, in relation to article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the case.
 Doreen Grave Parilla Medina v. Michiyuki Koike (G.R. No.
215723, July 27, 2016)
FACTS
 RTC denied her petition, saying that in this action for recognition of foreign
divorce, she was not successful in proving the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce.
 RTC observed that the Civil Codes of Japan that she presented were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan plus that the testimony
of Doreen’s relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect
on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as
a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and
divorce. The RTC held that because of the applicable Rules on Evidence
(particularly Rule 130, Sec. 46), since no expert witness on the subject
matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law
 Doreen filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
 Petitioner Doreen Parilla, a Filipino citizen and respondent Michiyuki Koike, a
Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in QC with two children.
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki filed for divorce before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City in Japan. They were issued a Divorce Certificate and was
duly recorded in the Official Register of Michiyuki.
 Doreen, on the other hand, sought to have the said Divorce Certificate
annotated on her Certificate of Marriage with Local Civil Registrar of QC. She
filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to Art 26 of the Family Code. No one appeared
to oppose the petition during the hearing. Doreen, on the other hand,
presented several foreign documents: Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce, and Family Register of Michiyuki Koike, issued by
Ichinomiya and authenticated in the Philippine Consul. In addition, she
attached copies of Civil Code of Japan and their English translation.

ISSUE
 Did the RTC err in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce?
RULING
 Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce. However, Article 26 of
the Family Code, which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
 This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine validity of dissolution of marriage.
 In Corpuz v Sto.. Tomas, the Court held that:
 The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect
of his claim or defense.
 Similarly, Garcia v. Recio stated that in order for a divorce obtained abroad
by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that
the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.
 Since the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially
factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that
is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
 However, because the rule 56 of the Rules of Court denotes discretion on the
part of the Court to either dismiss the improper appeal or refer the case to the
CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of
justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate
proceedings.
 Case REFERRED to the CA.
 Void ab initio Marriages [Art. 26, 35 ]

Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26, 2013)

FACTS: Fujiki a Japanese National married Marinay in the
Philippines. Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and
they eventually lost contact. Marinay remarried another
Japanese national but claimed she was being maltreated. She
contacted Fujiki and they reestablished their relationship. Fujiki
sought judgment from the Japanese courts for nullity of Marinay’s
second marriage on the ground of bigamy which was granted.
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment and Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The RTC dismissed the petition based on the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages which provides that it is only
the husband or wife who can file a declaration of nullity of
marriage.
HELD: The Rules on Declaration of Nullity and Annulment do not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
a foreign country. The rules also do not apply if the ground is
Bigamy. The parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. Since the recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
Article 34 Santiago v. People (G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015)

Four months after Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor Santos were

married, they were charged with bigamy. Santiago pleaded not
guilty while Santos died during the pendency of the suit.
The prosecution presented evidence that Santos had been married
to Estela Galang when he asked Santiago to marry him. Santiago
argued that she could not be accused for bigamy because she
believed that Santos was still single when they married. She
argued that (1) her marriage to Santos was void to the lack of a
marriage license; and (2) the prosecution had to prove that her
second marriage was valid for her to be convicted of bigamy.
The RTC convicted Santiago of bigamy, and said that her
marriage with Santos did not need a marriage license as per
Article 34 of the Family Code because they cohabited long
before their marriage.
Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming her
conviction was misplaced because of the absence of a marriage
license. She added that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they
did not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife
for at least five years. She alleged the records showed that she
married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. The CA affirmed her conviction.
HELD:
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted
of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. After a careful perusal of facts, it
is clear that the second marriage was void because the
cohabitation of Santiago and Santos were less that the five-year
requirement. Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this demonstrable fact.
However, despite such flaw in the second marriage, we
chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically
a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution.

The State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered

nugatory by allowing individuals to “deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and
to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment (Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals).”
Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)

In this Administrative case, the Supreme Court,

(in ruling against judges who irregularly
solemnized marriages from 2003 to 2007),
made a statement that for the exception
under Art. 34 to apply, “the parties should
have been capacitated to marry each other
during the entire period [of five years of
cohabitation] and not only at the time of
the marriage.”
Art. 35 Void ab initio Marriages
Montañez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On
January 24, 1983, while the first marriage has not yet been
judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a
petition in 2001 to nullify her marriage with Socrates for
psychological incapacity. The first marriage was declared null
and void in 2003
In a case for bigamy filed against her, Lourdes alleged
that since her marriage was declared void ab initio in 2003,
there can be no bigamy. RTC ruled that bigamy was not
committed by the respondent. The subsequent marriage was
solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family Code;
hence, the existing law at that time did not require judicial
declaration of nullity as a condition to remarry.
 ISSUE: W/N the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the action for bigamy filed
against her.
HELD: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not
justify the dismissal of the bigamy case. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no judicial
declaration, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore,
he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage can be prosecuted for
bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
 Castillo v. Castillo, (G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016)
 In 1972, respondent Lea married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). In
1979, Lea married petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). In May
2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be
declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Lea
opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. In 2002,
Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista
void. In 2003, the RTC declared Lea's first marriage to Bautista
null and void ab initio. In 2004, Lea filed a Demurrer to
Evidence claiming that the proof adduced by Renato was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground that it was bigamous.
 The RTC denied respondent's demurrer stating that
the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting
when she married Renato in1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it
void ab initio. The RTC stressed that so long as no
judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid
and existing; that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled,
since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity
for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting
her second marriage with Renato.
 Ruling: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must
be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the
time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code
was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the
Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the
Civil Code on void marriages.
 This Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza,
People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. This Court
clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, that
the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not
apply to marriages that were celebrated before the
 effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the
parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this
Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-
prevailing rule:
 Since the second marriage took place and all the children were
born before the xxx effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

 The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of

the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under the Civil Code.
 Void ab initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]

People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)

FACTS: Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in

1980. Thirteen years after, he married Eleanor. However,
his first marriage was declared void ab initio because it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Meanwhile, the
second spouse died. Respondent was charged with
bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the
information do not charge an offense of bigamy since his
first marriage was void ab initio; hence, there is an
absence of an essential element in the crime of bigamy.

ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
 Bigamy – who has
standing to raise Jona Bumatay v. Lolita Bumatay (G.R.
FACTS No. 191320, April 25, 2017)
 On January 1968, Lolita allegedly married Amado Rosete at 16 years old. Later on, at November
6, 2003, Lolita married Jose Bumatay (Jona’s foster father). Jona then filed a Complaint-Affidavit
for Bigamy against Lolita claiming that Lolita’s first marriage was still valid and that she was
aware that it was not yet legally dissolved. Lolita’s Counter-Affidavit claims that she learned from
her children (with Amado) that he filed a petition for declaration of nullity. Further, in 1990, she
was informed by their children that Amado had died in Nueva Vizcaya.
 On November 8, 2005, Prosecutor Valdez (Official Prosecutor of San Carlos) filed an Information
for Bigamy at RTC San Carlos. After the filing, but before her arraignment, Lolita filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Amado at RTC Dagupan. On September 20,
2005, RTC Dagupan declared the marriage void stating that no marriage took place between
Lolita and Amado since Lolita’s sister’s signature was on the marriage certificate.
 Lolita then filed a Motion to Quash the Information for Bigamy against her. Her argument is
based on the fact that the first element of the crime of bigamy is that the offender has been
previously legally married. Lolita attached the RTC Dagupan ruling as evidence that the first
element was absent.
 RTC San Carlos granted Lolita’s motion. They based the decision on Morigo v. People which
claimed that: Since the first marriage has been declared void ab intio, there is no first marriage
to begin with in determining the foremost element of bigamy. Such declaration of nullity retroacts
to the date of the first marriage.
 CA affirmed RTC San Carlos.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the CA erred in upholding RTC San Carlos’ Order granting Lolita’s
motion to quash the Information for the crime of Bigamy.

RULING
 Rule 110, Section 5, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that all criminal
actions commenced by information shall be prosecuted under direction and control of
a public prosecutor. Appeals before the SC must be represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
 Further Jona’s personality to even institute bigamy case is nebulous, at best. Every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in suit. “Interest” represents material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected and it must be present substantial
interest. Jona is merely a “foster daughter” of Jose without having undergone the
process of legal adoption and as such provides no real interest.
 The court does not see the need to waste time on the question of whether or not the
CA erred in its ruling.
 PETITION DENIED, CA DECISION AFFIRMED.
 Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen (G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
FACTS:
 Eliseo Quiazon died, leaving behind his wife, Amelia Garcia-
Quiazon, two legitimate daughters, Jenneth and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon, his common-law wife, Maria Lourdes
Belen, and their daughter, Elise Quiazon. After his death,
Elise, represented by her mother, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC.
 Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on her claim, she
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito).
 A marriage certificate issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
was presented as proof of the previous marriage.
 To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, attached to
the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left her real and
personal properties.
 To preserve the estate of her father and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.

ISSUE:
 W/N Elise may impugn the ‘void marriage’ between
Eliseo and Amelia Quiazon.
HELD:
YES. The existence of the previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by the Certificate of
Marriage. In the absence of any showing that such marriage
had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage
was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage has taken
place. Thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally and
may be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. There is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father.
ART. 36
Aurelio v. Aurelio (G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011)
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity: (1)
Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the FC as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must
order the fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Sol. Gen. issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, to the petition.
Republic v. Galang (G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011)
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established, citing Marcos v.
Marcos.

Pimentel v. Pimentel
(G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010)

The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no

effect on the alleged crime (frustrated parricide) that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)
HELD:
Psychological incapacity contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling to constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity and abandonment
are merely grounds for legal separation.
Camacho-Reyes V. Reyes, (G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010)

A recommendation for therapy does not

automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical
psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage
behavior. The recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily
negate the finding that respondent’s psychological
incapacity is incurable.
 Republic v. Pangasinan (G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016)
FACTS
 In 1981, Danilo Pangasinan, respondent, met his wife Josephine at the
Philippine Plaza Hotel in Manila. After a three-month courtship, Josephine
got pregnant which led them to contract marriage, first civilly on December
29, 1981, then a church wedding on January 23, 1982. The couple has three
children.
 They had a harmonious relationship that was only marred by arguments on
money matters from time to time. Their relationship started to change when
Danilo’s business began to slow down including allegations of infidelity
against him. They fought constantly because Danilo was not able to support
his wife and children the same way they were accustomed to. In September
2007, Josephine left their conjugal home after a heated fight with her
husband who left for a business trip the day she underwent hysterectomy.
 Thereafter, Josephine filed two cases against her husband for violation of
R.A. 9262 and a petition for annulment, all of which she withdrew.
Subsequently she filed an action for legal separation.
 After 30 years of marriage, Danilo filed a petition dated May 25, 2011 with the
RTC for the nullity of his marriage to Josephine on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The petition was consolidated with Josephine’s action for legal
separation. Danilo alleged in his petition that his wife already exhibited
negative traits from the time they were a couple which only became more
evident when they were married. He said that his wife was domineering and
enjoyed talking about herself. She even expected him to give her gifts which he
did by buying her nice and expensive gifts. Danilo also emphasized the fact
that she had an exaggerated sense of self-importance and entitlement.
Josephine made it appear that she was superior to him and took it upon herself
to make all decisions for the family, especially involving money matters.
Surprisingly she did not even have any empathy towards the plight of her
husband when he underwent heart surgery.
 In support of his case, Danilo presented Dr. Dayan, a psychologist, who in her
Psychological Evaluation concluded that the spouses are psychologically
incapacitated. Meanwhile, Josephine did not present any controverting
evidence.
 On March 6, 2012, the RTC rendered its decision declaring the marriage
between Danilo and Josephine void from the start. The OSG moved for
reconsideration of the decision, but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The
CA ruled that Josephine was indeed psychologically incapacitated citing the
Molina Case.
ISSUE
 W/N the evidence presented was enough to prove that the marriage was void ab
initio based on the parties psychological incapacity as provided in Article 36.

RULING
 According to the Supreme Court “psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify
marriage under Article 36 of the Family code should refer to no less than a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.”
It should be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability and
these characteristics were established in the case of Molina where the guidelines
for psychological incapacity were laid down. Therefore, psychological capacity of
a person must be rooted on a clinically or medically identifiable grave illness.
 However, the evidence of respondent failed to establish psychological incapacity.
Dr. Dayan’s findings were based on generalities and lacking in factual bases.
The findings were mostly based on the psychological examination on Danilo, his
sister, and their son Jay and not from Josephine herself. Dr. Dayan even testified
that she merely interviewed Josephine through a phone call. This undermines
the credibility of the psychological evaluation of Josephine.
 Although, it was not necessary that a physician examine a person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. It was important to present evidence
that can adequately establish a party’s psychological incapacity. In the case,
there was no reliable or independent evidence to establish Josephine’s
psychological incapacity.
 For the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the
CA and denied the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondent.
 PETITION GRANTED.
Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 203284,
November 14, 2016)
FACTS
 Petitioner Nicolas Matudan and Respondent Marilyn Matudan were married in Laoang,
Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children.
 In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. Since then, Nicolas and the children lost all contact
with her. She was never heard nor seen again.
 23 years later, Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage alleging that
before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically
incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother --- failing to provide Petitioner
and her children with necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance.
Petitioner also stated that based on the expert evaluation conducted by Clinical
Psychologist Dr. Tayag, Respondent’s psychological incapacity is grave, permanent,
and incurable. Petitioner also alleges that his consent to the marriage was obtained by
Marilyn through misrepresentation since she concealed her condition from him; and that
Marilyn is “not ready for a lasting and permanent commitment like marriage”.
 Their daughter, Maricel, and Dr. Tayag also submitted their testimonies as evidence
along with the report on the psychological condition of Respondent, their marriage
certificate, the birth certificates of the children.
 RTC dismissed the Petition on the ground that Petitioner’s evidence failed to sufficiently
prove Respondent’s claimed psychological incapacity. The CA affirmed the judgment of
the RTC.
ISSUE
 W/N Respondent’s psychological incapacity was sufficiently proved? NO.

RULING
 Petitioner claims that he was able to prove Marilyn’s psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr.
Tayag's diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even
before their marriage, and continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious,
incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations; that the
nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and family, but
will actually protect the sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with
psychological disorders that prevent them from assuming marital obligations from remaining in the
sacred bond.
 The SC affirms the decision of the lower courts. In the landmark case of Santos v. CA, this Court
has held that psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." 'Psychological incapacity,' as
a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
 Pursuant to the ruling in the Molina case, the burden of proving psychological
incapacity rests on the Petitioner. However, the Court has held that the existence or
absence of psychological incapacity is based strictly on the facts of each case and
should therefore be established by the totality of evidence present during the trial.
 Petitioner’s evidence mainly consists of his judicial affidavit and testimony; and those
of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag’s psychological evaluation report
on the condition of both Petitioner and Respondent. The supposed evaluation of
Respondent’s condition was based solely on Petitioner’s account since Marilyn did
not participate in the proceedings.
 For psychological incapacity to be established, it is important that the presence of
evidence can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. The complete
facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
 Petitioner’s judicial affidavit and testimony during trial fail to show gravity and juridical
antecedence. His earlier testimonies were contradicted by his own claims when he
said that he and Respondent were happily married and that the only reason for his
filing of the case was Respondent’s complete abandonment of their family when she
left to work abroad.
 Maricel’s testimony could not be regarded because she was only two years old when
her mother left. Dr. Tayag’s supposed expert findings were not based on actual tests
or interviews conducted upon Respondent herself and were merely based on the
personal accounts of Petitioner which makes his findings fail as well.
 PETITION DENIED.
 Castillo v. Republic & Impas (G.R. No. 214064, February 6,
2017)
FACTS
 As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe started as
friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that
Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned
tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They
got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children
born in 1992 and in 2001.
 On 2011, Mirasol filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC.
 Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe
that the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe
resumed philandering. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and
stopped any communication with him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less
than ten (10) years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.
 In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Montefalcon who, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The report stated that the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder of Felipe Impas was present before the marriage, grave, and incurable.
 RTC declared the marriage null and void. Subsequently, the Republic, through the OSG, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied.
 CA reversed, ruling that there is insufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity.
ISSUE
 Is there sufficient evidence presented to establish the psychological incapacity in this
case?

RULING
 Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to
be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
 In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, this Court laid down the more
definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases. The existence
or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each
case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
 In Ting v Velez-Ting, the court held: it is logical and understandable to give weight to the
expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity.
 However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such
opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base
its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
 This Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish
Felipe's psychological incapacity.
 The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological
evaluation by Montefalcon.
 Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was,
however, admitted that she evaluated respondent's psychological condition
indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness.
Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality
disorder as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed
truthful knowledge of petitioner.
 Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are considered
since the judge had found them to be credible enough, this Court cannot
lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Felipe's pre-
marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case
because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind,
not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.
 Regarding the alleged sexual infidelity of Impas, the Court has held that
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
 In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of
a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
 Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other
reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a
manifestation of his alleged personality disorder. Aside from the psychologist,
petitioner did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on
Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives
saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-
serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
 PETITION DENIED, CA DECISION AFFIRMED.
 Leonen, J. dissenting opinion
 The courts, in determining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment, must
essentially "rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter." Courts are "not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology"; resorting to expert opinion enables them to reach
an "intelligent and judicious" ruling.
 Dr. Montefalcon's expert testimony was consistent with the undisputed facts evincing Felipe's
incapability to fulfill his essential marital obligations to Mirasol.
 Totality of evidence is enough
 Felipe's continuous philandering, despite his being married and having children, shows a grave and
incurable psychological incapacity that warrants the dissolution of his marriage with Mirasol. Moreover, his
indifference about being seen publicly by friends and relatives with other women, as well as engaging in a
compromising act with a woman not his wife, shows his utter disregard for Mirasol's feelings.
 Indirect evaluation of Felipe’s condition should not discredit Montefalcon’s evaluation as expert
testimony
 Camacho-Reyes v Reyes: The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
 I cannot join the majority's reading of the law as it condemns loveless married couples to a life of pain
and suffering. The law should not be read as too callous or cruel that it forever condemns those who
may have made very human errors in choosing those with whom they should be intimate. For the State
to enforce this cruelty is the very antithesis of the freedoms embodied in many provisions of our
Constitution.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina interpreted Article 36 of the Family Code to introduce
restrictions not found in the text of the law. Worse, it was inspired by a conservative, religious view of
what marriages should be. This has caused untold hardships and costs for many Filipinos. It is time we
review this doctrine and allow intimate relationships to be what they truly are: a life o f celebration,
rather than a living hell.
 Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (G.R. No. 222541, February 15,
2017)
FACTS
 Rachel and Jose are married couples and they have a son named Wesley.
Rachel is an OFW working in Hong Kong as a domestic helper. In September,
2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC.
Rachel claims that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential
marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that Jose was
violent, that at the day of their wedding he punched him in the shoulder and that
Jose hit his own father when the latter did not pay for the wedding. Rachel also
claims that Jose was having extra marital affairs and that at one point her sister
and Wesley caught Jose with a woman. Rachel also presented the testimonies of
Wesley, her sister, and the testimony of Dr. Tayag. Dr. Tayag stated that Jose
suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) based from the interviews
the former conducted with Rachel and Wesley. Rachel also testified that their
marriage ran smoothly in the earlier years.
 Jose denies all the allegations assailing that he was able to fulfill the essential
marital obligations; that he never had an extra-marital affair; was never violent;
and that he always provided support for his family.
 The RTC granted the petition of Rachel. However, the CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE
 WON the marriage should be declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING
 No. Psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
 In Santos v. CA, the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The court laid
down the more definitive guidelines in the case of Republic v Molina.
 Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely
necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. That the evidence can come from
persons intimately related to the spouses i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly
testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage.
However, the totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid
down: gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.
 In Dedel v. CA, the Court held that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. Toring v. Toring held that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
 In the case at bar, the court held that totality of the evidence presented, there exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or
infidelity amount to psychological incapacity. That Dr. Tayag merely relied on the
testimonies of Wesley and Rachel and did not personally evaluate Jose as to justify his
finding that the latter is suffering from APD. The report also did not explain how Jose’s
alleged incapacity was so serious that it was incurable.
 In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies,
failed to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To
reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a
party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.
There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which
must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
 PETITION DENIED.
 Maria Dela Fuente v. Rodolfo Dela Fuente (G.R. No. 188400,
FACTS March 8, 2017)
 Petitioner Maria and Rodolfo met while they were still students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Maria
observed that Rodolfo was introvert, prone to jealousy, and did not have any ambition in life because of
his insecurity towards his siblings who were successful in their careers.
 On June 21, 1984, they got married and eventually had two children During their marriage, Rodolfo’s
attitude worsened. He was suspicious of his wife and even resorted to stalking just to confirm if she
was having an affair with another man. He even poked a gun to his 15-year old cousin who he
suspected was Maria’s lover. Maria also alleged that she was Rodolfo’s sex slave. That they had sex
five times a day. Rodolfo would even fetch her from the office during lunch break just to have sex. It
bothered her that her husband even suggested to invite another man to share their bed.
 She asked the advice of different people in order to fix their marriage, but Rodolfo was not keen to
undergo marriage counseling. It was in 1986 when Maria and her children left their family home
because Rodolfo poled a gun to her head after they had an argument.
 On June 3, 1999, Maria filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC. Maria’s
counsel presented Dr. Lopez as their expert witness. Dr. Lopez said that Maria was not suffering from
any severe mental disorder but she had an emotionally disturbed personality which is not severe
enough to constitute psychological incapacity. On the other hand, Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with
paranoid personality disorder which was caused by pathogenic parental model- that his family
background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient. Therefore, his disorder was serious and
incurable.
 The RTC rendered its decision on June 26, 2002 granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. They opined that while Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the findings
based on information from credible informants were enough. After the RTC denied OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the latter appealed to the CA. CA granted the appeal and reversed the decision of the
RTC. They ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay.
ISSUE
 W/N the CA erred in denying the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because the
evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated.
RULING
 The Supreme Court ruled that there was sufficient compliance with the Molina doctrine to
warrant the nullity of petitioner Maria De la Fuente’s marriage. The CA argued that the RTC
should not have given weight to the findings of Dr. Lopez since he failed to personally
conduct a thorough study of Respondent’s psychological and mental condition. However, as
ruled by the SC in previous cases like Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, “the non-examination of
one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the
examining psychiatrist or psychologist… the totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.”
 The testimony of Dr. Lopez with the corroboration of the petitioner proved that respondent
has psychological incapacity. The root cause of his paranoid personality was hereditary
since his own father suffered from a similar disorder. It started during his late childhood
years and progressed as he reached his adolescent years.
 His paranoid personality made him prone to extreme jealousy and resort to stalking. That led
to his incapacity to do his obligations in the marriage. Furthermore, the respondent
exercised coercive control over his wife. The respondent harassed the petitioner in order to
intimidate and dominate her. At first, he employed non-physical forms of mistreatment which
eventually led to physical violence.
 For the aforesaid reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage of Maria De La
Fuente.
 PETITION GRANTED.
Art. 36 & 147 Diño v. Diño (G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a VOID marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
Article 50 of the FC only applies to Arts. 40 & 45 and does
not apply to marriages declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties as the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.
Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato
(20 October 2014, G.R. No. 176492)
Held:
Article 147 is applicable, not Article 129. The marriage
between Nonato and Barrido was declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36. Article 147 states
that if the marriage is void, wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares, and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. This particular kind
of co-ownership applies when the following elements are
present: must be capacitated to marry each other; live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void.
 ART. 38 Vda. de Carungcong v. People
(G.R. No. 181409 , February 11, 2010)

ISSUE: If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity

to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment
of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the
relationship by affinity?

HELD: We hold that the second view is more consistent with

the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains
that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the
death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not.
ART. 39 Isidro Ablaza v. Republic (G.R. No. 158298,
August 11, 2010)

In 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC in Masbate a petition for the

declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato, alleging that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. However, this specifically extends only to marriages covered
by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
ART. 40 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. AZOTE
(G.R. 209741, April 15, 2015)

FACTS:
Edgardo and Edna Azote married on 1992, and their
union produced six children. Edgardo, a member of the
Social Security System (SSS) submitted to the SSS two E-4
forms in 1994 and 2001designating Edna and their six
children as beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away in January
2005.
Edna filed her claim for death benefits as Edgardo’s wife,
but the Social Security Commission (SSC) denied this
because records showed that Edgardo had previously
submitted E-4 forms in 1982 designating Rosemarie Azote,
his spouse and son Elmer as beneficiaries.
The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition stating that (1) Edgardo
did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-
beneficiary; (2) Rosemarie was still presumed to be
Edgardo’s legal wife; and (3) the NSO records revealed that
Edgardo and Rosemarie wed in 1982 thus making Edna’s and
Edgardo’s marriage as not valid without showing that his first
marriage was annulled or dissolved.
ISSUES:
W/N the SSS can determine the validity of Edna’s marriage
to Edgardo considering Rosemarie or Elmer did not appear
or contest Edna’s claim.
W/N Edna is entitled to Edgardo’s SSS death benefits as
his legitimate wife.
HELD:

Yes. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to

determine the validity of marriages, Section 4(b)(7) of R.A.
8282 (Social Security Law) requires the SSC to examine
available statistics ensure that benefits go to the right
beneficiaries.

No. Edna is not qualified to be Edgardo’s legitimate wife,

thus she is not entitled to SSS death benefits. She could not
adduce evidence to prove that Edgardo’s earlier marriage
was either annulled or dissolved, or whether there was a
declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before Edna’s
marriage to Edgardo.
ART. 41 Republic v. Narceda
(G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)
HELD:
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. Hearing of a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding. Article 247 of the Family
Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately
final and executory. Thus, by the express provision
of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., (G.R. No. 199194, Feb.10, 2016)
HELD: By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering
judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The degree of diligence and reasonable search
required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
present the persons from whom the present spouse
allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse’s
relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is
failure to report the missing spouse’s purported
disappearance or death to the police or mass media,
and (3) when the present spouse’s evidence might or
would only show that the absent spouse chose not to
communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was
indeed dead. Because of this, Jose’s efforts to locate
the missing Netchie are below the required degree of
stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence.
REPUBLIC v. Tampus, (G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016)
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L.
Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975. Three days after,
Dante, as member of the AFP, was assigned to a combat
mission in Jolo, Sulu. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. In a petition for the declaration of resumptive death
which she filed 33 years after, Nilda testified that she
exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his parents,
relatives, and neighbors, who also did not know his
whereabouts; and that after 33 years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already
dead.
HELD: Other than making inquiries with Dante’s parents,
relatives, and neighbors, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She never called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband. She
did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself
in finding him. Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives,
or neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated her
asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante.

Because of this, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing

husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
the strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief' of his death.
Celerina J. Santos v. Ricardo T. Santos ART. 42
(8 October 2014, G.R. No. 187061)
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
Celerina and Ricardo were married in 1980. According to
Ricardo, when the family business did not prosper, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work abroad as a domestic
helper. She left the Philippines and was never heard from
again. He also exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He claimed
that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about the petition only in
October 2008. She filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. She claimed that her residence was Quezon
City, which was also the conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo
left in May 2008. She also claimed that she never resided in
Tarlac and worked as a domestic helper. She referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations. She also argued that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.
The CA issued the resolution dismissing Celerina’s petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. CA
ruled that filing of a sworn statement before the civil registry
declaring her reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
to be the proper remedy.
HELD:
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
“remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.” (Compare to Sareñogon)
An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent. The
choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them
certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code
provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage. In turn, the Family Code
provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
ART. 92
Muñoz v. Ramirez (G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010)

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the

residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this
presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and
109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is
Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.

Article 120 of the Family Code provides the solution in

determining the ownership of the improvements that are made
on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. When the value of the paraphernal property is
considerably more than the conjugal improvement, said
paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.
 ART. 92 The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v.
Prudencio (G.R. No. 187942, September 7, 2016)
FACTS
 Felipe married twice during his lifetime. He had 5 children with his first wife,
Elena and 2 children with his second wife, Teodora. Felipe and the first wife
acquired a parcel of land during their marriage. When the first wife died,
Felipe and their children became co-owners of the land. Felipe died without a
will during his second marriage. The second wife together with their 2
children executed a deed of extra-judicial partition of the estate with waiver of
rights in favor of the second wife. The extra-judicial partition acknowledged
that the land was acquired during the Felipe’s first marriage, but it stated they
did not have any children in the first marriage who could inherit the property;
hence, the second wife and her children with Felipe are the only living heirs
by operation of law. After being published thrice in the Daily Mirror
newspaper, the title to the land was transferred to the second wife’s name.
The second wife sold the land to Spouses Cepeda (spouses) and the
spouses sold the land to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao
(petitioner).
 The children and grandchildren (respondent-appellees) of Felipe in his first
marriage filed a complaint for partition with reconveyance against the petitioner,
spouses and the second family of Felipe before the RTC. They asserted that
upon the death of the first wife, they became the owners of the first wife’s
conjugal share on the land while the other undivided half remained with Felipe
and that upon the death of Felipe, respondents-appellees then became owners
as well of Felipe's conjugal share in the property, together with the second
family. The first family claims that they were fraudulently deprived of their
rightful shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the extra-judicial partition
declared the second wife as the sole owner of the land.

 Thus, they prayed that they be declared the owners pro indiviso of its undivided
portion, and that this portion be reconveyed to them. The petitioner claims that
it was an innocent purchaser for value, that the spouses were in possession of
the land at the time they offered it for sale and that it had no knowledge of the
existence of any defect on the title. Spouses also claim that they were also
purchasers for value and in good faith.
ISSUE
 Whether the action for partition with reconveyance filed by respondents-
appellees against petitioner should prosper.

RULING
 Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code state that all the children of the
deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should participate in the
settlement of his/her estate. Thus all children of Felipe in his 2 marriages
should be included in the execution of the extra-judicial partition. In this case,
it is undisputed that respondents-appellees were children of Felipe by his first
marriage. The second family did not deny respondents-appellees' relation
with Felipe. Despite this they declared in the extra-judicial partition that they
are the only living heirs of Felipe. They claimed that Felipe had no child with
his first wife, in effect depriving respondents-appellees of their rightful shares
in the estate of their parents. They arrogated upon themselves not only the
share of Felipe in the land but also the shares belonging to the children in the
second marriage.
 The extra-judicial partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no force and effect from the
beginning, as if it had never been entered into and it cannot be validated
either by time or ratification.
 HOWEVER, the nullity of the extra-judicial partition does not automatically
result in the nullity of the sale between (1) The second wife and Spouses
Cepeda, and that of (2) Spouses Cepeda and petitioner. The second wife
may sell her undivided interest in the land, and such disposition shall affect
only her pro indiviso share; hence, the sale of the land to Spouses Cepeda,
then to petitioner is valid insofar as the share of Teodora is concerned. The
titles covering the entire land were issued in the name of the second wife,
Spouses Cepeda and then petitioner, by virtue of the subsequent sales. The
issuance of a title could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property;
neither could it validate their purchase of the same which is null and void to
the extent of the shares of the respondents-appellees. Registration does not
vest title, for it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws
do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.
 Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is dissolved
upon the death of either spouse. It shall then be subject to inventory and
liquidation, the net remainder of which shall be divided equally between
the husband and the wife. Therefore, the second wife is not entitled to the
whole land but only a part of it. Consequently, petitioner, whose title over
the Cagayan lot is ultimately derived from the second wife, is therefore
entitled only to 55,918.29 sqm. Thus, petitioner should return to
respondents-appellees the 74,557.72 sq. m. In the interest of fairness,
justice and equity, the SC directed Spouses Cepeda to return to petitioner
the corresponding value paid for the area of 74,557.72 sq. m.
 PETITION DENIED.
ART. 116
Dela Pena v. Avila (G.R. No. 187490, February 08, 2012)
In the case Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, the phrase
"married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status
of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that
the husband is also a registered owner.
"Since there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the
name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature
as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse.” (Conjugal Partnership of Gains)
 ART. 117 Beumer v. Amores (G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)
FACTS:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was
married on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the
basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and prayed for the distribution of several
properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
Beumer testified that while the four other lots were registered
in the name of his wife, these properties were acquired with
the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit.
ISSUE: W/N Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the
purchase of the real properties subject to the dissolution
proceedings?
HELD:
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates
no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. – (Distinguish
from Borromeo v. Descallar (2009) – relationship under Art. 148)
ART. 121
Aguete v. Philippine National Bank
(G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing
of the contract. Where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
FACTS:
Prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia,
and others of murder before RTC Surigao. The RTC acquitted
Efren but found Melecia and another person guilty and
sentenced them to the death. The RTC ordered those found
guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and
severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on
March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names
of Efren and Melecia.
 PNB v. Venancio Reyes (G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016)
FACTS
 Venancio Reyes is married to Lilia since 1973. While they were married they acquired
three parcels of land in Malolos, Bulacan. The properties were mortgaged to
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan amounting to P3,000,000. According
to PNB, spouses Reyes contracted and duly consented to the loan.
 The Spouses failed to pay for the loan obligations which resulted to PNB foreclosing
the mortgaged real properties. PNB won as highest bidder in the auction sale.
 Venancio filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and
Real Estate Mortgage against PNB. Venancio claimed that his wife undertook the
loan and mortgage without his consent and his signature. Since the three lots
involved were conjugal properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them
was void.
 The RTC ordered the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and directed Lilia
Reyes to reimburse PNB the loan amount with interest. The CA denied the appeal
brought by PNB. Hence, this present petition before the Supreme Court.
 PNB argues that the mortgage is valid, and that the conjugal partnership should be
liable for the loan. Also, PNB contends that both Venancio and Lilia duly consented to
the loan and mortgage and that it was impossible for Venancio to have no knowledge
of the transactions since the spouses lived together in the same house where the
notices and demand letters were sent.
ISSUE
 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Real Estate Mortgage void.
 Whether the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the loan contracted
unilaterally by Lilia Reyes.

RULING
 On the first issue, the real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-
contracting spouse did not give consent. The real estate mortgage over the conjugal
properties is void for want of consent from Venancio. The Family Code, Article 124 is
clear: written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary
before any disposition of conjugal property can be valid. As the marriage between
Venacio and Lilia was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code (they were
married in 1973), their property regime is that of Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Any
disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented
to by the other; otherwise it is void.
 As to the second issue, the principal obligation to pay the loan remains valid despite
the declaration of a void mortgage. The conjugal partnership should be made liable to
the extend that it redounded to the benefit of the family. Article 122 of the Family Code
applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the benefit of the
family. It applies specifically to the loan that Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.
A mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the principal
contract of loan. The mortgages, while void, can still be considered as instruments
evidencing the indebtedness.
 It must be remembered that nowhere in the RTC decision to which the CA
affirmed, did the courts say that PNB may no longer collect from the spouses
the amount of the loan. It is only the mortgage which the courts declared
void.
 The mortgage over the conjugal property is void and cannot be foreclosed.
However, petitioner can still hold the conjugal partnership liable for the
principal obligation since the loan is presumed to have redounded to the
benefit of the family. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
liability, the husband is solidarity liable with the wife for the unpaid balance.
 Article 121 holds that:
xxx
 If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
 In this case, if the conjugal properties of the Reyes Spouses are not enough
to answer for the loan, petitioner can recover the remaining unpaid balance
from the separate properties of either respondent or his wife Lilia.
 PETITION DENIED; CA DECISION AFFIRMED.
Art. 122
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
ISSUE: W/N the conjugal properties can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of wife’s civil liability in the
murder case.
HELD: YES, the conjugal properties may be levied and
executed in light of the fact that Melecia has no exclusive
properties.
No prior liquidation of those assets is required. Article 122
states that “at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such
[offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for
the purposes above-mentioned.” However, the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the FC must first be sufficiently
covered by conjugal properties before other properties may be
levied and executed.
 Spouses Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr. And Parulan
(G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010)
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties
made after the effectivity of the Family Code. The sale was
made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. :
“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision..
The power of administration does not include acts of disposition
or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an
authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa.
ART. 124 FLORES v. LINDO (G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011)

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions
also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power
of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of
the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
ART. 129 Quiao v. Quiao (G.R. No 176556, July 04, 2012)
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be
divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes
of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because
Brigido is the offending spouse.
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further
held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
HELD: In the normal course of events, the following are the
steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their
separate properties. In the instant case, the trial court found
that the couple has no separate properties when they
married. xxx
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay
the debts of the conjugal partnership; xxx
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive
properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned
to each of them. In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them.
The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in
the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be accounted for
in the guilty party's favor.
ART. 130 Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. Et. Al. v. Servacio and Go
(G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011)
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,
any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest to Servacio, but not the interest of his
co-owners.
The proper action in cases like this is the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.
 Art. 147 VIRGINIA OCAMPO V. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO
(G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015)
In a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. Properties acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court
and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to
prove that the properties were acquired solely on her
own efforts.
Attempts to establish respondent as an
irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as
family man were made but the testimonies
adduced towards that end, failed to fully
convince the Court that respondent should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the
conjugal property because of his indiscretion. Thus,
the presumption remains that said properties
were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by
them in equal shares.
UY V. SPOUSES LACSAMANA (G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015)
FACTS: Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents against his alleged wife Rosca and the
spouses Lacsamana to whom his wife sold two parcels of land. Uy
alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca; that they lived
together as husband and wife from the time they were married in
1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and
Rosca had eight children. Uy alleged that he and his wife acquired
2 parcels of land in 1964, but in gross and evident bad faith,
Rosca executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale
in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.

Rosca argued that she was never married to Uy. She testified that
sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited
and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize
their marital union with a marriage ceremony.
However, the celebration was not consummated because of the
bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they
were unable to secure a marriage contract. Rosca alleged that
Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her
which led to their physical separation before the year 1973.

HELD: Uy and Rosca were not married. Hence, the sale contracted by
Rosca is valid. There is a presumption established in our Rules
"that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. "Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio— Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven by testimony
of one of the parties to the marriage, or one of the witnesses to the
marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. Documentary evidence may also be
shown.
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage
contract itself. Uy was not able to present any copy of the
marriage certificate. The presumption of marriage has been
sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of
evidence showing that Uy and Rosca were never actually married
to each other. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies
when a couple living together were not incapacitated from
getting married. The provision states that properties acquired
during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is
proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and
appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the
subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.
ART. 148 Ventura v. Spouses Paulino
(G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013)

In unions between a man and a woman who are

incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence
of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties.
In Borromeo v. Descallar, it was held that it is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.
Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna (23 July 2015, G.R. No.
171914)
FACTS:
JLL obtained a divorce from Eugenia from the Dominican Republic,
and on the same day, contracted another marriage, with Soledad
Lavadia, the respondent. JLL and Soledad returned to the Phils.
where they lived as husband and wife. JLL organized a law firm
and bought a condominium unit to be used as the office of the law
firm. When JLL died, the firm was dissolved. The condominium unit
was partitioned, and the pro-indiviso share of JLL was determined
to be 25/100. This was claimed by his son from his first marriage,
Gregorio.
The property, including law books, office furniture, and equipment,
is subject to the complaint by Soledad against the heir of JLL.
The RTC ruled that the property was acquired through JLL’s sole
industry, and that Soledad has no right as owner. She was,
however, declared as the owner of the law books.
HELD:
The divorce did not dissolve the marriage between JLL and Eugenia.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of JLL and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until JLL’s death.
JLL’s marriage to Soledad, being bigamous, was void, and the
properties acquired during their marriage are governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
Soledad failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to
purchase the condominium unit. Also, it is logical that Soledad, not
being a lawyer, had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase
of books for the law firm.
 Salgado v. Anson (G.R. No. 204494, September 5, 2016)
FACTS
 On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-
Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa
Anson-Maya and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of
three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
 Luis claimed that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina. He alleged
they were married in a civil ceremony on December 1966. Prior to this,
Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa while Jo-Ann is Severina’s
daughter from a previous relationship. During their marital union, they
acquired real properties in San Juan, Manila. Luis claims that since there
was no marriage settlement between them, and the properties pertain to their
conjugal partnership. However, without his knowledge and consent, Severina
executed Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-
Ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of Severina, adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir.
Luis claimed that because of this, he was divested of his share in the
conjugal properties, and inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.
 Jo-Ann countered that she did not know about the marriage between her
mother and Luis, and that all they had was a common-law relationship. This
was terminated through a Partition Agreement executed in November 1980.
Luis then already received the properties apportioned to him. Maria Luisa
also claimed that she was not aware of any marriage. In the Partition
Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they
acknowledged that they were living together as common-law spouses.
 Luis presented a marriage contract with Severina during trial. The Spouses
Salgado disputed the validity of the marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license. Luis also admitted the existence and execution of the
Partition Agreement. The RTC ruled in favor of Luis, upholding the validity of
marriage despite the lack of the marriage license number. The CA affirmed
this.

ISSUES
 Whether there was a valid marriage between Luis and Severina.
 Whether Luis is entitled to properties from Severina’s estate under Articles
147 or 148.
RULING
 The marriage of Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, hence the applicable law is the Old Civil Code.
 The reason cited by Luis as to why there was no marriage license is the
exception under Article 77 of the Old Civil Code, stating that “In case two
persons married n accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or
religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered
as a purely religious ceremony.” However, it is clear that they were not
married to each other prior to the civil ceremony, and this was affirmed by
Luis in his testimony.
 On the issue of the co-ownership, the Court held that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148. As there is no showing that the parties were incapacitated to
marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code are the pertinent
provisions of law governing their property relations.
 Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. And
since Luis has admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the
Partition Agreement, it remains uncontroverted that he already received his
share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no
reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the
absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least,
voidable.
 PETITION GRANTED.
Art. 152:
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288 Aug. 15, 2012)
FACTS: The court issued a judgment against Sps. Fortaleza which
resulted to the execution of their conjugal house.
ISSUE: W/N he family home can be executed.
HELD: A family home is exempt from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code, provided such claim for
exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so
estops the party from later claiming the exemption.
In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the
one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the
property.
ART. 155 DE MESA v. ACERO (G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of
exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before August 3, 1988 must
be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code;
Second, family residences constructed after August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences not judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor him/herself
before the sale of the property at public auction.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home

and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses
De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a
family home and its being exempted from execution at the
time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the
property from execution.
 ART. 160 Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, July 8, 2015)
In a 1998 decision, the RTC ruled that the mortgage cannot
bind the property in question which was owned by the
Bells for violating Article 160 of the Family Code since the
mortgage was not consented to in writing by a majority
of the beneficiaries of the family home.
In 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon the Bells’
family home. The Bells claimed that the property cannot be
sold because it is a family home and that the Eulogios ploy
to re-litigate the issue had long been settled with finality
(res judicata) by the 1998 RTC decision. The CA ruled that
the RTC decision in 1998 only declared their house and lot
as a family home, not the issue of whether it may be sold in
execution.
HELD:
Respondents’ family home cannot be sold on execution under
Article 160 of the family Code. The issue of whether the
property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of Php300,000
has already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its
findings necessarily meant that the property is exempt from
execution.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home
under Article 160, the Eulogios must establish that (1) there was
an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the
persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157.
The Eulogios have not proven that they are protected by the
exceptions under Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code.
 Onstott v. UTNAI
FACTS (G.R. No. 221047, September 14, 2016)
 Albert Cas, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Due to
non-payment of realty taxes, the Provicional Government of Rizal sold the subject
property at public auction to one Amelita De Sena, highest bidder at public auction.
 UTNAI, an association epresentingt he actual occupants of the subject property,
subsequently redeemed the same from De Sena. UTNAI thereafter filed a complaint for
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title of Albert Cas. It alleged that it became the
owner of the property upon redemption from De Sena. They also contend that Albert
was an American citizen who, under Philippine law is not allowed to own a parcel of land
in the Philippines. The RTC granted the petition and issued a new title in the name of
UTNAI.
 Michael Onstott, claiming to be the legitimate son of Albert with a certain Josephine
Onstott, filed a petition for relief alleging that UTNAI impleaded only Albert
notwithstanding knowledge of Albert’s death. He averred that UTNAI fraudulently and
intentionally failed to implead him and Josephine in order to prevent them from
participating in the title proceedings. Josephine as wife of Albert is owner of half of the
property as it is conjugal in nature. Michael insisted that at the time of the filing of the
case, Albert was already dead, which means that the ownership of the property had
already devolved to his compulsory heirs.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Onstott reinstating the OCT in the name of Albert. The CA
however reversed the ruling and declared that the grant of title to UTNAI had become
final and executory. Hence, the present petition filed by Michael before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the courts erred in its failure to implead Josephine Onstott as an
indispensable party since the subject property was allegedly conjugal in nature.

RULING
 Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
 However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with
strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses.
 As Michael invokes the presumption of conjugality, he must first establish that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage of Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the
presumption cannot stand. Records are bereft of any evidence from which the actual date
of acquisition of the subject property can be ascertained. Considering that the presumption
of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired, the subject property is therefore considered to be Albert's exclusive
property.
 PETITION DENIED.
Art. 172
Salas v. Matusalem (G.R. No. 180284 April 10, 2013)
HELD:
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign
in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity.
A baptismal certificate considered as public documents but
only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child’s paternity.
Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat (28 January 2015, G.R. 200169)
Facts:
Spouses Aguilar died, intestate and without debts. Their estate
include two parcels of land which is the subject of the controversy.
Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G.
Siasat, alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses; that he discovered that the subject titles were
missing, and he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan had
stolen the same.
In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness
of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife,
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share
of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue;
and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

To prove filiation, petitioner presented school records stating that

Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent; ITR indicating that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother and Alfredo Aguilar’s
Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957,
a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo
Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks indicating that petitioner, who was
born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. Respondent
offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar announcing that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that
she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s SSS E-1 Form, a public document, is
sufficient to establish legitimate filiation with his father,
Alfredo Aguilar and W/N respondent has personality to
impugn legitimacy of the petitioner.

HELD:
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship of petitioner to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Filiation may
be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required.
As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality
to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his
legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has
already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, the Court has held before that –
Article 263 (Old Civil Code provision of Art. 170 of the FC)
refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a
child of Jose at all.
Nevertheless, since the petitioner has shown that he is the
legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is also the heir
to the latter's estate.
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO V. KAREN SANTOS
(G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015)

In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein

respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that
respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased
brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner
alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. When petitioner alleged
that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence
shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling
on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such
proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not
being a direct action to prove one's filiation.
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo.
The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities
consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth
and the name of the informant made the document
questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries
on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are
alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent
herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities
and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding
the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth
certificate.
 ART. 175
Jesse U. Lucas V. Jesus S. Lucas (G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011)
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to establish
FILIATION with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the RTC. Jesse alleged that he is the
son of Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which
include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth (no father
stated); (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology;
(d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from UP College of Music; and (f)
clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
HELD:
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or “good cause” for the holding of the test.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our

jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.”
 ART. 175
San Agustin v. Sales
(G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016)
FACTS
 Ernesto Sales (respondent) and Teodoro Sales (now deceased) are brothers
who are claiming that they are the illegitimate children of the late Louis
Fernandez before the RTC. They allege that Louis Fernandez and his
common-law wife, who was a house helper in the Fernandez household, was
their parents. That the legal wife of Louis Fernandez, Marie Louise, never
had children. Respondent presented two public documents namely; (1) a
notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and
Epitacia formally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a
document solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980, dominated as
Acknowledgement of Children. These documents bears Louis thumbmark.
 Petitioner files an amended complaint alleging that the 2 documents are
spurious and that the thumbmark was irregular considering that Louis was
still able to write at an old age. Also, petitioner claims that the brothers are
children of Corpus, the house boy, by showing evidence that the brothers
used the surname of Corpus in their report cards and in the death certificate
of Corpus.
ISSUE
 WON the brothers are the illegitimate children of Louis Fernandez.

RULING
 Yes. The court held that the legitimate filiation of a child may be established
by any of the following:
 (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
 (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the present concerned.
 In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proven by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

 Such requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate

children. That petitioner’s claim that a thumbmark is not sufficient, as Louis
was still able to write during old age, is without merit. That a thumb mark has
been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of signature. The Court, in the
case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga, held that a signature may be made by a
person's cross or mark.
 The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized
documents. A notarized document is a public document and as such it enjoys
the presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and
convincing evidence. It serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. The bare allegations of the petitioner cannot qualify as clear and
convincing evidence to overturn such presumption.
 Also, with regard to the contention of petitioner that the brothers used the
surname of Corpus is also without merit. Louis' existing marriage to Marie
Louise must have prevented him from making any declaration that would
have exposed his relationship with the house maid. The use of Louis'
surname by his children during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter
to his intention to cover such relationship. It is no less than the putative father
who voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate
children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the law that
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one's legitimacy
or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
 Petition DENIED.
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia v. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and
Henry Rossi (G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017)
FACTS
 Petitioners and Respondents all claim to be the children of Josefa A. Ara, who died on
November 18, 2012. Petitioners assert that Respondent Pizarro was born to Josefa and her then
husband Vincent Salgado. He died during World War II. Towards the end of the war Jose lived
with Darwin Gray, an American soldier, and gave birth to Petitioner Ara. Later, Josefa met
Alfredo Garcia, got married, and gave birth to Petitioner William Garcia and Ramon Garcia. After
he passed away, Josefa met Frank Rossi and gave birth to Respondent Rossi.
 Respondent Pizarro claims that she is the only child of Josefa and has stated that Petitioner
Garcia is recorded as a son of Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia as evidenced by a Certificate
of Live Birth (June 19, 1950) and Petitioner Ara is recorded as a son of Jose Ara and Maria
Flores as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth.
 The parties verbally sought partition of the properties left by Josefa which were in the
possession of Respondent Pizarro, who refused to partition. The plaintiffs referred the dispute to
the Barangay Lupon for an amicable settlement, which they were unable to do. The parties then
filed a complaint for judicial partition of properties before the RTC of Malaybalay.
 Respondent Pizarro claimed that to her knowledge, she was the only child of Josefa. She denied
that the other parties were her siblings. Further, Josefa left other properties with the plaintiffs.
During the pre-trial, the plaintiffs claimed part of Rossi’s property.
 RTC ruled that the other properties (other than Baguio and Valenci) shall be co-owned by all
parties in equal shares.
 CA held that only Respondents Pizarro and Rossi, as well as plaintiff Ramon, were children of
Josefa and are entitled to shares of her estate. The CA also found that the RTC erred in allowing
ISSUE
 Whether or not the petitioners have proven their filiation to Josefa even after her death.

RULING
 No.
 The Family Code has stated:
 Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
 In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
 Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by
the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (268a)
 Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
 As such, a person must establish illegtimiate filiation after the death of a parent via record
of birth. The case of Uycuango v. CA also supports this with the facts of the case being
similar.
 Petitioners submitted:
 Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as the mother
 His Certificate of Marriage indicating the same, a picture of the wedding including Josefa
 A Certificate of Marriage between Alfredo and Josefa
 Garcia’s Certificate of Birth retrieved after Josefa’s death, a group picture
 A comment of Rossi which stated that Josefa sis nor register all of her children so she wouldn’t lose her
pension
 Ara’s testimony that he was the son
 Nelly Alipio’s, a first degree of Josefa, testimony stating the same.

 None constitute as evidence under Article 172 of the Family Code. Although Garcia had a birth
certificate, the fact that he registered it late prevents the Court from according it the same weight
as any other birth certificate. Further the late registration of the birth certificate is pursuant to
Rule 25 of the National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93. This is shown in
Fernandez v. CA where certificates of live birth are not competent evidence in the paternity suit
where there was no showing that the putative father had any participation in the preparation of
the certificate.
 Further, in People v. Villar, the Court sustained the Trial Court’s rejection of a delayed
registration of birth as conclusive evidence through Article 410 of the Civil Code which states
that documents from the civil registrar are only prima facie evidence. The petitioners may have
been able to prove the filiation without the birth certificate through an admission of the filiation in
a public or private handwritten document signed by Josefa but none was presented.
 The evidence of pictures, testimonies, and marriage certificates are also insufficient as there
were no acts, declarations, or omissions which attributed directly to Josefa, much less ones
pertaining to the filiation of the petitioners.
 PETITION DENIED, CA DECISION AFFIRMED.
SURNAMES and 176 Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248
February 18, 2014)
FACTS:
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship,
two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
The parties’ relationship eventually turned sour, and Grande left
for the United States with her 2 children. This prompted Antonio to
file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to
take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/
Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Appending the petition was a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
ISSUE: W/N Antonio may compel the use of his surname for
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother (Art 176 of the Family
Code). The exception provided is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on
the mother; hence, Antonio’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
As to the matter of the change of surname of the
illegitimate children. There is no legal basis for the
court to change the surname of the children. To do
otherwise would be to contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of the law.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who
is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate children.
Petition for Correction
of Entries Emelita Gan v. Republic (G.R. No.
207147, September 14, 2016)
FACTS
 Petitioner Emelita Basilio Gan was born out of wedlock to father Pia Gan, a
Chinese national, and mother Consolacion Basilio, a Filipina. Her birth
certificate indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.
 Petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name with the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Sur, seeking to change the full name indicated in her birth
certificate from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.” She claimed that she
had been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in her school records from
elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other
government records.
 The RTC issued an order which noted that the petition sought not only a
correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of name. RTC ordered
petitioner to make the necessary amendment to her petition. Petitioner obliged,
and after due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the change of
petitioner’s name.
 Respondent Republic sought a reconsideration of the RTC order, alleging that
the petitioner, an illegitimate child, failed to adduce evidence that she was duly
recognized by her father, which would allow her to use the surname of her
father. RTC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.
 On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC orders. CA opined that pursuant to
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9225, the petitioner may
only use the surname of her mother as she is an illegitimate child. Moreover, she may only
use her father’s surname if their filiation has been expressly recognized by her father.
 Petitioner maintains that the RTC correctly granted her petition since she only sought to
have her name indicated in her birth certificate changed to avoid confusion as regards to
her personal records. She insists that her failure to present evidence that her father
recognized her as his illegitimate child is immaterial; a change of name is reasonable and
warranted, if it is necessary to avoid said confusion.

ISSUE
 Whether petitioner’s change of name should be granted.

RULING
 A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. "In granting or denying
petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the
sound discretion of the court. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.”
 SC agrees with the CA that the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for
change of name, i.e. that she has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her
records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner
was born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's use of surname:
 Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If
recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
 Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.

 In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was
born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural
child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's birth, either
of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of
her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code.
 However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed
was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth
certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract,
certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural
child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father's
surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner
to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan.”
 PETITION DENIED.
Petition for Correction In re: Petition for Correction of Entry v.
of Entries
Republic (G.R. 214064, August 24, 2016)
FACTS
 For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela."
However, when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to discover that he was registered as
"Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a Petition for
Correction of Entry under Rule 108 in his NSO birth certificate before the RTC.
 Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan,
Catanduanes and is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela
(Jorge), former governor of the said province, and Francisca B. Condeno
(Francisca), both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each
other, he has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has
been using the said surname in all of his official and legal documents, including
his xxx appointment as Provincial General Services Officer, report of rating in the
First Grade Entrance Examination of the Civil Service Commission, Philippine
Passport, Marriage Contract, and Certificate of Compensation Payment/Tax
Withheld.
 In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth certificate issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing
that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.
 The RTC initially dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner's
recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was improper, as the petition did
not involve mere correction of clerical errors but a matter of filiation which
should, thus, be filed in accordance with Rule 103 of the same Rules.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, maintaining that the issue of filiation is
immaterial since he was only seeking a correction of entry by including the
surname "Almojuela" to "Felipe Condeno," his first and middle names
appearing on his birth certificate with the NSO. He likewise insisted that the
name "Jorge V. Almojuela" was clearly indicated thereon as the name of his
father.
 RTC granted. OSG moved for reconsideration. RTC denied the OSG's
motion and reiterated its stance that based on the allegations thereon, the
petition was only for the correction of entry in the records of the NSO.
 CA reversed RTC because of failure to comply with the requirements of Rule
108, where his failure to implead and notify the Local Civil Registrar and his
halfsiblings as mandated by the rules precluded the RTC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case; and that the correction of entry sought by petitioner
was not merely clerical in nature, but necessarily involved a determination of
his filiation.
ISSUE
 Was the CA correct in nullifying the correction of entry on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction?

RULING
 Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry through an appropriate adversary
proceeding. An adversary proceeding is defined as one "having opposing
parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which
the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded
the latter an opportunity to contest it.
 In Republic v. CosetengMagpayo, the Court emphasized that in a petition for a
substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is
mandatory that the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim
to have any interest that would be affected thereby be made respondents for the
reason that they are indispensable parties.
 In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the
Local Civil Registrar and his half siblings. Although he claims that his halfsiblings
have acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules nonetheless
mandate compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due
process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest
 Although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the
subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure
to implead and notify the affected or interested parties, such as when: (a)
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections
proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently left
out, these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.
 In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above discussed requirements
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil
registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations renders the entire
proceedings therein null and void.
 Republic v. CA The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including
the judgment.
 The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for
lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.46 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
 Petition DENIED.
Petition for Correction
of Entries
Republic v. Sali
(G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017)
FACTS
 Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court before the RTC.
 Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay.
Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of
Baybay, Leyte[,] thru inadvertence and mistake[,] erroneously entered in the records the
following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of "LORENA" and
Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968.
 The petitioner has been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas["] and her date of birth as "April
24, 1968" for as long as she (sic) since she could remember and is known to the community
in general as such.
 [Sali] then prayed for the issuance of an order correcting her first name from "Dorothy" to
"Lorena" and the date of her birth from "June 24,1968" to “April 24, 1968.”
 RTC moved to grant the petition for correction.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC Decision.
The CA denied the appeal.
 In the SC, the Republic, through the OSG, argues that if the first name is being sought to be
changed, it does not involve the correction of a simple clerical, typographical or innocuous
error such as a patently misspelled name, but a substantial change in Sali's first name. This
considering, the applicable rule is Rule 103.
ISSUE
 Was Sali correct in filing a Rule 108 proceeding instead of a Rule 103 proceeding as averred by
the OSG?

RULING
 Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for
correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which
were committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all
alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical
errors may be set right under Rule 108.
 Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect
 SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change ofFirst Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general.

 The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first
name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been
publicly known by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition
is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court.
 In Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar - In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
 In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was
not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should
have been administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil registrar
concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have
dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.
 On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24, 1968"
to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that
R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No. 9048
 Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy in
seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil registry.
 Petition to correct her birth date GRANTED; Petition for Correction of Entry in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to her first name is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil registrar
concerned.
 Support (Art. 194 ) Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for
support pendent lite amounting to P500,000. Respondent on the
other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give
as much as 75,000 as support. The RTC ruled that based on the
evidence presented the proper amount to paid should be
115,000. This was not assailed by any party thus, it became final
and executory. Issues once again arose, when respondent in
complying with its obligation, deducted from the amount of
support in arrears, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner representing the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses and purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods.
HELD:
The amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.

Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for

his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses, etc.,
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
 Art. 198: Interlocutory Orders on Support

Calderon, Ma Carminia v. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA

(G.R. No. 185595, Jan 9, 2013)

FACTS: Complaint of declaration of nullity of marriage was filed

by Calderon against husband Roxas. Trial court granted support
pendente lite, ordering Roxas to support minor children. Upon
motion, the support was reduced. The order to reduce support
was appealed from, but was denied by CA.
ISSUE: Whether orders on the matter of support pendente lite are
interlocutory or final.
HELD: Orders on matters of support pendente lite are
interlocutory. It decides an incidental matter but is not a final
decision on the main issue of the case. The proper remedy is a
special civil action, not an appeal of the interlocutory order. Thus,
CA properly dismissed the appeal.
Art. 203

Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012)

HELD: Since filiation is beyond question, support

follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his/her child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. The amount is variable and, for this
reason, no final judgment on the amount of support
is made as the same shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities
of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to
support.
 Designation of Parental Authority (Art. 213)
Beckett v. Sarmiento(A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013)
FACTS:
Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to
Eltesa, a Filipino citizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr.
The couple were subsequently divorced and by virtue of a
compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was granted to
Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly
Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits, Geoffrey
consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the
holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011.
However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey Jr.,
hence, this prompted Geoffrey to file a petition for violation of RA
7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus.
During the conference on the application for habeas
corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed
inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying,
not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the
father, was a total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst,
Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directing Eltesa to return
Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of
did not materialize.
Hence, Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of
the Order. But instead of enforcing said order, Judge
Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr. . It is Geoffrey’s main contention
is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional
custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on
compromise agreement.
HELD:
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody, did not
disregard the res judicata rule. The matter of custody, to borrow
from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, “is not permanent and
unalterable [and] can always be re-examined and adjusted.”
The situation of the parents and even of the child can change,
such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be
to the latter’s best interest.

Under, the Family Code, in parental authority the Court shall take
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be
turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As
such, he was very much capable of deciding, based on his past
experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.
 RA 7610 People v. Caballo (G.R. No. 198732, Jun 10, 2013)

Facts:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old. The
two became sweethearts. Sometime in 1998, Caballo persuaded
AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more incidents of sexual congress.

Issue: W/O Caballo is guilty of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.

Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:

(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period,
xxx
(c) x x x

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age
(Jojit Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011)
Held:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Consent is not
material in cases under RA 7610.
Moreover, the abuse is punishable whether habitual
or not. In the case, Caballo’s actuations of assuring AAA
of his love and promise to marry may be classified as
“coercion” and “influence’’ within the purview of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610. These were meant to influence
AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give
into having sex with him, in which he succeeded.
Interpretation was criticized as early as in Olivarez v. CA, G.R. No. 163866,
July 29, 2005
 J. Carpio, dissenting: The Information failed to allege the second
essential element of the crime as defined in Section 5 of RA 7610
[The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse], thus, Olivarez cannot be convicted
for violation of RA 7610. The Information is void to charge Olivarez
for violation of Section 5 of RA 7610. Otherwise, Olivarez would be
deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge
against him.
This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs
acts of lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness
that the accused performs on the child are separate and different
from the child’s exploitation in prostitution or subjection to “other
sexual abuse.”
 Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the
acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited
in prostitution nor subjected to “other sexual abuse.”

 The phrase “other sexual abuse” refers to any sexual

abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness complained of
and other than exploitation in prostitution. Such “other
sexual abuse” could fall under acts encompassing
“[O]bscene publications and indecent shows” mentioned
in Section 3(d)(3) of RA 7610.
 George Bongalon v. People, (G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013)

 Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC

and CA that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with
their holding that petitioner’s acts constituted child abuse
under RA 7610. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity”
of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.

 With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent

to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse. Crime is slight physical injuries.
 Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron v. People, (G.R No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

 Jabalde is guilty of slight physical injuries only and not child abuse
under R.A. 7610. Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin,
but the records do not show that Jabalde intended to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human
being. The laying of hands on Lin was an effect of Jabalde’s
emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter’s head was
punctured which made her think that she was already dead. Dr. Munoz
stated that the abrasions may have been mildly inflicted. This runs
contrary to the accusation that she intended to abuse or maltreat Lin,
because if she did, she could have easily hurt the 7 year old boy with
heavy blows. As a mother, the idea of the death of her child caused
an instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm
and danger in the form of the mild abrasions inflicted on Lin. Having
lost the strength of her mind, she lacked the intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that is essential in the child of crime abuse.
Felina Rosaldes v. People, (G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014)
 Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
 The petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard
Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the boy fell down, his
body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead]
of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further
held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."
 Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly
discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the
physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive.
The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.
She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake
of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by
a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child
care exercising special parental authority.

 Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable

doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds
that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Michael Ryan as a human being.
 VAWC BBB v. AAA
(G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015)
 FACTS: When BBB married AAA, the birth certificate of CCC
(who was AAA’s son by a previous relationship) was amended to
make it appear that he was a legitimated of BBB and AAA. In a
VAWC case against BBB, the PPO included support for CCC. BBB
raises the issue of CCC not being his child.

 HELD: BBB cannot raise the issue of CCC’s status and filiation in
the instant petition. In Tison v. CA, the Court held that "the civil
status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The child’s
legitimacy "cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose." The
instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for a PPO before
the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a
collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.
 VAWC Pavlow v. Mendenilla (G.R.
No. 181489, April 19, 2017)
FACTS
 Petitioner, an American Citizen, is the husband of respondent’s (Cherry) daughter (Maria Sheila),
a Filipino. Petitioner and Maria got married in civil rites in QC. Three months into their marriage,
Maria Claims that petitioner was employing physical violence upon her because of their quarrels
with regard to petitioner’s infidelity. Maria claims that petitioner always punched her and that she
was made to take pills which caused her to be unconscious. Respondent filed a complaint with
the Assistant prosecutor of Makati for slight physical injuries. But the same was denied because
respondent was not able to substantiate its allegations. Thereafter, respondent, in behalf of her
daughter, filed a Temporary Protection Order against petitioner. The same was granted and the
summons was forwarded to the residence of petitioner. However, at that time petitioner was
abroad. The summons was forwarded to Tolentino, petitioner’s employee.
 Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the dismissal of Mendenilla’s petition alleging that
the case filed by Mendenilla was an action in personam and at the time the summons was
served, he was out of the country. He theorizes that in cases where a temporary protection order
is issued ex parte by a trial court, the temporary protection order itself is the summons. He adds
that Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law and Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC stipulate
personal service - and absolutely no other means of service - of the temporary protection order
upon the respondent. Thus, service through Tolentino was ineffectual.
 Also petitioner claims that respondent has no personality to file the petition for the issuance of a
protection order and that in filing such is a ground for forum shopping due to the fact that the
complaint for slight physical injuries were dismissed by the prosecutor.
ISSUE
 1 – WON respondent has personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order under the
Anti-VAWC Law – YES
 2 – WON respondent is guilty of forum shopping - NO
 3 – WON summons was properly served on petitioner – YES

RULING
 1 & 2 – The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order. However, the right of a mother and of
other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a
petition for herself. The filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings
on her own petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at
the level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the
issuance of a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's
Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve
the basis of a finding of forum shopping by her mother.
 That there are three distinct remedies available to victims of “violence against women and children”:
first, a criminal complaint; second, a civil action for damages; and finally, a civil action for the issuance
of a protection order. A civil action for damages may be resorted to pursuant to Sec 36 of the Anti-
VAWC Law. A protection order is issued "for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against
a woman or her child . . . and granting other necessary relief;" thereby "safeguarding the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and
ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life." Republic Act No. 9262 allows for the
issuance of three (3) kinds of protection orders: a Barangay Protection Order, a Temporary Protection
Order, and a Permanent Protection Order. A Barangay Protection Order is issued by a Punong
Barangay or by a Barangay Kagawad. Temporary protection orders and permanent protection orders
are judicial issuances obtained through trial courts. As its name denotes, a temporary protection order
is a provisional relief. It shall be effective for 30 days, following a court's "ex parte determination that
such order should be issued.” Within these 30 days, a hearing to determine the propriety of issuing
permanent protection order must be conducted.
 3 – A protection order is not a procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the progression of an
initiated action. Rather, it is itself a substantive relief which "prevent[ s] further acts of violence against
a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of [the Anti-VAWC Law] and granting other necessary
relief." Protection orders issued by courts come in two (2) forms: temporary and permanent. The
distinction, as their respective names denote, is their duration. A temporary protection order is
provisional, whereas a permanent protection order is lasting or final. When a case is of particular
urgency, a trial court may ex parte issue a temporary protection order, granting the reliefs under
Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law in the interim, that is, for a 30-day period. Precisely because the case
is of such particular urgency that a temporary protection order is deemed necessary.

 The information served on petitioner is different, it does not pertain to the filing of an action but merely
to the schedule of an upcoming hearing. At no point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the
protection order is the means for acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

 It has been emphasized that residents who temporarily leave their residence are responsible for
ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that, upon their return, they shall attend to exigencies that
may have arisen. This case pertains to alleged acts of violence against a woman.

 Petitioner was alleged to have physically and psychologically assaulted his wife, Maria Sheila, on
multiple occasions. Maria Sheila was noted to have had to be confined in a medical facility on account
of petitioner's assaults. Maria Sheila's mother found herself having to intervene to protect her
daughter. The totality of these entails an urgency which, by statute, justifies the issuance of a
temporary protection order even as the respondent to Mendenilla's petition was yet to be heard. This
is an urgency, which the Regional Trial Court actually found to be attendant as it did, in fact, issue a
temporary protection order.
• Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of
justifiable causes and how, by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's
temporary absence, immediate personal service was rendered impossible.
These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner
during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable
age and discretion, who also resided at petitioner's own residence.
Jurisdiction over petitioner's person was then validly acquired, and the
dismissal of respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla's petition on this score was
correctly held by Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon to be unwarranted.

• PETITION DENIED.
THE END

THANK YOU