CHAPTER 1

1. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA (GR. 97336)

2. Coca-cola Bottlers Phils, Inc. v. CA (GR 110295)
3. Taylor v. Manila Electric Company
4. Vergara v. CA
5. Elcano v. Hill
6. Castillo et al v. CA
7. Jarantilla v. CA
8. Barredo v. Garcia
9. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. Ppl
10. Casupangan et al v. Laroya
11. Sps. Santos, et al v. Pizardo
12. Manliclic v. Calaunan (GR 150157)
13. Franco v. IAC
14. Cerezo v. Tuazon
15. Philippine School of Business Administration, et. al v. CA
16. Singson v. BPI (23 SCRA 1117)
17. Air France v. Carrascoso
18. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. CA
19. Light Rail Transit Authority, et al. v. Navidad
20. FEBTC v. CA (GR 108164)
21. Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges Science and Tech, et al (GR 156109)
22. Orient Freight International, Inc v. Keihin-Everett Forwarding (GR 191937)
23. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co
24. Manila Railroad Co v. La Compania Transatlantica (GR 11318)
25. Sps Batal v. Sps Tominaga
26. Calalas v. CA (GR 122039)
27. Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers (GR 180440)
28. Perena c. Nicolas
29. Construction Development Corp v. Estrella
30. Anuran v. Buno (GR L-21353 and l-21354)
31. Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC
32. Metro Manila Transit Corp v. CA
33. Viluan v. CA
34. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez (56 Phil. 177)
35. Construction Development Corporation v. Estrella
36. Joseph v. Bautista (GR 41423)
37. First International Bank v. CA
38. Vda de Severo v. Go (GR L-44330)
39. Fabre Jr. et al v. CA
40. Emerciana Vda De Medina v. Cresencia
 CHAPTER 2
1. Ph Bank of Commerce v. CA (GR 97626)
2. Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp v. Borja
3. Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil 809
4. People v. De los Santos (2001)
5. Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA
6. Equitable Banking v. Special Steel Products
7. US v. Juanillo (GR 7255, Oct 3, 1912)
8. Thies v. Thomas (77 NY Supp., 276)
9. Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad et al
10. SD Martinez v. Buskirk (GR L-5691)
11. Ylarde v. Aquino
12. Francisco v. Chemical Bulk Carriers
13. Abiad v. Albayda, Jr
14. Associated Bank v. Tan (GR 156940)
15. Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co
16. Pacis v. Morales
17. Manila Electric Co v. Nordec Philippines
18. US v. Reyes, 1 Phil., 375, 377
19. United States v. Clemente (GR 8142)
20. United States v. Knight (GR 8561)
21. Wright v. Manila Electric Co (GR 7760)
22. Mindanao Terminal v. Phoenix Assurance

PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED

23. American Express International v. Cordero
Facts
American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used
to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers.
Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express
charge card. An extension charge card, was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero
which he also signed. Respondent, together with his family went on a three-day holiday
trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watson’s Chemist Shop. While there, Noel
picked up chocolate candies and handed his American Express extension charge card to
the salesclerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed
respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s
American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent,
caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases
using her own American Express charge card. The card was placed in the Inspect
Airwarn Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the
company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a
card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card
is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is
established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is
revoked or confiscated. Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
damages against petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral damages and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the humiliation he suffered. According
to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1, 1991,
a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of
respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate
cause of the “confiscation and cutting of respondent’s extension card which exposed the
latter to public humiliation for which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the public humiliation allegedly
suffered by Cordero to Amex.
Held:
In his complaint, respondent claimed that he suffered embarrassment and humiliation
because his card was unceremoniously confiscated and cut in half by Susan Chong of
Watsons Chemist Shop. In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there
must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there are
exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a
subsisting contract between
the parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which b
reaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply. Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be
the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause
is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing
similar number to that of respondents card; and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do
so is
the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of [respondents] extension card whic
hexposed the latter to public humiliation for which [petitioner] should be held liable. We
cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion. As explained by respondent himself, he could
have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to
petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the
true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be
attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment
was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative.

24. VDM Trading v. Carungcong

_______________________________________________________________________
__________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________
______________________________
25. The Consolidated Bank & Trust Co v. CA
FACTS: L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. Mercedes Macaraya, L.C.
Diaz’s cashier, instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the
money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre
went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 2 deposit slips and the passbook. Since
the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C.Diaz with
Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbankto
retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. L.C.
Diaz through its CEO, Luis C. Diaz, called Solidbank to stop any transaction using the
same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. On that same day, L.C. Diaz
learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000
from its savings account.L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the
return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint or Recovery of a
Sum of Money against Solidbank with the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether Solid Bank is liable due to quasi delict
HELD:
No, solid bank is liable for the loss of the 300k based on the ground of culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code). There is a debtor-creditor
relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor
is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the
depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the
depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties. Under
their contract, it is the duty of LC Diaz to secure its passbook. However, this duty is also
applicable to Solidbank when it gains possession of said passbook which it did when the
messenger left it to the bank’s possession through the bank’s teller. The act of the teller
returning the passbook to someone else other than Calapre, the firm’s authorized
messenger, is a clear breach of contract. Such negligence
binds the bank under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility.
However, mitigating damages must be applied since Under Article 1172, "liability (for
culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances." This
means that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C.Diaz was guilty of
contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized
signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should
be reduced.

The trial court, ruling in favour of Solidbank stated that Solidbank's act of allowing the
withdrawal of P300,000 was not the direct and proximate cause of the loss. The trial
court believed that L.C. Diaz's negligence in not securing its passbook under lock and
key was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor to withdraw the P300,000 (1) the
possession of the passbook by a person other than the depositor L.C. Diaz; (2) the
presentation of a signed withdrawal receipt by an unauthorized person; and (3) the
possession by an unauthorized person of a PBC check "long closed" by L.C. Diaz,
which check was deposited on the day of the fraudulent withdrawal.)

On the other hand, CA ruled that it is Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause of
the unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz. The
teller of Solidbank who received the withdrawal slip for P300,000 allowed the
withdrawal without making the necessary inquiry. Had the teller called up L.C. Diaz,
Solidbank would have known that the withdrawal was unauthorized. The teller did not
even verify the identity of the impostor who made the withdrawal. Thus, the appellate
court found Solidbank liable for its negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

ISSUE(S):
Whose negligence is the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal.

HELD:
SC did not agree with both courts. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by
the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.

L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor.
Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After
completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the
passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed
to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another person.

Solidbank's failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the withdrawal of
the P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of the passbook. Under Solidbank's
rules on savings account, mere possession of the passbook raises the presumption of
ownership. It was the negligent act of Solidbank's Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor
presumptive ownership of the passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of
the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause
of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbank's negligence in not returning the
passbook to Calapre.

SC did not agree to the appellate court's theory that the proximate cause of the
unauthorized withdrawal was the teller's failure to call up L.C. Diaz to verify the
withdrawal. Solidbank did not have the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the
withdrawal. There is no arrangement between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz to this effect.
There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their representatives
withdraw significant amounts from their accounts. L.C. Diaz therefore had the burden
to prove that it is the usual practice of Solidbank to call up its clients to verify a
withdrawal of a large amount of money. L.C. Diaz failed to do so.

ISSUE(S):
WON Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence.
RULING:
YES. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of
banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791”), which took effect on 13 June
2000, declares that the State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires
high standards of integrity and performance.” This new provision in the general banking
law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions holding
that, “the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.” This fiduciary
relationship means that the bank's obligation to observe “high standards of integrity and
performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its
depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of
diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes
the statutory diligence required from banks — that banks must observe "high standards
of integrity and performance" in servicing their depositors. Although RA 8791 took
effect almost nine years after the unauthorized withdrawal of the P300,000 from
L.C. Diaz's savings account, jurisprudence at the time of the withdrawal already
imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required under RA No. 8791.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert thecontr
act between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether
express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple
loan, and not a breach of trust. The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple
loan into a trust agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but
to earn money for themselves.

26. 86 CJS 943 – CANT FIND THE CASE

27. PLDT, Inc. v. CA

FACTS
: 1968, in Negros, Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth
mound and fell in an open trench on the road resulting to slight injuries to the husband
and serious injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the
accident. Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning
signs placed near the manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on the road causing
injuries to the wife. PLDT contends the injuries were the result of the negligence of the
independent contractor the company hired (Barte)and should be the one held liable and
not the company. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses while the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE
: Whether or not PLDT may be held liable for the injuries obtained by the Spouses
Estaban.
HELD
: No. The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to,
hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care
and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner. PLDT and Barte contends that the independent
contractor placed signs on the road and that it was the fault of Mr. Esteban because he
did not diligently drive the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly swerved from the outer
lane thereby hitting the earth mound.

SC finds no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the
accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident;
the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn
the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already kn
ew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident
mound.

Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on
that inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound. Through the tiremarks, it can
be seen that the accident mound was hit by the jeep swerving from the inside lane. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to
fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane towards the accident mound. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an
hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the
moment it struck the accident mound. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the
jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiffs would not have been thrown
against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries. If the accident
did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some
reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident
mound, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the accident.

CONCURRENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSES

28. Far Eastern Shipping Co v. CA
Doctrine: Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,
assumes to
exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of
diligence.
Facts: MV Pavlodar, owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at
the
port of Manila from British Columbia. Manila Pilot’s Association assigned Senen
Gavino to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself
in
the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. When the vessel
was
already about 2,000 ft. from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped, to which
Kavankov
relayed to the crew. However, the anchor did not hold as expected, and the speed of the
vessel
did not slacken. The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable
damage to the pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern
Shipping
Company, Gavino, and Manila Pilot’s Association.
Issue: Were the pilot and the master negligent?
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be
the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly,
where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of
the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured.
It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent
tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to
all
or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same.
No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed
the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single
injury to a third person, itis impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code
Doctrine: Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,
assumes to
exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of
diligence.
Facts: MV Pavlodar, owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at
the
port of Manila from British Columbia. Manila Pilot’s Association assigned Senen
Gavino to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself
in
the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. When the vessel
was
already about 2,000 ft. from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped, to which
Kavankov
relayed to the crew. However, the anchor did not hold as expected, and the speed of the
vessel
did not slacken. The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable
damage to the pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern
Shipping
Company, Gavino, and Manila Pilot’s Association.
Issue: Were the pilot and the master negligent?
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be
the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly,
where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of
the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured.
It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent
tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to
all
or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same.
No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed
the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is
liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single
injury to a third person, itis impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code
Doctrine: Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,
assumes toexercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable
degree of diligence.
Sometime in 1980, M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company, arrived at the Port of Manila. When the vessel reached the landmark, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped and the anchor dropped which was relayed by Kavankov to
the crew. However, the anchor did not take hold and the bow of the vessel rammed into
the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier and the vessel. The PPA,
through the OSG, filed a complaint about a sum of money against the FESC, Capt.
Senen
C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots Association, praying that the defendants therein be held
jointly and severally liable to pay for damages plus costs of suit., which the trial court
and
the CA decided in the affirmative.
Facts: Sometime in 1980, M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern
Shipping Company, arrived at the Port of Manila. When the vessel reached the
landmark, Gavino (pilot) ordered the engine stopped and the anchor dropped which was
relayed by Kavankov (master) to the crew. However, the anchor did not take hold and
the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier and the vessel. The PPA, through the OSG, filed a complaint about a sum of
money against the FESC, Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots Association,
praying that the defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay for
damages plus costs of suit., which the trial court and the CA decided in the affirmative.
Facts: MV Pavlodar, owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at
the port of Manila from British Columbia. Manila Pilot’s Association assigned Senen
Gavino to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside
him. When the vessel was already about 2,000 ft. from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped, to which Kavankovrelayed to the crew. However, the anchor did not
hold as expected, and the speed of the vesseldid not slacken. The bow of the vessel
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. PPA filed a
complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Company, Gavino, and
Manila Pilot’s Association.
Far Eastern allege that it is not liable since vessel is under compulsory pilotage and the
shipmaster is not liable. MPA and pilot Gavino are those who should be held liable.
Issue: Were the pilot and the master negligent?
Ruling: Yes. Prudence required that he, as pilot, should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed. He was not sure whether the anchor was
drop on time or not since there a was a commotion between the officers who are in
charge of the dropping of the anchor and the captain when he gave the order and he
could not understand their language, it was in Russian, so he only presumed the anchor
was not dropped on time. Capt. Kabancov unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in
the face of troublous exigence constitutes negligence. The master is still in command of
the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. His choice to rely blindly upon the
pilot's skills, to the point that despite being appraised of a notice of alert he continued to
relinquish control of the vessel to Gavino, shows indubitably that he was not performing
his duties with the diligence required of him.

As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly,
where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of
the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not
have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not
have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the
other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and
each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all
of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear
that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible
for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both
of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable
for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code

29. Cea v. Villanueva (GR L-5446)

Facts: Defendant Villanueva began an action against the plaintiff to foreclose a
mortgage which he held upon various parcels of real estate belonging to the plaintiff,
and prosecuted the same to final judgment. The properties were sold in a public auction
wherein Villanueva was the winning bidder including a pieces of land under parcel No.
2. Upon delivery of possession of parcel No. 2, sheriff found out that there is a house in
the lot which was not included under parcel No. 2. The sale was annulled and another
public sale held wherein Villanueva still won. However, before the 2 nd public sale was
made, the house located on parcel No. 2 was destroyed by fife. The evidence does not
disclose in what manner the fire originated or through whose fault or negligence, if of
anyone, it occurred.

Plaintiff’s action proceeded upon two theories: (1) Upon the theory that the defendants,
having entered into the possession of a house and lot, the property of the plaintiff, by
gross negligence and carelessness, caused it to be burned to the damage of the plaintiff;
and (2) upon the theory that the defendants entered into possession of a house and lot
belonging to the plaintiff, knowing that they were not entitled to the possession thereof,
and acting, therefore, in bad faith, they were responsible to the plaintiff for the
destruction of the house by fire.
HELD:
SC held that it is quite clear that the description contained in the mortgage of parcel
No. 2 fully includes the house and lot described by the appellant. The defendant having
entered into possession of the property lawfully, he was obligated to
exercise only reasonable diligence and care in themanagement of the property. It appeari
ng from the nature of the relation of the defendant to the property that he was not a
holder in bad faith nor a usurper, he is responsible only for those losses which are shown
to have been caused by his negligence. No negligence having been shown in this
case, the complaint was properly dismissed upon the merits.

30. Brown v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company

Facts: The plaintiff, George E. Brown, filed a complaint against the Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company (MERALCO) to recover damages for an injury sustained
by his horse and calesa (horse-drawn carriage) in a collision with a street car owned by
MERALCO. The accident occurred at around 11 o'clock at night on Calle Concepcion in
Manila. The horse and calesa were traveling west towards Bagumbayan, while the street
car was traveling east towards Marcelino. The plaintiff's witnesses testified that the
street car ran into the horse and calesa, causing damage to the front end of the calesa.
The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, claimed that it was the horse and calesa
that ran into the street car, with the first point of contact being on the side of the car. The
lower court dismissed the complaint, prompting the plaintiff to appeal the decision.
Issue: Whether the street car company is liable for damages resulting from the collision
with the horse and calesa.
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, dismissing the
complaint.
The court found that the evidence presented by the witnesses for the defense, which was
corroborated by the condition of the car after the accident, was more credible than the
testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses. The court held that the horse and calesa ran into
the side of the street car, rather than the car striking the horse and calesa end on.
Therefore, the court concluded that the street car company was not negligent and not
liable for damages.
Ratio:
To recover damages from a street-car company in a collision with a horse and calesa,
negligence on the part of the company's employees must be proven. In this case, the
evidence shows that the street car was passing along the street at the usual rate of speed,
with the motorman ringing the bell. The horse and calesa, which had been following
close behind a garbage cart, turned out and sought to pass the cart on the side next to the
street car. The horse became frightened at the white covering of the cart and suddenly
leaped sideways into the side of the street car, causing the damage. The motorman
stopped the car after the collision within a distance equal to one and a half times the
length of the car. These facts do not show negligence on the part of the motorman, as he
took appropriate action to stop the car after the collision. If an injury is received in an
accident without the intervention of negligence, no damages can be recovered by reason
of such injury.

31. Nakpil & Sons v. CA (GR L-47851)

Facts: Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a non-profit
organization formed under the corporation law decided to put up a building in
Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil &
Sons, while United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved
by the Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was
completed in 1966. In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the
building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to
vacate the premises. United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United Construction
subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and
specifications. Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court
appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building, but was
opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the building suffered more
damages in 1970 due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were
deviations in the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the
building; failure of PBA to exercise supervision in the construction of the building. For
its part, Nakpil countered that an act of God caused the failure of the building which
should exempt them from the responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from liability parties
who would otherwise be due to negligence?

Ruling: No, they are not exempted from liability. There is no dispute that the earthquake
is a fortuitous event or an act of god. But, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or
an act of God, here concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation, which results in loss or
damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. The negligence of the defendant was shown
when and proved that there was an alteration of the plans and specification that had been
so stipulated among them. Therefore, therefore there should be no question that
NAKPIL and UNITED are liable for damages because of the collapse of the building.
One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural
and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God
for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

Article 1174 of the New Civil Code, states that no person shall be responsible for events,
which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the
following must occur: 1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable 3) event must be such that it would
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation 4) debtor must be free from
any participation or aggravation of the industry to the creditor.

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
32. Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado
ACTS: Two vehicles were involved in this accident (1) a jeepney driven by respondent
KAPALARAN BUS LINE VS CORONADO, GRAJERA, SHINYO AND
CA
FACTS: Two vehicles were involved in this accident (1) a jeepney driven by respondent
Facts: The first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was a jeepney. Seeing that the road
was clear, the jeepney driven by Lope Grajera which had stopped at the intersection
began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the
intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about this time, the KBL bus driven by
Virgilio Llamoso was approaching the intersection and its driver was engaged in
determining from his Conductor if they would still pass through the town proper of Pila.
Upon learning that they were already full, he turned his attention to the road and found
the stopped vehicles at the intersection with the jeepney trying to cross the intersection.
The KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles of Atty. Manicad and the other vehicles
behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both vehicles at the intersection, therefore, causing
the accident. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming
into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to
gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which
had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on
the path of the KBL bus. The gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off. The impact
indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the
collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit
an electric post. The KBL bus driver violated traffic rules and regulations on restriction
as to speed and restrictions on overtaking and passing. Kapalaran argues that there was
no justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering that such
liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence and that petitioner"as mere
employer" was not guilty of such negligence or imprudence.
Issue: Whether or not KBL is liable for negligence
Ruling: YES . KBL is liable for the damages in the collision. Yes, KBL is liable for
negligence.
The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's
driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence
either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer is held
liable for damages; it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent
employee. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was
unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral
damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest
considering Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death
hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent
collision

33. Guillang vs. Bedania GR No. 162987

FACTS:
On October 1994, Guillang was driving his Toyota Corolla along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite
when it was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck driven by Rodolfo Bedania and owned by
Rodolfo de Silva. The passengers of the car were rushed to the Medical Center in Dasmariñas,
Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero, one of the passengers, was later
transferred to the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero
died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the
truck sustained minor damage. On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and
the heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
respondents Bedania and de Silva. On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the
truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the
safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver, Bedania. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower
court and dismissed the civil case for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail.
Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Who is liable for the damages suffered by the petitioners? -
BEDANIA
The trial court held Bedania and de Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable because the proximate cause
of the collision was the sudden U-turn executed by Bedania without any signal lights.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and held Genaro liable
because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaros failure to stop the car despite seeing that
Bedania was making a U-turn.
RULING:
Motor Vehicles; Unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
trafficregulation

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there

is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In this case, the report showed that the truck,
while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated
that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is
another violation of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was
negligent at the time of the mishap.

Traffic Rules; U-turns are generally not advisable particularly on major streets
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is
not supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch does not indicate an intersection and
onlyshows that there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision.
Furthermore, U-turns are generally not advisable particularly on major streets. Contrary to
Videna’s testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the
trial court that if Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to
maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal light sand made sure that the
highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn

Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and
injured the petitioners. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for
if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not
have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious
risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The truck’s sudden
U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and
the injuries of petitioners.

33. Mendoza v. Soriano

Facts: On July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by
Lomer Macasasa while crossing Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Soriano was
thrown five meters away, while the vehicle stopped 25 meters from the point of impact.
Macasasa initially agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital but fled the scene instead.
Soriano was brought to the hospital but later died. The Quezon City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of a criminal case against Macasasa for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano, Soriano's
wife and daughter, filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner
Flordeliza Mendoza, employer and the registered owner of the vehicle. The complaint
was dismissed against Macasasa, and the trial court also dismissed the complaint against
petitioner. Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision and found petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner argues that since
respondents caused the dismissal of the complaint against Macasasa, there is no longer
any basis to find her liable. RTC: Dismissed. Sonny was negligent in crossing instead of
using the overpass to get across.CA: Reversed. Macasasa was negligent for speeding
and fleeing the scene of the crime (Article 2185). Sonny’s own negligence does not
preclude recovery of damages from Macasasa’s negligence.
Art 2180: Presumption of Negligence of the Employers in the selection and supervision

Issue: WoN Mendoza is liable for negligence

Ruling: Yes.
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily actions for the recovery of a
sum of money for damages, and in this case, the claims for damages were the principal
reliefs sought by the respondents. Petitioner, as the owner and employer, is directly and
separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and the liability arises
due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees.
Petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
supervising Macasasa, making her primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused
by him. The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of
contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing
Commonwealth Avenue.

Under Article 2180: Employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. This liability arises due to the
presumed negligence in their supervision of their employees unless they can prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Mendoza is directly and separately liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in
supervising Macasasa. She had been unable to prove that she had exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa. Note: the contributory negligence
of Sonny for not using the pedestrian overpass only serves as a mitigating circumstance.
(Article 2179).

The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. Macasasa was found to be overspeeding and did not aid the accident
victim. Petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her
failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa.

34. Anonuevo v. CA
Facts: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc.,
the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an action for damages
against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. Añonuevo claims that
Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install
safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a persondriving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.

Issue: W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles,
making Villagracia presumptively negligent
Ruling: No. There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-
motorized vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical
exertion is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At
the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or
damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors
peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass,
and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.

Other Issues and Ruling:

1. W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations --> No.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the
personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
determines what would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia
was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Añonuevo
was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate
cause of the accident. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia
because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s
part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded
to make the left turn.
2. W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence --> No.
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo assolel
y responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding
should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have
occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment

RES IPSA LOQUITUR DEFINED

35. Layugan v. IAC
Note: IAC found petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa
loquitur
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked
truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the
highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and
limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who
claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist
negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle.
Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted
to the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on
the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there.
Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable
mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device, like
that required by law, or, by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn
vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time,
place, and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in
the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke
the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well
as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.

The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked
truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed. Whether the cargo truck was parked along
the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment
taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed
three or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning which we rule
as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private
respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. It is clear from the foregoing
disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by
clear and convincing evidence.

This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.

Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence.

it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine
cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury
complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident
and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. 43 Finally,
once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the
plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no
inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the
evidence, 44 as in this case.

36. Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana

Facts: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil, diagnosed her to be
suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid.” Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the
Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found
that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s
husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. After a
couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She
consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the
natural consequence of the surgery.

Two weeks after Natividad returned from the United States to seek further treatment, her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about
it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon
vanish. Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified,
prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While
confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in
her vagina — a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected
her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which
forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to
remedy the damage. Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for
damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for
negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for
concealing their acts of negligence. Pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad
died and was duly substituted by her children (the Aganas). The RTC rendered its
Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for
negligence and malpractice.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes with
Dr. Ampil liable to reimburse Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount the latter
will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs.

The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on
the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the
fact that the two pieces of gauze were left inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie
evidence of Dr. Fuentes’ negligence.

Issues: Whether or not Dr Fuentes is Liable.

Held: No. The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1)
the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control
and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management
used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing
requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which
caused the injury."

SC find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury"
to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie. In this jurisdiction, res
ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute
an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In other
words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been
committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.

It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of
Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy
when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her
left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his
work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed
Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on
Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him
that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the
misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in
fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. Clearly, the control and management of the
thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

37. Africa v. Caltex

FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire then
spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them. The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex
(owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).Trial court and CA
found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due
care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of the iremployees. Both courts
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that “as to its
applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite,” and that while
the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however,
we find no practical use for such docrtrine. The trial court and the CA found that
petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.

RULE: Yes. The doctrine applies and respondents are held liable solidarily to petitioners.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care. The
aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is
applicable in this case.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the
appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is
fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The
report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the
gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof
intothe underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negli
gence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through
or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs
owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is
located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls
adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at most and cannot prevent the
flames from leaping over it in case of fire.

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not
for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide
a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.. Defendants’
negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with
respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the second
amended complaint that “the fire was caused through the acts of a stranger who, without
authority, or permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and
negligently threw a lighted match in the premises.” No evidence on this point was
adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable inference
from the admission may be taken against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his
negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of
the present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. “It is the rule that those
who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the public
proportionate to and commensurate with a danger involved … we think it is the
generally accepted rule as applied to torts that ‘if the effects of the actor’s negligent
conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that
the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s
innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,
does not protect the actor from liability.’ Stated in another way, “The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with
the independent cause in the resulting injury.”

38. FF Cruz and Co., Inc v. CA

Facts: A fire broke up from the furniture shop of the petitioner in Caloocan city early
September 6, 1974. Prior to that, neighbor of the said shop requested that the petitioner
should build a firewall but failed to do so. The cause of the fire was never discovered.
39. FGU Insurance Corp v. GP Sarmiento Trucking Corp
PETITIONER: FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS:
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION andLAMBERT M. EROLES
SUMMARY:
GPS Trucking Corporation was to deliver 30 refrigerators. Enroute, the truck, driven by
Eroles, collided with an unidentified truck, fell into a deep canal, and the cargo was
damaged. FGU, as insurer, paid Concepcion Industries for the loss of the cargo and
sought reimbursement from GPS. GPS claimed that because FGU failed to prove that
they were a common carrier, they
may not claim relief under laws governing common carriers. // The SC REVERSED the
decision in so far as GPS is concerned. GPS is ordered to pay for damages not under the
rules on quasi-delicts but under rules on obligations.
DOCTRINE: A case based on culpa aquilana would require the claimnant to prove
negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. In culpa contractual, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and by the fact that
the obligor failed to comply with the contract

Facts: G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver 30 units of

Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert
Eroles, from
the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along SouthSuperhighway in Alabang, Met
ro Manila, to the CentralLuzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck wastraversi
ng the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol,
Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep
canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in
turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought
reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking
company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages
and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the
RTC of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive
hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in
business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage
was purely accidental. FGU presented its evidence, establishing the extent of damage
to the cargoes and the amount it had paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its
evidence, filed with leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer
to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common
carrier. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that FGU was not able to prove that
GPS was a common carrier so the law on common carriers is inapplicable. The
applicable law is Art. 2185. But because FGU was unable to prove violation of any
traffic regulations, negligence cannot be presumed and
GPS nor Eroles cannot be made liable for damages. Upon appeal, the CA upheld
the RTC’s decision and supported the reasoning that because FGU insisted that GPSwas
liable under Art.1735 as a common carrier, FGU has
the burden of proving that GPS is a common carrier or that thecarrier was negligent.
Because FGU failed to prove either, the appeal was dismissed
SSUE/S: WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case

RATIO: No. Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a) the event is
of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are
sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff Thus, it is not applicable when an
unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the
defendant could not be responsible.

Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable
when the thing that caused the injury is shown to be under their management and the
accident is such that it would not ordinarily happen if proper care was used. It relieves
the plaintiff of the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. However, it can
only be applied when other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated and the
indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. In this
case, it is not shown that the accident could have been exclusively due to the driver's
negligence, so res ipsa loquitur does not apply.

40. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. v. OEP Philippines, Inc

Facts: Interphil Laboratories, Inc. (Interphil) and OEP Philippines, Inc. (OEP) entered
into a Manufacturing Agreement in 1998. Under the agreement, Interphil agreed to
process and package Diltelan capsules for OEP. OEP was responsible for providing the
necessary instructions and materials for the processing and packaging. Interphil accepted
the delivery of the capsules and packaging materials from OEP and charged OEP for a
packaging fee and a packaging materials inspection fee.

In August 2000, OEP received reports from its client in Taiwan that there was a defect
in the packaging of the Diltelan capsules. It was discovered that some 90-mg capsules
were mistakenly wrapped in foils meant for 120-mg capsules and placed in boxes meant
for 90-mg capsules. OEP demanded reimbursement from Interphil for the expenses
incurred in recalling and destroying the defectively packaged capsules, but Interphil
refused to pay.

OEP filed a complaint against Interphil, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in
favor of OEP, ordering Interphil to pay actual damages, compensatory damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Interphil appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), but the CA affirmed the RTC's decision. Interphil then filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Interphil was negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Ruling: Yes.

On the merits of the case, the Court found that Interphil was negligent based on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The elements of res ipsa loquitur were clearly established,
as Interphil had exclusive control over the packaging process and the accident would not
have happened except for Interphil's negligence. OEP did not contribute to the incident,
and its unilateral destruction of the products was a prudent move to prevent further harm
to the public.

Interphil was held liable for actual damages, compensatory damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the decision of the CA, with the
modification of imposing an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid.

41. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Sps Sarangaya

Facts: In 1986, respondent spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya
erected asemi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the
provincial road of Santiago, Isabela. The building was known as Super A Building and
was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey residence
of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building. On the left side
of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine
Corporation (Matsushita). In 1988,petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through
its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease
of the first door of the Super A Building. Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented
space and divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office while the right
was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina. Pascual returned
to Santiago from Pampanga and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided
to warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key,
the engine made an odd sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline
percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This
revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small
flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and
started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear
compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered
burns on his face, legs and arms. Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television
when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no
time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and
appliances. The fire marshalls concluded that the fire was accidental. The report also
disclosed that petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law.

A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property was fil
ed against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, petitioner-corporation was asked to pay
the amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. The
complaint was later on withdrawn. Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on
quasi-delict against petitioners for a sum of money and damages, alleging that Pascual
acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in
the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee. Pascual insisted that the fire
was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages. He also
denied putting a container of gasoline in the cars rear compartment. For its part,
petitioner-corporation refused liability for the accident on the ground that it exercised
due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pascual as
its branch manager. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents and held that Pascual
was negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court’s ruling and only modified the amount for damages.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are negligent?

Held: Yes. As to Pascual, for failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of
the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of
thecar. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to
the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption.

To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
following requisites must concur: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Under the first
requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is
negligence. Ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car
engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an
explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any
direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes
into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand,
someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident.

Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he
had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his
negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in
provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove
care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that
Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car. The circumstances on record do not
support the defense of Pascual. Clearly, there was nocaso fortuito because of his want of
care and prudence in maintaining the car.

As to Perla Compania, failed to prove that the

it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
relationship between the two petitioners was based on the principle of pater familias
according to which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its employee
if he fails to prove due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employees. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.
While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for
his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the
fire. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the
breach thereof. Here, petitioner-corporations evidence hardly included any rule or
regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not
have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the
vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or
inventories of its properties either. Based on these circumstances, petitioner-corporation
clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascual’s car or its
serviceability. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for the
damage caused by their employees. The liability is imposed on all those who by their
industry, profession or other enterprise have other persons in their service or
supervision. Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to employers in the
transportation business.

42. Padillo v. Magnaye

Facts:
 On December 10, 2002, Christopher Magnaye parked his car in front of a
shop in Cainta, Rizal, leaving the engine running.
 While Magnaye was inside the shop, a Hino Bus, driven by Ramon Lojo,
crashed into the rear of a passenger jeepney, driven by Guidofredo Solamillo
Jr., which was stopped behind Magnaye's car.
 As a result, the jeepney rear-ended Magnaye's car, pushing it forward and
causing it to hit an electric post.
  Magnaye filed a complaint for damages against Gloria Padillo, the owner of
the Hino Bus, and Jesus Fernandez, the owner of the jeepney.
 Magnaye sought payment for actual damages, transportation expenses,
moral damages, and attorney's fees.

Issue:
 Whether Gloria Padillo should be held liable for damages to Christopher
Magnaye and Jesus Fernandez.

Ruling:
 The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings and ruled that Gloria
Padillo is liable for damages to Magnaye and Fernandez.
 The Court denied Padillo's petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

Ratio:
1. Padillo's claim that she was not the registered owner of the bus is a factual
matter that cannot be entertained in a petition for review on certiorari.
2. Padillo failed to prove that she exercised the required degree of diligence in
selecting and supervising the bus driver, making her liable for damages
under the Civil Code.
3. Magnaye was the real party-in-interest as he already possessed and was
driving the vehicle at the time of the collision, despite the registration
occurring three days after the incident.
4. The Hino Bus was the proximate cause of the damages sustained by
Magnaye's car, as it rear-ended the jeepney, which then collided with
Magnaye's car.
5. The award of actual damages to Magnaye and Fernandez was supported by
competent proof, while the award of attorney's fees was deleted for lack of
basis.

CHAPTER 3
1. Singapore Airlines Ltd v. CA
2. Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc v. Continental Cement Corp
3. Ngo Sin Sing v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc
4. Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. CA
5. Negros Navigation Co, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance, Corp
6. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (GR 925594)
7. Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research, Inc8. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co
9. Metro Manila Transit Corp v. CA
10. Cerezo v. Tuazon
11. Vitug, concurring opinion, Valenzuela v. CA
19. Go v. IAC
20. Martin v. CA
21. 10 Am. Jur. 105-107; 263-265
22. Dixie Motor Coach Corp v. Toler
23. Van Hoeffen v. Columbia Taxicab Co
24. Brockway v. Modenti
25. Korner v. Cosgrove
26. Maranan v. Perez citing Texas v. Monroe
27. Marchan v. Mendoza
28. Baliwag Transit v. CA
29. Campo v. Camarote
30. MMTC v. CA (GR 116617 & 126395)
31. Victory Liner v. Heirs of Malecdan
32. Francis HS v. CA
33. Imperial v. Heirs of Sps Bayaban
34. Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC (GR 75112, 1990)
35. Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC (GR 75112, 1992, MR)
36. Poblete v. Fabros
37. Cuison Norton, 55 Phil. 18
38. Cerf v. Medel (GR 10351)
39. LG Foods Corp v. Hon. Pagapong-Agraviador
40. Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa
41. Victory Liner v. Malecdan
42. MMTC v. CA (298 SCRA 495)
43. Ph Hawk Corp v. Lee
44. Lampesa v. Vera
45. Syki v. Begasa citing MMTC v. CA(298 SCRA 495)
46. Perla Compania de Seguros v. Sps Sarangaya
47. Equitable Leasing Corp v. Suyom
48. Montecalvo v. Tan (GR 241941)
49. Del Carmen Jr v. Bacoy
50. Sps Mangaron v. Hanna Via Design
51. Phil Bus Rabbit v. Phil-American Forwarders
52. Rafael Trucking v. Ppl
53. Calang v. Ppl (2010)
54. Basa Marketing Corp v. Bolinao
55. Carpio v. Doroja
56. Equitable Leasing Corp v. Suyom
57. Franco v. IAC
58. Alvarez v. CA
59. Cerezo v. Tuazon (2004)
60. Aguila v. Baldovizo (2007)
61. Chapman v. Underwood
62. Duavit v. CA
63. R Transport v. Yu (2015)
64. Lung Chea Kung Kee & Co v. Wright
65. Fontanilla v. Maliaman
66. E. Meritt v. Ph (March 21, 1916)
67. US v. Guinto
68. City of Manila v. Teotico (1968)
69. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan
70. San Fernando v. Judge Firme (1991)71. Exconde v. Capuno
72. Mercado v. CA
73. Amadora v. CA*
74. Palisoc v. Brillantes (1971)
75. Salvosa v. IAC (1988)
76. PSBA v. CA
77. Soliman Jr. v Tuazon
78. University of the East v. Jader (2000
79. De Roy v. CA (1988)

CHAPTER 4
1. Ilusorio v. CA
2. Fe Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete
3. Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company (1910)
4. Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan
5. Ylarde et. al v. Aquino
6. Menchavez et al v. Teves Jr
7. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden et al v. Reyes
8. Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co v. Phil Motors Corporation
9. Fernando et al v. CA
10.Afialda v. Hisole
11.Ilocos Norte Electric Comp v. CA
12.Rakes v. Atlantics Gulf
13.Ong v. MWD
14.Picart v. Smith
15.Mckee v. IAC
16.LBC Air Cargo et al v. CA
17.Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware v. IAC
18.Pantranco North Express Inc. v. Baesa et al
19.Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp v. CA
20.Tiu et al v. Arriesgado
21.De Roy et al v. CA
22.BPI v. Spouses Quiaoit (2019)
23.Gan v. CA (1988)
24.Valenzuela v. CA
25.Delsan Transport Lines Inc v. C&A Construction
26.Kramer v. CA (1989)
27.Franco et al v. IAC
28.Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co
29.Wildvalley Shipping v. CA
30.MMTC v. CA (1993)
31.Secosa v. Francisco (2004)
32.Rakes v. Atlantic (1907)
33.Syki v. Begasa (2003)
34.Ma-ao Sugar Central Co v. CA
35.Picart v. Smith
36.JArco Marketing Corp v. CA
37.PCIB v. CA (2001)
38.Lambert v. Castillon (2005)
39.National Transmission Corp v. De Jesus (2015)
40.Genobiagon v. CA citing Ppl v. Orbeta
41.Ramos v. COL Realty (2009)