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Justa Causa V Causation

The document discusses the differences between civil law and common law systems regarding contractual principles, particularly focusing on the concepts of 'Justa Causa' and 'consideration'. It traces the historical development of these doctrines, highlighting their significance in determining the enforceability of contracts and the role of moral obligations in both legal frameworks. The document also examines various legal cases that illustrate the application and interpretation of these concepts in Sri Lankan law.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
124 views19 pages

Justa Causa V Causation

The document discusses the differences between civil law and common law systems regarding contractual principles, particularly focusing on the concepts of 'Justa Causa' and 'consideration'. It traces the historical development of these doctrines, highlighting their significance in determining the enforceability of contracts and the role of moral obligations in both legal frameworks. The document also examines various legal cases that illustrate the application and interpretation of these concepts in Sri Lankan law.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Table of Contents

Introduction............................................................................................................................................2

Tracing the Roots of Doctrines.............................................................................................................3

Defining Legal Concepts........................................................................................................................5

Exploring the Purpose of Contractual Principles...............................................................................8

Role of Moral Obligation.......................................................................................................................8


Significance of Motive............................................................................................................................9
Adequacy isn’t Required, but Value is Essential..............................................................................10
Analysing the Role of Part Payment in a Debt.................................................................................10
Evaluating the Validity of Past Services............................................................................................11
Legality in Contractual Agreements..................................................................................................12
Conclusion............................................................................................................................................13

References.............................................................................................................................................14

1
Introduction
Within legal frameworks, civil law systems prefer to view that a contract is binding on the
concept of ‘Justa Causa’ which is used to satisfy the requirement that a serious and
deliberate promise was made. On the other hand, common law systems look at the contract
more as a bargain and hold the view that the party that desire enforcement should contribute a
material share in the contract. Therefore, English Law1 uses ‘consideration’.2 In Sri Lankan
law requires causa and not consideration. However, common law doctrine of consideration
forms an essential part of legal system in Sri Lanka.3

E.g.: - Section 12 of the Thesawalamai Pre-emption Ordinance.

Further, Civil Law Ordinance4, Sale of Goods Ordinance5, and Bills of Exchange Ordinance6
are governed by the EL.

1
hereinafter referred to as ‘EL’.
2
CG Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967) 219-220.
3
In Waharaka Investment Co. v Commissioner of Stamps (1932) 34 NLR 266, Macdonnel CJ: “Wherever the
term is used in one of our statutes, there is a strong presumption that it ought to be given the meaning it has in
English Law...”.
4
Civil Law Ordinance No. 5 of 1852.
5
Sales of Goods Ordinance No. 11 of 1896.
6
Bills of Exchange Ordinance 1927.

2
Tracing the Roots of Doctrines
According to Sir Edward Jenks, the origin of ‘consideration’ in EL can be unveil in three
aspects.

Firstly, consideration began to shape around the 16th century, though its roots can be traced to
earlier legal actions such as covenant, debt and cause. These legal actions were able to
provide remedies in the royal courts for enforcing contractual claims which consideration
became the necessary element for the enforceability of informal agreements. 7 Early on, the
doctrine was linked to the action of ‘assumpsit’ which emerged as a common law response to
the limitations of other legal systems. This allowed the plaintiff to seek remedy for non-
performance of promises where no formal covenant existed.8

Secondly, contrary to what some legal scholars have suggested, there’s little evidence that
this doctrine originated from chancery. Equity courts did eventually adopt contract law but
minimized the role of consideration by allowing ‘good’ consideration which is broader than
the ‘valuable’ consideration required by common law. So, Jenks argue that if chancery had
played a significant role in developing the doctrine, there would likely be some enduring
maxim with Chancery doctrine that reflect this. But Equity focuses on principles like ‘Equity
acts in Personam’, not ‘Equity aids man who has given consideration’. In summary, Jenks
concluded that the doctrine of consideration developed within the common law courts which
was likely influenced by economic principles and possibly by the Law Merchant rather than
by ecclesiastical or chancery doctrines.9

Thirdly, the term consideration itself became common in legal texts during the time of
Elizabeth I. Before this, the phrases like ‘quid pro quo’ were more frequently used to
describe the reciprocal nature of the agreements which consideration came to embody. He
stated like this because the term appeared in ‘Doctor and Student’ 10 a dialogue first published
in 1530. Further the legal terms used in judgements, such as consideratum est or conisaunz
found in early Year Books might be linked to consideration.11

7
Edward Jenks, History of the Doctrine of Consideration in English Law (London, C.J. Clay and Sons, 1892)
161-162.
8
Ibid., 192-208.
9
Ibid., 209-211.
10
Doctor and Student, 1n. 24; Edward Jenks, History of the Doctrine of Consideration in English Law (London,
C.J. Clay and Sons, 1892) 211-212.
11
Edward Jenks, History of the Doctrine of Consideration in English Law (London, C.J. Clay and Sons, 1892)
211-212.

3
Ultimately, he suggested it’s better to rely on the limited but concrete knowledge which
underscores the challenges in tracing the roots of this doctrine.

Meanwhile, the origin of Justa Causa is not as complicated as consideration since its origin
is closely tied to the legal traditions inherited from Roman law.

Roman law required an agreement had to fall under certain categories of contracts or pacts to
be enforceable. If an agreement did not fit these categories, it was considered as a “nude pact”
and was not actionable.12

In medieval Roman Dutch Law13, the concept of Causa evolved from these Roman legal
principles into more generalized notion applicable to contracts and promises. Unlike Roman
law, which required a specific category to make agreements enforceable, medieval scholars
sought a broader test for actionability. This search resulted the concept of Justa Causa, which
aimed to generalize and simplify the understanding of enforceable agreements.14

Grotius, a key figure in RDL, referred ‘Justa Causa’ as a specific lawful transaction from
which an obligation arises such as sale, hire or donation. This interpretation suggests that it is
concerned not just with the legality of the act itself, but also with ensuring that the transaction
has a lawful basis.15

12
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts [1919] XXVIII (7) Yale Law
Journal 624-637.
13
hereinafter referred to as ‘RDL’.
14
CG Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967) 243-245.
15
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration [1919] 36(3) South African Law Journal 245-253.

4
Defining Legal Concepts
In EL, for a contract to be valid, it must be either formally executed or supported by
consideration. If a contract lacks formal execution, then it must include consideration
provided by both parties. It must be noted that consideration is not limited to tangible acts like
giving money or performing a task. It also included forbearance, 16 suffering a loss or
detriment or assuming a new responsibility that was not bound to do previously.17 Essentially,
anything that represents a legal or economic value can constitute consideration.18

The classical definition from Currie v Misa19 states:

“A valuable consideration, in the eye of the law, may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.”20

This highlights the idea of reciprocity, which is central to the concept of consideration.
Essentially, consideration involves a mutual exchange where one party provides something of
value in return for the promise of the other party.

This was adopted by Sri Lankan Supreme court cases21

But this definition was criticized for its limitations, particularly in cases where consideration
is mutual but does not involve a direct detriment or benefit. For example, in agreements like
promises of marriage, where there might be no immediate detriment or benefit involved. 22

16
Alliance Bank v Broom (1864) 2 Dr Sm 289 ruled that the plaintiff’s forbearance to sue constituted a good
consideration. This concept is followed by a Sri Lankan case, Senanayake v Wijeyesekere (1929) 31 NLR 88,
which held that there was a valid consideration for the promissory note because the plaintiff’s agreement not to
enforce his valid claim against the bank constituted good consideration.
17
In Collins v Godefroy (1831) 1B & Ad 950, the court held that there was no valid consideration for
defendant’s promise to pay plaintiff because plaintiff merely performing his existing legal duty by attending
court as required by the subpoena. But in, Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council (1925) AC 270, the
police have gone beyond their public duty by providing specific service which constituted sufficient
consideration for the mine owner’s promise to pay because it exceeded the standard legal obligation of the
police.
18
CG Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967) 221.
19
(1875) LR 10 Ex 153.
20
Sir Jack Beatson and others, Anson's Law of Contract (29th edn, Oxford University Press, 2010) 91.
21
Umma Saloomar v Hassim (1928) 30 NLR 164; Waharaka Investment Co. Ltd. v Commissioner of Stamps
(1932) 34 NLR 266; Highland Tea Co. Ltd. v Commissioner of Stamps (1940) 41 NLR 385 at 387; Bartleet &
Co.
v Commissioner of Stamps (1939) 41 NLR 82 at 87.
22
Michael Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract (15th edn, Oxford University
5
Press, 2005) 94-97.

6
Therefore, a more modern and preferred view, affirmed by Lord Denning and others, is that
consideration can simply be the act of one party offering something in exchange for the other
party’s promise.

This was brought out through the case Dunlop v Selfridge23

“An act or forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the
promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable.”24

This highlights the notion of a bargain, where each party gives something of value in
exchange for something else, which underscores the English approach to contract law.

So, the definition in Currie25 may not cover situations where the exchange is less tangible,
whereas Dunlop26 offers a more flexible and modern approach which suits a broader range of
contracts.

On the other hand, the term Causa carried a range of meanings, which leads to confusion and
complexity in its application. It is a fundamental concept of Roman law, referring to the
reason or justification that makes the contract legally binding. The Roman legal system did
not have a unified theory of contract; instead, it operated on a case-by-case basis,
distinguishing between agreements that were actionable and those that were not, based on
specific characteristics.27

The principle of “Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio” translates to “From a bare agreement, no
action arises.” This means that an agreement without Causa is not actionable in a court of
law.28

In RDL, the idea of Justa Causa evolved with jurists offering varied interpretations. The
collective view of these jurists 29 suggests that Justa Causa is a legitimate reason or cause
that provides the legal foundation for an agreement. It is an essential element that
transforms promise into a legally binding obligation. The common thread is that the cause
must be sufficient to justify the legal enforcement, whether understood as intent, reason or
lawful cause.30

23
(1915) AC 847 at 855.
24
CG Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967) 222.
25
(1875) LR 10 Ex 153.
26
(1915) AC 847 at 855.
27
CG Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967) 243.
28
Ernest G. Lorenzen, 'Causa and Consideration' [1919] 36(3) South African Law Journal 246 and Ernest G.
7
Lorenzen, 'Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts' [1919] XXVIII (7) Yale Law Journal 624-625.
29
Grotius, Voet, Lorenz, Leeuwen, Lee, Wendt J., Walter Pereira.
30
CG Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967) 245-247.

8
The Sri Lankan case Lipton v Buchanan31 is involved in determining if there was a lawful
cause for the promise in question. Wendt J. reflecting the principles of Justa Causa
empathized that causa encompasses both motive and reason for the promise, and purely moral
considerations which is broader than the English concept of consideration. This case
reinforced the distinction between RDL causa and English consideration.

31
(1904) 8 NLR 49.

9
Exploring the Purpose of Contractual Principles
Both consideration and just causa served as the mechanisms to determine the enforceability of
contracts.

Role of Moral Obligation


In common law, a pre-existing moral obligation is generally not considered a valid
consideration. In 1782, Lord Mansfield attempt to include moral obligation in the common
law doctrine of consideration32 but this was later rejected. 33Despite modern developments and
trends that have sometimes sought to expand the scope of consideration, the principle that
“moral obligation is not consideration” remains a firm rule in EL.

This principle was upheld in Sri Lankan case of Latchime v Jamison.34 This case affirmed
that, according to the definition of the EL, a moral obligation does not suffice to create a
legally enforceable contract.35

Conversely, in RDL, moral obligation plays a significant role in the concept of Justa
Causa. It recognizes that certain promises can be enforceable based in moral obligation or
other serious and legitimate reasons, even if there’s no tangible exchange involved. This
shows that Justa Causa not only includes economic or transactional reasons but also moral
considerations.

This is affirmed in Jayawickrema v Amarasuirya36, confirmed in Privy Council.37 The Sri


Lankan courts have historically recognized and applied the concept of causa distinct from the

32
In Hawkes v Saunders (1782) 1 Cowp. 289, he proposed that if someone is under a moral obligation that
cannot be legally enforced, but still, they make a promise, the “honesty and rectitude of the thing” could serve as
a sufficient consideration.
33
In Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 9 LJQB 409, the guardian Eastwood had spent money on his ward (Sarah) and
when she came of age, both her and her husband (Kenyon) promised to repay. When guardian sued for this
promise, Lord Denman rejected the argument that a moral obligation could serve as a valid consideration to
support the promise.
34
(1931) 16 NLR 266.
35
In this case, a man left the country, leaving behind his illegitimate children. The defendant gave a promissory
note (PN) to the mother of the children to maintain them. The defendant failed to honour the PN. The court ruled
that the PN, made to fulfil a moral obligation was not enough to create a binding contract. However, the court
indicated that if the PN had been given to prevent the mother from suing the brother for maintenance
(forbearance to sue), it might have constituted a good consideration, as it would represent the valid exchange of
value.
36
(1918) 20 NLR 293, 294.
37
In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was responsible for managing the trust. The plaintiff had
threatened legal action against the defendant to compel him to perform the duties of the trust. The privy council
held that even if no legal action was taken, the defendant was still morally obliged to fulfil the terms of the trust.
This judgement underscored that in RDL, a promise made to discharge a moral duty or perform an act of
generosity could be legally enforceable, even if it would not constitute valid consideration under English Law.
10
English notion of consideration, which reinforces that the form and seriousness of the
promise could fulfil the requirements of causa.38

Moreover, recent cases in Sri Lanka also plays a major role in highlighting the importance of
Justa Causa in RDL, which allows a contract to be upheld even without consideration, if
there’s a lawful reason for the agreement. Those cases are, Indian Bank v Acuity Stockbrokers
(Pvt) Ltd.,39 Pingamage v Pingamage and Others40, John Cyril Fernando v Samuel Vivendra
Eliyatambi41 and Muruthawalage Chandrarathne v Sri Lanka Insurance Coporation
Limited.42

From the above comparison, moral obligation used in RDL is considered subjective, while
consideration is viewed as essentially objective.

Significance of Motive
Consideration refers to something of economic value exchanged between parties in a contract
which is essential for the formation of a valid contract. Motive on the other hand is a personal
or psychological reason behind the party’s decision to enter a contract. In EL, motive does
not have any legal bearing on the enforceability of a contract as it does not satisfy the
legal requirements for consideration.43 In Sri Lankan context this is applied in the previously
mentioned case44, which stated by Lascelles CJ, “…. mere motive such as a moral obligation
is not valuable consideration”.

38
Muttu Carpen Chetty v Copper (1888) 1 CL Rep 11; Lipton v Buchanan (1904)8 NLR 49; Abeyesekere v
Gunesekere (1918) 5 CWR 242; Weerakoon v Hewamallika CA (SC) 371/67(F).
39
(SC Appeal No.11/2001(CHC)) which was decided on 2011 by SC, concluded that Acuity Stockbrokers had
breached the undertaking by not informing the Indian Bank of the new arrangement and by failing to ensure that
the sale proceeds of the shares were credited to Sivasubramaniam’s account at the Indian Bank. The SC agreed
with the Indian bank, ruling that RDL which does not require consideration in the same way as English Law
does, was applicable.
40
(2005) 2 Sri LR. The court upheld the validity of the deed, emphasizing under RDL, which highlighted the
lack of consideration does not invalidate a deed if there is Justa Causa.
41
SC/Appeal No. 120/2014, which was decided on 2021, the court did not find sufficient evidence to prove that
the consideration was adequate or not paid. The presence of a valid power of attorney and the plaintiff’s
subsequent actions provided Justa Causa for the sale, supporting the validity of the transaction.
42
SC (CHC)Appeal No.18/2008 which was decided on 2017, the court cited previous decisions Hatton National
bank Ltd. v Helenluc Garments Ltd., where the wavier of prescription was upheld in Sri Lankan law, which is
influenced by Roman Dutch principles, even without consideration. This further underscore how RDL departs
from the strict necessity of consideration in English law.
43
In Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851, the executors of the will agreed to let the widow live in a house for a
nominal rent of £1 rent per year. Here the motive was to honour the husband’s wishes, but the consideration that
made the agreement enforceable was the rent.
11
44
Latchime v Jamison (1931) 16 NLR 266.

12
On the contrary, in Justa Causa motive is indeed be considered when determining whether
a promise or contract is legally enforceable. This methodology is applied in Sri Lankan
case law Public Trustee v Udurawana.45

So, consideration acts as an external requirement for contract validity, focusing on whether
something value has exchanged which creates a rigid framework with anomalies. In contrast
causa focuses on the internal content of the contractual intention, emphasizing the reason or
motive behind the promise, which allows broader interpretations accommodating moral and
generous intentions.

Adequacy isn’t Required, but Value is Essential.


This means, while consideration must have some value in the eyes of law, it does not have
to be equal value to the promise it supports. So, the courts are more concerned with the
existence of consideration rather than its fairness or equivalence in value. In Chappell & Co
Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd,46the court held wrappers constituted valid consideration in the context of
the contract.

This notion is affirmed in the Sri Lankan case Assen Cutty v Brooke Bond Ltd47

Exceptions for this concept are same nature considerations48, evidence of fraud49, and denying
specific performance of a contract.50

Analysing the Role of Part Payment in a Debt.


A promise to accept a part payment of debt is not considered a valid consideration for
releasing the remainder of the debt. This rule exists because the debtor is already obliged to

45
(1949) 51 NLR 193. In this case, a promise to made discharge a moral duty or out of generosity could be
enforced under RDL. This decision highlighted that causa encompasses a wider range of motives than English
consideration.
46
(1960) AC 87.
47
(1934) 36 NLR 169, the court emphasized that the consideration, while not necessarily equal in value to what
receive must have an economic worth.
48
Williston highlights an exception where consideration is of the same nature as promise, such as exchange of
money as a promise to pay money. In such cases inadequate consideration for example, one dollar for hundred
dollars, does not suffice because it does not represent a true exchange.
49
Lord Eldon remarked, if the consideration is so inadequate that it “shocks the conscience,” it may suggest
fraudulent intent.
50
Inadequate consideration can also be a reason for denying specific performance of a contract, especially if it
appears that the parties did not negotiate with equal understanding of the contract’s value.

13
pay the full amount, and paying part of it does not provide a new value or detriment to the
creditors.51

This Rule in Pinnel’s case is heavily criticized for rigid and sometimes unjust outcomes,
leading to near absurdities, especially in a situation where a lesser payment would reasonably
satisfy the parties’ agreement.

Promissory Estoppel, developed in the case Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Tree
House Ltd52offers a remedy for this rule and allows a party to enforce a promise even without
consideration, provided the promisee has relied on the promise to their detriment. 53

It is crucial to underscore that in Justa causa, the Sri Lankan case Edward v De Silva54
provides further insight to this application. This case illustrates that a promise to fulfil a moral
obligation, paying a portion of a statute-barred debt can be enforceable under RDL,
provided that the promise acts with intention and seriousness. This highlights Justa Causa
sharply contrast with Pinnel’s rule and aligns with the Promissory Estoppel which provides a
flexible approach.

Evaluating the Validity of Past Services


According to EL, Past consideration is generally not considered valid consideration in
law. Consideration must be contemporaneous with the promise, meaning it should be given in
exchange for the promise at the time of contract formation. 55 This is followed in Sri Lankan
context as well.56

Exception to this concept is Section 27 of Bills of Exchange Ordinance 1927,


acknowledgement of a time barred debt, and past consideration given at the request of the
promisor.57

But it is of outmost importance to note that, in Justa Causa, straight away, a promise made in
consideration in past services can be enforceable. It reflects the understanding that such
promises are valid when they acknowledge and reward previous contributions, even if the

51
The rule stem from Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co R117, which established that part payment of a due date is not
sufficient consideration to discharge the entire debt unless there is some additional benefit or difference in the
agreement.
52
(1947) KB 130.
53
Lord Denning’s ruiling in the High Tree emphasized that where a creditor has led the debtor to believe that
they will accept less than what is owed, and the debtor has acted on that belief, so the creditor has estopped from
insisting on the full debt.
54
(1945) 46 NLR 510 at 512.
55
Re McArdle (1951) Ch 669; Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 9 LJQB 409.
56
Salmon v Obias (1918) 21 NLR 410; Vyramuttu v Suduappu (1931) 17 NLR 13.
14
57
Lampleigh v Braithwait (1616) Hob 105; Sri Lankan case Umma Saloomar v Hassim (1928) 42 NLR 30.

15
consideration is not contemporaneous with the promise. This concept is applied and followed
in Sri Lankan cases.58

Legality in Contractual Agreements.


Both legal systems consider about the legality of the contract. In consideration, counter
promise or act for the promise which it brought must not be illegal. 59 Same goes with Justa
Causa, if the grounds of a promise are illegal or immoral, then causa is redundant.

58
Public Trustee v Udurawana (1949) 51 NLR 193; Jayawickreme v Amarasuriya (1918) 20 NLR 259; Edward
v De Silva (1945) 46 NLR 510 at 512.
59
Perera v Crusze (1916) 19 NLR 349; Bastiampillai v Rasalingam (1936) 38 NLR 89.

16
Conclusion
The concepts of EL and RDL, represents two distinct approaches to determine the
enforceability of contracts. While consideration accounts on something of value exchanged,
Justa Causa counts on serious and deliberate reasons with moral obligations and motives. In
Sri Lanka, though the broad doctrine of Justa Causa plays a major role, Consideration makes
appearance in certain areas in our law. Therefore, understanding the similarities and
differences of them, provides a deeper insight into the application of those different legal
frameworks.

17
References
Primary Sources

Statutes/Statutory Instruments

1. Bills of Exchange Ordinance 1927.


2. Civil Law Ordinance 5 of 1852.
3. Sale of Goods Ordinance No 11 of 1896.
4. Thesawalamai Pre-emption Ordinance 59 of 1947.

Case Laws

1. Abeyesekere v Gunesekere (1918) 5 CWR 242.


2. Alliance Bank v Broom (1864) 2 Dr & Sm 289.
3. Assen Cutty v Brooke Bond Ltd (1934) 36 NLR 169.
4. Bartleet & Co. v Commissioner of Stamps (1939) 41 NLR 82 at 87.
5. Bastiampillai v Rasalingam (1936) 38 NLR 89.
6. Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Tree House Ltd (1947) KB 130.
7. Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd (1960) AC 87.
8. Collins v Godefroy (1831) 1 B & Ad 950.
9. Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153.
10. Dunlop v Selfridge (1915) AC 847 at 855.
11. Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 9 LJQB 409.
12. Edward v De Silva (1945) 46 NLR 510 at 512.
13. Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council (1925) AC 270.
14. Hawkes v Saunders (1782) 1 Cowp. 289.
15. Highland Tea Co. Ltd. v Commissioner of Stamps (1940) 41 NLR 385 at 387.
16. Indian Bank v Acuity Stockbrokers (Pvt) Ltd. (SC Appeal No.11/2001(CHC)).
17. Jayawickreme v Amarasuriya (1918) 20 NLR 259.
18. John Cyril Fernando v Samuel Vivendra Eliyatambi SC/Appeal No. 120/2014.
19. Lampleigh v Braithwait (1616) Hob 105.
20. Latchime v Jamison (1931) 16 NLR 266.
21. Lipton v Buchanan (1904) 8 NLR 49.
22. Muruthawalage Chandrarathne v Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation Limited SC
(CHC)Appeal No.18/2008.

18
23. Muttu Carpen Chetty v Copper (1888) 1 CL Rep 11.
24. Perera v Crusze (1916) 19 NLR 349.
25. Pingamage v Pingamage and Others (2005) 2 Sri LR.
26. Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co R117.
27. Public Trustee v Udurawana (1949) 51 NLR 193.
28. Re McArdle (1951) Ch 669.
29. Salmon v Obias (1918) 21 NLR 410.
30. Senanayake v Wijeyesekere (1929) 31 NLR 88.
31. Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851.
32. Umma Saloomar v Hassim (1928) 30 NLR 164.
33. Vyramuttu v Suduappu (1931) 17 NLR 13.
34. Waharaka Investment Co. v Commissioner of Stamps (1932) 34 NLR 266.
35. Weerakoon v Hewamallika CA (SC) 371/67(F).

Secondary Sources

Books

1. Furmston Michael, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract (15th edn, Oxford
University Press, 2005).
2. Jenks Edward, History of the Doctrine of Consideration in English Law (London, C.J.
Clay and Sons, 1892).
3. Sir Beatson Jack and others, Anson's Law of Contract (29th edn, Oxford University
Press, 2010).
4. Weeramantry CG, The Law of Contracts Vol I (HW Cave & CoLtd, 1967).

Journals

1. Lorenzen EG, Causa and Consideration [1919] 36(3) South African Law Journal.
2. Lorenzen EG, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts [1919] XXVIII
(7) Yale Law Journal.

19

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