I-35W Bridge Collapse

Organization: University Of Manchester

Name: Philip Mandalios Student No: 7501094 Date: 16th November 2009

Contents

Abstract Introduction Incident Investigation Findings Conclusion References

Page 3 Page 3 Page 4 Page 4 Page 4 Page 6 Page 7

Abstract
The I-35W Mississippi River bridge (officially known as Bridge 9340) was an eight-lane, steel truss arch bridge that carried Interstate 35W across the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota, United States. The bridge consists of approach spans consisting of stringers, and a 3-span deck truss over the river. The bridge collapsed during the evening rush hour on August 1, 2007. It fell into the river, killing thirteen people and injuring 145. The bridge was carrying 140,000 vehicles daily, making it Minnesota's fifth busiest bridge. The length of the bridge reached 580 meters, it had a width reaching 34.5 m and its roadway deck was 35 meters above the river. The primary cause of the collapse was a design error that went buy unnoticed 40 years. The error was that the gusset plates used were too thin. The responsibility falls on to the Transportation Department of Minnesota that conducted yearly investigations, but still deemed the bridge was safe enough to operate.

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to describe and analyze the events that occurred before during and after the collapse of the I-35W Mississippi River Bridge. Thus it will examine the causes of the Bridges collapse and their importance. This report will also attempt to place responsibilities to the involved bodies. The I-35W Mississippi River bridge has been designed by Sverdrup & Parcel following the standard and specifications of 1961. The construction contracts were taken by Hurcon Inc. and Industrial Construction Company, which at the time were worth 5.2 million U.S dollars. Construction began in 1964 and the bridge opened to traffic in 1967. Since 1993, the bridge was annually inspected by the Transportation Department of Minnesota, in 2007 no inspection report has been completed due to the construction work. In reports done before the collapse, problems had been cited with the bridge structure. Two engineering reports, one by University of Minnesota Civil Engineering Department in 2001, and the other by the URS Corporation in 2006 attempted to explain faults discovered in the field inspections made by The Minnesota Department of Transportation for over 30 years. In 1990 the federal government gave the I-35W Bridge a rating of "structurally deficient," due to significant corrosion. By 2007 75,000 other bridges in the U.S had this classification. The National Bridge Inventory contains a report on this bridge from 2003. It reports the following items: Deck Condition: Fair. Superstructure Condition: Poor. Substructure Condition: Satisfactory. Scour: Foundations determined to be stable. Bridge Railings: Meets currently acceptable standards. Structural Evaluation: Meets minimum tolerable limits to be left in place as-is.

Water Adequacy Evaluation: Superior to present desirable criteria. Bridge Sufficiency Rating: 50%

Furthermore the I-35W Bridge was remodelled three times after it was completed. The first was in 1977, where the deck was milled, and then new concrete was poured on the roadway. The second renovation was in 1998. The railings were replaced, allowing 8 lanes of traffic to flow over the bridge and the addition of an anti-ice system. The final renovation was underway in 2007 at the time of the accident. This project was to make a number of repairs, with the major work being removal and replacement of the top two inches of concrete on the roadway.

Incident
On the 1st of August, 2007, 5 minutes past 6 in the evening the 40-year old bridge collapsed into the river and its banks without warning, killing 13 and injuring 145 others. When the incident occurred, there were approximately 120 vehicles on the bridge, carrying 160 people, including 18 construction workers. Due to the impact of the fall the bridge broke into multiple planes of steel and crushed concrete. The vehicles that were on the bridge, included cars, buses and trucks, after the collapse they were found resting along guardrails, unprotected edges, crashed into other vehicles, in the muddy river bank, or in the river. The day after The Mayor and Governor declared the city of Minneapolis and the state of Minnesota being in a state of emergency. Rybak's declaration was approved and extended indefinitely by the Minneapolis City Council the next day. As of the morning following the collapse, according to White House Press Secretary Tony Snow, Minnesota had not requested a federal disaster declaration. At this point the priority was to rescue the people trapped inside their vehicles, under debris or in the river this includes giving them first aid at the site and then having transport ready to move them to hospitals in the area. In the rescue and recovery operations Seventy-five local, state and federal agencies were involved which include the United States Department of Defense, the United States Coast Guard, the Navies Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit, the Underwater Search Evidence Response Team from the FBI and many others including volunteers. It took 3 weeks to recover all victims after which The Minnesota Department of Transportation employed Carl Bolander & Sons, an earthworks and demolition contractor to remove the collapsed bridge and demolish the remaining spans that did not fall.

Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board began a comprehensive investigation immediately after the collapse, which was expected to take up to eighteen months to complete. With the engineering firm Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc. providing engineering analysis know-how. During the investigations the site was treated like a crime scene, this is indicated by the fact that cameras and motion detectors were installed. It is also worth mentioning that an employee of the NTSB had written his doctoral thesis on possible failure scenarios of this specific bridge while he was a student at the nearby University of Minnesota, his thesis including the computer model of the bridge he developed 4

were used investigation.

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Findings
On November 13, 2008, the findings of the NTSB investigation were released. The primary cause for the bridges collapse was the fact that the gusset plates were 50% too thin to meet the design requirements. The figures below show the gusset plates were over loaded and by how much. The second that contributed to the collapse was fact that 2 inches (51 mm) of concrete were added to the road surface over the years, thus dead load increased by 20%. And thirdly at the time of the bridges collapse, construction equipment and material were resting on the bridge just above its weakest point. That load was estimated at 578,000 pounds (262,000 kg) consisting of sand, water, and vehicles. It might also seem surprising that corrosion was not a significant factor to the collapse. GUSSET PLATE GUSSET PLATE

GUSSET PLATE BULCKING

Although this point in not a direct consequence of the I-35W Bridge Collapse it is applicable. Today bridge engineers design bridges so that if any single component of the bridge fails it will not cause the entire bridge to collapse. If this

design technique was implemented a few years earlier the collapse would not have happened.

Conclusion
Firstly it can be concluded that there were signs and warnings indicating that the bridge was going to collapse, some were known prior to the collapse and some were acknowledged after the collapse. Nevertheless the bridge had a very poor safety rating but due to negligence of the Transportation Department of Minnesota no action had been taken to avoid the consequences that followed thus the Transportation Department of Minnesota can be held largely responsible. It can also be said that the Transportation Department of Minnesota did not utilize the expert advice available regarding the condition of the bridge. Furthermore the fact the design mistake existed and passed unnoticed or at least was noticed but not enough for action to be taken shows that inspection procedures and techniques have to be revised. Responsibility also falls upon both the draftsman that designed the bridge and project engineer that reviewed the design for using gusset plates that were undersized. Nevertheless it is through mistakes like these, through which we develop and move forward. Every mistake has lessons to be taught, its up to us to give them their attention and learn from them.

Reference
BBC NEWS,2006. In pictures Minneapolis bridge. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_pictures/6928804.stm John A. Weeks.2007.I-35W Bridge Collapse. Available at: http://www.johnweeks.com/i35w/i35wdetail.html Minnesota News,2009. State sues firm for $37 million in 35W bridge collapse.Available at: 6

http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/07/31/state-sues-35w-bridgeconsultant/ Wikipedia,2007. I-35W Mississippi River bridge. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I35w_bridge_collapse Bill Kallman,2007. I 35W Bridge Collapse Investigation Available at: http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474977114728 Minnesota News, 2009. Lessons learned from the 35W bridge collapse. Available at: http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/07/30/bridgelessonslearned/ Federal Highway Administration, 2008. Adequacy of the U10 & L11 Gusset Plate Designs for the Minnesota Bridge No. 9340. Available at: http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/pdfs/ntsb_design_adequacy_report.pdf U.S Department of Homeland Security,2007. I-35W Bridge Collapse and Response. Available at: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr_166.pdf