1. Mercado v.

CA (1960)

Facts: Case involved two pupils, Augusto and Manuel, of Lourdes Catholic
School. They were classmates who had a quarrel over a pitogo (an empty nutshell
used by children as a piggybank). Augusto owned the pitogo who lend the same to
a classmate who lent it to another until it reached in the hands of Manuel. Augusto
attempted to get back the pitogo but Manual thought that it was owned by one of
their other classmate so the latter refused to give the same. Augusto did not like the
answer of Manuel and started the fight. As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr.
on the right cheek with a piece of razor. Manual and his parents sue Augusto’s
father, Ciriaco.

Augusto’s father averred that he is not liable but it is the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible since the incident of the inflicting of the wound
on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time).

Ruling: The teacher and school are not liable. The clause "so long as they remain
in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the
teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation
does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school
hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.

2. Amadora v. CA (1988) (custody is not co-terminus with the semester; as

long as the student is within the premises of the school)

Facts: Alfredo went to his school submit his physics report as a requirement for his
graduation when he was shot by one of his classmates in the auditorium. His
parents filed a claimed for damages against the College, the HS principal and the
physics teacher.

His parents averred that he was in school when he was shot so he was then under
the custody of the school. On the other hand, the school claimed that Alfredo was
only in the school to submit a report and he was no longer in their custody because
the semester had already ended. The school also allege that Art 2180 does not
apply since it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning.

Ruling: The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is
teaching.

While the custody requirement, does not mean that the student must be boarding
with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon
the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the
period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of
the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance
of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues.

The SC ruled that the school, the principal and the dean were not liable since it
should be the teacher who is liable since the latter has the direct control and
supervision of the students. The former were merely exercising general control and
were not charged with the custody of the student.

3. Sps Palisoc v. Brillantes (school is liable even during recess time)

Facts: The case involved two students, Palisoc and Daffon, students of Manila
Technical Institute. During recess time, Daffon and a classmate was working on a
machine while Palisoc was merely looking. Daffon made a comment that Palisoc
looked like a forman. Palisoc slap Daffon and thereafter exchange blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. He
fainted, never regained consciousness and died thereafter. Palisocs parents sued
Daffon, the owner and president of the school and the class instructor. The trial
court absolved the school officials.

Ruling: The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.

1. Maitim v. Agila, 218344, 3/21/22

Facts: Maitim and Aguila are neighbors. While Maitim was on board her vehicle
driven by her driver of 12 years in the common driveway, the car hit Aguila’s
daughter and dragged for about 3 meters which resulted to her right leg fracture.
The girl underwent in operation and was in wheel chair for months. Aguila filed a
claim for damages against Maitim and her driver. Maitim averred that she should
not be held vicariously liable since the vehicle was being driven with due care by
the driver and she exercise exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of her employee. RTC and CA ruled in favour of Agila.

Ruling: Maitim and Santos (driver) are liable. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
applied in the case and that Santos is presumed to be negligent yet failed to prove
otherwise.

Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses

would not result to children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a
reasonably prudent man, especially an alleged experienced driver, would have
foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit towards the common driveway
anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly run across or
along said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with
utmost caution when traversing the said driveway, even if given a "clear" signal by
a guard.

The finding of negligence against Santos gave rise to the presumption of

negligence on the part of Maitim in the latter's selection and/or supervision of the
former. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Maitim to prove that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employee, Santos. In her petition, Maitim stubbornly insists that she cannot be held
vicariously liable because she alleges that Santos has an unblemished 12-year
driving record, and that before Santos was hired, he was required to submit a
police clearance and an NBI clearance. However, she presented no evidence to
corroborate or support her bare, self-serving allegations.

2. WG&A v. Asuncion, 225975, 1/12/21

Facts: WG&A Shipping Lines, Inc. (now 2Go, Inc.) is a licensed domestic
common carrier and owner of the vessel M/V Super Ferry 1. Respondents, Spouses
Luis and Sylvia Asuncion, are the parents of Rizzie Gay Asuncion, a 17-year old
high school graduate. On February 1, 2003, Rizzie boarded Super Ferry 1 in
Manila to go to Zamboanga City. However, when the vessel arrived in Zamboanga
City, Rizzie did not disembark and was reported missing. Despite the efforts of the
respondents and the police to search the vessel, WG&A's security personnel denied
them access. Several days later, Rizzie's lifeless body was found floating in the Rio
Grande River in Cotabato City. Respondents filed a civil case against WG&A for
breach of contract of carriage and damages. WG&A insisted that it is not liable
since there is no incident report of a crime made by its employees, no proof that
crime was made on the vessel, no proof that employees were the pertrator (rape
with homicide)

Issue: The main issue in this case is whether or not WG&A is liable for damages
arising from breach of contract of carriage.
Ruling: The Court ruled in favor of the respondents and affirmed the decision of
the lower courts. WG&A failed to exercise the utmost diligence required of
common carriers and its employees exhibited indifference and lack of care towards
the respondents' concerns. The Court held that WG&A is liable for damages arising
from breach of contract of carriage and ordered it to pay civil indemnity, moral
damages, temperate damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees to the
respondents.

It is explicit under Article 1756 of the Civil Code that WG&A is presumed
negligent or at fault for Rizzie's death. After extensive review, this Court affirms
the ruling that WG&A failed to overcome this presumption. The records are replete
with badges of negligence on the part of WG&A and its employees in handling the
case of Rizzie: 1) It failed to prove policy and procedure to ensure the safety and
security of vulnerable passengers; 2) WG&A and its employees were not aware
and in control of what has happening in their own vessel; 3) WG&A relies on its
self-serving allegation that no untoward incident was reported to its officers during
the voyage; 4) failed to exercise the required extraordinary diligence for common
carriers when it did not sufficiently act on respondents' request to search for Rizzie
and investigate her disappearance

Ratio: The Court held that common carriers are duty-bound to exercise the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons in carrying their passengers safely to their
intended destination. WG&A failed to exercise the required extraordinary diligence
as a common carrier and its employees exhibited indifference and lack of care
towards the respondents' concerns. The Court also emphasized that the duty of
common carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence continues even after the
passengers have disembarked, especially in cases involving passengers' injury or
death.

3. Latonio v. McGeorge, 206184, 12/6/17

Facts: Spouses Latonio accompanied their 8-month old son Ed to a bday party at
McDonalds in Ayala Cebu. One of the respondents Lumibao was dressed as a
mascot birdie. When a photo was taken with the guest and the mascot, Mary Ann
placed Ed Christian on a chair in front of the mascot "Birdie." The mascot
positioned itself behind the child and extended its "wings" to give a good pose for
the camera. As photos were about to be taken, Mary Ann released her hold of Ed
Christian. Seconds later, the child fell head first from the chair onto the floor. Ed’s
parents sued Lumibao and the Cebu Golden Food and its licensor McGeorge Food
Industries, Inc.

The trial court held Cebu Golden Food is liable because the proximate cause of Ed
Christian's fall is the negligence of their employee, Lomibao. On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that Ed Christian's
mother, Mary Ann, is liable because the proximate cause of the child's fall was
Mary Ann's act of leaving her eight-month-old child, Ed Christian, in the "hands"
of Lomibao who was at the time wearing the Birdie mascot costume.

Ruling: The proximate cause of the injury sustained by Ed Christian was due to
Mary Ann's own negligence. It is irresponsible for a mother to entrust the safety,
even momentarily, of her eight-month-old child to a mascot, not to mention a bird
mascot in thick leather suit that had no arms to hold the child and whose
diminished ability to see, hear, feel, and move freely was readily apparent.
Moreover, by merely tapping the mascot and saying ''pa�picture ta", Mary Ann
Latonio cannot be said to have "told, informed and instructed the mascot that she
was letting the mascot hold the baby momentarily."

Here, it is beyond dispute that the cause of Ed Christian's fall is traceable to the
negligent act of Mary Ann of leaving him in the "hands" of Lomibao who was
wearing the Birdie mascot suit. We noted that "hands" and "wings" were used
interchangeably during the testimonies of the witnesses, thus, causing confusion.
However, it must be stressed that while indeed Lomibao has hands of his own, at
the time of the incident he was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. Suffice it to say that
the Birdie mascot suit have no hands but instead have wings. Lomibao cannot
possibly hold or grasp anything while wearing the thick Birdie mascot suit. In fact,
even if he wanted to hold Ed Christian or anything, he could not possibly do so
because he was wearing the Birdie mascot suit which do not even have hands or
fingers to be able to hold or grasp firmly.
4. Abrogar v. Cosmos, 164749, 3/15/17

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the
death of a participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on
the route of the race. The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor
of the marathon were guilty of negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the
proximate cause of the death of the participant; on whether the negligence of the
driver of the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether the
doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the
heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity of the latter
who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.

Rommel, son of the Abrogars, joined a marathon (10km course through public
roads and streets). Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along
the route of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A venue (DMMA for brevity).
Rommel died due to the injuries he sustained. His parents filed claims for damages
against the organizer (intergames) and sponsor (cosmos) of the marathon. Cosmos
averrment: not liable since participation is limited to providing financial assistance.
Intergames: Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively caused by the
negligence of the jeepney driver. Parents: They failed to exercise care to ensure
safety of participants: 1) participant made to run along traffic and not against it; 2)
no traffic marshall; 3) Intergames could not limit its liability on the basis of the
accident insurance policies; 4) waiver signed by Rommel could not be a basis for
denying liability because the same was null and void.

Ruling: Intergames were short of the diligence demanded by the circumstances of

persons, time and place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the organizer
was guilty of negligence.

5. Allarey v. Dela Cruz, 250919, 11/10/21

6. Dalen v. Mitsui, 194403, 7/24/19

7. QC Govt v. Dacara, 150304, 6/15/05

8. Libi v. IAC, see book

9. Tan v. Olayvar, 238175, 3/20/21

10. Toledo v. Asian Terminals, Inc, 242613, 12/9/20

11. Arcilla v. Pp, 229370, 10/5/20

12. Caravan v. Abejar, 170631, 2/10/16

13. Mangaron v. Hannah Via, 224186, 9/23/19

14. Bachelor Express v. Santos, 244132 6/17/20

15. OLLH v. Capanzana, 189218, 3/22/17

16. People v. Bayabos

171222, 2/18/15

17. SSM v. Perez, 222740, 9/28/16

18. Morales v. AMA, 249813, 3/9/20.