Assignment Week 5
February 12, 2025
Convention: In a zero-sum game, the column player maximizes their payoff, while
in a non-zero-sum game, both players aim to maximize their payoff. Additionally, the
notation used is the same as in the lectures.
1 Assignments
Question 1. Consider a multiplayer game in which each player i has a continuous
strategy set Yi ⊂ Rn (for some n ≥ 1) and a continuous cost function Ji : Yi × Y −i → R.
For any fixed opponent strategy profile y −i ∈ Y −i , the best response set for player i is
defined by
Ri (y −i ) := {y i ∈ Yi | Ji (y i , y −i ) ≤ Ji (z, y −i ) ∀ z ∈ Yi }.
Consider the following statements:
Statement A. For every i and every y −i , the set Ri (y −i ) is closed.
Statement B. If y ⋆ = (y ⋆(1) , . . . , y ⋆(n) ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game,
then for every i it holds that
Ri (y ⋆(−i) ) = {y ⋆(i) }.
(a). Statement A is True, and Statement B is True.
(b). Statement A is True, and Statement B is False.
(c). Statement A is False, and Statement B is True.
(d). Statement A is False, and Statement B is False.
Answer 1. Statement A is True, and Statement B is False.
Question 2. Consider the following (2 × 2) bimatrix game with players P1 and P2 :
(1, 2) (0, 3)
(2, 1) (−1, 0)
P1 is the row player and P2 is the column player. In each element of the matrix (x, y), x
and y are the utilities of P1 and P2 respectively. Each player tries to maximize its utility.
1
2
Find the quantal response equilibrium of the players given the quantal response function
as
Vij (σ −i )
σij = P −i
,
j∈Si Vij (σ )
where σij is the probability with which player player Pi plays strategy j, Vij is the utility
of player Pi for strategy j and Si is the strategy space of player Pi .
(a). σ11 = 12 , σ21 = 21 .
(b). σ11 = 23 , σ21 = 31 .
(c). σ12 = 12 , σ22 = 21 .
(d). σ12 = 13 , σ22 = 32 .
Answer 2. σ11 = 21 , σ21 = 12 ; σ12 = 21 , σ22 = 12 .
Question 3. Consider the following payoff matrix of a two-player game where P1 is
the row player and P2 is the column player. Here, both the players are maximizing their
payoff.
P 1\P 2 L C R
T (0,0) (7,6) (6,7)
M (6,7) (0,0) (7,6)
B (7,6) (6,7) (0,0)
Select the correct option(s).
(a). The game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
(b). The game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(c). The mixed strategy ([1/3(T ), 1/3(M ), 1/3(B)]; [1/3(L), 1/3(C), 1/3(R)]) is a Nash
equilibrium.
(d). The payoff for the pure strategy maxmin for P1 is 0 and the payoff for pure strategy
minmax for P2 is 7.
(e). None of the above.
Answer 3. : The game has a unique Nash equilibrium; The mixed strategy ([1/3(T ), 1/3(M ), 1/3(B)];
is a Nash equilibrium; The payoff for the pure strategy maxmin for P1 is 0 and the payoff
for pure strategy minmax for P2 is 7.
Question 4. Consider the following statements about the quantal response function:
Statement A. As the responsiveness of the quantal response function λ tends to −∞,
the quantal response function gives the security strategy.
Statement B. As the responsiveness of the quantal response function λ tends to ∞,
the function gives the security.
Select the correct option.
3
(a). Statement A is True, and Statement B is True.
(b). Statement A is True, and Statement B is False.
(c). Statement A is False, and Statement B is True.
(d). Statement A is False, and Statement B is False.
Answer 4. Statement A is False, and Statement B is False.
Question 5. Consider the game of matching pennies where P1 is the row player and
P2 is the column player. Both player are trying to maximize their utilities.
P1 /P2 H T
H (1, 0) (0, 3)
T (0, 2) (1, 0)
If y 2 = (0.75, 0.25), then R1 (y 2 ) is a subset in [0, 1]2 . Calculate the area of R1 (y 2 ) (up to
2 decimals).
Answer 5. 0.
Question 6. Consider the following statements about the quantal response function:
Statement A. If a pure strategy is strictly dominated, then the quantal response
function assigns zero probability to that strategy.
Statement B. Quantal response equilibrium strategy payoff is greater than the security
strategy payoff for each player.
Select the correct option.
(a). Statement A is True, and Statement B is True.
(b). Statement A is True, and Statement B is False.
(c). Statement A is False, and Statement B is True.
(d). Statement A is False, and Statement B is False.
Answer 6. Statement A is False, and Statement B is False.
Question 7. Consider the following asymmetric matching pennies game,
H T
H (x, 0) (0, 1)
T (0, 1) (1, 0)
P1 is the row player and P2 is the column player. In each element of the matrix (x, y), x
and y are the utilities of P1 and P2 respectively. Each player tries to maximize their
4
utility. Find the quantal response equilibrium of the players given the quantal response
function as
(Vij (σ −i ))λ
σij = P −i λ
j∈Si (Vij (σ ))
where σij is the probability with which player player Pi plays strategy j, Vij is the utility
of player Pi for strategy j, Si is the strategy space of player Pi and λ is the responsiveness.
Which of the following is/are true about the quantal response equilibrium?
xλ/(λ+1) 1
(a). σ11 = 1+xλ/(λ+1)
, σ21 = 1+xλ
2 /(λ+1) .
2
xλ/(λ +1) 1
(b). σ11 = 2
1+xλ/(λ +1)
, σ21 = 1+xλ
2 /(λ2 +1) .
2
xλ/(λ +1) 1
(c). σ11 = 2
1+xλ/(λ +1)
, σ12 = 2
1+xλ/(λ +1)
.
2
xλ /(λ2 +1) 1
(d). σ11 = 2 2
1+xλ /(λ +1)
, σ21 = 1+xλ
2 /(λ2 +1) .
Answer 7. (b),(c).
Question 8. When λ → ∞, the quantal response function gives a pure strategy for a
player.
(a). True.
(b). False.
Answer 8. False.
