Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of
the respondent Judge, dated 10 December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay support
pendente lite to private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same
respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in
the action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion
to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing and trying the case.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City,
presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. This case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed
with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for
concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On
14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending
a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case
for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered
The payment of support pendente lite.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be
suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private
respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended party shall have
instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as
contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed:

(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the
same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered. . . .

The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's

position that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for
concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to
await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this position
is this Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1

Petitioner's contention is not correct.

In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legal
separation would be proper if an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on
Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to wit:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by
law, the following rules shall he observed:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;

(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)

The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to
be suspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as,
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed
out by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:

The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et
al., L-11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec. 1,
of then Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found,
until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. (Emphasis supplied)

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to
"civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c),
Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but
is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the
contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code."2

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before
the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal
separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.

Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao 4 has been modified,
as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and
had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be
established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been
reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been
uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.5

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as
we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in
ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same. 7

Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as
the grant of support pendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the
case, are taken by the petitioner as a disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines,
thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.

Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a

case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground
to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality.
This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to
be sound and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.